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Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

ISSUED QUARTERLY

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VOL. XXXII

OCTOBER, 1921, JANUARY, APRIL, AND JULY, 1922

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Rumford Press, Concord, N. H.
James H. Tufts, The University of Chicago
London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

1922

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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VOL. XXXII OCTOBER, 1921 NO. 1

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Published for the Editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager
London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

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JOURNAL OF ETHICS

OCTOBER, 1921

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY.

B. M. LAING.

THE question of sovereignty is receiving at the moment increasing attention, and the idea of the "sovereign state" is being attacked. In the criticisms, however, which are being directed against it there are certain relevant points which have not been sufficiently emphasised and to which it is the aim of this paper to call attention. It is not thereby implied that what may be called the traditional view of sovereignty is theoretically satisfactory; it seems indeed necessary to maintain that the traditional conception is no longer a true expression of fact. Political fact is derivative in its nature, being the outcome of a very complex mass of various kinds of forces—physical, biological, psychological, and especially economic. Discussions on sovereignty have probably not sufficiently recognised this conditioned character of political fact; and, in consequence, the tendency seems to be to treat the problem of sovereignty as if it were merely a question of the relation between the state and subordinate social groupings. That is probably how the problem first begins to be felt; but to stop with such an opposition leads only to emphasis being put upon the group as against the traditional state, or upon the need of a "synthesis" or "integration" of the groups in a larger group. That does not effect any very vital solution, any more than did the former controversy of "man versus the state." It may be that the question whether the groups

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should each be sovereign, or whether the state should be shorn of its sovereign powers, is not the question of primary importance. It may be that that is only a question of organisation, a question of method; while the primary question is, what necessitates an organisation of such and such a kind? That means that it is essential to know what is being aimed at in the reorganisation, what is the task that has been set for solution, what has given rise to these tasks or problems? If the political problem is one concerning the relation between the state and social organisations or groups, that implies an opposition between them; and it is necessary to know the cause of the opposition. If the state is condemned in favour of the minor groups, why is this condemnation passed on it? Is it because of the inadequacy of its aims? It may be, as Professor Laski says, that "in the England before the war the ideal of the trade-unions was a wider ideal than that which the state had attained,"[1] but was it an ideal to which they could give effect? It is advisable to put the question in this particular form, because it serves to bring out a difficulty which probably constitutes the problem of sovereignty. It is impossible to put much value upon an ideal which is not realisable; and doubt may be expressed whether the trade-unions were capable of giving effect to their ideal. It may also be that what prevented them from doing so, what set limitations upon their capacity is what moulds the state and necessitates its character. Only, the statesman who acts on behalf of the state feels himself directly limited as to what he can do, because he is face to face with the real forces at work, while the trade-unions are not up against these real forces and consequently tend to regard the state as the real obstacle, since it is the state with which they come into contact.

Now the idea to be put forward here is that the political organisation rests upon, and is conditioned by, various factors or forces of a non-political nature; that they are

[1] Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, p. 15.

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impersonal, but not merely psychological, and are capable of scientific treatment; and that only by a scientific knowledge of these forces and a scientific control of their operation is it possible to solve the problem of sovereignty in the sense of a problem concerning the relation between the state and subordinate organisations. The aim at present is only to suggest that this is the best line of solution; and no attempt is to be made to analyse these forces or even to specify their nature. That is probably not the task of political theory. The latter may utilise such results when, and if, they are accomplished by the sciences they more directly concern. What is to be done here is to elaborate the suggested idea by a consideration of various points, first, the traditional view of sovereignty and its inadequacy; second, historical aspects of the relation between state and subordinate organisations; third, conclusions from these facts and their significance for the question of sovereignty.

I. What may be called the traditional view of sovereignty gradually took shape with the rise of the modern unitary state and was in its origin influenced by Roman ideas. That view regards the state as one and supreme; this supremacy is its sovereignty; and the characteristics of sovereignty are indivisibility, inalienability, and illimitability. The theories of Hobbes and Rousseau may differ as to how this sovereignty is exercised and as to who exercises it, but they agree as to the qualities attaching to a sovereign power and as to sovereignty being an attribute of the state. Such sovereignty signifies, in practice, authority and control over individuals and over organisations or associations. The existence of the latter may even be regarded as incompatible with, or as inimical to the sovereignty of the state, as by Hobbes and Rousseau. The state will in practice prevent any minor organisation, for instance a labour organisation, from usurping or encroaching upon its supremacy or sovereign powers. It stands, or claims to stand, and is asserted to stand in a unique relation to all other forms of social organisations; all the latter are equally

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—or should be and are believed to be—subordinate to it, while it itself is not subordinate to any other body. To be subordinate to another state or to some international body would mean a deprivation of sovereignty—a difficulty which lies at the root of such a body as the League of Nations. The sovereignty of the state has, accordingly, two aspects—internal and external. Its external aspect is expressed in the form of treaties and agreements or conventions, in the maintenance of prestige, and in the possession of force—an army or navy or both—to secure its claims. Its internal aspect is its relation to minor associations and to its individual members; this aspect appears in the form of law; the relation is maintained through the enforcement of law and through the maintenance of a type of order which is called a political order.

Such, in very general terms, is the character of the state, though such a characterisation, in view of what the state at the present time does, and in view of the nature of other social organisations, is admittedly inadequate. It is inadequate because the state has, in recent times, undertaken many other tasks than those of making and enforcing law and of defence against attack; it attends, for instance, to the national health and to education, to the poor and the aged, to unemployment and other industrial matters; and recently it has claimed the fixing of prices as one of its sovereign functions. It is inadequate, too, because other social organisations or groups make rules and enforce them, even by fines; for instance, clubs, unions, boroughs; so that these are law-making and law-enforcing bodies, and the state is not uniquely *the* law-making and law-enforcing body. What, however, is distinctive of the state is its sovereignty, its claim to supremacy; to its decisions there attach a finality and an indisputability which do not attach to the decisions of any other organisation; and this supremacy appears in the control which it exercises over the rules or by-laws of its subordinate organisations and in the redress offered in the law-courts to individuals who feel themselves wronged at the hands of their associations or unions. State

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laws or political laws are ultimate; it is they which finally influence the decisions of the law-courts, and law-courts are organs of the state.

It is the "sovereign state" implied in this theory that is being attacked. The unitary character of that state is maintained to be much too simple. In modern times the state has become something quite distinct from other associations, that is, in practice, though it has not always been given due recognition in theory. In more general terms the distinction is one between state and society, the latter meaning the different associations into which the individual citizens may enter. The significance of this distinction (in some quarters not very freely admitted) and the problems arising from it have not been clearly appreciated. There has arisen the question of the nature of the relation between the state and subordinate organisations, between the state and the individual and between the state and classes of individuals. It is the nature of this relation that constitutes the problem of sovereignty—a problem which did not arise where the distinction between state and individual or class of individuals, between state and society was not keenly felt. But the distinction leads to a still more important question—namely that concerning the factors or forces, which condition and determine the state. Once a distinction is made between state and society, what becomes of very great importance for the problem of sovereignty is the location and nature of the forces which move and fashion the political mechanism. It has been held by some that the state is that which is present in, and animates, the individual and social groups as its parts or organs; but the facts make it more probable that social organisations animate the state. It is necessary to ask whether the state is such an organisation as has within itself its own motive power, or whether it draws that power, draws its sustenance—in the physical sense of material to carry on its activities as well as in a spiritual sense of aim or purpose—from the social organisations and the conditions on which they rest. What is the relation between political

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forces and social forces, or the forces which make themselves felt in the life of the social individual?

It may be said with truth that there is no social force, no social movement, and no social question which may not very easily become a political force, movement, or question. A strike generally regarded as a purely economic weapon has been seen to assume a political character. The demands of Labour, at first giving rise to an economic movement, have come to express themselves politically. The fixing of prices, which has been held to be purely a matter of economic adjustment, has recently been declared to be a "sovereign function of Parliament," and attempts on the part of Labour to influence prices have been interpreted as having political significance. These are only a few instances of how the sphere of what has political significance varies. It is here that the root of one of the objections to the modern sovereign state is found. The state is claiming to be or attempting to be "omnicompetent," and objection is taken to this omnicompetence. It claims to be, or attempts to be, all-inclusive. This all-inclusiveness and omnicompetence are characteristics of the sovereign state, which claims to include the whole of the individual and exercises compulsion upon him to do what it wants him to do. Against this it is argued that the state cannot be sovereign, because it cannot be all-inclusive and omnicompetent. All these attributes stand or fall together. To come to a decision, however, concerning the full implications of such an argument by mere abstract considerations is impossible. It seems sometimes to be believed that the state is always the creature that is all-absorbing, that is always claiming to be all-inclusive. What is necessary is to understand how the state has come to have that apparent character of all-inclusiveness and omnicompetence. What an appeal to the facts is likely to show is that the state is continually adjusting itself to the demands being made upon it, that the characters of all-inclusiveness and omnicompetence arise from the means which it is compelled to adopt—if it is to meet these demands. Capital and Labour

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alike have appealed to the state, asking that it, not they, shall "solve" some problem.

What is the significance of this for political theory? To give reality to the latter it is necessary to consider the state in relation to its conditions. Political science cannot deal with the state in the abstract and at the same time expect to reach a sound view of the nature of the state. That will lead to, as it has led to, a purely formal doctrine of sovereignty. Theory has concerned itself with the sovereignty of King and Parliament, with the sovereignty of the people, with questions of franchise and of representation, of making representation more representative, with forms of government such as monarchy, autocracy, democracy and so on. In the meantime the sovereignty of the people and the representative character of government have been declared illusions and contemptuously rejected. Democracy has been called an empty form; and it may be so; and it may be that parliament is only an institution that is retained because its imprimatur is necessary to legalise, or to give legal form to, conditions forced upon it. Hence political theory may easily become formal through viewing the state in an abstract and static manner, through dealing with institutions that are sovereign only in form or name, and with the means of exercising sovereignty that are only formal. To avoid this it is necessary to take into account the conditions and presuppositions of the state. This method will bring political theory into relation with the different forces that operate both in and through society—physical or natural on the one hand, psychological and economic on the other, and hence into relation with the other sciences. The result is likely to be that the state in itself has little motive-power that is distinctively political, that that motive-power is non-political in origin.

II. The distinction between state and society is one which is not found at all historical levels of social evolution, but at the present level it is recognised in everyday experience and in common speech; and history confirms the reality of the distinction. History shows that the state as

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it is known to us has not always existed; it has come to be what it is through a conflict with other social organisations; and it has emerged from a type of social life in which it cannot be said to have existed at all. It is possible to trace the conditions which led to such an emergence, to trace the process whereby the earlier and simpler organisation became transformed into that of a political type; whereby aspects of human life, which were not absorbed by the evolving state and carried along with it in its evolution became centred in minor social groups; whereby some of these groups, though offshoots, as it were, from the development of the state, seemed at times to threaten the state; and whereby the state extended its own sway, overthrew possible rivals, or else built them into its own organisation, even though they had a more ancient lineage than itself. The sovereign state is a thing of evolution; it can be seen in the making; there was a time when there was social life without a state, though it was a time when man's life was simple and one organisation was capable of providing for all man's needs. As against abstract à priori views of the state and its functions, history shows what the state actually does, what functions it has been led to undertake, and the causes or factors which have led to its development and to its assuming certain tasks. This does not mean an admission that the historical treatment of the state alone is sufficient; but in history we come into touch with the conditions on which the state rests, and which mould it and move it. To understand fully, however, their mode of operation it is necessary to go beyond history and to find an analysis of these conditions. History may show that the state is not a mystical Idea developing in history, that it is not creative, that it is rather a product of constant adjustment to forces of various kinds, and there is no reason to regard it as at any time a perfect adjustment, for that would imply that man possessed a full and accurate knowledge of the causal operation of the factors to which the state had to adjust itself; it cannot be granted that even now such knowledge is possessed. Yet it is such knowledge that constitutes an

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indispensable means to a solution of the problem of the relation between the state and social organisations, and without such knowledge it is practically useless to attempt a rearrangement of groups. In the absence of accurate knowledge of the conditions, there is no surety that the old causes will not lead to eruptions as of old.

The state first begins in an effort to effect an organisation capable of undertaking the tasks of the old kinship organisation, as well as additional tasks arising out of fresh conditions and leading to the breakdown of the old group on account of its inability to deal with them. This inability was due to the principles on which the group was based or which held it together. The fresh conditions were due to man's growing power over nature—the development of agriculture, of arts and crafts, of trade and commerce—accompanied by increasing population and wars of conquest. These constitute the type of forces which fashion the type of social organisation,—the state as well as other types. Out of them arise problems which man seeks to solve by evolving some kind of group organisation. The influence of such forces in moulding the type of social organisation can be seen in Greece, Rome, The Feudal State, the Mediæval City-State, and the Modern State.

The long history of Rome shows a very varying and a very complex political life. It is she who evolved the conception of sovereignty which is more or less that accepted in modern times. The development and expansion of Rome depended upon one important condition, and that was the Roman conception of the state as a public thing, as a kind of corporation having common property and rights. It was not the property of any one person, nor was it divisible amongst a number of individuals; it could not be broken up and shared out. It was one and indivisible; and even the Emperors retained this conception. In virtue of this the state could grow and expand, being free from the constant divisions to which the Feudal monarchs subjected their kingdoms. What, however, is of more direct importance here is the development of the idea of sovereignty. Such an

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idea rests upon the idea of unity; and it was in virtue of the Roman idea of the state that the idea of sovereignty could evolve in association with it. Where the sense of unity is lacking the basis for sovereignty is wanting; and where the unity comes to be or requires to be more and more emphasised sovereignty is being emphasised and exercised, and that means domination. That was what came about in Rome; and it was necessitated by social conditions.

The Roman mind was pre-eminently practical. Roman expansion proceeded at first not by way of domination, but by way largely of treaty or convention whereby conquered cities and peoples came within a kind of confederate union. The social structure and the political and religious prejudices of the conquered were respected; and no attempt was made to secure uniformity by imposing the Roman social structure and Roman law, custom and religion. The extension of Roman citizenship, as a result of the demand of the cities and people themselves raised the problem of their relation to Rome; and Rome met it by means of the idea of a municipality. She made the latter a unit in her system of government, carving out wherever it was possible new municipalities in freshly conquered territory. In this way she was able to reconcile the sovereignty of the state with a considerable degree of local autonomy and of freedom of association; she showed how a decentralisation of powers could be effected over a large area while yet unity could be secured. The sovereignty of the state was there, but it was not emphasised as the unity was not emphasised; and in consequence there was no opposition between the state and its subordinate parts. But Rome ignored or was ignorant of the operation of the factors which lay at the foundation of her social life. The building up of her great organisation created agricultural and financial chaos throughout her boundaries. Under the stress of conditions—economic and social—the Central Authority is compelled to interfere both in its own interests and in those of its municipalities. More and more does power pass from the municipalities into the hands of that Authority and become exercised directly

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by it or its agents. The autonomy of the cities is invaded by state officials; in time their liberty disappears and they fall into decay; and all is done for the sake of order and the safety of the state. The latter, to save itself, has to sacrifice its constituents, and unity is asserted at the expense of the different parts. Not merely is this the case with the municipalities, but the same fate befalls all forms of association. Associations had existed freely down to 64 B. C.; but the changed social conditions react on them and bring them into conflict with the Central Authority. They are subjected to harsh treatment, are saddled with heavy burdens, lose their freedom, and gradually decay. The unity characteristic of the state, at first not marked on account of the existence of autonomous municipalities and of free associations, stands bare in its nakedness. Emphasis is now placed upon that unity and its indivisibility; and it is maintained that "it was impossible to divide the indivisible, that the body of the state is one, and could therefore only be ruled by the mind of one man." The Emperor comes to represent the indivisible state, and its powers are vested in him.

The rise of the modern "sovereign state" means in the same way as in Rome an emphasis upon unity, and it is the insistence upon unity that constitutes the essential feature of sovereignty. To bring about this unity and to make it effective a process of centralisation had to be set going whereby all power was removed from the many separate and independent bodies—Church, Feudal Estate, Towns, Gilds and so on, and concentrated in the hands of one central authority. All bodies that might be a menace to this unification had to be rooted out. A point of interest to note in connection with this development is that all power was not vested in the state from all eternity; power at first lay elsewhere and the state had to acquire its power; but, having acquired it, it then claimed to be the source of all power, and whatever powers are possessed or exercised by other bodies or persons are declared to be derived from the state, or to the concessions on the part of the state. Sover-

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eignty is something acquired or achieved; and it is acquired, so far as history shows, not because of any à priori rights attaching to it, but because of certain empirical conditions. It is for this reason important for the understanding of the question of sovereignty to see what conditions tended to bring about centralisation. An ambitious monarch may have been a factor; but it is doubtful if he could have effected successfully a complete centralisation through his own efforts. There were factors which he utilised, which favoured him, but which also set limits to him. In England a lead is given to the development of the unitary state; feudalism in its strict form was not established there, and that means a less severe contest between the opposing sides; while use was also made of existing local institutions for purposes of administration instead of replacing them wholly by royal tribunals or royal officials. This made the process of unification more easy, but it also meant that the state in England was not so centralised as it was on the continent, and that its sovereignty was not so strongly emphasised. The aspect of domination was not so marked, and this tended to make the people more favourably disposed towards it.

Of the forces favouring centralisation, religious and economic are most pronounced. On the side of religion the Church by its internal corruption was calling for reform, and by its oppressive exactions was alienating the sympathies of different rulers. The civil power found support from the religious reformers because they saw in it the only instrument that could be effectively used against the Church, and that in the interests of religion—not of the state itself—could bring about reforms in the Church. The reformers regarded a strong central authority as being necessary for their purpose. On the economic side a call was coming from trade and commerce for greater security within wider territorial areas. It is no longer sufficient to have a market-peace nor even peace-districts; it is necessary that the peace-districts be linked up and that the King's Peace extend to the whole area. Economic needs were urging to

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political unity and were favouring the development of the unitary state. The same support was gained from the towns on account of the exactions made by the feudal lords and of the way in which their trade and manufactures were hampered by them. The towns turned to the king who, in his own interests, was prepared to give them protection against the feudal lords and whose "peace" was regarded as the best because the strongest, and as the most likely to favour the progress of their trade and manufactures.

The development of the unitary state was thus favoured by the expectation that it would tend towards efficiency, order, peace, and prosperity. Behind the growth of monarchical power was the idea that the interests of the monarch were indentical with the interests of his subjects. The monarchy expanded from lordship over personal domains to rulership over a country under the influence of the belief that it was to the interests of the monarch himself to look after the welfare of his realm. This implies that the policy of the monarch is also an expression of social policy, of what social conditions require. It was as a failure to realise this expectation that the monarchy was attacked. And this attack leads to a fresh and important stage of political development. The purpose underlying this development is to bring about the identity of political interest and social interest; it is to make the political organisation of such a nature that it can give effective expression to the complex social needs; and it is this idea which has led to the state's having the character which we at present know. For one thing, it is believed that there are difficulties and problems of so complex and universal a nature that only a general and comprehensive organisation like the state can deal with them. For this reason it has assumed various tasks such as Education, Public Health, Industrial Regulation, and so on. The important aspect of this development is a growing tendency towards centralisation—a tendency on the part of the state not merely to regulate conditions through its instrument of law, but to engage directly in, or to manage (this is different from exercising legal control over), various

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social and economic affairs; and the motive for this change has been the interest of the community in virtue of its being the most effective way, or perhaps the only way of securing that interest. There has arisen, however, the belief in modern times that there are certain human needs which cannot be effectively secured through political organisation, and that the satisfaction of these needs can be left to the individuals concerned without the basis of the state being endangered. Hence, there has grown up and expanded freedom of association for religious, political, economic and other purposes. But in spite of this the state may at any time, if the circumstances require it, restrict such freedom, as it does personal liberty in time of war.

III. History shows a close interaction between the state and social conditions. The powers which the state at any particular time assumes and exercises depend on an impulse which comes from the social life of the community; and that life is represented mainly by various types of associations with their different aims and activities. The rise of the unitary state rested upon an identity of interest between it and the elements which have become woven into its texture; so that the problem of the relation between the state and its subordinate groups is not primarily one of opposition or conflict. The strongly-marked unitary state arises either through the need of interfering to restore the efficiency of subordinate organisations which have become unable to fulfil their tasks and of assuming the burden of supplementing the deficiency, or through the need of providing conditions to give social and economic life room to develop. But the present problem of sovereignty seems to be due to an opposition between the state and social organisations. Hence, a prior question to be faced is, how has this opposition arisen? This question turns upon the relative efficiency of the sides in the conflict. The assumption of increasing powers on the part of the state is a symbol of a growing defect in its foundations; the symptoms are, on the one hand, increasing social chaos, and on the other, an ever-increasing amount of state-legislation, followed by

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attempts at direct management. The latter represent an effort on the part of the state to make up for the inefficiency of the social machinery. The state has to justify itself by what it achieves, but so also must social organisations. It may be that the causes which have rendered social organisations unable to fulfil their tasks are also causes which are doomed to render the state impotent. The state does not possess a mystic source of knowledge or wisdom which is not accessible to its subordinate groups and citizens; and if the difficulty is really due to lack of knowledge of causes, there is no reason to expect the state to succeed where its citizens and social organisations have failed. It is their mutual failure, the failure of the state to achieve what was expected of it in order to make up for failure elsewhere that has brought about the opposition between the two sides. They have begun to quarrel. It may safely be said that, if either side were doing efficiently what was required of it, there would be no quarrel. Both sides, having failed, indulge in mutual recriminations. Social organisations throw the blame upon the state—for instance, interference with liberty, heavy taxation, extravagant schemes, reckless policy, while statesmen protest that they are sincerely doing their best to deal with the situation. And there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. Their policy is not their own creation, but is dictated to them by the social conditions represented by the aims, the activities of social life, and the forces set in motion by these aims and activities.

For this reason there is a defect in all views of sovereignty based on psychology; and the doctrine that sovereignty rests upon consent is a psychological treatment of sovereignty just as much as the doctrine based on group-psychology is. It is advisable to guard against expecting too much from group-psychology. Psychology, even of a group, is a product; it is an effect brought about by conditions of various kinds. The creation of a collective will is effected by factors which are not psychological. Psychology may show that the "core of the group process is creating," that it is "acting and reacting," that it is dif-

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ferentiating and integrating.[2] But it must be remembered that psychology deals with mental phenomena and not with with the objective conditions which may have helped to make these phenomena what they are and to which the mind has to react. Psychology leaves unsolved the question of the causal operation of the forces with which man has to contend, and the problem of the material or of the mechanism which will effect integration or unification. A reorganisation of society, assuming it to be necessary, is not merely a mental process; it is not even primarily a mental process; it is primarily a question of ends and of knowledge of causes whereby ends are attained or defeated. The basis of sovereignty is not any mental process, is not psychological; the psychological element involved is itself an effect, is itself conditioned.

The doctrine that sovereignty rests upon consent of men seems at first simple and clear, but it contains a certain obscurity. It implies a distinction between governors and governed, which, on the theory of popular sovereignty, is a little difficult to understand, and its relevance to the real problem of sovereignty at the present day is not quite clear. Sovereignty is an attribute of the state, and the governors are not the state. The governors may be cast aside and replaced, while the sovereignty of the state is continuous. Not in any case do the governors exactly create law; social tendencies mark out the lines along which legislation must go. But the doctrine of Consent is also a psychological doctrine. It presupposes a conflict within the state. There is an opposition of wills implied, and such an opposition, as well as a conflict of loyalties, is a psychological conflict. That conflict reflects conflicting social conditions or tendencies—objective in their nature, and the former conflict is not prior to, but an effect of, the latter. The primary problem is, through an analysis of the conditions on which human life rests, to discover the causes which lead to conflicts between different wills, and which, through that psy-

[2] M. P. Follet, *The New State*, p. 33 and *passim*.

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chological factor, give rise to a problem of sovereignty. The latter problem has its source in social conditions, and no psychological solution can be final, or will continue to be effective, so long as the causes of the psychological factor remain operative.

The difference between a psychological solution and a solution based upon objective factors and upon a knowledge of causes may be illustrated by a reference to a solution of labour difficulties proposed in certain quarters. That solution is "control of industry" by Labour. This can be regarded only as a psychological solution, for all that is involved is only a matter of psychology. It gives Labour a consciousness of being in control without giving any guarantee that that of which it assumes control can be altered or made to produce results different from what have been produced in the past. The assumption implied in the solution is that what is wrong is merely a matter of control, that industry has been manipulated for private ends, that in it an anti-social will has been operative; and that is a belief which has extended to politics and has similarly led to a demand for a more effective popular control in political affairs. To prove the existence of such a sinister hand either in industry or in politics is a matter of extreme difficulty; but it is not necessary to make the assumption, much less to prove it. Impersonal forces may so operate as to produce the appearance of human volition and may be sufficient to account for apparent design. The control which is demanded in industry as in politics is administrative power. The latter does admit of degrees of efficiency; but there is no reason to believe that in the hands of Labour it will be more efficient than in the hands of private directors. It may be that it is not merely a question of control, but a question of what is controlled. It may be that a defect lies in what is to be controlled; and a change of *personnel* in the administration will lead to different or more efficient results only if the new *personnel* brings along with it a fresh knowledge as to how the defect is to be put right. A mere change of *personnel* does not bring about a change in the causal

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operation of forces; it is necessary that the forces be acted upon, and that presupposes knowledge of their nature. Without such knowledge change of control produces only a psychological effect.

The question of control, however, is very important in connection with the problem of sovereignty, for it is here that the fundamental difficulty in the latter problem is to be found. But it is necessary to distinguish between administrative power, and control of policy. The question of policy is a vital one in connection with any theory of the state. In it is to be found the core of the problem of sovereignty, of the problem of the relation between the state and social organisations, and of the problem of the relation between states. Who determines policy? It is not enough to say that it is governments, for they rise and fall, and that means their policy must conform to something beyond themselves. Politicians do not create policy, they formulate it; but its basis lies beyond politics. The policy of any state is a continuation of the social life and is an attempt to solve the problems which the conditions, aims, and organisation of social life create. For a state to pursue a policy (either deliberately or through ignorance) that is not firmly rooted in the existing and accepted conditions of its social life will bring about its collapse. Given certain conditions, certain social and economic tendencies, a state cannot avoid adopting and pursuing a certain policy, if it is going to preserve its existence. But policy which is thus forced upon the state moulds the nature of the state. In order to give effect to its policy it must adopt certain means, organise itself in a particular manner, and arrogate to itself certain powers. In virtue of this it assumes a certain character, which history shows to change from time to time. The state historically moves between the monistic and the pluralistic type. History shows that the state is not universally monistic; but it also shows that it is not necessarily only pluralistic. The degree to which it approximates to either type depends on its policy and the execution of that policy. The actual state may be considerably different

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from what either a political monism or a political pluralism holds the state to be; and when there is a reaction, accompanied by criticism, against the monistic state, it is necessary to be clear as to whether a political theory or the actual state is in question.

The state, consequently, is to be regarded as continually varying in its relations to social organisations and to individuals. It is an adaptation to definite circumstances and problems that confront it; it is organised to give effect to a policy. At one time there may be a need for centralisation, for domination, as during a war; at other times there may be a call for decentralisation, non-interference by the state, and freedom. The question of sovereignty thus turns very much upon the question of means, including general organisation, for facing the problems. Given the problems and the need of a certain policy, abstract, sentimental or ethical considerations can play little part in deciding what powers the state should or should not assume. There is only one test—that of efficiency—in solving the problems presented. Compulsion to obey its orders, even if individuals find compliance with these orders contrary to their conscience, may be a necessary means in the execution of its policy. If such action of the "sovereign state" is to be criticised, the attack must be directed to the basis of the policy of the state. Ethical feeling or sentiment will not prevent the operation of causes, if the causes are not themselves dealt with; and it is futile to allow a problem to arise and to exist, while refusing to admit the means to an attempted solution. Everything points to the bitter reality of the problems confronting the state—cost of living, unemployment, war and peace. An attack upon the "sovereign state" will have to justify itself either by attacking these problems at their roots and so rendering the objectionable powers of the state unnecessary, or else by showing that social organisations are themselves capable of solving these problems. Social organisations, as they are, have not shown this capacity, and that is why the "sovereign state" has been called upon to solve them. In fact, as they are, they are the source of

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the problems of the state; their nature determines the nature of the state, and necessitates the concentration of power in the state. The alternatives, accordingly, open to those attacking the "sovereign state" are reducible to one task—that of discovering the ultimate root of the problems requiring solution and leading to an opposition between the state and social organisations. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it is merely a matter of organisation, of developing a collective will, of evolving a group-organisation. That may prove to be quite unimportant or, at any rate, of secondary importance. It is necessary to understand why the "sovereign state" has assumed such proportions and why its "sovereignty" is so strongly emphasised; and that understanding lies in the discovery of the causes operative in the material of which social life is built and in the control of such causes—for man seeks causes in order to control them. Then the problem of sovereignty may be nearer a solution.

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PLATO AND THE MORAL STANDARD.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

THE aim of the present paper is to ascertain Plato's position on the subject of the moral standard, *i.e.*, to consider what are the standards of moral judgment, the principles or criteria which the philosophic judge applies in coming to a decision upon questions of ethical value. With this aim, we shall examine inductively and without prejudice the various norms mentioned in the Dialogues as serving this purpose, one by one, until, after all have been investigated, we find ourselves in a position to come to some general conclusion as to Plato's main standpoint—if there *is* any main standpoint—on the general question.

The actual norms or standards definitely mentioned in the Dialogues as criteria which assist the philosophic judge in deciding questions of moral value are: (1) Universal assent, (2) The writings of the legislator, (3) Quantity of pleasure, (4) Æsthetic quality, (5) Expediency or benefit, especially to individuals, (6) Contribution towards the life of the social whole, (7) Orderliness, (8) Adequacy and self-sufficiency, (9) Consistency, (10) Objectivity. Under these ten heads is concentrated all the evidence from the Dialogues which bears upon the question of the moral norms or standards. We shall proceed to examine this evidence, taking one item at a time.

1. Universal Assent.

With Plato it is almost axiomatic that all normal men agree upon certain general questions in ethics, and that their agreement establishes certain general norms of conduct. All percipient beings whatever desire and hunt after good, and take no interest in the attainment of anything which is not accompanied with good. Good is the universal object of desire, the final end which every living being pursues, refusing to be put off with mere appearances, and

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insisting always upon establishing contact with reality. This "universal sense of honor and justice" remains, however, very general in character, and can be appealed to only to settle very general questions, such as the characteristics which must be ascribed to a chief or perfect good in order to make it universally eligible (Phileb. 60 A f.). As soon as questions of detail come up for discussion, although dialecticians like Socrates and distinguished teachers like Protagoras or Gorgias can come to some agreement on ethical questions somewhat in advance of contemporary ethical opinion, and exceptionally gifted students in exceptionally favorable circumstances can be led to understand and accept detailed applications of general principles, yet in general, assent ceases to be strictly universal, and dissent and dispute seem in fact to be the rule (Euthyphr. 7 D f., Rep. 505 B ff., etc.). The use of this criterion or standard is thus limited to the most general questions.

2. The Writings of the Legislator.

A definite group of norms, establishing concrete detailed standards of right and wrong, is furnished by the written laws of the community. These arise largely from the experience of the group itself in the course of its struggle for unity and continued existence in an environment only partially favorable to such existence.[1] But as the group develops, it tends to make a definite study of the laws of other social groups, testing out by experience such as can be adapted to its own needs, and eventually incorporating these, so far as possible, in its own legal system (Laws 957 A f.). This body of social and civic norms is kept up to date by each new generation of legislators, and is of the utmost value, not only in deciding questions of justice between man and man, but also as furnishing certain standards of community values which can be used, *e.g.*, to determine what writings are fit or unfit to be put into

[1] Cf. Lodge, Reality and the Moral Judgment in Plato, *Philosophical Review* vol. XXIX, pp. 464–465.

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the hands of youth for purposes of education (Laws 811 A f., 858 E), or to instruct adults as to how they may make the most out of social life or test the quality of their own moral development and see clearly in what direction they are trending (Laws 627 E f., 728 A f., 880 D f.). The general body of law thus furnishes a standard of reference which is primarily of value for the ordinary citizen. If, however, we are enquiring what are the norms by reference to which the philosopher or legislator himself comes to his decisions, while this is, of course, partly a matter of precedent and acceptance of the experience of the race in general and of the group in particular, yet the fact that written laws of themselves tend to lag behind the moral evolution of the community, while the legislator himself keeps, if anything, slightly in advance of the times (Polit. 294 A f., Laws 875 C–D), sufficiently indicates that for the *original* standards which guide the legislator in giving expression to norms which reflect and at the same time guide what is best in the experience of the community, we must look further.

3. Quantity of Pleasure.

Pleasure and pain are the very first perceptions of children, and are the forms under which virtue and vice are originally present to them (Laws 653 A). For most men the use of pleasure as a standard for measuring the value of actions is retained through life, and so general is its acceptance as such a standard, that it can almost claim the authority of universal assent. But, as in other cases of universal assent, so here; it is only in cases of the simplest kind that such a standard is found perfectly satisfactory. As soon as problems of any degree of complexity make their appearance, certain restrictions and qualifications are at once found to be inevitable. Thus, pleasure can be derived from diverse sources, some of which are mutually inconsistent (Phileb. 12 C f.); men are said to be led astray by being overcome by pleasure (Protag. 353 ff.); certain pleasures are thought to be bad, and certain pains are thought to be good, etc. (Rep. 505 C–D). In the face of

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such problems, the difficulty of which is a matter of almost universal experience, it is found necessary to introduce certain distinctions, which lead gradually further and further away from the basis of simple sense-pleasure. Thus the first and most widely acceptable of these distinctions is the distinction of pleasures in terms of quantity. Everyone believes that a greater quantity of pleasure is to be preferred to a smaller quantity. But this distinction becomes clearly intelligible only if we think of pleasures as reduced to a unit basis, *e.g.*, in respect of intensity and duration, so as to admit of arithmetical computation. A thoroughly scientific hedonistic calculus, erected upon this basis, would be of immense value as an intellectual standard by which to check the misleading influences of appearances—*i.e.*, of our ready-made, "snap" judgments—upon our calculation of a psychological maximum of enjoyment, and could, indeed, well be regarded as the saving principle of human life. The standard has thus begun to shift from the field of experienced pleasure to the field of scientific, mathematical calculation, *i.e.*, from the sphere of sensation to the sphere of intellectual evaluation. In the *Protagoras*, scientific hedonism is left, without further qualification, as the formulation of the moral standard which meets with acceptance from the whole group of professional teachers of ethics,[2] and there are, in the other Dialogues also, many traces of this position. But mathematical calculation, for Plato, is always merely a first step upon the long road of intellectual development which ends in the vision of the Ideas and especially of the Idea of Good as the final source of the reality of our experiences, and in dialogues where the question is discussed more deeply than in the *Protagoras*, the shift from sense to

[2] Protag. 355 D ff. T. D. Goodell, Plato's Hedonism, *Am. Jour. Philol.* XLII, pp. 25, 30, 33, states roundly that only a superficial reader can find scientific hedonism in the *Protagoras*, and that the references to the "art of measurement" are purely figurative. This does not seem to me consistent with the reference given, or with 358 A f. With his general position, however, I find myself in agreement.

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intellect, which we have already noted as furnishing the norm or standard of pleasure, is carried further, and as the sense-pleasures finally drop out of sight as unworthy of the genuine philosopher (Phædo, 69, Rep. 581 D ff.), the scientific calculation of such pleasures also vanishes, and its place is taken by intellectual insight into the objective sources of real value. The saving principle of human life thus becomes less a matter of "nicely calculated less and more," and more a matter of getting in touch with the objective sources of permanent satisfaction, so that quantity of pleasure cannot be regarded as a final standard of moral value.

4. Æsthetic Quality.

The close connection between beauty and symmetry on the one hand, and moral excellence on the other, is always clearly recognized in Plato. It is indeed sometimes stated simply and without qualification that the good *is* the beautiful, and arises from the presence of symmetry.[3] At other times it is stated more figuratively that virtue is the beauty of the soul, that grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue, etc., and a certain parallelism between the vision of absolute beauty and the Idea of Good has frequently been noted by modern Plato-students. How far such a general connection is to be regarded as furnishing a definite norm or standard, so that the moral worth of a man or of an action could be decided by consideration of such æsthethical characteristics is, however, not quite so clear. It is definitely stated that the good man is superior to the evil man in beauty (Rep. 588 A), and a thorough training in music and art generally forms a considerable portion of the early education which is to develop moral character; but if we push our questions, and insist on knowing, *e.g.*, whether the presence of æsthetical qualities may always be regarded as reliable evidence of the

[3] Lys. 216 D, Symp. 201 C, Soph. 228 C, Phileb. 64 D f., Laws 773 A, cf. Alc. I, 116 A.

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presence of ethical qualities, we come upon certain difficulties. We find, *e.g.*, that, on the whole, æsthetical qualities are in themselves regarded as specifically non-moral, and that they derive whatever moral value they may come to possess for certain educational purposes, solely from imitating or participating in ideas which are moral in their own right. Although beauty and symmetry are reckoned high in the list of goods (Phileb. 66 A), there can be no question that the moral significance of æsthetical quality is fundamentally dependent upon "a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character," and that in general the beautiful is to be weighed by the sole standard of the good (Rep. 400 D–E, 452 E), so that Plato's settled conviction appears to be that æsthetical quality, in spite of its frequent and close connection with moral quality, cannot, as such, be used legitimately as a norm or standard for determining moral excellence.

5. Expediency or Benefit.

By the expedient or beneficial, Plato as a rule means something opposed to and contrasted with the harmful. By harmful, he normally understands something which destroys or impairs the peculiar excellence of anything—*i.e.*, that in virtue of which it functions in its own specific way—and thus makes it inferior. For example, in the case of man, justice being regarded as his peculiar excellence, in virtue of which he functions as a specifically human being, to harm him is to make him lose his specific excellence and become less just, less fit to take his place in a society which is struggling towards closer co-operation and organization (Rep. 335 C f.). To benefit a man, then, is to confirm and strengthen him in respect of his peculiar excellence, to make him a better man, more just, better fitted to play his part in the forward march of humanity, and it is peculiarly characteristic of good men, whether as private citizens or as leaders and guardians in the community, that they are beneficial to their fellow-citizens in this way, and give advice and pass laws which are expedient for the group

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as a whole. What makes good men capable of being beneficial in this way is partly (1) their ethical characteristics, which bring them into especial favor of the Gods, who will not suffer men who resemble Them to fall permanently into misfortune or error of any kind, partly also (2) their intellectual insight, which enables them in an especial sense to acquire an appreciation of the true values of things and to get in touch with what really matters, with the nature of the real and the Idea of Good. Hence the advice they give to their fellow-citizens, and the laws which they pass, being based upon the ultimate sources of value, tend to be of genuine and permanent benefit to the community of which they are members.

How far can expediency or benefit be regarded as a standard, by reference to which the philosophic judge can decide questions of moral value? Let us consider. Bodily health is sometimes expedient or beneficial, sometimes harmful to the individual. Is it a good so far as it is beneficial, and an evil so far as it is harmful? Plato says, Yes, and adds, that it is beneficial so far as it is guided by genuine insight into values and used in the service of such values. So, too, of strength, good looks, money, temperance, just actions, manliness, magnificence, intellectual acumen, sound memory, etc., in a word, of all the excellencies of body and mind. These are all goods so far as they are beneficial, and evils so far as they are harmful. What makes them beneficial, is the way in which they are employed in specific concrete situations; and the value of the way in which they are thus employed depends wholly upon philosophic insight into values, into the nature of things.[4] So, too, on the other hand, poetry is regarded as an evil, to be banished from the ethical community, largely on the ground that it is harmful and tends to make even good men inferior as citizens. But in this case also, it is because it is deficient in insight, out of touch with things-

[4] Meno 87 D ff. So, too, of men: the fact that *A* has benefited (or harmed) *B* or *C*, does not, as such, make *A*'s action good (or evil). It has further to be asked, what was *A*'s disposition, etc. (Laws 862).

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as-they-are, that poetry produces this effect (Phædr. 277 B f., Laws 801 B f., etc.). So again it is stated that the one thing of supreme importance is to choose between the good and the evil life, using as a sole criterion the quality of making the soul more just—*i.e.*, expediency or benefit (Rep. 618 C f). But here, as in the other cases, it is still philosophic insight into objective values which is finally decisive, and the emphasis tends to shift, from expediency or harmfulness as such, to the objective nature of reality as the real standard.

6. Contribution Towards the Life of the Social Whole.

In the ethical community, the well-being of the whole group is one of the supreme values. Law, art, science, commerce, agriculture, politics and diplomacy—in all of these, it is the interest of the group taken as a whole which is, and which should be, the dominant principle (Laws 875 A f., etc.). So, too, in the case of the virtues of manliness, self-control, wisdom, and justice: it is especially their social or civic side whose value is constantly stressed by Plato, and even in the case of dialectic or technical philosophy, it is its value to the community as a whole which tends to be placed in the foreground (Rep. 519 C ff., etc.). So again in such social institutions as friendship and family life, or in the more individual pursuit of power, wealth, and happiness, it is always the interest of the group as a whole which should predominate (Rep. 423 E f.). In fact, for Plato the civic ideal is always a united, firmly organized group, the members of which live, as far as possible, a common life, educated from the cradle in common nurseries and schools, eating and drinking at common tables, exercising in common, and having, as far as may be, common objects of joy and grief on all occasions of life (Rep. 462 ff., Laws 942 C). The "enemy" is excessive individualism, the pursuit of private well-being, exclusive power, exclusive wealth, exclusive pleasures, whether such individualism assumes the collective form which pursues

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the exclusive interest of a specially favored group, such as an industrial class, a political faction, or an aristocratic club (Laws 715 B f., etc.), or assumes the more extreme form which produces the superman or tyrant. Tendencies in such directions disrupt the community, cause it to disintegrate, to separate into its component elements, so that the flower of civilization perishes. Individualism, or the competitive pursuit of goods, the possession of which by *A* excludes their enjoyment by *B* or *C*, is thus the root of all evil, and communism, the co-operative pursuit of goods whose enjoyment can be shared by the whole community, is the root of all good (Rep. 462 ff.).

That the life of the social whole furnishes a norm, an explicit rule or standard by reference to which the philosopher or legislator guides himself in estimating the ethical value of actions and situations, is frequently stated and yet more frequently implied in the Dialogues. Thus the question as to the happiness of the guardian class is explicitly determined by reference to this principle (Rep. 419 ff., 519 C ff.), and when it is a question of justifying almost any element in the social organization of the state, it is to this standard that the appeal is almost invariably made. So, too, the immoderate pursuit of wealth, on the one hand, and the life of political faction with all its consequences, on the other, are condemned precisely because they divide the city and cause it to fall apart (Rep. 551 D, 556 E, Laws 715). Finally, it is hinted that the principle is of more than practical significance, and has an ultimate or metaphysical justification (Laws 903 B f.).

This last statement leads naturally to a further question. Is the judgment that actions and situations are morally valuable because and in so far as they contribute to the life of the social whole, final—or is this only a proximate standard, itself in need of further, metaphysical justification? The answer can be in no doubt. The organized ethical community, with all the subordinate elements contained in its idea, certainly furnishes a standard, and a high standard, by reference to which a large group of difficult ques-

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tions concerning ethical values can definitely be settled. But it does not furnish a final or absolute standard. It has its place in the world of ideas which furnish reliable standards for human life. But its use as a standard cannot be final, until it has been transformed and justified by being grounded in the ultimate principle of the ideal world—the Idea of Good.[5] Only when transmuted in the light of this final principle, is its use as a standard, by which to decide ethical questions without possibility of error, legitimate. In itself, it is a high standard or norm, but not the highest.

7. Orderliness.

That orderliness is a characteristic of virtue and disorderliness or lack of orderliness is a characteristic of vice, is a commonplace in Greek philosophical literature ever since it found embodiment in the Pythagorean table of opposites. So, too, in the Platonic writings. Whether in opposition to the sophistic glorification of *pleonexia*, or to the man of the world's pursuit of pleasures, or to the well-known Syracusan habits of luxury, the reference to orderliness as the test of virtuous living is clear and unmistakable.

Just exactly what does Plato understand by orderliness? In the first place, he understands by it a certain innate quietness of disposition, a temperamental tendency in the direction of moderation and self-control in the satisfaction of impulses and appetites. The virtuous man is temperate, orderly, self-restrained, free from sudden excitements, without violent passions, not liable to fall into temptation, and simply and naturally quiet and self-controlled in all things (Charm. 159 B, etc.).

In the second place, by orderliness Plato understands a tendency to accept without question the direction of those in authority, not merely to conform to the actual legislative enactments of the community, but especially a certain

[5] Uncritical faith in the value of "social solidarity" belongs to the level of "opinion" as opposed to "knowledge," which last rests upon insight into the Idea of Good (Rep. 505 D–E, etc.).

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willingness to co-operate in a more general spirit with the government in its effort to regulate conduct in the interest of the group as a whole. This represents a higher stage of ethical development than the mere natural disposition, as in this case the temperament is, at least to a certain degree, directed and controlled by reason. The reason, however, by which the virtuous man is here guided, is reason at a comparatively low level, the level of "right opinion" (Crito 50 C ff., Rep. 412 C f., etc.).

In the third place, something beyond respect for the opinions of men is understood. The orderliness of which Plato speaks is regarded as having a certain cosmic significance. The movements of the planets betray the presence of a certain immutable and Divinely established order. Not only the system of sunrises and sunsets, but the orderly movements of the whole physical universe, are here in Plato's mind. It appears to him to be impossible to study astronomy and other branches of physical science without something of the order in the object studied sinking into the soul of the student and making it orderly and attuned to this cosmic orderliness. This represents a still higher stage of ethical development, as it raises the reason of the student above the level of mere human opinion, and of reliance upon the guidance of others, to a level at which he seeks and attains for himself a certain dispassionate insight into law and order (Gorg. 508 A, Rep. 485 C f., etc.).

In the fourth place, Plato understands by the term a certain ideal orderliness, an ideal only very partially realized in the measured dance of the planets and in the motions of the world which we can touch and see. It is the same ideal which is partly realized in the legal institutions of men, and even in the mere psychical disposition towards quietness and moderation. The home of this ideal orderliness is in the realm of ideal patterns generally, and the final source and pattern of orderliness is the highest of these ideals, the Idea of Good (Rep. 490 B, etc.). From this standpoint, Plato speaks of things or actions as morally valuable, so far as they are partakers in the ideal patterns and resemble

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these, so far, that is, as they conform to their own idea or realize their own law. For example, it is by conformity to the Idea of Justice that men become just, by conformity to the Idea of Temperance that they become temperate, etc. The doctrine is also expressed characteristically in his conception of the "mean" or "limit"—actions which exemplify this being orderly and tidy, rather than disorderly and chaotic, and representing, in the form of a microcosm or small organized system, a portion of the macrocosm or complete ideal system itself (Polit. 283 E ff., Laws 903 B–C, etc.).

Thus understood, in what sense is orderliness to be regarded as a standard or criterion, by which we can determine whether an action is good or bad? The first and lowest level, the stage of innate disposition, does not, when we come to examine Plato's meaning, furnish us with such a criterion. While it may be true that all virtuous men are orderly and quiet in this sense, it cannot be urged that all men who are naturally unaggressive and readily accept orders from those in authority, are virtuous. At the two lower levels of temperament and opinion, those who possess this ingrained tendency towards obedience practically invite aggression and exploitation on the part of less scrupulous and less tender-minded neighbors, and may thus be a cause of evil, rather than of good, to themselves and the community. This Plato regards as culpable weakness, rather than as virtue, and at this level, orderliness can thus not be treated as a standard or criterion by which to distinguish good from bad (Pol. 307 E, 309 A). So, too, at the next level, the level of opinion, it is not because action is controlled by opinion that it can be regarded as good. Action controlled by false opinion is bad, and is bad precisely in proportion as the opinion is false. It is only in so far as the guiding opinion is right or true, *i.e.*, in accordance with the truths discovered by philosophic insight, that the resulting action can be designated as good. It is not the mere orderliness or controlledness of action which makes it good, but rather the rationality and objective

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validity of the principle in accordance with which it is ordered and controlled, which makes it good (Meno 88 B, Rep. 441 E f.). So, too, the cosmic orderliness, the orderliness of the observed movements of the phenomena of nature, is not morally valuable in its own right. Its moral significance resides wholly in its providing a training-ground for the developing intelligence, so as to distract it from the merely phenomenal and sensuous, and to assist it in its progress towards acquiring insight into the ideal realm of a strictly rational, more than phenomenal realm (Rep. 527 C ff.). When, however, we come finally to the orderliness of this realm of ideas, knowledge of which arises only as we succeed in obtaining insight into the Idea of Good, then, indeed, we seem to have come upon an orderliness which may be used as a standard by which to measure actions and decide whether they are good or evil. Action patterned upon the ideal order and guided by insight into its orderliness, is virtuous. Action not so guided is not virtuous, but may be either morally insignificant, or—if opposed to the ideal order—vicious (Phædo 68 E f., Rep. 534 B f., etc.). In this sense, then, orderliness *is* a moral standard. But it must be noted that, understood in this way, orderliness either coincides fully with standards such as consistency and objectivity, or at least overlaps to such an extent as to be practically indistinguishable from these standards. Further consideration of ideal orderliness, then, must await consideration of these further standards.

8. Adequacy and Self-Sufficiency.

When Socrates sums up the discussion in the *Philebus* by attributing to the *summum bonum* the distinguishing characteristics of adequacy, perfection, and self-sufficiency (66 A, cf. 20 D), he is simply repeating, so far as the words used are concerned, what is an accepted commonplace in Greek philosophical literature and life. It is universally admitted that the good is something final, something which everyone seeks as a basis which shall give to his life meaning and value; that he who is in possession of the good is in some

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sense superior to the unenlightened masses of humanity; and that he has access to a hidden source of power, which makes of him a master of life, independent of other men and indifferent to the sudden reversals of fortune which were so marked a feature of fourth-century political existence (Gorg. 508 C f., Rep. 505 ff.).

So far as the words used are concerned, this is the merest commonplace, and there is no one to oppose it. *Cadit quæstio.* But when we come to consider the content of the terms, we note a great difference, which corresponds to the difference between opinion and philosophic insight. For the average educated Greek, and indeed for the sophists from whom the Greek gentleman received his higher education, as well as for the general public opinion, the highest good was regarded as consisting in political power (Gorg. 466 B, etc., Rep. 344). Based, as was actual fourth-century life, upon the distinction between free-born citizen and slave, and upon further distinctions of caste or wealth within the free-born class, it seemed natural and indeed inevitable, that the basis for living a free, independent existence should be a matter of wealth and power. The man without means and without powerful friends was exposed, not only to neglect, but to calumny and even direct insult, against which he had no effective remedy. The obvious way to raise his life above this quasi-slavish level was to seek power, by acquiring wealth and powerful friends, linked together in a political club. Thus secured, he could not be insulted with impunity (Gorg. 486, Rep. 364 f.). Carried to its extreme conclusion, the ideal of the independent life seemed to the average educated Greek to be represented in the person of the unconstitutional dictator or "tyrant," who exercised supreme power in the community, and was accountable to none (Gorg. 484 A, Laws 661 B, etc.). And this seemed reasonable, for the tyrant-ideal appeared to exhibit in unmistakable form all the characteristics of the *summum bonum.* The tyrant lived a complete, spacious, well-rounded life, surrounded with art and luxury, and in a word with all external goods. Raised above the opinion of

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the world, and self-sufficient to the highest degree, he was also the fount of honor and the chief immediate source of social and political values in the community; for could he not elevate his friends to positions of eminence, and exile his enemies and confiscate their goods, where he did not go further and actually take away their lives? Dazzling and glorious, an object of envy to all beholders and all hearers, supreme power appeared the most satisfying of all earthly goods, the sweetest bliss and sole fruition, the highest and most assuredly valuable of human ideals (Gorg. 468 E, etc., cf. Theag. 124 E, Alc. II, 141).

To this ideal, so cunningly interwoven out of strands which are partly true and only partly false, the representatives of philosophic insight in the Dialogues oppose varying objections, from empirical generalizations to a mathematical demonstration of the complete misery of the established tyrant. The exercise of political power is never accepted as the highest of human activities, and never regarded as satisfying to the highest degree the demands of such standards as adequacy, finality, self-sufficiency. From this standpoint there is one kind of activity which is indubitably more satisfactory and demonstrably more raised above possible criticism: the life of philosophic contemplation (Rep. 581 E ff.). But society cannot allow its finest intellects to enjoy this life to the full; for it cannot afford to allow such men and women to withdraw wholly from the pressing problems of the community. Accordingly, men and women with the aptitude and training for this higher life are compelled to descend into the arena and accept the task of political administration, not as a highest good, as something desirable and an object of keen competition, but as a form of service, as something which they accept as a social duty (Rep. 500 D f., etc.). Thus, to the popular ideal of the unconstitutional despot, Plato opposes his ideal figure, the philosopher-king.

The opposition is not, however, between a power-ideal and a knowledge-ideal, between force and philosophy, between Might and Right, as such. The contrast is rather

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between two fillings-in of one and the same power-ideal: between power directed by instinct, and the same power directed by reason. The despot of popular admiration is, when all is said and done, devoid of vision, a blind leader of the blind, a man who uses his power, however acquired, merely in external things, to heap up riches for himself at the expense of others, to satisfy his desires at the expense of others, in a word to exploit the people, to pull down what others have built. The struggle for power, in this sense, is always regarded by Plato as hopeless, unprogressive, leading nowhere, a confused motion back and forth, which is essentially meaningless (Gorg. 492 ff., Laws 715 B, etc.). All that the tyrant can do with his power is to satisfy his instinctive cravings, his "unnecessary" appetites. Additional power brings him no accession of insight, and his habitual cravings merely become stronger, more unreasonable, harder to control and harder to satisfy. There is no saving grace in him (Gorg. 466 ff., Rep. 572 D ff.).

Certain elements, then, in the popular ideal, Plato rejects. But certain other elements he unhesitatingly accepts. He accepts, with reservations, the high value ascribed to political power. He accepts, and indeed insists upon, the necessity of economic independence, as a *sine qua non* of a socially valuable career (Rep. 421 C f., Laws 744 D f., etc.). He anticipates admiration and willing obedience on the part of the citizens towards the philosophic wielder of power, hearty co-operation, and the greatest success of the administration in foreign as well as in domestic policy (Rep. 502, etc.). He accepts, and indeed emphasizes, the characteristic of "superiority" for his guardians. But it is not merely as raised above the opinion of others, in a political sense, that they are to be esteemed superior to the ordinary run of humanity. They regard no human thing as of serious importance, and despise the honors of the present world, and think nothing of misfortune or even death. The reason for this is that in the life of philosophic contemplation, to which they return at frequent intervals, they have another and a better life than

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that of administration. With their eyes fixed upon true being, and as spectators of all time and existence, they contemplate and derive continual refreshment and inspiration from the eternal ideas of right and justice, taking up into their souls something of the strength and permanence of the Divine order, and regarding themselves as co-workers with God, when they set in order their own city (Rep. 500 B f., 540, etc.). Not the exploitation, but the salvation of humanity, is their ideal, and they possess the knowledge and training to realize this ideal.

From the new standpoint of philosophic insight, just what does Plato understand by adequacy and self-sufficiency? In the first place, he understands a certain all-roundness. The concept of adequacy or completeness means wholeness as opposed to something which falls short of wholeness (Laws 647 C–D, 806 C). In the second place, a systematic, organized wholeness is meant, a wholeness which has been put together out of particular experiences in accordance with a single principle (cf. Phædr. 249 B–C). In the third place, this principle, in accordance with which character-elements are organized into a well-rounded whole, is a rational principle, a principle discovered by philosophic insight and by opinions which are true or objective. That is to say, the character which is adequate or complete is one which is based upon and guided by the philosophic element in the soul, and from this standpoint, to say that the good is adequate or complete is to say that it possesses the characteristic of being a totality organized upon a principle which is not merely rational and intelligible, but is also "true" or objective, grounded upon the nature of the universe (Rep. 499 B, Laws 653 A).

The good is self-sufficient. More negatively, this means that the good man is peculiarly independent of resources which are mainly external, such as wealth, powerful relatives and friends, and is superior to mischance and even death (Rep. 387 D). More positively, this freedom from external wants and consequent independence upon others, arises from the fact that the good man contains within

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himself whatever is necessary for a happy life. That is to say, his character, as such, is based upon philosophic insight into values, an insight which enables him to live at the level of the "real Above," a life which partakes of true being and real existence (Rep. 581 D ff.). Self-sufficiency, then, like adequacy, is a consequence of wholeness, *i.e.*, of a totality organized in accordance with a principle which is not only intelligible, but also of objective significance.

Thus understood, to what extent can adequacy, perfection, and self-sufficiency be regarded as moral standards, as criteria by which to distinguish good from bad? Whatever is good is adequate, perfect, self-sufficient; whatever is bad is inadequate, incomplete, lacking in many ways (Rep. 351 ff., Soph. 227 E f.). Assuming this to have been established, can we go further, and say that whatever possesses the characteristics of adequacy and self-sufficiency is morally valuable, and that whatever is without these attributes is morally unsound? As we read the Dialogues, it would seem so, at least on a first reading. The presence and absence of these attributes are frequently used to distinguish characters or actions as good and bad respectively. Thus the tyrant is regarded as evil, on the ground that he is so weak in respect of internal organization and internal resources, and so wholly dependent upon other men and upon resources which, like wealth, are external, and because even these resources have little objective significance, his friends, for example, being almost wholly untrustworthy (Rep. 568 ff., Laws 728 B–C). But when we examine such cases more closely, we gradually come to see that these characteristics of adequacy and independence, while symptomatic of moral value, are not in themselves final standards or criteria. It is as indicating that a character under discussion is in genuine contact with the nature of things, *i.e.*, is based upon a rational principle which is identical with the principle in accordance with which the genuine world, the world of Ideas, is constructed, that adequacy and self-sufficiency can be used to characterize the good and distinguish it from what is evil. So, too, it is as showing that

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the opposite character is out of touch with things-as-they-are, insignificant because blind to the ideal realm, that inadequacy, weakness, and incompleteness or fragmentariness can be used to assist in recognizing the presence of moral evil (Rep. 586 A, Phileb. 39 G ff.). The real standard is what lies behind the proposed criteria, and is brought out by the question, Is such and such a character real and objective, in touch with things-as-they-are, *i.e.*, with the ideal world, or is it the reverse? The further consideration of this standard leads to a consideration, therefore, of the two further standards of consistency and objectivity.

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THE WILL AND THE INSTINCT OF SEX.

JOHN DASHIELL STOOPS.

THE organic life is more deeply rooted than the special senses. The vague pleasure-pain characteristics of the organic processes under the control of the autonomic nervous system belong to the older and deeper strata of our psychophysical life. The higher senses, described as distance-ceptors, are a part of a projection system which adjusts the central organic life to distant stimuli. The higher projection system of the brain with its special senses and its imagery is an instrument for mediating between distant stimuli from the external world and the inner organic and emotional life under the control of the autonomic nervous system. Special senses like vision, hearing, smell, touch, taste and temperature, come and go, but the older organic levels of life are constant. Hunger, sex, fear, anger, gregariousness, may confer a wholly new life on sensations and images and ideas.

The loss that comes from injury to sight or hearing consists in the fact that it narrows the range of our life's central processes, or blocks their free expression. The loss of these distance-ceptors may, however, deepen and enrich the inner nucleus of personality.

We are coming to see that the brain with its distance-ceptors or sensations and its images is an organ of projection; that older and deeper than this projection system is the inner organic life itself under the control of the autonomic nervous system. It is these continuous rhythmic organic processes in whose service the projection system functions. It is because we are hungry or cold or fearful or angry, because we are predisposed to manipulate, or to experience sexual desire, that we have need of a projection system of vision and hearing and smell and taste and touch. It is these organic systems that make possible our long-range activities like the growing and storing of food, the accumu-

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lation of property, the building of a home. And of these organic processes the most powerful one, save hunger, is the drive of the instinct of sex. The fire of sex burns undimmed and furnishes most of the energy for man's long-distance activities.

In the plant and animal the object of the processes of sex is the perpetuation of life. Sex is an unconscious sacrament. The evergreen, the lily, the egg, are symbols of an undying life. Only through participation in this sacrament can the individual plant or animal share in the undying life of the race. The preservation of this unceasing life is the only possible object of the processes of sex in the plant and animal.

The sex psychosis is the heart of the myth of man's fall. Through the subtlety of the serpent man's will yields to the apple of desire and is forever driven out of the unity which he once shared with the animals and which in his painful dualism of will and instinct he looks back upon as a Garden of Eden. Out of this Eden of instinctive and emotional unity with nature man is henceforth driven by his sharing in the knowledge of the gods.

We of to-day have lost that immediate unity with the life of the race which was so natural and so unconscious in the minds of our ancestors. The early Christian, the mediæval saint, the modern introspective philosopher are alive in us all. We moderns live on the higher cerebral levels of our minds; and these higher levels reflect not the deeper tides of the life of the race, but the conscious thought of the individual. We have not only inherited from the middle ages the doctrine of an absolute inner life of thought, but we have endowed each individual with such an absolute inner thought life. Into the free movement of such a thought life the racial tides of the sex life come as an irrational intrusion. The modern individualization of the mediæval absolute thought has made of each individual person an end in himself. In this way there has arisen a dualism between the sex life of the race and the volition of the individual. The a priori patterns of the reason of the

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individual conflict with the instinctive patterns of sex and parenthood. This is as clear in the Seventh Chapter of Romans as in the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Volition, reason, individuality, are the inner citadel of the modern mind. The old abandon, the old immediate joy, in the flow of the tides of racial life are gone.

The normal expression of any instinct in its appropriate object is accompanied by pleasure; and the development of analysis may single out the pleasurable elements of any experience and make them the object of the will to live. It is this hedonistic treatment of the instinct of sex which is the chief cause of the consciousness of shame. The end of nature is no longer the object of man's will. Man has become a rebel, an outcast. The clandestine worship of Venus has supplanted the reverent worship of the Great Mother. A sex consciousness which has lost the objective of nature is the ground of one of the deepest sources of shame. Venus is the symbol of sex as a process divorced by the individual will from the ends of nature. Passion devoted to Venus has no objective circle of interest in which to swing. Pleasure is not a legitimate object of the will. It is an accompaniment of any process of will which is reaching its proper objective fulfilment. Aphrodite, the sacred mother of life, was the symbol in ancient thought of the sex processes as issuing in the preservation of the race. Aphrodite as the august symbol of a self-perpetuating life can alone furnish the objective pattern by which the powerful impulse of sex can be organized. Nature is not remade by the arbitrary personal philosophies of individual minds. Where the object of the will conflicts with the objective ends of instinct there necessarily results a condition of chronic nervous and mental strain. The channels through which the instinct of sex expresses itself, the higher idealization of sex, are due to reason, but the sex drive itself is one of the ageless processes of nature. Its suppression by the thought and the will of the individual is only apparent. By being divorced from the will the sex instinct is made the nucleus of a powerful emotional complex. A system of

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emotionally toned ideas is built up around the suppressed instinct. A double-mindedness develops. Within the field of sex the will becomes highly unstable. The disassociation of the sex consciousness from the personality gives increased energy to the sex instinct by freeing it from the organizing control of the will. In the Puritan type of mind, especially in women, the moral ego forces the sex instinct into a separate compartment of the mind. There arises, with varying degrees of strength and organization, a second personality.

The advent of reason occurred but yesterday in the history of the race; the instinct patterns, on the other hand, are the surviving modes of response that have come down from an unknown past. If the mind of man evolves a system of intellectual ideas which run counter to the ineradicable action patterns of the race man must lay on his own conscience the responsibility for such a conflict. Freud has called our attention to the widespread conflict between the instincts of the race and the cherished intellectual ideals of the civilized man. The ego-complex of the highly individualized consciousness is maintained at the price of a constant warfare with the instincts of the race.

The half millennium of Protestant rule is still saturated with the ideal of sex derived from the previous millennium of mediæval ethics. The chastity of Milton's Comus is but the Protestant equivalent of Augustine's celibacy.

In woman, especially, sex may be so repressed as to be submerged below the level of conscious motives. The moral censor may be so consolidated, so unified, that the sex motive may be forced completely out of the conscious moral ego. The instinct of sex because it is not consciously organized by the will and reason, because it is no longer controlled by the moral censor, becomes the subconscious nucleus of a separate disorganizing personality.

The disassociation of the will from the instinct of sex always brings to the foreground of consciousness the reality of sex in its most terrible form. Nature, the great mother, always sends her avenging furies on the will which attempts

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to thwart her plans. This is the theme of Euripides' Hippolytus. Modern philosophy by bringing the inner life of the mediæval church to individual self-consciousness has brought the traditional dualism of will and sex closer home to the individual mind. All the various modern forms of sex inhibition are unconscious survivals of the mediæval cult of virginity and chastity. But the suppression of the most volcanic of all instincts has filled the subterranean caves of the mind with the fiercest beasts of human passion. The apostasy of the will from the purposes of Nature, the great mother, always leads to a wavering of the heart between the worship of the Virgin and the cult of Venus. The great mother will avenge herself on him who prefers the objects of his own reason and will to the ends of her own ageless purposes.

If the instinctive action-patterns are the ultimate sources of all the energy of volition, then any permanent blocking of these action-patterns will set up a dualism, a disassociation, in consciousness. In this process those who are nervously and mentally unstable will suffer most. But strain, conflict, disassociation, even in the most stable, implies a shunting off of volition from its instinctive sources of energy.

The emotion of sex is the voice of a unit larger than the self-conscious individual person. Schopenhauer is right in setting the pattern of sex over against the a priori patterns of the reason as interpreted by the individualism of modern thought. But this is no condemnation of sex. The race cannot be condemned by the individual, especially when the view of the individual who passes judgment was formulated by the abstract rationalism of the eighteenth century and ignores the deeper racial aspects of each individual life.

Sex instinct stamps the individual of our modern intellectualistic thought with incompleteness. We are in dire need of a larger definition of the individual which shall include the individual elements of the mind, such as reason and will, and the deeper instinct patterns of the race in one living whole.

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This view of the relation of will to instinct connects volition, conscience, the ideal self, with those deeper instinctive patterns apart from which the will is an inefficient and disruptive activity.

Psychology is showing us the truth of the Platonic view of the will expressed in the Symposium. Here in a myth Plato teaches us that the will of the higher self must learn to see in the older instinctive pattern of sex activity not a limitation, but an enlargement. On the theory of the priority and absoluteness of individual volition the sex instinct is a limitation. It is exorcised, "diabolized," and a dual personality is the result. But Plato sees deeper than this. That form of unrest which the poets call love is an unconscious search of the mind for a part of our nature which because we are individuals has been lost!

The abstract spirituality which centred about the virtues of chastity and celibacy symbolized, objectively, the thrusting of the family outside the moral realm, and subjectively, the development of an introverted, truncated, unstable will. The introspective individual must enlarge its conception of itself; the drives of sex and parenthood must be regarded as entering into the very basis of the will, and the objective of the family must save the will from the process of introversion, from its feeding on its own vitals. The ideal of the inner life must be brought within the circle of the instincts of sex and parenthood. This is not imposing a social institution on the inner will of the individual; for sex means that the self has within its very nature the drive toward motherhood and fatherhood. This drive breaks down the barrier which a rationalistic psychology has set up between an inner, spiritual will and the institution of the family. The moralization of the drive of sex restores to the will one of its main sources of power and one of its chief social objectives lost in the downfall of Paganism. The introverted will is in need of redemption. It is without power and it is without objective. It will be a new day in ethics when the feverish, detached self discovers that thought has not been achieved by evolution for the purpose

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of combating the powerful drives and social objectives of the pre-reflective life. Then will dawn an era in which reason and volition and self-conciousness, which have been achieved through a long and perilous process, will serve as the nucleus for the reorganization, the redirection, the idealization, of the deeper and older drives and objectives of human nature. And in this process the ideals of the inner life will be realized in a richer way than the mediæval seers could ever have realized. The dream of the inner life will be realized not in a process of negation, but in a positive development in which our instincts and emotions and desires will be organized in a system of objective ends.

Knowledge, pleasure, conscience, individuality, freedom, are not ends in themselves; they are the means of raising the deeper instinctive patterns of the mind to higher levels of experience. Rationalism, hedonism, intuitionalism, individualism, are all attempts to cultivate a subtle independence of the racial foundations of life. Such independence is deceptive.

With the development of the inner life the drive of the sex instinct came into open conflict with the will. This is the meaning of the ideal of chastity, of the cult of the Virgin, of the centuries of monasticism. But this disassociation of the will from the drive of the sexual and parental instincts diabolized both the instinct of sex and the institution of the family. By diabolizing the family this disassociation destroyed the normal objective of the sex drive and thus introduced introversion, internalization and all the different forms of intuitionalism. Thus was laid the basis for a veritable moral insanity, for man's individuality as well as that of woman can reach its full orb only within the circle of sex and parenthood. The individual of the mediæval rationalistic type proved its inadequacy by bringing to light the more terrible aspects of the sex instinct. This disassociation, by diabolizing the instinct of sex, disorganized the very process of the will itself, for the maximum energy of volition can be attained only in a proper organization by the reason of the ideals, the sentiments,

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the habits, upon the deeper action-patterns of the instinctive and emotional sort. Will, to be effective, must have something of the power and immediacy of instinct and emotion. A chronically inhibited will cannot be an efficient will. Our will must express itself through our deepest predispositions. Our professional ideals, our interest in art, literature, social service, should be an extension of, and not a substitute for, our deepest instincts.

In the animal the sex rhythm is seasonal; and there still remains in the sex life of woman a monthly periodicity. In the human male, however, the urge of sex is chronic. Also the complex development of the cerebrum with its development of free imagery has influenced the sex life.

This difference in the sexual life of the human male and female has brought about in man a condition of sexual suppression. Sex, unlike fear and anger, is fairly independent of objective, environmental stimuli. It is a practically continuous urge of the psychophysical life, like hunger or gregariousness or workmanship. But unlike these instincts sexual expression is limited to definitely specific channels. This situation involving such protracted inhibition is the greatest single cause of disassociation between will and instinct. It actually tends toward a dualism of personality. It is this dualism of volition and sex which underlies the most intense consciousness of shame and sin. This conflict is not only historically but psychologically the nucleus about which has been woven the dogma of the fall of man.

It is in the sexual realm particularly that man finds himself literally as well as theologically damned. The traditional dualism of mind and body finds its most perfect expression in the field of sex, and as the traditional conscience is most adequately expressed in woman it is in her that this dualism is unconsciously incarnated. The traditional dualism has in many women forced the sex urge into the unconscious. Another source of friction is due to the fact that the sex life of woman tends normally to issue in, and to centre about, the birth and development of children.

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The long period of gestation and the prolongation of infancy give an orientation to the sex life of woman which does not exist in the male mind.

It is a sad psychological and ethical fact that novels and dramas which deal with the sex question usually end with marriage. Romance traditionally ends with marriage. It is a still more shocking fact that the Greek idealization of sex which culminated in Platonic love was independent not only of the family, but of woman herself. And mediæval love, as embodied in the immortal experience of Dante, was not the love of husband and wife; it was the sublimated form of love which only a saint could experience toward a spiritualized abstraction. The object of mediæval love was rather a sexual hallucination than a woman; and the love of chivalry while existing between individuals in the flesh did not exist between husbands and wives.

It is the consciousness of sex tension in man that drives him to seek in woman his own sex parallel. He wants to believe that she too has the same sexual urge that fires and animates him. The psychoanalysis of the abnormal mind supports this view. So, also, do the writings of a growing number of women psychologists. According to this view woman has her own sex urge determined by her physiological rhythm. Stanley Hall sees in the synchronizing of the rhythm of the male and female, which makes possible a totalizing of volition and instinct, the redemption, the regeneration of man's disassociated will. This unifying of a temporarily repressed instinct and the personal volition of the individual results in the true spiritualization of sex. The disassociation of the Great Mother and the Christian Virgin is overcome in a higher synthesis.

If it be true that the energies of the will are in the instincts, we have the key by means of which the dualism of volition and instinctive drive can be overcome. Disassociation can be remedied by re-training, by re-education. Protestant psychology and ethics have not only not overcome the dualism which they inherited from the Christian conflict with paganism, but they have introduced this

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dualism into the very citadel of the individual personality itself. We must re-educate ourselves out of this disassociation of personality, this dualism of sex and volition.

It is the unity of volition and reason with the deeper patterns of racial life which makes possible all genuine creative activity. If the disassociation of the instinct of sex from sentiment and volition and reason brought about the Fall of Man, then an integration of instinct and will is literally a process of regeneration. It is psychologically a process of redemption from the fall of disassociation wherein man becomes conscious of sin in its deepest sense. This is, however, only one of the many phases of the process of regeneration or redemption. The protest of the Christian conscience against a purely physical sex life has crystallized itself in the symbol of the Holy Virgin. And the true redemption of sex is achieved only when this Virgin becomes a Mother. This fusion of instinct and volition does away with the dualism of body and mind; it incarnates spirit in a body. It is a process of redemption so far as our sex life is concerned. The individual is born of the spirit only when the will swings into the deeper and wider orbit of racial motivation. The holy spirit is the link between individual volition and the surges of life manifesting themselves in the race.

Plato tells us that all original creation is a form of divine madness. In the minds of Plato and Dante,—and, as we can see more clearly to-day, of Paul and of Augustine as well,—there were energies of sex which carried the will to unsuspected levels of achievement. The sex drive, like the drive of gregariousness or of workmanship, can furnish a divine madness which gives creative power to whatever major interest the individual may have. The creativeness of Dante is traceable to his spiritualized passion for Beatrice. The chronic suppression of instinct brought to consciousness, if it did not bring into being, the human will, the self, the personality. And the sublimation of the sex impulse has furnished a vast store of energy to the will; this is especially true in the fields of art, religion, morality

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and literature. There is no field of endeavor into which the energies of a sublimated sex consciousness do not directly or indirectly radiate. Temporary inhibition furnishes the maximum of volitional energy. But chronic inhibition results in instability, disorder and abnormality of will.

The universals of the rationalists are unreal fictions to us. And the "social consciousness" is equally unreal. We cannot escape the ego. The hope of society is to be realized in enlarging the ego. Through such mental patterns as those of sex and parenthood and gregariousness the individual is furnished with objects in common with other individuals. These patterns constitute the mental patterns of what Kidd appropriately calls the social integration.

The enlargement of the will through these deeper racial drives melts away the phobias and the inhibitions of the introverted self. Wife and child and the economics of the home are no longer "fetters" which bind the will,—as Buddhism regards them;—they are a means through which the ego, the will, is enlarged. What was a disassociated, inhibiting, instinct of sex becomes a drive of nature furnishing both momentum and perspective to the individual will.

The instinct of sex keeps alive in us the old pagan naturalism. But we have been forever lifted above our pagan selves by centuries of mediæval asceticism. Nor have these centuries of inhibition been a hopeless nightmare of the will, for through this discipline the drive of sex may be lifted into the higher level of volition and love.

The facts of experience, such as sensations, images and ideas, are always organized, more or less completely, into wholes by the various instinctive drives. *It is within such a drive or whole that every sustained process of volition must function.* And sex is one of the dominant drives of the race in the individual mind. Every instinctive drive has an objective end. Without such an objective end the sex consciousness becomes a hotbed of festering sentimentality. If the drives, the creative patterns, of life are in the in-

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stincts, then the will must find its ends and its motive power in the instincts. The ends of individual volition apart from the ends of the race are blind alleys. The sex instinct, like all instincts, has its unity of pattern, and volition can find a durable end only within the instinctive pattern which nature provides.

The saying that true marriages are made in heaven indicates the difficulty with which the inner conscious purposes of the individual fit themselves into the deeper abiding patterns of the race.

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THE MORAL EDUCATION OF YOUTH.

M. C. OTTO.

IN view of the prevailing unrest it is natural that we should be finding a new significance in the old Hebrew aphorism, "Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it." It is true there was never a time when men were indifferent to the moral outlook of the rising generation. In the lowliest, most primitive social economy we know anything about it was already considered of paramount importance to make certain that those who should shortly constitute the community were equipped to carry on its common beliefs and practices. And this has continued to be a central concern of men from generation to generation, from age to age, through every change of economic condition or spiritual state. In the last two decades, however, the subject has received new emphasis in this country and abroad. This new emphasis has taken the form of a demand for formal moral instruction of school children. In our own country associations and leagues for the promotion of such instruction have grown in numbers, laws have been put upon the statute books making moral education compulsory throughout the public schools, state-wide courses have been introduced even where no law existed, a whole library of books on the subject has been published, covering the field from kindergarten to college, while training courses have been introduced into the universities to prepare teachers for the supervision of moral education in the grades and in the high schools. In short, a widespread, well-organized movement is under way intent upon making it a function of public education to determine the ethical personality of the coming generation through formal instruction in morals. The movement will no doubt be greatly stimulated during the next few years in an effort to counteract the disintegrating effects of the war and the increasing tendency to irresponsi-

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bility and lawlessness which we believe ourselves to be witnessing.

No argument is needed to show that this is a matter of great importance. To the man or woman interested in the human venture nothing more fundamental could be proposed. Two questions push to the front at once: (a) What is the conception of morality upon which moral instruction in the schools is to be based? (b) By what means is this morality to be made to function in the lives of the instructed? In a word, what are the ethical and psychological assumptions and implications of the movement? However highminded the advocates of moral education may be, the deliberate purpose of using the public schools for the inculcation of ideas of right and wrong is so fraught with vital social consequences that it demands the most careful examination.

The first discovery one makes upon familiarizing one's self with the movement is that moral education seems a much simpler problem to many of its advocates than one had supposed it to be. Up to a few months ago, for example, the school laws of one of our eastern states which declared it illegal for any public school teacher to receive compensation for her services unless she taught her pupils, among other things, "honesty, kindness, justice, and moral courage," concluded with this simple provision: "The memorizing and reciting by each pupil to the teacher of quotations or a declamation of not less than fifty words, and upon these subjects, shall be equivalent to and take the place of four weeks' requirements in this section."

Perhaps this is the lower limit of the over-simplification in question; still, it differs only in degree from the bulk of the literary output on the subject. In one of our southern states a book has just been published by authority of the State Board of Education which aims to "suggest methods of inspiring a love and desire for the civic virtues in the hearts of our boys and girls and conversely a detestation of vice and wrong." The method to be employed is the usual one of story telling, and the book comprises a large

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number of highly abbreviated tales, fables, and anecdotes, the telling of which, the reader is assured, will serve "to establish high ideals in the minds and hearts of our future citizens." To develop self-control the children are to be told the story of Socrates, who refused to be disturbed in his meditations even when his exasperated wife poured hot water on his bald head; to develop the sense of orderliness they are to be told of Von Moltke who, when an orderly burst into his bedroom announcing that France had declared war on Germany, simply directed him to File E in his cabinet (containing complete directions for the conduct of the war) and calmly turned over and went to sleep again; to develop truthfulness they are to be told the story which opens with this dramatic sentence: "When he was quite small his father gave him a bright new hatchet. . . ."

Other enthusiasts favor visual instruction. They pin their faith to the stereopticon. Lantern slides, illustrating moral situations, are to be sent from school to school accompanied by suitable printed remarks which are to be memorized by a capable teacher and delivered in connection with the pictures. Still others, admitting the advantages of visual instruction, oppose the lantern-slide method because it fails to catch the active aspect of conduct. They are all for moral movies. And so on.

It is true that these naïve schemes would be rejected as worthless by the leading moral educationalists, but their objection does not go to the root of the matter. How much less naïve, after all, is the program of some of the recognized experts? A book on Citizenship, the work of four women, with an introductory chapter by ex-President Taft, and highly endorsed by superintendents, principals, and teachers in various parts of the country, is representative. Beginning in the first grades with simple stories in kindness and helpfulness at home and in school, the book is intended to provide teachers with the means of developing, through the use of graded stories, poems, and definite suggestions for morning talks, "an ideal attitude of the pupil toward himself, his comrades, his community, his own

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nation, and the other nations of the world." One searches in vain in the writings of these authors for the slightest suspicion that there is any difficulty connected with formulating such an ideal attitude, or the slightest doubt that such an ideal attitude can be verbally communicated by teachers who have properly digested the material supplied to them for the purpose. In this they are typical of the movement. With striking unanimity writers on moral education ignore the difficulty of reducing to a set of teachable formulas what William James called life's concrete fulness. With the same unanimity they assume, as one of them expresses it, that "the minds of children are wax to receive and marble to retain." And all the while they take it for granted that if these moral formulas are transferred from teacher to pupil by word of mouth they will make their appearance in the latter as habits, and that adherence to a set of approved habits constitutes character.

Offhand it would seem a waste of time to discuss this aspect of moral education on the ground that the public cannot for any length of time be imposed upon by a program out of touch with the realities of human nature and the conditions of life. Unfortunately the facts do not warrant such optimism. Not only has this type of moral education already found its way into the schools, but unless active measures are taken to oppose its progress it will become still more popular in the course of the next decade. Our growing nervousness regarding the moral outlook of the rising generation, our increasing fears for the existing social and economic order, our irrational insistence upon immediate, advertisable results, these and other factors co-operate to make us extremely gullible when noble sounding schemes of moral regeneration are presented to us. Unless effective opposition develops there is little doubt that we shall live to see school children receiving regular instruction in morals from teachers who mistake sentimentalism for moral fervor and a succession of emotional thrills for the development of character; we shall see it become a function of public education to exploit the moral

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energies of youth in the interest of a travesty on morality. To turn for a way out of the present crisis to moral education thus conceived would be nothing short of a social catastrophe. The program would fail to enlist youth in the great task of achieving the best possible scheme of life and would tend to make moral idealism itself ridiculous. Which is to say, that just in so far as the moral educators in question have their way, the next generation will not only be left idealistically bankrupt, but with the feeling that idealism is bunk.

Moral educators, however, are not all of this get-rich-quick class. There are some who have a sense of reality. They realize that to develop the character of youth calls for all the knowledge, insight, skill, and common sense the teacher can muster. They realize, as the outstanding book on the subject puts it, that "moral instruction does not have a mass of putty to deal with," but that "ideal, however incoherent and imperfectly formulated, faces ideal from the day the teacher is confronted with his pupil." They see in the child the centre of a long line of influences—tendencies of race, of ancestry, of family—constituting a powerful, often a baffling force. Moreover, they appreciate the complexity of issues in terms of which present-day morality must be conceived. Consequently they reject the Sunday school philosophy and the Sunday school technique to which the majority subscribe. What, then, do they propose?

First of all, a profound difference in ethical theory divides these moral educators from the others. They look upon the development of character not as the result of ideas funnelled into the minds of youth from without, but as the result of the perfection of powers found within. The moral life is expanded or is actualized as these potential powers are perfected through responding to suitable stimuli. This change is a big step in advance. It centres attention upon the nature of youth rather than upon the desires of adults, and it suggests the important doctrine that character is the precipitate of action.

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As applied, the theory takes two very interesting forms. In the one case, "the whole future man" is conceived to be "hidden, not yet declared, but latent all the same in the child's heart." The problem of the moral educator is to unfold this latent moral nature. This is to be accomplished by telling to children fables and stories which set forth the peculiar virtues and temptations of childhood. If these stories are properly told, the moral law enshrined in them will call forth "an answering echo" from the child, and through response to a progressive series of stories, thus presented, the child's innate moral nature may gradually be liberated. In the other case, the outstanding moral defect is conceived to be moral thoughtlessness, or blindness to the ramifying effects of conduct. What is needed, therefore, is the development of "the power and the habit of reflecting upon life." Now power is obtainable in only one way, by exercise. Hence, the analysis of moral issues as presented in stories, biography, history should be made an integral part of public education. Through such exercise children will acquire the habit of analyzing actual moral situations and will thus perfect the power which is the chief attribute of the moral man, namely, moral thoughtfulness.

This is not the occasion to consider the conceptions of morality here adumbrated even if it were fair to criticize views so greatly condensed. One remark regarding each may perhaps be in place as germane to the central point at issue in this discussion. With reference to the first view, it seems no more reasonable to hold that character is hidden away in the child than that a certain number and variety of jumps are hidden away in the frog. In each case we have capacities which, given proper conditions, will lead to characteristic results. This is important to bear in mind, because it calls attention to the fact that the result is not the unfolding of something already existing, but the joint product of a given capacity and the nature of the environment. An actual jump made by a frog comes into being when a stimulus of a certain sort impels a frog to exercise his jumping powers in a certain way. What we

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are given with the frog is jumpability, not an assortment of jumps. Similarly, an actual character develops as a certain kind of environment calls into play certain human capacities rather than others. What we are given in the child is character capacity, not the adult character as yet unfolded. Character is not a deliverance, but an achievement.

The second view looks in a more promising direction. It is a real contribution to the subject to make insight into the ramifying consequences of action an essential quality of the moral attitude. But what assurance have we that the analysis of set problems, under the conditions bound to obtain, will develop a power and habit that will carry over into concrete moral crises? Even granting that we are satisfied on this point, a more serious objection remains. Since the aim is character rather than intellectual exercise for its own sake, something more is needed than insight. There must be sensitiveness to the conflicting ends which insight reveals. In other words, unless this reflection upon life is the servant of a particular kind of purpose, a purpose, let us say, to realize the richest total of satisfaction out of the interests in conflict, it has no more connection with morality than a knowledge of geometry has. What reason have we to believe that the analysis, at set times, of artificial moral problems, will develop this purpose?

This brings us to the heart of the matter. How does a human being acquire his character? How does he attain to the moral ideas that function significantly in his life? Where does he get the standards of right and wrong he actually lives by? Are these communicated to him through formal instruction or the analysis of type situations, or do they come to expression in him in the give and take of life? The moral educators, whatever their differences, rely for the development of the moral personality upon exercises conducted alongside of and in preparation for the everyday activities. This alone is a serious objection to the whole movement. It withdraws attention from the chief source of our vital moral ideas. Our vital moral ideas are not

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acquired in courses designed to prepare us for life, but from contact with life itself. The process is illustrated in the story told by a former university student:

"Until I was eight years old, telling the truth was as natural as breathing. I doubtless exaggerated and created romantic tales out of nothing, but, as far as I know, I never, up to that time, deliberately set out to deceive. But now I learned to lie, and it was my father who taught me. This is the way it happened.

"One afternoon after school, coming home hungry and finding my mother out, I went into the cellar where I ate the half of a smoked sausage and drank some milk. On the way up the cellar steps I met my father coming down.

" 'What have you been doing?' he asked.

"Out of my surprise, hardly knowing what I said, but certainly with no set purpose to deceive him, I replied, 'Why, nothing.'

"There were evidently tell-tale traces about my mouth, for he asked me to show my tongue.

" 'So you've been drinking milk,' he said. 'What else did you have?'

"I was overwhelmed by shame, not shame for what I had done or because I was conscious of guilt (as my father no doubt thought), but because of a dumb sense of the ignominious situation in which my father and I were involved. 'I ate some smoked sausage,' I replied.

" 'Is that all?'

" 'Yes.'

" 'And yet you told me you had done nothing,' said my father sternly. 'Come upstairs.'

"My father carefully explained both before and after the ordeal that the whipping was not for eating the sausage or drinking the milk, but for lying, for telling him that I hadn't been doing anything in the cellar when I had been doing a good deal.

"The lesson my father intended to enforce was, of course, the advantage of being truthful, but the experience had a quite different effect upon me. The one thing that stood out in my childish mind was that confessing had brought a whipping. While the tears were still wet on my face I experienced a new insight. It was my first clean-cut conception of a lie. 'Perhaps,' I said to myself, 'if you say you didn't do a thing which you did do, and stick to it, you'll get along better.' The idea came like an illumination, banishing all sense of hurt feelings or bodily pain.

"A few days later I was charged by a neighbor with a misdemeanor of which I was actually guilty. I stoutly denied it, and felt a new sense of power in doing so. The evidence was strong against me, and yet confronted by my father I persisted in my denial. 'Now remember,' he said, 'what happens when you lie. What you are accused of isn't so bad, and

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can be fixed up; I shan't whip you for it. But if you lie about it, you may expect severe punishment.'

"I almost winked at myself in spite of my nervousness. Looking my father in the eye I said: 'I tell you I didn't do it. You may whip me if you want to, but I won't lie.'

"This was a poser for my father. Much puzzled, he let me off. I have no words to describe the ecstasy of that moment. My whole being shouted 'Didn't I tell you! Didn't I tell you!' I soon became one of the most artistic little liars, I believe, that ever walked, and I came to take keen delight in a neat deception."

This story makes clear the point at issue. I am contending that children acquire certain modes of behavior through participation in life and that these give rise to their moral ideas however we may teach and preach. How much, for example, can be accomplished by formal instruction in respect for age in a town where an elderly woman who had failed to buy liberty bonds was locked in a circus cage and hilariously hauled through the hooting streets? How deep going will formal instruction in respect for law be in the city where, only the other day, when the common council by regular vote refused to place a captured siege-gun in the public park, on the ground that so doing would encourage the militaristic spirit, a mob of citizens set it there a visible witness to respected lawlessness? What will moral instruction accomplish toward solving the negro problem in the South while lynching and mobbing of negroes is permitted? The effect upon the adult white citizen is distressing enough, but the effect upon the children is appalling. What difference will it make to give formal lessons in good-will to children in a class-conscious labor community, or in any community the daily and hourly life of which is dedicated body and soul to the competitive acquisition of material goods? No; it is not the scheduled filtering in of ideas, but the behavior called forth by the texture of everyday life that determines the character of developing human beings.

And children, as we all know, are extraordinarily canny in seeing through our verbal morality to the real springs of action beneath, so that even the subtler motives of our

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lives are sensed by them. They accept the real motives of our lives rather than our published creeds as authority. What we do, as Emerson put it, thunders so loudly in their ears that they cannot hear what we say. The playground, the street, overheard conversations, books, newspapers, movies, the routine of school and home life, in a word, all the various contacts with men and women and the world, these are the real character building forces. It is these we must elevate if we are concerned for the moral outlook of the generation to come. The problem is no easier than that. The moral education of youth involves first of all a moral regeneration of adults.

The contention so far has been that character is not the resultant of verbal instruction. Perhaps one or two cautions are advisable. There is no intention to hold that all telling of stories or discussion of moral problems is futile. At critical junctures, when the story or the discussion has direct reference to an actual situation, when real alternatives of conduct present a living option, and with a suitable person as guide, stories, poems, conversation may make all the difference in the world. The issue may be clarified, the conflicting values involved may be set into relief, the force of a respected or loved personality may be brought to bear, and so conduct of the profoundest moral significance may be initiated. This, however, in no way warrants the conclusion that moral instruction, at stated times remote from such occasion, with no provision that the instruction lead to action, and with the whole exercise in charge of either the already overworked teachers or of professional moralizers, will have anything like the same effect. The odds are against its doing anything but harm.

Another thing must be kept in mind. We are concerned with the great mass of public school children. The proposed moral education may be effective as regards the sheltered children of the few, because the environment with which they are most intimately and continuously in contact is fashioned to enforce the ideas promulgated through teaching. But this only emphasizes the validity of the

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position that character grows out of the give and take of life.

To say that scheduled moral instruction cannot be depended on to develop in children the disposition and judgment which together constitute the essentials of character is not to say that it has no effect whatever. For one thing, it cannot but promulgate a most unhappy conception of morality, a morality which consists in adherence to a list of abstract virtues. The whole scheme of moral instruction, as developed in book after book, begins with a table of virtues, such as courtesy, bravery, humility, generosity, honesty, thrift, patriotism, and ends with a theory as to how these may be instilled into the young. But genuine moral situations are always concrete; they always have to do with specific conditions, and thus always involve the fitting of the general rule to the particular case. When a boy has learned the rules of baseball he finds them to hold wherever baseball is played. Not so with the rules of morality. Here is he taught by example and by precept that circumstances alter cases. And this—the interpretation of the general rule to fit the specific case—is the crucial moral issue. It is at this point that character improves or deteriorates. Yet this important fact is persistently ignored. As a result most people grow into the conception that the business of life is one thing, the business of being good another. You do your best to be moral under the condition of being successful. The difficulty arising from the attempt to apply an abstract rule to a concrete case is well shown in a discussion which took place between a boy of eleven and his sister of thirteen. The first thing overheard was in the sister's voice:

"Well, you shouldn't fight."

"I know I shouldn't fight," replied the lad; "but what's a fellow to do when a kid picks on him?"

"I tell you it isn't right to fight," urged his sister.

"Yes, and if you don't," returned her brother, "you're a coward. I heard Dad tell Ma you were."

At that the faint-hearted heroine lost her patience. "I tell you you shouldn't fight," said she, stamping her foot. "Can't you understand me?"

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But the little hero would not let go of the reality of the conflict that results when you try to apply a ready-made standard invented by grown-ups to an actual situation as it arises in a ten-year-old's life.

"You keep on saying 'You shouldn't fight' 'you shouldn't fight' 'you shouldn't fight!'" he fairly shouted. "I tell you it ain't so easy." And then, gathering together all his pent-up scorn at one who would deal in this offhand manner with a genuine perplexity, he rammed his hands deep into his trousers' pockets, turned upon his heel, and hissed over his shoulder as he departed, "You make me sick."

Here is the problem in a nutshell. We shall have done much toward the moral education of youth when we shall have agreed to define morality not as the observance of a set of abstract rules, but as such a way of dealing with the issues of all sorts that arise in our daily life as shall make life more liveable for all. Experience has taught us that certain acts defeat us in this attempt, that certain others help us on, but this is far from saying that our catalogue of right and wrong actions, abstractly conceived, covers the issues of life. On the contrary, as our Latin teachers used to tell us, there is no rule to which there are not several exceptions. This being the case, let us put our cards on the table; let us admit that our moral virtues and vices are rough and tentative, and let us urge that the noblest life aims ever to broaden and always to give unique expression to its purpose to observe them. After all, what more can we sincerely say to one another than this: Aim so to act that if everybody acted on your principle of action life would become, as you honestly believe, ever richer in satisfaction; and seek as you can to give this purpose broader and deeper meaning as years and experience and opportunity come your way.

Scheduled morning talks will do another thing. They will supply the pupils with notions and prejudices. At present the books insist that moral instruction be nonsectarian and unpartizan. This is an impossible program. Any teachable morality must have content; there must be something to teach. And in the very nature of things the tendency of any table of virtues and vices is to become sectarian and partizan. The very statement of neutrality

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as a rule discloses bias. Take the resolution passed by the Educational Association of South Dakota: "Whereas a sound morality," it reads, "is the very foundation of a truly progressive society and of a healthy public opinion, we recommend that systematic ethical instruction be a part of the course of study in our public schools. We believe that this instruction should be entirely divorced from partizan and sectarian bias and founded on the broad basis of Christian ethics."

This is only one aspect of the matter. Let formal instruction in morals become an integral part of public education and the bias will not stop at the unconscious point. The whole educational machinery will very shortly be employed deliberately in the interest of the dominant social group. We have recently seen the political governments encroach upon the world-wide free masonry of science, art, music, literature, and other spiritual activities of mankind which are by nature universal. We are aware of the difficulty of getting uncontaminated news, and since the Great Steel Strike there is no excuse for doubting that even religion is exposed to the danger of being exploited by powerful interests in the service of their private ends. With this record before us, with this living danger active about us, how can we fail to anticipate the inevitable next step if formal instruction in right and wrong becomes a function of public education? The dominant group, be it what it may, will poison citizenship in the making in order to perpetuate itself in power. And that would be the greatest calamity mankind could be called upon to suffer, for it would make normal what is after all still exceptional,—the encroachment of this dominant group upon the most sacred domain of life, the moral potentialities of youth.

Well, then, what is the upshot of the whole matter? As it seems to me, there is but one permissible conclusion. If we are really interested in the moral outlook of those who are to succeed us, we shall do our best to establish conditions which will make growth in character the natural, normal result of the daily contacts of life, in school and out.

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At present the mass and momentum of these contacts are set against the promptings of youth's aspiring hours. From the beginning, we emphasize the letter of morality while we undermine its spirit. And if aspiration develops in spite of this, if it has not been starved, betrayed, or crushed out by the time school days are over (thanks very often to that strange renewal of being we call adolescence), then with what ruthless insistance does the work-a-day world lay siege to the idealism that remains! By direct attack, by bribery, by innuendo, by every art of compulsion and persuasion, communication with life chills the ardor of idealism until one by one we enter the game in which each tries to defeat the rest and the devil gets us all. Nothing so eloquently testifies to the deep reality of human aspiration as its persistence in spite of these obstacles, as its perennial resurrection from the grave of buried hopes and lost causes. In some men it triumphs gloriously, overcoming all odds; in others it fights a slow retreat, making many a noble stand before it retires at last beyond the smoke-veiled sunset. Only in the few does it go out altogether. But in all it battles against the weight of common practice and against the great bulk of wood and steel and stone of the things that are. It is this fact we must amend. We must give youth's moral possibilities a better chance. To be sure, not all have equal capacity. There are moral imbeciles as there are mental imbeciles. The great mass, however, have greater capacity than we realize. They are like unsold bulbs in the florist shop, sending out little premature sprouts, but for lack of soil never coming to flower. One thing cannot be dodged or avoided, society must be so constituted that the everyday relations of man with man do not subvert the moral life but offer an opportunity for its fulfilment.

Parallel with this change must go the recreation of the school in accordance with the same principle. Public education can be made a great moral instrument provided we turn the regular school work to account instead of depending for results upon special courses in morals con-

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ducted on the side. Unless the entire school economy is designed to further the moral education of youth little can be accomplished. This means that the prevalent conception of morality as conformity to catalogue virtues must be replaced by a very different one, a conception which appeals to the greatest moral force at our disposal, namely, the ambition of every normal human being to make something of his life. Instead of exhorting to self-denial, and forgetting that every act of self-denial is an act of self-assertion, one self going down that another may go up, we shall utilize the dynamic power of self-respect and concentrate attention where it belongs, upon the nature of the most desirable self. With education organized on this basis the important qualities of the moral personality—intellectual integrity, creative purpose, a sense of workmanship, the spirit of co-operation, appreciation of beauty—may all be developed in the regular course of school work.

Finally, a great driving force may be secured for morality by bringing the individual's ambition to make something of life into accord with man's project of making himself at home on this planet. That is to say, the spontaneous and powerful impulse to self-realization characteristic of youth may be won to the service of mankind. Here the way to begin is plain. Nothing so appeals to human beings as the story of human beings. Nothing so appeals to youth. Where men have tramped and sailed; what songs they've sung, what deeds they've wrought; how they've lived and how they've died; this is the interest behind all our casual and learned questions about the stage, the stage-setting, the properties, the trappings, and the rest. The Story of Man, the checkered career of victories and defeats through which we have come to where we are with our spiritual assets and liabilities, is adventure in the grand style.

There was a time when we believed man had been created perfect—in the image of God, we said; had fallen, and crawled still lower. We have learned a better truth. We now know that our earliest brother was nearer brute than God. As we make out his dim figure in the mistiness of

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that early morning, intelligence and human feeling redeem hardly at all the rudeness and barbarity of his life, as the little fire by which he huddles in hairy nakedness illuminates but faintly the gloom of his cavern home. No other adventure can even remotely parallel the romance of his achievement from that far day to this. He has, after all, behaved like a god. He has made waste places to bloom, transformed solitudes into cities, flung a million stars across the night, said unto the lightning, go, and it went to the uttermost parts of the earth. Nor has he failed to make marvelous advances in the realm of the spirit. Science, Art, Law, Philosophy, Literature, Religion, are a few of the great words in which chapters of the story are told. Let it be made a function of public education to acquaint youth with this record; with the dreams which led men on, and the mechanical and social discoveries in which these dreams have been realized. Not with the object of teaching abstract doctrines, but of giving youth a sense of man's achievement and a vision of his possibilities. This will fire the imagination, penetrate to the centre of being, and release the energies upon which the renewal of life depends. Thus the school may serve to lay the foundation of the moral life, which remains, when all our fine words are said, devotion to the project of making life liveable and joyous.

M. C. Otto.

University of Wisconsin.

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MISTAKING AMERICA.

ETHEL E. SABIN.

IN the April number of *The National Review*, a London conservative monthly, and reprinted in *The Living Age* on April 30, there is an article entitled, "Guessing America," by John Otway Percy Bland, sometime Lowell lecturer, traveller, man of affairs, and journalist.

His guess about us, confirmed by a recent visit, during which he unfortunately had the trying experience of reading in its entirety the Sunday edition of a Chicago newspaper, is that as a nation we are addicted to vague idealisms and are blind to the unwholesome realities of our actual life. The reason for this, in his opinion, is that woman, dominating our educational institutions, is able with her "spinster" soul and repressive New England conscience to impress upon the youth of the country—even upon its future leaders—"an obviously feminine conception of morality and utility."

His indictment of America is that as a nation we are sentimental, in evidence of which he cites, among other things, the Fourteen Points, the sponsoring of the League of Nations, Prohibition, Purity Leagues, and the Statue of Liberty. He believes, as has been said, that the cause of this sentimentality is the dominance over American life of a feminine conception of morality and utility.

I find every reason to agree with Mr. Bland's use of the term sentimentality as meaning a sensitive avoidance of realities, coupled with the disaster-fraught attempt to live life upon a plane of compensatory and illusory values. I find every reason to disagree when he further identifies this indiscriminately with idealism and future-looking, melioristic programs. Moreover, I am distinctly puzzled to find a sociologist distinguishing between masculine and feminine morality. We must distinguish, of course, between the moral standards of childhood and of age, and accordingly

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between the morality of men and of women whenever, or wherever, the limitations set upon woman's education and the terms of her life make her intellectual development impossible. But Mr. Bland, himself, viewing women in America to-day describes them, not, I think, without exaggeration, as more eager and alert than men, with a range of vision and activities more commanding, having more speculation in their eyes and a swifter resolution in their voices.

With so much granted to woman's intellectual development, for "alertness," "vision," "speculation" and "resolution" point infallibly to an educated mind, Mr. Bland's disparagement of "feminine morality" can be explained only if he believes that woman's reason has little or nothing to do with her moral judgments, but that, educate her as you will, in matters of conduct she is the creature of impulse and emotion. This is a slippery, as well as an invidious, doctrine, relegating woman to the level of such loveable but irrational animals as our various household pets.

Now it is obvious that an infant's conduct, if its behavior can be dignified by so formal a name, is wholly a matter of random movements, reflexes and instincts. As the normal child grows older the noticeable feature of the development of his conduct is that it becomes amenable to reason. The very instincts are modified by the enlightenment which comes when the consequences of their expression are no longer unknown. In large measure the deepest significance of civilization, as well as of education, is precisely this substitution of rational for instinctive control, which in no sense means the eradication of emotions and of instincts, but only that that which was blind has now received sight. Mr. Bland can hardly mean that woman is a unique exception to this law of human development.

While mentioning education, let me hasten to admit a charge which our English critic might have brought against us, but which he did not. What we do show, both men and women alike, is all too often the sentimentalism, or romanticism, of the half-educated. Very often, we see only part

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way into our problems, and in the half-light of our understanding, the inconsistencies of our courses of conduct are not sharply revealed. Thus, for instance, like the disciples of old, thrilled with a vision of heaven, yet seeking each the place of supreme honor in that Kingdom of equal brotherhood, we are moved to eloquence by the idea of a rule of equal justice among all nations,—in which the United States of America shall hold a sovereign place, safely above all law.

In like manner as a spokesman and a representative of the nation, President Harding proclaims "normalcy" in a time which is actually abnormal in the extreme and in need of radical measures. This is sentimentalism, more disastrous than Don Quixote's.

We have seen that as evidence of our sentimentalism Mr. Bland cites the American support of the League of Nations. There is, as I have just indicated, a way of supporting the idea of a League of Nations which is sentimental. Very different is that mass of opinion in favor of it which issues from such sessions as that of the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia. The purpose and the effect of the discussion there were to throw light both upon the realities of existing conditions and the implications of the proposed remedies, in a manner, dispassionate and exhaustive. The addresses would not have served the traditional purpose of Fourth of July orations, for too many hard truths concerning national bad faith were brought to light to inspire a hearer with a romantic idealism. Many of the proposed schemes were branded as impossible of execution, and yet, throughout this facing of realities, there gleamed a no less determinedly faced program for progress and for betterment based upon an understanding of political and economic laws.

Mr. Bland's article leaves with the reader a further impression which he cannot have intended. It is that one can judge of the quality of an action by knowing—not the motives, or even the intentions which actuated it, nor yet,

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more significant omission still, by knowing the quality of its results, but merely by knowing its source. The "vague idealism and uplift," which he has come to associate with American political pronouncements, is reprehensible in his eyes because he considers it a manifestation of what he calls a feminine monopoly of intellectual and artistic culture in the United States. In all strictness, he is expressing merely his aversion, an emotional response, comparable to a shrug of the shoulders, and not a judgment arrived at by a process of reasonable analysis.

And finally there is "the spinster" whom in his mind's eye Mr. Bland sees leading the male youth of the United States "in the way it should go from childhood to the very portals of manhood." This spinster of hallowed tradition, sensitively avoiding realities, is a younger sister of Mrs. Gamp's Mrs. Harris, that "most famous woman who never lived." In the concrete one must search diligently ere one finds her; in the large I cannot detect her features in our national life. As I think of the women I know in schools, in colleges, in public life, in homes, I am impressed above all with their practical sense. They function very largely as the Ways and Means Committee of our national life. They are more often than not the people to whom men turn in order to have the practical details of their world-embracing reforms accomplished.

Uneasy lies the thinker who dares to make a generalization, and Mr. Bland's last paragraph is a little feverish. He knows his theory may have flaws (it has); he may be told the premises of his argument are false and his conclusions foolish (it is he has said it), but like all of us, when once we have made a pronouncement, he is committed to his standard as to a flag, so rallying to his colors with spirit he asserts that, "Nevertheless, as a theory it is fundamentally scientific and it seems on the face of it to square with the facts."

ETHEL E. SABIN.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

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IS THERE A UNIVERSALLY VALID MORAL STANDARD?

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

"THOSE who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ." Thus spoke the imprisoned Socrates to his disciple Crito as they discoursed concerning the justification of retributive punishment. The master's assertion with regard to the morality of revenge was developed later by Pyrrho and his followers into a broad generalization which we now call ethical subjectivism. Under an eclipse for a number of centuries, it has within the last fifty years emerged from the shadow of neglect and to-day has a large number of adherents. According to this view it is impossible to formulate a moral code which shall be binding upon mankind as a whole. Moral judgments, it asserts, express merely personal likes and dislikes in matters of conduct, and vary from individual to individual as do tastes in pets or tastes in foods. As it would be ridiculous to say to anyone that he ought to like cats as pets or olives as food, if he actually does not like them, so it would be equally ridiculous to say he ought to approve of forgiveness of enemies or of keeping one's pledged word if he happens to feel no approbation for these things. On this basis it was entirely right for the Germans to invade Belgium if they did not feel any dislike to so doing, while it would have been very wicked indeed for the French to have done the same thing if they felt as strongly against it as they have been claiming they did. Accordingly the moral question concerning the invasion of Belgium can only be solved by an examination of the feelings of the Germans,—and these feelings as they happened to be in the year 1914.

The traditional opponents of subjectivism in ethics, as is well known, are ethical rationalism and the egoistic systems.

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The characteristic feature of the former is the assertion of the existence of a certain principle or system of principles actually accepted by all members of the race. The intuitionism of Martineau and the æstheticism of Herbart take the same position at this point. The egoistic theories, whether the "vulgar" egoism of the hedonists, or the "refined" egoism of such men as Green, take another tack. They attempt to reduce the multiform modes of human conduct to the expression of a single desire, or at least assert that this one desire is the only one whose satisfaction will commend itself to reflective scrutiny. The moral judgment is thereupon identified with the approval of the conduct demanded by this desire.

During the past two decades rationalism with its satellites and egoism in all its forms have pretty completely lost their hold upon students of the moral life. In consequence many persons seem to suppose that subjectivism has come into undisputed and indisputable possession of the field. It is the purpose of this paper to challenge this conclusion. It attempts to show that it is possible to face every fact upon which the older theories turned the back and yet find a criterion for distinguishing between valid and invalid moral judgments which shall hold for every human being;—and to find this criterion, not to promulgate it.

Of the grounds upon which ethical subjectivism is based the most telling, the most important, and in every way significant is that which is supplied by the actual variations in the moral judgments of the race. Upon the first view of the field these variations seem to be limitless and planless. Murder, theft, every form of what we regard as sexual immorality, are treated in some parts of the world, at least under certain circumstances, as, at the lowest, permissible, and sometimes highly laudable. On the other hand, that which seems to us trivial may form the content of a demand or a prohibition obedience to which is regarded as the very corner stone of morality. Antigone, *e.g.*, believes herself bound to cast three handfuls of dust upon her brother's

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corpse, though the command of the king threatens anyone with death who shall in so doing satisfy the demands of the Greek burial ritual. This supreme act of sacrifice she lays upon herself in obedience, as she tells us, to "the unwritten laws of God that know not change." Thus in the eyes of ethical subjectivism have the principles for which this heroic soul in her naïve provincialism was willing to lay down her life been laughed to scorn by the passage of time.

Before we accept this conclusion, however, let us look at this seemingly alien conception of duty somewhat more concretely than is sometimes done; and let us try to illuminate it by certain features in our own code which would have seemed equally absurd to our grandfathers. Among the "new commandments" delivered to this age of ours is the following: Thou shalt not spit on the sidewalk. What its basis is everyone knows. It is the belief that tuberculosis germs may be passed from one person to another by this act. The principle at the bottom of this commandment, therefore, is the duty to regard the health of our neighbor. Is there anything new in this principle? The question answers itself. What differentiates us from our grandfathers in this matter, therefore, is not any difference in moral standards; it is merely a difference in opinion concerning the effects that will follow upon a certain action, a difference based upon certain discoveries in the science of bacteriology. The chasm that separates our ideas of duty from those of Antigone is to be bridged in the same way. She felt a compelling obligation to throw a few handfuls of dust upon her brother's corpse because she believed that, failing of the ritual burial, her brother's spirit was condemned, like the Wandering Jew of the Christian legend, to roam restless, homeless, lonely, and despairing, through all the long ages that the world would last.

These simple illustrations will serve as a key for explaining a very large number (by no means all) of the divergences in the use of the adjectives right and wrong. As found in everyday speech these terms are used to express two very different things, namely, approbation or disapprobation of

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the intention or the purpose of an act, and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with its actual results. As everyone knows, it is the purpose only, not the results, that are the object of the moral judgment. If this distinction is sound,—and every eight-year-old boy is acquainted with it, uses it, and carries about with him a rankling sense of injustice perhaps for years when his parents ignore it in their punishments—it will follow that differences of opinion in eschatology, bacteriology, or any other department of the kingdom of science, do not represent differences in moral standards.

The fact that differences in moral judgment are always differences in attitude with regard to the intention or the purpose, that is to say, the end adopted by the will of the agent,—this fact will throw light upon the significance of another widely distributed set of expressions of approbation and condemnation. It is clear that there are a number of likes and dislikes of human actions which persons do not ordinarily regard as belonging in the category of the moral, precisely because they do not refer to intentions. One of the most important forms of these dislikes has its source in the feeling of disgust. A sufficient illustration is the disgusting in table manners. There are, however, certain condemnations of actions into which enters the element of disgust for which the adjective wrong is more or less habitually used. This is particularly true of offenses against the code of sexual morality, but it applies to many others also. How it comes about that sometimes these disgusts lead us to use the adjective wrong and at other times do not, is an interesting question to which I believe a satisfactory answer can be given. But the question why is irrelevant to our present inquiry and may be dismissed. Our immediate problem is: Do expressions of disgust as such, even when using the vocabulary of the moral judgment, conform to the condition necessary for their inclusion in the category of morality? The answer is, they do not; and the reason is that they are not directed towards intentions. This reason is by itself sufficient. But it could also be shown that the disgusting as such (in its purity, so to speak)

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is never regarded as an offense against morality. Some of the tasks of the nurse, for example, are among the most disgusting that can be conceived. Our disgusts presumably have a useful place in the economy of the mind. But their function is to reinforce reactions which derive their rationale elsewhere rather than to create moral distinctions *de novo*.

There is another form of immediate antipathy for conduct. Its object is cowardice, want of fortitude, of self-control, and every other variety of weakness of will. These arouse, or tend to arouse the feeling of contempt. Such condemnations appear to be immediate, but it is doubtful whether in reality they are. We seldom, perhaps never, condemn a man for refusing to risk his life or for refusing to satisfy present inclination or to inflict pain or loss upon himself unless it is for the sake of an end of which, for whatever reason, we approve. If or in so far as we do condemn we are making the same mistake as that exposed in the preceding paragraph. The reason is the same as before. The dislike is not determined by the direction of the aim.

The antithesis of contempt for weakness of will is admiration for strength of will. And this is but one form (though doubtless the most important one) of what we may call judgments of admiration for personality. Usually civilized persons keep their admirations fairly distinct from their moral approbations. Most men, for example, are capable of admiring the courage of a Webb who attempts to swim the Niagara Rapids in order to make money or reputation, or out of sheer bravado, without finding anything morally praiseworthy in the action. The employment of the moral vocabulary to express admiration for will power is, however, by no means uncommon. But, as will appear from the above analysis, it represents confusion of mind.

If we include in the sphere of the æsthetic our direct revulsions from the ugly as well as the immediate attraction exercised by the beautiful in conduct we may call the preceding judgments æsthetic. Æsthetic judgments upon conduct have much to do with our use of the adjectives right and

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wrong. But they are not moral judgments because they do not apply to purposes. In this conclusion I am very glad to find myself in agreement with the most eminent representative of ethical subjectivism in this generation, Professor Westermarck.[1]

When we thus remove all extraneous matter we find the amount of difference in the use of the adjectives right and wrong as applied to conduct, cut down to an enormous extent. But this is far from meaning that all differences have disappeared. On the contrary important variations in moral judgments, in the sense of judgments upon purposes, remain for examination. These differences of opinion all deal with the competing claims of conflicting interests. The real problem before the moral judgment (although ordinarily it does not present itself to the mind in precisely this form) always is, at bottom, as follows: The interests at stake being such and such, which of these interests or systems of interests ought to have the right of way when one must stand aside for the other? A study of the answers given to this question in everyday life will show that a considerable (though by no means indefinite) variety of solutions is actually to be found in the moral judgments of the race.

Our explorations in this field may begin with the recall of an incident which was much in the foreground six or seven years ago. The Germans at that time found it very shocking that we Americans should supply the British Government with ammunition to be used in killing German soldiers. If we had supplied the German army equally, they freely admitted it would have been all right; but this was rendered impossible by the British control of the sea. On the other hand the supplying of ammunition to this same government under exactly the same circumstances in the Boer War on the part of German munition makers aroused no protests from the Germans, as those can testify who, like

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[1] See the *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, pp. 744, 745, *et passim*.

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the writer, were living in Germany at that time. This little piece of inconsistency, I need hardly say, is very far from being peculiar to Germans or to the sphere of international relations. On the contrary it will be found at every turn alike in private and in public life, and is characteristic of the men of every nation, every clime, and every period of the world's history.

The influence of egoistic considerations (whether national or individual) in warping the judgment is not confined, however, to those cases where the egoistic interests of the person judging are actually involved. It insinuates itself into situations where there is no personal interest whatever at stake, and where we might suppose there would be no opportunity for it to serve as a disturbing factor. Called upon to decide between two rival claims, the mind tends spontaneously and instantly, by a kind of dramatic impulse, to put itself in the position of one party or the other; and while it is supposed to be determining which set of interests, objectively considered, has the better claim, it is in fact asking: If I were in the place of one of the parties concerned what should I want? Thus when a newspaper announced that the daughter of an absconding defaulter had declared her willingness to help the police find her father—a certain woman told her friend she thought such an offer wrong. "At least," she added, "I should not want my daughter to treat me in that way." Ordinarily we put ourselves in the place of the chief actor in the drama. That is to say, the abstract question of right and wrong usually takes for us the practical form: What would it be my duty to do under the circumstances? In this case we tend to look at the situation primarily from the point of view of the actor's interests, to the greater or less disregard of the interests of the other parties.

The chief exception to the above principle is very significant. It is that of murder. Thus a hundred university men students were asked the following question: Miss W., an opera singer, made an exclusive contract to sing for a certain period for Mr. L. Later, another manager, Mr. G.,

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induced her to break her contract with Mr. L. and to appear in his opera company. Miss W. had no justification for her action, and her only motive was the desire to make more money. Was Mr. G. justified, on his part, in offering her the inducement which led her to go back on her agreement? About fifty per cent answered that Mr. G. was entirely justified. They thought the responsibility for the wrong rested solely upon the shoulders of Miss W. Then another question was asked involving precisely the same principle: Was Lieutenant Becker justified in inducing the New York gunmen to kill the gambler Rosenthal? All answered, No. The difference in the returns in the two cases was obviously due to the fact that whereas no one of them could imagine himself really committing murder, all could very easily picture themselves trying to get a prize away from a business competitor.

The clouding of the judgment by egoism is so familiar a phenomenon that it may be difficult to arouse any interest in the question of its *modus operandi*. The course of the argument, however, requires a brief examination of this subject. We are all supplied with a set of interests, interests in gaining money, power, standing, in having a "good time," etc., etc., which have a certain impulsive power differing, of course, from person to person, and in the same person at different times. These interests or desires may be aroused so as to produce activity even by the presentation of the end in very abstract form, as wealth, power, health, or success, as such. But the ability of these ends to produce action is enormously increased by the realization, or apprehension in the concrete (whether by a picture in the "mind's eye," or otherwise) of the state of fruition. The mental power or powers capable of producing this state of realization, as contrasted with bare awareness, I shall here call, for want of a better term, imagination.

Now Hume and, after him, James have shown that a very important reason why each of us is so much more interested in attaining his personal ends than in other people attaining their ends is the just described activity of the imagina-

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tion. I can picture my plans for to-morrow and what their attainment will mean to me in a far more detailed and vivid fashion than I can picture yours. The warping of the moral judgment by egoistic interests is thus largely (perhaps at bottom entirely) the work of the imagination. It lights up one side of the picture—the issues which are represented by my own personal interests, or those with which, though they may be utterly foreign to my life, I spontaneously identify myself. In failing to throw an equal light upon the other side of the picture it seems—like the searchlight—to plunge this part of it into a still deeper gloom, whereby the values involved suffer a more or less complete eclipse.

The same cause explains the variations produced by differences in nearness of the event under consideration, whether in time or space, differences in the completeness, concreteness, and clearness of the description of the events, differences due to the fact that we have or have not witnessed the event ourselves, or have seen the locality in which it took place, or one of the actors, and a great deal else of the same sort. "When Mencius saw King Suen much touched by the frightened appearance of an ox being led to sacrifice and ordering that a sheep should be substituted for it, he told the king very justly that it was because 'You saw the ox and had not seen the sheep.'"[2] In the same group of phenomena belongs the difference in our attitude towards the welfare of those with whom we are constantly associating as compared with our attitude towards that of mere acquaintances, and of an acquaintance as compared with a stranger. Once more, in accordance with the principle which we have already seen at work and whose workings we shall study again immediately below, these circumstances prejudice us in favor of the claims of associates as compared with acquaintances as such, of acquaintances as compared with strangers as such.

One-sidedness in the working of the imagination, again,

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[2] The Works of Mencius, Book I, Part I, Chapter vii, as summarized in Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 3d Edition, p. 254.

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is the source of those variations in moral judgments which are due to the accidents of our experience. What has been experienced by us is more likely to be realized and its value completely appraised than that which lies outside this circle. "He jests at scars that never felt a wound." A school boy, guilty of persistent pilfering in the school garden, went to this same garden one morning to pick his own carefully tended watermelon and found that it had disappeared during the night. Thereafter he took a very different attitude toward stealing, as shown both by his voluntary confession and his later conduct. "I never knew before how it felt to lose a thing you had worked for," was his explanation of his change of heart.

Experience determines my appreciation of values not merely in matters in which I myself am personally concerned, whether actively or passively, but also in matters in which the decision does not affect my personal interests in one way or the other; where, therefore, I seem to be most objective. Thus a certain person declared Jean Valjean did wrong to steal the bread which saved from starvation his widowed sister and her children, whereas he thought it quite right that a doctor should give an overdose of morphine to release from torture a man hopelessly sick with cancer. When inquiry was made into the reasons for this somewhat peculiar combination, it appeared that the respondent was able to imagine with great vividness the situation of the patient racked and torn with the agony of cancer; whereas the sufferings of the family dying of starvation did not form any definite picture in his mind. This difference in sensitiveness in the two cases was, in its turn, apparently due to the presence of illness and the absence of the pangs of starvation in his own past experience.

As the imagination may render us more sensitive to certain aspects of the world of values than we otherwise should be, so on the other hand may a set of physiological and psychological factors serve as depressants. Among these is familiarity; habituation to the sight of suffering, for example, lowering our sensitiveness to it and thus reducing, or

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tending to reduce, the vigor of our reaction towards the conduct which is its cause. Others are, the pre-occupation of the attention with other affairs, especially with one's own sufferings, losses, or anxieties, and the physiological factors of fatigue and disease.

With a given set of interests at stake, then, the mind may react so unevenly as to produce any one of a considerable number of different judgments. There is, of course, another possibility. The mind may respond to the interests in proportion to their actual importance in the lives of the parties concerned. This may be due to the fact that the imagination works evenly in reflecting these interests. Or it may be due to a purely intellectual apprehension that the interests are such and such and of such and such importance, the imagination with its power of distorting the vision being entirely inactive. In either case the judgment will be determined by a correct estimate of the relative importance or value of the competing interests or sets of interests involved in the situation. Such an estimate may be called an "objective valuation."

If it is asked what is the force or agency at the source of all these judgments, my answer is that a great multitude of facts point to the conclusion that this underlying force is direct interest in the interests of the parties who make up the situation upon which judgment is passed. This interest in the attainment of interests may best be called "benevolence," where the term is used in its etymological rather than in the commonly accepted signification. This desire for good or welfare as such is of course quite competent to make its own demands upon conduct without any help whatever from the imagination, or anything else. But it is particularly susceptible to stimulation from without, and in this stimulation from without (apart from some possible irregularities in its internal working of which we really know nothing) we shall find the causes of all variations from what we have above called an objective valuation. In accordance with this hypothesis, then, I shall assume throughout this paper that benevolence, as just defined,

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is the ultimate source of the moral judgment, and the language I use will be molded upon this assumption. But it must be particularly noted that the conclusions reached with regard to universal validity and the arguments upon which these conclusions are based would hold independently of the truth or error of this, or perhaps any other reasonable hypothesis with regard to the ultimate source of our moral ideals.

When the plain man discovers that his moral judgments have been made the plaything of the chance influences whose workings we have been describing, what attitude does he take toward this fact? Suppose, for example, that he catches himself calling an action right when he gains by it, and wrong when he is the loser; or finds himself regarding as entirely innocent an incitement to break a contract, while considering it the equivalent of murder to incite a person to commit murder; or condoning a breach of a rule to prevent one kind of suffering (as that due to disease) which he has happened to feel, while refusing to permit a similar breach to prevent the starvation which lies outside the boundaries of his experience. What does he do when he awakes to these inconsistencies of judgment? Does he say: It makes no difference whatever; one judgment is precisely as good as the other? By no means. He says spontaneously: One of them must be mistaken. Of the two inconsistent judgments, which will he reject, and which will he stand by? He will stand by that judgment in which—as he believes—he has eliminated from consideration all the effects of the conduct in question upon his personal interests, and all its other accidental relations to himself of whatever kind. Here "accidental" includes his proximity to it in space and time, the similarity of the incident to features in his own past experience, and the other items of like nature which have been enumerated above. Such a judgment may be said to be passed from an impersonal point of view. It is from this point of view that the plain man supposes himself to be surveying the action

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when he calls it right or wrong. "Right" means for him, that which will be approved by an impersonal judge.[3]

If we accept the hypothesis stated above, according to which the source of moral distinctions is to be found in desire—the desire for certain kinds of conduct—we can state the same definition in slightly different formulation. Right, as an adjective applied to purpose, means that which we desire everyone to adopt in the conditions under consideration. Hence the familiar maxim that what is right for one is right for everyone else under the same conditions. This maxim was discovered neither by Kant nor Cumberland (who stated it half a century before Kant was born), but is recognized and employed by every six-year-old boy. Thus you may hear him say to his father: "You won't let *me* talk when there's company at dinner, but *you* talk"; or, "You whipped *me* for telling a lie to you, but *you* told a lie to the street-car conductor when he asked how old I was." And when he does not dare make these accusations to his father's face, he thinks them,—often in bitterness of spirit.[4]

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[3] The traditional term, which goes back to Hume, the originator of this entire point of view in ethical theory, is "impartial." I employ the word "impersonal," as being less ambiguous and less open to abuse as a question-begging term.

[4] Two possible difficulties in the way of the definition of a right purpose as that which we want everyone to adopt under the same conditions, may be given a moment's consideration. "Everyone," of course, includes self. If I object to stealing on the part of others when I myself am not the victim, I must object to it on the part of myself also. Of course, in my case there may enter opposing considerations which overrule the objection. But if I really object to stealing, I shall, in the midst of my thievery, still wish that I could get the money through some other means.

"The same conditions," of course, are never repeated. This fact raises a difficulty similar to one which has been much discussed in logic. The solution of each puzzle is at bottom the same. "Right" means the purpose which we desire everyone to adopt under *essentially* the same conditions; and what conditions are essentially the same, and what differences in the conditions are relevant depends upon the nature of the moral consciousness and the conditions under which it works. The moral judgment is a judgment upon the relative claims of competing interests. Moral responsibility is limited by power, so that where there is no power—in at least certain senses of that ambiguous term—there can be no obligation. Differences unrelated to these facts are

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Our definitions of right enable us to understand and justify the distinction made every day between moral judgments as "correct" and "incorrect." When a judgment is the result of actual impersonality of view, it is what it supposes itself or claims to be. It is, therefore, entitled to the designation of genuine, or "correct"; otherwise, it is "incorrect." Since claims that can be substantiated are most accurately denominated as valid, the best usage will designate the judgments embodying such claims as valid, and those judgments which cannot meet the test as invalid, respectively.

Impersonality is a negative term. It is equivalent, as we have seen, to the absence of stimulants and depressants. What do these agencies do to render the judgment invalid? As they ordinarily work, they destroy, or tend to destroy, the accuracy with which, in the moment of judging, the mind registers the values involved. Their removal, therefore, is significant because or in so far as it results in the determination of the judgment by the relative importance of the interests at stake in the situation under consideration. Accordingly, as far as the materials which we have as yet studied are concerned, the valid judgment is that which is determined by what we have above (on page 82) called an objective valuation.

This conclusion enables us to formulate provisionally the ultimate standard of morality. Where the judgment is actually determined solely by this objective valuation, it will demand that when choice is necessary the greater good be chosen in preference to the less. In other words, the valid standard will demand that we aim to produce the maximum of good attainable under the conditions.[5]

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irrelevant. All others may be relevant, that is to say, may make a difference in the answer. The only way to determine whether they do or not is to try. Thus in deciding the question whether a man was justified in picking my pocket, the size of his family and the economic conditions prevailing at the time might conceivably be a relevant consideration, but the color of his eyes and the initial letter of his name presumably would not.

[5] I am purposely ignoring in this formula all differences—actual or supposed—of qualities in goods. Moralists differ radically on this subject, and a fair

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The preceding enumeration of variations in moral judgments is by no means complete. For as, sometimes in the most subtle way, the imagination attracts our sympathy to one side of the scene to the more or less complete exclusion of the other, so does another set of agencies work upon the mind in essentially the same manner, rendering its valuations narrow and one-sided. In order to have a common name we may call them our likes and dislikes for the persons concerned. The words "likes" and "dislikes" are here used, not in a very exact sense, but as a blanket term to cover the related phenomena whose description is to follow. If we examine them carefully we shall find the imagination at work in most or all of them. But other factors also enter which cannot be directly identified with this agency, and they must accordingly be assigned a place as independent elements in the determination of our standards.

The influence of the "emotion of tenderness" in strengthening interest in the welfare of the person loved is too well known to require discussion. The same may be said for the belief in identity of blood. When the two unite their influence upon the judgment is almost irresistible. When my son blackens your son's eyes I am likely to regard the incident as merely an instance of the natural ebullition of healthy animal spirits. But when your son performs precisely the same operation upon my son—it becomes a very different matter indeed. As everyone knows, the influence of actual or supposed identity of blood may extend beyond the immediate family to the very confines of the tribe, or nation, or even the race. Its most striking manifestation in this wider field is the phenomenon called "tribal morality."

Our moral judgments are constantly being determined by these relationships, precisely as in the case of our egoistic interests, in cases where we suppose ourselves most imper-

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discussion of it would require a paper by itself. The formula given is to be taken in abstraction from such differences in quality as are irreducible to differences in quantity, if such there be. If the existence of such qualitative differences be asserted, however, the principle laid down in the text still holds as far as it goes.

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sonal. A typical illustration follows. Some years ago, in the course of an investigation, certain problems in casuistry were given to a number of University of Wisconsin undergraduates. One of them was the following: A man returning from his day's work discovered that a careless switchman had left a switch open, which would mean death or injury to the several hundred people on an immediately approaching train. At the same moment he saw his only child playing upon the track in front of the engine. He had time only to turn the switch and save the train or else to save the child. Which was it his duty to do?

The second was the problem that John Howard had to face when called to choose between the moral welfare of his son and the continuance of his work in prison reform. In order that the real issue might be apprehended it was expressly stated that this work was primarily one of moral reformation. Howard's problem was also presented in a modified form, as follows: This same alternative, the reformation of a number of prisoners and the reformation of a dissipated son whose rescue imperatively demanded removal to another place, was presented to a certain prison official. His opportunities for doing good were very insignificant compared with Howard's. He might reasonably expect, if he remained in his present position during the ensuing ten years, to restore to a life of honorable citizenship perhaps twenty of thirty of the unfortunates committed to his care. The chances, on the other hand, of the appointment of a successor who would take an interest in carrying out his work were very slight. What ought he to do? One of the respondents answered the two last questions: "Continue the work for the prisoners"; whereas he held most emphatically that the man at the switch ought to save the child rather than the train, and he maintained this position even when the man at the switch was supposed to be the switchman himself, to whose carelessness the peril of the train was directly due. When asked for the grounds for these divergent answers he replied that the idea of the helpless little child sitting, all unconscious of its

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fate, upon the track in front of the oncoming engine, had appealed so strongly to his sympathies that it overcame every consideration which might oppose it. And the strength of this appeal was due to the fact that he had a little brother of his own to whom he was devotedly attached, and whom he pictured in this position. When asked what would have been his attitude if his imagination had placed his little brother in the train he said he didn't think of that.

This little experiment seems to me to show unmistakably the mode of origin of those judgments which demand the choice of family interests as such above all other considerations, and demand it, seemingly, as an ultimate deliverance of the moral consciousness. A situation is put before us involving on the one hand the claims of the members of a person's family, and on the other hand the claims of other human beings outside of this circle. If we happen to have a child or a little brother of our own we immediately thrust him upon the stage. If not, we tend to place there an imaginary one. Furthermore, we place him at the centre of dramatic interest; or, what will ordinarily come to the same thing, we place ourselves as father or big brother at the point of view of the man who is called upon to act.[6] In consequence, the beam immediately tips in favor of the father's interests, and we judge the claims which most powerfully appeal to him to be superior to those of all the other parties concerned. In the concrete, we hold that a person ought to save his little brother, or his child, rather than a trainload of people. Such a judgment has the *form* of the moral judgment—applicability to everyone; but it lacks the spirit, because, in deciding it by thinking what we should most want to do if it were we who found our own child sitting on the track, we have, unawares to ourselves, abandoned the impersonal point of view.

The next item on our list is the "consciousness of kind." By this I shall mean the feeling of congeniality which arises from the existence of community of tastes, interests, points

[6] Compare above, page 78.

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of view, etc. Said Samuel Johnson to Boswell: "Sir, I was once in company with [Adam] Smith. We did not take to each other; but had I known that he loved rhyme [in preference to blank verse] as much as you tell me he does, I should have hugged him."[7]

The discovery of congeniality is a tremendous stimulant to interest in the congenial person. Its presence or absence, however, cannot determine valid judgments of right and wrong, because right means precisely that which is desired or approved apart from the accidental relations of the parties concerned to self. For the most part, this fact is well recognized to-day. The man who should assert that he recognized moral obligations only to those who—like himself—were enthusiasts about Conrad's novels, or golf, or collecting coins, would be regarded as a person who was either trying very hard to appear different from the herd about him—a kind of Cubist in morals, or, if he spoke seriously, as a candidate for an insane asylum. Public opinion among the modern European races has thus gone a long distance on this road. All that is needed is that it continue to the end. And I know of no tribe, however primitive, which has not made a long start in the same direction.

We now come to another source of preferences, namely, the feelings of admiration, approbation, and what I shall call thankfulness. By admiration I shall understand the reaction to the æsthetic elements of personality; first of all, strength or power whether of will, intellect, or muscle, together with what other features of personality arouse this or any other emotion that can properly be called æsthetic. By approbation I shall mean our non-æsthetic valuation of personality; valuation on account of utility and of anything else, if there be other things, in which the æsthetic element does not enter. Thankfulness is a broad term for which we use the word gratitude when we ourselves are the recip-

[7] Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, Hill's edition, Vol. I, p. 495.

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ient of a favor. Thankfulness may be defined, in words suggested by Westermarck, as a friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure. It tends to be a consequence, therefore, of admiration and approbation; and this—sporadically at least—not merely when these two emotions are aroused by qualities of character, but also by the other excellences of personality. Since these three feelings (I purposely use this vague term to avoid the necessity for irrelevant psychological discussion) act upon the moral judgment in essentially the same manner, they may be treated together.

The influence of these agents upon the moral judgments of the race is written upon every page of human history. Hence the more extensive rights and the higher claims of the privileged classes in all aristocratic societies, privileges accorded with the same readiness as that with which they are accepted, because regarded as the proper concomitant of superior excellence. Theft and murder committed by a commoner against a noble have almost universally been judged in primitive and in somewhat higher forms of society also as far more serious than a similar crime committed by one commoner against another member of his own class. For the same reason among the Greeks, as among many other peoples, the son's duties to his father were regarded as more binding than those to his mother. This point of view has always been one of the mainstays of the justification of slavery (though by no means the only one). It takes a thousand forms in our own world to-day. There is room for only a single illustration. Some years ago a murderer of the lowest type escaped from the penitentiary, somehow got hold of a rifle and cartridges, and by the exercise of great skill, pluck and endurance, succeeded for a number of days in evading and then in holding off the posse who were in pursuit of him. The newspapers, of course, spread his exploits all over the front page. While he was still at large more than one person was heard to express the hope that he would get off because he deserved to. This whole point of view was once expressed by a youthful

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Nietzschean, a twelve-year-old boy at the Albany truant school, in a form which ought to become a classic: "It's mean to hit a dog, but I'd hit a cat every time."

So much for the range of this class of judgments. What about their validity? The history of the conflict of moral ideals shows a life and death struggle between two classes of standards. One consists of those which are the product of the working of some stimulant or depressant, as the imagination, the emotion of tenderness, the sense of blood-relationship, the "consciousness of kind," and the forces of habituation, inattention, and fatigue. The other standard is that which is based upon an objective valuation of the interests concerned. In this conflict, as we have seen (page 85), the valid judgment is that in which claims are weighed, not in accordance with their actual pressure upon our feelings, but rather in accordance with the real value to the parties concerned of the interests at stake. This same principle, applied to the problem immediately before us, involves the elimination of our admirations, approbations, and feelings of thankfulness, as factors in determining the merits of rival claims.

The conclusion just stated rests upon an assumption. It is that no judgment can be recognized as valid which is inconsistent with any other judgment so recognized. In certain cases, as we have seen, the plain man spontaneously calls his own judgments or other people's incorrect, namely when he notes a failure in what throughout this paper we have been calling impersonality. Now judgments influenced by our admirations, approbations, and feelings of thankfulness to any of the parties involved do not necessarily offend directly against this prescription. Admiration, for example, may produce a preference which is quite impersonal. The objection to such judgments is that they introduce into the code elements which are inconsistent with the principle of objective valuation, a principle which, as we have seen, is the positive aspect of the principle of impersonality, so that its validity is a fundamental fact of the moral consciousness.

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The significance of consistency I shall leave for discussion till the close of the paper. Here it must suffice simply to point out its actual rôle in the formation of moral judgments in everyday life. In very many cases it is through the discovery of inconsistency that the plain man becomes aware of mistakes in his judgments. He speaks of it as a "contradiction." Illustrations have been given above, (page 83.) A classical, and in many respects typical illustration of the attitude of mankind toward moral inconsistencies, when discovered, is King David's repentance when, after having ordered the death of the husband of Bathsheba, and having added her to his already considerable collection of wives, the prophet Nathan came to him and told him the story of the rich man who seized his poor neighbor's ewe lamb.[8] The authority of consistency in morals is thus something which the plain man never thinks of questioning.

But what is consistency? It is nothing but persistency in the use of a principle; or, in Francis Lieber's phrase, it is "the existence of the same spirit through a variety of measures." This demand for consistency thus proves that the moral world is not a series of petty principalities, under the authority of independent rulers, each of them living in a state of more or less chronic warfare with the others. It is rather one great kingdom ruled by a single monarch. Who this monarch is, in other words, what this spirit is which must remain the same through all our moral judgments if they are to deserve the name of valid, we have already seen. It is nothing other than the principle of objective valuation, implicit in the plain man's condemnations of the variations first studied in this paper, and, therefore, if these condemnations are to stand, valid also in the field now under discussion.

The actual moral judgments of the race offer more than abundant evidence of the fierce conflict that has been, and is being carried on, between the two incompatible standards whose claims we have been examining. They show also

[8] See II Samuel xii: 1–7.

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that the victory is, in the main, with the principle of objective valuation. The only field where the majority of the race make a firm stand in behalf of the call of admiration and its kindred forces is in the field of moral desert, that is to say, where the object of admiration and approbation is character. In the field of intellectual ability and physical strength and skill there is a greater division and a greater uncertainty of opinion. In such matters as personal beauty, refinement of taste, agreeableness of disposition, including freedom from certain attitudes such as gloom or conceit, pleasing manners, style in dress, ability to drink long and deep without falling under the table,[9] and much else, the demands of admiration would be far more sporadic and also far less insistent. Nowhere, in fact, from the lowest stages of primitive life with which we are acquainted up to the highest reaches which civilization has as yet attained, do we find any real willingness to carry through the principle that claims should vary according to admiration, with anything like consistency. As evidence of where we stand to-day, consider the outcry that would be raised far and wide if a state Industrial Commission appointed to determine a fair working wage for girls should be caught laying down the principle that the pretty girls (or the stylish girls, or the girls that do not chew gum) ought to receive a minimum of twenty dollars per week, while the rest might properly receive whatever wages their employers chose to give them.

As admiration and approbation tend to stimulate benevolence, so do disadmiration and disapprobation tend to act as depressants. Their place in the moral judgment has been determined, in effect, through the preceding discussion, so that this subject calls for no further treatment. On the other hand, resentment, the antithesis of thankfulness, introduces a new psychological factor. For its effect, as everyone knows, is not so much to depress benevolence as

[9] See Hume, Essay on National Character (*Works*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. III, p. 257).

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to reverse it. In its several forms it demands actively the infliction of harm for its own sake. In reality it is subject to the same condemnation as its antithesis, and for the same reasons. But since it represents something completely different from anything we have yet studied it will perhaps be desirable to make its pretensions the subject of special examination.

In taking up the claims of resentment we must recognize at the outset that the problem which they present (as is true in the parallel case of admiration, approbation, and thankfulness) is merely a part of a much larger one. Resentment demands, as has just been said, harm not for the sake of some greater good, but harm for its own sake. It says: "This man has made another suffer; therefore he ought to suffer in return." Let us call the desire which is thus characterized, malevolence. Now this desire is awakened most frequently, at all events in adult members of the civilized races, by wrongs inflicted upon either themselves or others. These arouse the emotion of anger or resentment, and this in turn serves as a stimulant for the malevolent desire. But resentment is often aroused by other causes than moral delinquencies. In the first place, whereas everyone admits in principle that it is the intention or purpose that is the object of the moral judgment, most persons grow thoroughly angry at an attempt to injure them only when it succeeds. Again an act of stupidity which does serious injury, especially when I myself am the victim, has precisely as great a tendency to arouse anger in me as does an intended wrong. For resentment, as Westermarck points out, is "an aggressive attitude of mind towards a cause of pain." Furthermore, purely accidental injuries, of which I or mine am the victim, which are due neither to wrong intentions, nor carelessness, nor stupidity, have a tendency to arouse the same feelings against the person who is the last link in the chain of causation. Indeed the impulse to hurt that which hurts may be felt when the offender is a tangled fishline or a door that slams and hits me on the nose.

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But this enumeration is only the beginning. In many cases malevolence takes the form not of resentment, but of envy. Here the cause of the malevolent desire, far from being the defects of its object, is often his excellences. In some primitive codes this spirit exhibits itself in the permission to kill a man who has killed someone else by accident, in order that the relatives of the former may feel an equal grief with the relatives of the latter. Again malevolence may be awakened by physical or mental suffering of any kind which serves to embitter a man against the world. Finally in still other cases it emerges without any special stimulus of any kind; the desire to harm arising spontaneously when it sees a possible victim, as in the love of teasing or of "purposeless" torturing. A study of the conditions which determine the direction, the intensity, and the duration of the malevolent feelings, particularly of resentment, would exhibit a complex mass of evershifting phenomena, limitless in its variety and bewildering in its defiance of fixed rule. The problem of the place to be accorded to resentment against wrong conduct is therefore but one small part of the general problem of the place of malevolence in the moral life.

Now the universal attitude of the race is to exclude entirely the greater part of the expressions of malevolence from the field of morality. In response to what demands? In response to an ideal of good, of welfare. But if this is to be done in one case it must be done in every case. For in forming judgments that may properly be called moral judgments we are not at liberty to pick up a principle one moment and drop it the next, as the play of momentary feelings chances to dictate.

We are ready now, I believe, to hear the conclusion of the whole matter. All moral judgments have their source in approbation or disapprobation of the intention to help or harm some being or beings capable of experiencing good or evil. All moral judgments, except the demand for retribution, approve the aim to serve and disapprove the aim to do

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harm; and all forms of the moral judgment, turn, in the last resort, on the answer to the question: Which interest or set of interests has the superior claim when one must be sacrificed to the other? The principle on which this question must be answered is obtained by inquiring what we mean when we call conduct right. The word right, applied to conduct, means that the purpose under consideration is one which we desire all human beings to carry out under essentially the same conditions. This carries with it the implication that the approbation which the judgment embodies shall be based upon what we have called an objective valuation, and this implication is found to be actually recognized more or less completely by the plain man as he passes judgment upon conduct. The term "objective valuation" is not one which is introduced in order to beg the whole question of universal validity in ethics. It is merely a name chosen to describe one of several modes of valuation which we find actually employed in the world about us. It is that mode of valuation in which we weigh the interests involved in accordance with their real importance in the lives of the parties who make up the situation under examination. The judgment based upon this foundation will always demand (at least if we abstract from hypothetical differences in quality among goods) the choice of the greater good. In other words, it will pronounce that action right which aims to bring into existence the greatest amount of good for all concerned attainable under the circumstances. There are diverse agencies that tend to prevent us from weighing equal interests in equal scales. They include the imagination, our likes and dislikes for the persons involved in the situation, and a set of forces of which familiarity, inattention and fatigue will serve as types. There are demonstrably a few other agencies which work in the same direction, and there are doubtless still others of which we have no knowledge. But the former, at least, are of no great importance in life, and all are amenable to the same principle. In so far as any of these agencies drags the mind away from an objective valuation the resultant

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judgment is invalid. Thus there exists for each individual one and only one standard of morals. And this is the same for the race.

Our conclusion, as will be observed, is no requirement set up from without, representing the taste or whim of some would-be autocrat of the kingdom of morals. It is obtained by studying the workings of the mind of the ordinary man when he finds his judgments upon conduct, whether his own or another's, have been determined by the accidents of his personal relationship to the act in question, or when he finds that for whatever reason one of his judgments is inconsistent with another. Under these conditions he repudiates one judgment and holds fast to another. All that we have attempted to do is to penetrate to the ultimate source of these judgments in the human will, exhibit its demands, show what are the variations from these demands and their causes, and thus set forth at the same time the fundamental forms of invalid judgments and the content of the standard which may properly claim validity.

In the latter part of our examination our argument turns, as will be remembered, upon the demands of consistency. But suppose it be asked, What difference does it make whether a person is consistent or not? In view of the actual, unquestioning, and universal acknowledgment of the place of consistency in the moral world, as shown above, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary in this paper to answer the question. Our problem, I repeat, has been merely to take the word right as it appears in the vocabulary of the plain man, study his use of it, and see where it leads.

But while the challenge to justify the demands of consistency is irrelevant to our argument, this fact is no reason why it should not be met. Morality, as we have seen, has its source in desire, or in the will. Now we are often enough inconsistent in our volitions, even in our deliberate volitions, and are not infrequently consciously so. The impulses of the moment, the superior attractions of the immediate over a more remote future, and the play of other

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forces often make our actual path the zigzag of a drunken man. But when we "sit down in a cool hour" and reflect upon our course we always mean to be, or at least wish we had the self-control to be, consistent. The reason is that inconsistent actions are those which proceed on mutually destructive principles. In a certain small town in which it was generally believed (incorrectly, no doubt) that tubercular infection could be carried by clothing, a rummage sale was once held for the benefit of an anti-tuberculosis campaign. At this sale three suits of clothing, which came from homes where there was tuberculosis in the family, were sold and knowingly sold without any attempt at disinfection. What does the reader infer when he is told of this incident? I believe he infers what I do (for I know no more about the details than he does), namely that the people in charge of this sale cared nothing for the public health, but were either amusing themselves or using the sale to further their social ambitions or something of the kind, or that whatever zeal they started out with evaporated before they got through. Why do we make such a supposition? Because we find it difficult to believe that even though consistency be a jewel and therefore rare, a case of inconsistency so palpable as this could actually take place in a sane mind. It is inherent in the nature of the human will that a man should not at the same moment wish to work for a cause and work against it, should not attempt to create and destroy the same thing. This is precisely the essence of inconsistency, whether in the sphere of the prudential judgment in the individual life, of public policy, of law, or of morals. We are, of course, often unaware of our inconsistencies, and when we are half aware of them we often try to conceal them from ourselves for many and obvious reasons. Furthermore we are rather indifferent to inconsistency in trivial matters, such as capitalization and punctuation. But precisely in proportion to our feeling for the importance of the interests at stake do we recoil from tearing down with the one hand while we build up with the other. Thus the will that creates moral standards must,

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in virtue of its inmost nature as will, demand the removal from these standards of whatever inconsistencies they may be found to contain.

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DISCUSSION—PLURALISM IN RELIGION.

CYRUS H. ESHLEMAN.

In an article in the July, 1921, number of this JOURNAL, Benjamin Ives Gilman says, page 429, that there is one infinite personality, and that all our individual personalities are embraced in it during life and are identified with it after death. At the bottom of our minds, he says, this one higher personality reveals itself. Happiness is attained in so far as we live as one being; misery exists because there are bars that keep us asunder.

This view is held in one form or another by probably the large majority of writers on these subjects, but it should in part at least be opposed, for it obstructs the rational solution of all the problems of religion and ethics. In some degree, it is true, all human personalities may be unified; but in some degree also, and perhaps greater degree, they cannot be unified, for they are fundamentally different. Husband, wife, father, mother, child, brother, sister; statesman, soldier, sailor, mechanic, farmer; scientist, poet, pastor, physician, nurse, teacher, and numerous others, are largely diverse personalities and cannot be unified without excluding more than is retained. In the highest summations and sublimations, thus, we have, not one supreme personality, but numerous supreme personalities. I named some of these also in the discussion headed "A Satisfactory Religious Code," in the October, 1920, number of the JOURNAL.

The pluralistic view contributes perhaps more to the understanding of the ultimate realities, including human life, than does the monistic; and Greek polytheism stands out perhaps more as the ancestor of modern religious truth than does Jewish monotheism. And yet few philosophers venture to develop this line of thought. Howison, James, and MacTaggart occur to mind. But Howison, while favoring the plurality of individuals, did not, as I understand, argue for plural deities. James contended the world cannot be completely unified, but he thought it could be unified in the main, though many odds and ends would be left over. MacTaggart has gone far in the right direction, but not, I think, to the ultimate conclusion—that is, to the belief in coordinate supreme personalities.

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Pluralistic deities and ideals do not involve discord and misery. On the contrary, the toleration of diversity, which exists in the nature of things and cannot be suppressed, is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of harmony. Nor need pluralism lead to absolute individualism. The categories and personalities, while numerous, will be limited. Each individual will in some measure be unique, but in the main it can be referred to a class.

I heartily agree with Mr. Gilman's main contention—for euthanasia in extreme cases for hopeless defectives and sufferers. This great principle and two others—birth control (mostly by sexual restraint), and eugenics—are exceedingly important, and will in time bring incalculable benefits to mankind. But these principles are stronger on the pluralistic than on the monistic basis and are aided rather than injured by my criticism.

Granting that numerous supreme personalities or beings exist, the question presses for solution, What is the proper designation for them collectively? Is gods satisfactory, or deities? Or should a new term be introduced? A term including the sound elements of the older ones, yet expressing also the newer and larger conceptions? Could not contributors to the JOURNAL answer this question, which for many of us is urgently important?

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE SEX FACTOR IN HUMAN LIFE: *A Study Outline for College Men.* By T. W. Galloway, Ph.D. The American Social Hygiene Association, Inc. (N. Y.), 1921. Pp. 142.

For one familiar with the fine mesh through which the publications of the American Social Hygiene Association are put, it takes some intrepidity to criticise one of them. Furthermore, the present case is that of picking flaws in a diamond.

The book has the advantages and disadvantages of a compiled manual or catechism. It shows marks of the mesh, and lacks the inspirational quality of a one-man book. With exception of a few passages, however, it succeeds in avoiding preachment—endeavoring thereby to secure the respect of the intended readers. It is didactic, but has a scholarly "punch" which carries considerable conviction. Some of the sources are secondary.

From the point of view of its avowed purpose, it may be questioned whether the appeal of the book will be wide, and whether it will succeed with the unregenerate. It is calculated to strengthen and rationalize the character habits of well-brought-up fellows (with a strong vocabulary) who are subjected to some new strains. Certain other types of college men would sense the motive underlying certain passages which give the author away. "Highbrow propaganda" would be the verdict. The answers to the outline-questions are too foregone.

It is obvious, for example, that the opening chapters on appetites in general are being arranged as stage setting for the main actor; and the final chapter (Sex and Religion) though thoroughly sugar-coated, is still "Y. M. C. A." stuff to some of the men it is aimed at. The material in this chapter, if included in such a book, should have been scattered through it without reference to Christ and God, and without special label. Religious education has this analogy with sex education, that it should be "left in," where it belongs, in each subject and each phase of life—not "introduced" in isolation.

Religion seems to have become like the secret of the magician: anyone, he tells you, can perform the trick, provided that, when he attempts it, he will avoid thinking of a monkey with a blue face. A person devoted to a cause will retire his name from any

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appeal in which its appearance would damage the cause: the reviewer has confidence that God is at least as good as his children in that respect. The religious sanction is valuable where it exists: it cannot be implanted by means of a single climax chapter, even if its common meaning be stretched, as here, in terms of a naturalistic psychology and an optative theology.

Similarly, a didactic analysis of the nerve-mechanics of romance, or even of athletics, in relation to sex control, is apt to sophisticate behavior in such a way as to identify these wholesome activities with one pole of a conflict, instead of permitting them to serve as spontaneous outlets, relieving and automatically sublimating the life-energy.

In general, however, the book is far superior to most previous attempts in this field, and is to be heartily praised for facing, with some show of bravery, certain questions that inevitably arise. The college man seeks the end of the tether: in the writer's observation, you *must* discuss with him such subjects as free unions, birth control, "prophylaxis," independent motherhood, if you would satisfy his real wants for knowledge. By certain frank and perhaps unexpected admissions the book helps to breed confidence in a skeptical student. Certain omissions may, however, be noted: There is no discussion of the ethics of "prophylaxis," of birth control, of intra-marital intercourse, free divorce, "trial marriage."

Certain questions of substance may also be raised: (1) There are traces of an external teleology in certain statements regarding the appetites. (2) If an instinctive mechanism may only be used for its biological purpose, what becomes of sublimation? Are art, fashion, music to be condemned? (3) Mating, however, may have originated biologically quite as much from communion for mutual advantage as for reproduction. The significant sanction of a thing is to be found not so much in its origins as in its becoming. (4) Man's surplus of sex may be due, not only to self-consciousness, but to a cause underlying both: The abatement of the keen animal struggle which previously required all his energy (a) in fighting and (b) in multiplying. (5) "Sex indulgence" is used a bit loosely. It is distinguished clearly from continence but not from legitimate intercourse. Occasionally an impression is left that physical pleasure from sex is gross *in se;* that sublimation will leave no physical expression, or that physical expression is entirely inconsistent with good taste and

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morals. It is the *merely* physical, not the physical as such, that is a hindrance to sublimation. We need, as a positive sanction of permanent virtue, as vivid a portrayal in prose of the joy of marriage in its physical aspects as in its social and spiritual aspects. This will yet be achieved, without suggestiveness, materialism, or commonplace. The physical may be sublimated through irradiation of symbol and affection, without ceasing to be physical. To state the issue as an out and out alternative: *degradation or sublimation*, suggests an ethics of internal conflict, the polarized ethics of "twice-born" evangelism. In many normal personalities, at least at present, it seems possible to establish in marriage a balance and harmony between the various channels, without mutual exclusion. (6) The paradox, that singleness is abnormal, yet continence is not physically nor mentally harmful, is not clearly reconciled. Jesus is offered as model; yet he was celibate. (7) In spite of one disavowal, the "family pattern" used as an emotional fulcrum throughout, is an ideal pattern, which will therefore not appeal to all cases, especially to those who need it most. Offered rewards, to be effective, must carry confidence in the source. (8) Venereal disease is called a "direct" result of sex indulgence; violation of the home is called "*indirect.*" (9) No ethical distinction is allowed between rank prostitution and the irregular union by common consent. It is assumed that no such union can ever occur with due sense of responsibility to self, society and offspring. The contrast is made absolute between utter demoralization and "the continuous evolution and improvement of a satisfactory monogamous home." This may be true and suitable for didactic purposes; but for scientific purposes it begs the question. (11) The mental and emotional attitudes of prostitutes are given little discussion. Those of men in patronizing them are not analyzed at all. Such an analysis might develop wholesome inhibitions. Apparently no distinction is made between promiscuous intercourse and any other kind of non-orthodox relationship, in respect to their mental and emotional effects upon the individual. (12) Not all the possible alternatives to, or variations from, permanent and total monogamy are described. (13) Any variation is condemned if it cannot be sanctioned for all. This hides a fallacy. I may justly claim right, because of exceptional circumstances, to exceptional conduct which, while not sanctioned for all, would be sanctioned for *anyone* under similar exceptional circumstances.

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(14) It is assumed that all variations on monogamy are mere substitutes, that they necessarily deny the sanction of past human experience, and that they all leave the home at the mercy of sensuality. This seems to be a rather sweeping statement.

The book is virile and is crammed with good things, excellently stated. One of the best things is this: "Monogamous marriage more than any other form of sexual selection forces some consideration of traits of character rather than of merely bodily attractiveness, temporary emotions, or accident in the choosing of mates." It is worthy to rank with its excellent predecessor to which it owes much: "The Rational Sex Life for Men," by Dr. Galloway's colleague, Dr. Exner, also formerly of the Y. M. C. A. Published by a non-religious agency it should prove especially effective for use in Y. M. C. A. classes.

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FUGITIVE ESSAYS. By Josiah Royce. With an Introduction by Dr. J. Lowenberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Pp. 429.

The second posthumous volume edited by Dr. Lowenberg from the literary remains of Josiah Royce appears under the above title. It consists of some fifteen essays and articles, four of which are now published for the first time, and the remainder of which, once appearing in periodicals like *The Californian*, *The Berkeley Quarterly*, *The Harvard Monthly*, or *The Boston Evening Transcript*, have now become virtually inaccessible. Two date from the early nineties, and one from 1903. All the rest are dated within two years of 1880, and represent, therefore, the earliest evidences of Royce's thought and scholarship.

During these early years Royce was teaching English at the University of California. He had had no systematic university instruction in philosophy. It is of interest, then, to note the themes that were engaging his attention: "Schiller's Ethical Studies," "Shelley and the Revolution," "George Eliot as a Religious Teacher," "The Practical Significance of Pessimism," "Pessimism and Modern Thought," "Tests of Right and Wrong," "Natural Rights and Spinoza's Essay on Liberty," "On Purpose in Thought," "How Beliefs are Made," "The Nature of Voluntary Progress." Every one of these topics, both in conception and

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treatment, has a predominantly philosophical significance. But further, as we go behind the titles and note closely the course of the thought, we are struck by the evidences of the close and successful study of the great masterpieces of philosophy which had then already been carried out. Spinoza, Kant's main works, Hegel's Logic and Phenomenology, Schopenhauer, Hartmann—these and many more are subjected to a penetrating and constructive criticism which is always technically true to form and fruitful in result. And as these more distinctly philosophical topics are treated against a background of wide literary knowledge and interest, and with a noble style, the outcome is a volume worthy to be associated with the name of Royce. Throughout the entire series we find nothing which is trivial, amateurish, or underdone. "The qualities which we have come to associate with the great thinker"—comments Dr. Lowenberg, "universality of mind, imaginative insight, wide range of interests, skill in subtle analysis, independence and originality of thought—predominate in these early essays."

Two of the papers are somewhat more thoroughly technical than the others. "Tests of Right and Wrong" shows the author working towards an essentially Kantian conception of Ethics, through an analysis of empirical or evolutionary views. But the analysis does not stop with Kant. A concluding passage from this essay of 1880 is significant for the understanding of Royce's entire thought life: "And so for this higher insight each moment of life is judged in the presence of the whole of consciousness conceived as one being, or better, as one moment of being. Every moment-atom of this infinite life is approved if, knowing the other atoms, it recognized their claim in its action. For each deed of good done at any moment for another moment, the moral sense has the approving word that comes as it were from the very throne of the infinite consciousness: Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these, ye have done it unto me. This sense of the absolute worth of all experience, this insight into the unity of life, has been the continual theme of moral teaching and preaching, of all true religion, since there were minds to think. One has no new doctrine to teach about it. One can but restate and try to justify the old one. And I confess that for this purpose I know of no possible way other than that taken. If we give up this doctrine, I see nothing but moral scepticism before us, with the claims of self and others left unsettled, with the illusion of selfish-

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ness perpetually tormenting us, with a sophistical torturing of history to make it prove what it cannot prove, that boundless self-sacifice is a good, in brief, with all the half-heartedness of uncritical ethics. Let us throw these incomplete theories aside, or use them as we can as stones to build up a better building. Upon the basis here proposed, we may raise a structure in honor of the true and eternal object of life, which is the good of the great conscious soul whose atoms of experience are the moments of our individual lives. For this One Absolute Being all our right work is wrought."

From the essay "On Purpose in Thought," also of 1880, I quote two passages: "A good deal of reflection has at all events convinced me that no study of thought is complete which does not treat the problems of thought in their teleological aspect, and which does not ask as to every thought assumption: What end does it accomplish?" "To sum up, from this point of view the end of thought appears to be: That experience past and future, should be conceived as one whole with a necessary connection of parts; that the present and the immediately given content should be found to be, not alone significant nor enough, but a moment in a world of life. And the end of thought is realized in the act of constructing the image of possible experience."

To these passages, so prophetic of our philosopher's well-known mature views, I must add one in which the author is giving his own answer concerning "The Practical Significance of Pessimism": "But the practical significance? This I can briefly state. The practical significance is not that men should go and hang themselves. Just the opposite. The indictment has been, mark me well, against human life regarded as individual life. This is evil. But you note that I have had nothing to say about other facts of life; about the worth of love, of sacrifice, of the worship of the beautiful, of the purely intellectual delights, of the devotion to ideal ends. These things I have not touched upon. And why? These things belong not to the individual life. Sum them all up, in their practical aspect in one term, Holy Living. And then of this I shall say that Holy Living is living not for Self, but for the quelling, the putting down of self, and for the building up of the peaceful, harmonious, but entirely unselfish life. The object of such a life is found in its own perfection. The pessimistic argument does not touch it, because such a life is not one of restless striving or of fleeting desires, but of calm, of resignation, of broad

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earnestness. It is affirmed, then, that in so far as one lives in the unselfish love of others, in sacrifice for the sake of the higher prosperity of the world, in sacrifice if you will for the sake of true sacrifice, in contemplation, in the delights of thought for thought's sake, in a word, in the Ideal, that in so far as one thus lives, he lives not as an individual, but as a representative of the higher life. Such a higher life is beyond the pessimist's criticism. Such a life we would seek."

The interest of these passages, and to a large extent, doubtless, of the entire series of essays, turns upon the striking evidence they display of the essential unity and continuity of Royce's philosophical development; and I cannot quit the volume without calling special attention to the editor's introductory discussion, which handles this theme in a particularly satisfactory manner. Dr. Lowenberg studies not only these earlier papers, but also *The World and the Individual, The Problem of Christianity,* and *The Hope of the Great Community;* and he makes it quite evident, I think, that the recent chatter about "Royce's later philosophy," as if it represented an essential change of view, is entirely beside the point.

E. L. HINMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

THE GROUP MIND. By William McDougall. New York: Putnam's, 1920. Pp. 418.

This "sketch of the principles of collective psychology, with an application to the interpretation of national life and character," is the second volume of a trilogy contemplated by the author. The terminology of his "Social Psychology" is utilized in analyzing the psychology of the group. A third volume, which is to complete the series, will emphasize the effect produced by the social complex on the individual.

The present volume is divided into three parts. I. The General Principles of Collective Psychology contains some excellent chapters on crowd psychology. The secret of understanding McDougall's description is in recalling his analysis of the individual into a system of responses. It can then be seen that the set of responses in a crowd will effect an individuality, which is not, however, to be confused with the "collective representations" of Cornford or Lévy-Bruhl. Part II, The National Mind and Char-

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acter, deals with the problem, What is a nation? The criterion is held by McDougall to be "mental organization" especially as conditioned by freedom of communications and as directed by leadership. Chapters on the Will of the Nation and Ideas in National Life bring out the integral part played by the emotions in group responses. In general one gains the impression that Parts I and II are not continuous, quite an important gap intervening between the so-called "highly organized group" and the "nation." This difficulty becomes accentuated in Part III, The Development of National Mind and Character. After several interesting chapters on the Race Making Period, the author immediately goes over into the modern period, taking the position that there has been little or no progress in "innate" moral or intellectual dispositions. Progress becomes thus a matter of social organization, intensified somewhat by the development of imaginative sympathy.

Certain parts of the book were obviously written under the stress of the war and contain matters which a greater span of time and the perspective of peace-values will condemn. Furthermore, the author has failed to utilize the rich mass of materials related to the subject of "personality of corporations," materials which would go far in bridging the gap between the more remote and the more recent periods of human development. As a result, The Group Mind does not grip the imagination as did the Social Psychology.

C. F. Taeusch.

University of Chicago.

SHORTER NOTICES.

Problems of a New World. By J. A. Hobson. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. viii, 277. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Hobson's new book is filled to the brim with concentrated bitterness which makes his examination of the variegated pattern of disorder into which he sees the old system making both pungent and censorious. The whole world and the people in it, he feels, must have been different from what we all thought them to produce such a catastrophe as the war, and in this spirit he turns to examine this world before the war, and pour out the vials of wrath upon it. The bitter fruit of his experience has set his teeth on edge; he considers the civilian mind, and expresses in chapter headings war weariness and reaction. It is cleverly done, but hardly worth while doing. But the later portions of the book make amends. Summarising the results of the war on labour and the capitalist class, he foresees no danger of the red revolution which is often announced, but a ripening of a

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new era of society in which the rights of property and the related government of industry are everywhere directly challenged. The advances in the organisation of both capital and labour in the forcing period of a war preclude any return to earlier conditions; and capital has eventually completed its evolution, passing out of the stage of competition into that of combination,—a change which compels the nation to look steadily at the immediate sharply defined issue between private monopoly and public service in a number of essential industrial services of the country. The progress in the organisation of labour has also been considerable, as we see by the new factor of the Triple Alliance and more effective co-operation among the allied Trade Unions. These unions, it is claimed, hold the keys of the nation's economic life and could hold up the state coach like a highwayman by the stoppage of essential supplies and services. But by this holding up, the members of these unions are also penalised, and the resentment of the whole community is directed against them, as we see by the experience of the spring Coal Strike in England in this year. A revolutionary strike for the overthrow of the capitalist system and the mastery of the state could count on no body of outside support (p. 248). Mr. Hobson rapidly sketches the industrial evolution to which he thinks we are progressing, and foresees an immense extension of nationalisation of certain fundamental industries such as coal mining, railways, electricity, insurance and banking, in ownership if not in actual working. But in industry state-management is excluded as "thoroughly discredited"; the management of industry is to be in the hands of a body representing those where activities contribute to the value of the product. In other industries not under state ownership he proposes (as a half-way house) state control of prices, or other devices designed to secure the superior personal initiative and efficiency believed to inhere in private enterprise, but he wisely refuses to apply any single solution. The book is an irritant, but deserves full consideration from Mr. Hobson's penetrating analysis and wide knowledge of our social and economic system; unlike less well-equipped writers, he is fully aware of the delicate complexities of social structure.

OUR SOCIAL HERITAGE. By Graham Wallas. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 292. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

Social heritage, a term akin to "Social inheritance," which is used in the same sense by Benjamin Kidd in his *Science of Power*, is the subject of Professor Wallas's engrossing and discursive examination of modern society and its problems. His opinions, always sharp and clear cut, have had an edge put to them by the war; each chapter is a stimulus to the reader, and his very characteristic footnotes should in no case be lightly passed over.

Man lives by tradition, and this social heritage is defined here as that part of our nature which we may acquire from teaching and learning, the knowledge and expedients and habits which were originally the personal acquisition of individuals, but have been afterwards handed down from one generation to another. It is obvious that we have become "biologically parasitic" upon our social heritage, and if we once forgot what we had been taught the species might die out before it had time to acquire a new heritage. Professor Wallas's field, covering the whole of our social activities, is therefore a very wide one though he has excluded the subject of the application of the physical sciences to new world problems. But with this exception, he is envisaging as a whole our socially-inherited ways of living

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and thinking, as far as they are directly concerned in the political, economic and social organization of those modern communities which constitute what he termed eight years ago, the "Great Society," envisaging them critically. In the chapter treating of the need of civilized man for conscious and systematized intellectual effort, therefore, he abounds in suggestions for stimulating intellectual effort and self-direction; "We should not," he adds, "leave instruction in mental attitudes and method either to accident or to the Pelman Institute and other commercial firms."

The defect of tradition is that it has reached such vast proportions at the present day that it has become unwieldly and difficult to deal with, and our educational system has obviously not perfected the absorption of this too vast load; so that unless some new expedients are contrived by which our social heritage may be handed on, civilization may recede, instead of progressing. He points out the defects of vocational organization and concludes that any system of government in which control is found within the vocation itself is bound to secure a reactionary and selfish attitude towards progress. The legal and medical profe. sions work is some measure at the expense of the interests of the community. Among lawyers, the "policy of make-work is carried far beyond the dreams of the worst unions of plumbers and bricklayers." The church, too, is a close corporation, and it is a significant fact that there was "an unmistakable inverse statistical correlation between membership of the historical churches and an attitude of protest against the wrongdoing of one's nation." The languor, confusion and helplessness of the churches have never been so well exhibited as in his chapter "The Church," where the footnote (on page 259) respecting the failure of Christianity and the Dr. Gore's claim that "Christianity has not failed; we have only to try it," is significant, concluding as it does that "if a religion which has existed for two thousand years and has been officially held by the most powerful nations in the world for fifteen hundred years, has not been tried, it has failed." Professor Wallas approaches the world with George Bernard Shaw's clear-sighted realism without the eccentricity of the latter's outlook, and has a power of seeing through make-believes to reality in the working of institutions. The book is destructively directed against particular modes of thought and particular social and political expedients, in the belief that the "effort to make our working conception of the world resemble as near as may be the fact, is worth while."

DEMOCRACY AND CAPITAL. By W. Barnard Faraday, LL.B. London: John Murray, 1921. Pp. 314. Price, 8s. net.

Mr. Faraday, a sturdy anti-Marxian, presents his ideas somewhat carelessly in his desire to expose socialism and the "disastrous adventures" in nationalisation which he foresees both in England and America. His remedies are sometimes as summary as Pride's Purge: "there is only one cure (he writes) for industrial unrest, and it is an easy one. Let the sane Trade Unionists purge their Unions of the extremists as the nation purged Parliament in 1918 of the pacifist and pro-German." The co-partnership scheme outlined on pages 249–50, in which the workers who are financially interested in the firm are assumed to be willing to work at a lower wage in the face of foreign competition rather than be turned adrift unemployed, has been frequently brought forward and as frequently combated by the extremists who suspect in this offer an attempt to draw the worker into the capitalists' camp, and weaken his class-consciousness. As propaganda, therefore, it is hardly persuasive. The book, however, in spite of its defects of method and manner is marked by imaginative common sense.

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There is value in the suggestion that the real grievance of labour, a grievance that is rarely put into words and that its holders themselves do but half realise, is a grinding sense of insecurity, and that the limitation of production is largely due to the fluctuations of the piece rate. He insists, and rightly, that the problem of the well-being of one class cannot be isolated or stated in the terms of one class alone; and that the general tendency in present-day civilisation is to increase the number of small capitalists and against the concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands.

THE EVOLUTION OF REVOLUTION. By H. M. Hyndman. London: Grant Richards, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 406. Price, 21s. net.

History seen through the eyes of this veteran of the Marxian school is a "tendencious" spectacle, and in his survey he prefers to regard the conditions of primitive society as golden, while civilisation is to him invariably accompanied by the "degradation and embitterment of vast numbers of men and women." For the primitive communism of our ancestors before private property was invented, he reserves the sentimental admiration of certain thinkers of the eighteenth century for the noble savage and his institutions. In the case of his neolithic "gens" he imagines a remarkable unity and peace. "For under the conditions of natural production for the social and personal use of each and all and equitable sharing of the results of the general toil, there were no *economic or social antagonisms* whatever within the groups themselves." That is because it was co-operative and communistic, and in his eyes, as with the late Prince Kropotkin, communism is the key to social regeneration. His views on primitive family organisation are, however, too largely based on the speculations of Morgan, to ensure a firm foothold on reality.

In his survey of later history, such as seventeenth-century England, and eighteenth-century France, Mr. Hyndman has no qualms in denouncing Cromwell as brutal and merciless and devoid of sympathy with democracy and freedom; and also the authors of the "Bourgeois revolution." "Property," he writes, "was the one god of the middle-class leaders of the French Revolution"; the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, again, is due to a bourgeois group attempting to force Communism on an unripe community. For the secret of success is that revolutions should not be hurried; no permanent revolution can take place until social conditions are ripe for the change. Revolution is an evolution, not a breach with the past, and the term in his mouth loses all connotation of violence, suddenness or illegality. All that happens is that the wheel has come full-circle. It is significant of Mr. Hyndman's optimism that he believes that England is now ripe and ready for socialism, having matured the new social structure within the precincts of the old.

N. C.

KARL MARX AND MODERN SOCIALISM. By F. R. Salter, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. 263. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Salter places his book very openly in his preface as a readable survey of the life of the man Marx, and his influence, and disclaims any profound or original study of his subject. Its ready appeal, its price, and its sympathetic tone should certainly bring it before the working man and the layman, who cannot afford the preliminary study of the partisan and occasionally repellent literature of Social Democracy. It is hardly cor-

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rect to say with Mr. Salter, however, that Marx has certainly had less than justice done him hitherto, because class interpretations have made him out as either an "impeccable hero or a worthless ruffian." He has been, especially lately, sympathetically and impartially studied. Attacks are directed against the vulnerable points of his system, such as theory of value, rather than the total contribution of Marx to the forces of Socialism. Marx's position is a peculiar one; his influence remains largely that of personality, and of the accordance of his militant philosophy with the sentiments of the mass. He belongs, as Mr. Beer aptly says, to the ranks of those philosophical and sociological thinkers who throw potent thought-ferment into the world, and set in motion the masses of mankind, but is himself rather the rallying-point and focus of other peoples' ideas than an original thinker; so that at the present day the strict Marxian formulas and categories are exploded, the school of Marx does not represent its master very faithfully and his theory of value and surplus value has rather the significance of a political and social battle-cry than an economic truth.

The book is concerned not only with the man Marx and the expression of his themes, but with later developments in German Social Democracy, French Syndicalism and Russian Bolshevism.

M. J.

COMMON SENSE ETHICS. By C. E. M. Joad, with a Preface by Professor A. H. Wildon Carr. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. xvi, 204. Price, 6s. net.

The last words of Mr. Joad's fresh and interesting study speak of his search for "results which are related to life" and that, clearly, has been his objective. He tries the older ethical systems, but comes out by that same door wherein he went, sceptical with regard to the significance of their conclusions, only sure of their cold remoteness from the facts of human life. In this study he stresses the relativity of rules of conduct and statements of ethical value, which are conditioned by the changing nature of the material which rules of conduct seek to regulate. In practical ethics, he finds, there is no ultimate criterion of morality, just as there is no ultimate good. His ethics, therefore, are provisional instead of ultimate, and fluid instead of static, arriving in the end "at no one good which is good for all men in all ages, and no one criterion of right and wrong which is valid for all men in all ages."

The "common sense" of Mr. Joad's ethics is derived from the psychoanalytic school of Freud and Jung, and also from Mr. Bertrand Russell, who drew attention to the importance of impulse in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (p. 117). He has been led to this full recognition and rehabilitation of impulse—the Cinderella of earlier ethical writers,—by a wish to redress the balance so heavily weighted by them in favour of reason and desire. If, as is admitted, a great part of our actions is the result of impulse which is "a push from behind" (just as desire is a pull from in front), the criteria established by traditional ethical systems seem unfair and irrelevant. "To apply the moral sense criterion," he writes, "to the actions which proceed from impulse and unconscious desire is like getting a six-foot ruler to measure the quantity of bad temper in men with red hair." It is absurd, he claims, to blame a man for what he cannot help, and if most of his desires are unconscious he cannot be expected to be responsible for them. Ethics should be, he maintains, designed not to repress impulse, but to liberate and encourage it, holding with Blake strong

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opinions as to the evil effects of the thwarted and unacted desire. "Sooner murder an infant in the cradle than nurse unacted desires" is Blake's dictum, and this summarises Mr. Joad's position and also Mr. Russell's. If impulses are repressed or starved, there, firstly, is a general reduction in the vitality of the individual which results from an individuality at war within itself; and, secondly, the repression forms a complex, of whose danger we have had lately sufficient warning from psycho-analysts. But are impulses equally valuable? Following Mr. Russell again, the conclusion is that creative impulses are to be encouraged at the expense of the possessive. The best life, according to Mr. Russell, is that "in which the creative impulses play the largest part, and possessive impulses the smallest"—which produces practical ethics not far removed from the Christian. The weakest portion of the book is the final chapter, in which Mr. Joad justifies the ways of impulse by considering it as the manifestation of the life-force—a conception which we do not seem able to escape in modern theory, and which finds a notable expression in Bergson.

M. J.

A YOUNG GIRL'S DIARY. Prefaced with a letter by Sigismund Freud. Translated from the German by E. & C. Paul. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 271. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

Even the critics of Professor Freud would have in honesty to admit that his researches have put before the public an enormous amount of raw material for the study of the human soul. Especially in the case of children the psycho-analysts have succeeded in making every intelligent person realise that the child nature is far more delicate and complicated organism than was ever realised before, and that the early sensitive years of life are going to decide the nature of the full-grown man.

The Diary of a Young Girl is quite one of the most important documents that Dr. Freud has been instrumental in giving us; as he says in the introduction, "We are shown how the sentiments pass from the simple egoism of childhood to attain maturity: how the relation to parents and other members of the family first shape themselves, and how they gradually become more serious and more intimate: how friendships are formed and broken." Educationalists and doctors may no doubt be primarily interested in the book as a study in puberal development, but no one can lay it down who has any sympathy with child life and remembers the irritations caused to oneself by the necessarily limited liberty and understanding of childhood. The perpetual strain of childhood, that ceaseless striving after one doesn't know what, the boundless curiosity about the perpetually elusive, is better pictured here than in any book we have read.

The diarist, a child belonging to the upper middle class, writing from the age of eleven to fourteen and a half, was happy in her family, her friends and her teachers. Professor Freud says truly in his introduction that this diary is "artless." So it certainly is in any pejorative sense of the word, but the writer in an all unconscious way has a genuine gift of letters and an artistic sense of values, without which any human document becomes worthless.

The most obvious moral deduction to draw from this book is that if only the child's parents had told her about the facts of sex when she was eleven years old, she would have been saved a great deal of morbid excitement and some very dangerous ideas. We may read with horror such passages as the following written when she was 14: "Hella says that

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there is not an officer who has not got venereal disease and that is really what makes them so frightfully interesting," or again, "Ada told me something terrible to-day; Alexander (he is the actor) has *venereal disease*, because he was once an officer in the army. She has heard that all officers have venereal disease as a matter of course. . . . There is only one cure for a man with venereal disease, that a young girl should give herself to a man suffering from it—then she gets the disease and he is cured." That that should be common school gossip is a terrible reflection on sex education, and perhaps even the Anglo-Saxon remedy of unlimited hockey is hardly a perfect substitute for intelligent enlightenment.

FRANCIS BIRRELL.

LAW AND BUSINESS. Vol. 1: Introduction. By William H. Spencer. The University of Chicago Press, 1921. Pp. xviii, 611. Price, $4.50.

This is the first volume of a series of modified case books, designed to present the materials necessary for study in the law courses given as part of the curriculum of the University of Chicago School of Commerce and Administration. The aim of the series is "to acquaint the student with the business man's problems of adjustment to his social environment." The present volume contains the introductory materials. A succession of textbook excerpts and editorial notes provide the student with a brief discussion of the structure of our legal system, the forms of action, procedure, and the method of studying cases.

Chapters on Persons, Torts, Contracts, and Agency follow. Each consists of a prefatory note by the editor, followed by a selection of cases, well abbreviated in length. Appended to each case is a list of questions designed to aid the student in his analysis, and in his subsequent building up of doctrine. A final chapter, on Property, contains cases on personal property, and readings on real property culled principally from Blackstone.

Subsequent volumes in the series are designed to present the case material "in terms of functions, relations, or problems of the business man, and not in terms of the order in which the law has developed." These functional topics are marketing, finance, risk-bearing, the relation of business to labor, and the form of business units. It is obvious that an intelligent criticism of the case content of the present volume can be made only in the light of the case content of the subsequent volumes.

The conception behind the series seems to be an excellent adaptation of Professor Langdell's method to a portion of the business school curriculum. The success of the method in practice will depend upon two factors,—the dialectical skill of an instructor who is prepared to teach law as form and economics as content, and an active interest on the part of the students in formulating problems of business as problems of law. When these two elements are present, the traditional method of teaching commercial law by means of a textbook will appear to be an outworn device.

D. R. H.

HUMAN TRAITS AND THEIR SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE. By Irwin Edman. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1920. Pp. 41, 467. Price, $3.00.

This book grew out of a new type of course of study called out in the great war, in which the aim was, not to isolate and study separate aspects of life and civilization in separate academic departments, but to bring the united resources of several departments to a focus, so that the future soldier might have some insight into present problems of civilization and

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some appreciation of life's values. Columbia University decided that such a course was as important for the citizen as for the soldier, and as one outcome we have this survey of human nature in two parts: Social Psychology, and the Career of Reason, including under the latter the four fields of religion, art, science and morality. It is good reading for anyone who wishes the most recent views of psychology and related disciplines concerning human behavior and the four activities cited, written in non-technical style and with a broad range of illustrative material.

J. H. T.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNISM. By Leo Pasvolsky. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921. Pp. xvi, 312. Price, $2.25.

The valuable feature of this book is that it is primarily not argument, but information. The author believes indeed that the Russian experiment in the economics of communism is coming to an end and that it is face to face with a fundamental dilemma: Communism or Production, or more fully expressed

> "Communism is impossible without the application of compulsion in the economic life of the country; but economic production is impossible with the application of such compulsion."

Yet the body of the work is almost entirely devoted to a statement in detail of the actual organization of production, distribution, transportation, agriculture, labor, and management. Much statistical material taken from official sources is included, and the book affords much more information than has been hitherto generally available.

J. H. T.

THE WORLD IN REVOLT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF OUR TIMES. By Gustave Le Bon. Translated by Bernard Miall. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921. Pp. 256. Price, $4.00.

The author of *The Psychology of the Crowd* finds plentiful material in the War and its succeeding events for psychological analysis. It is too near the War to be very objective and no one would be at a loss as to the nationality of the author if his name had not been printed. However, France as well as Germany and the Bolsheviki comes in for severe criticism. The spirit of routine is severely indicted. The American ability to set aside bureaucracy and "create on French soil towns, railways, seaports, and factories" was a discovery for Europe of unexpected mentality. The psychology of the propagation of beliefs has interesting material, though it might easily have been treated more extensively. A valuable document in the record of the European state of mind even if not a wholly objective discussion.

J. H. T.

MANHOOD AND HUMANITY. By Alfred Korzybski. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. Pp. 264. Price, $3.00.

The author objects to the traditional definitions—man is animal or animal plus a supernatural addition—but does not make much metaphysical advance by defining men as animals plus a superimposed time-binding faculty; especially when he regards this latter as "inherent, as an inborn capacity, a gift of nature."

The general attitude of the author is that of the scientist. "If 'good,' 'bad,' 'truth,' could be scientifically defined then the social studies would

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advance to the rank and dignity of sciences." Not only is there a failure here to appreciate the difference in complexity between the two, but no cognizance is taken of the vicious results of resolving social complexes to exact concepts to the exclusion of the subtler factors. Mathematics may indeed "subserve the supreme law of human rectitude," but quite often accuracy is obtained at the expense of adequacy, especially in analysing human activity.

C. F. T.

A HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY. By Howard C. Warren. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 328.

The interest in this book, for students of Ethics, lies in the historic fact that "the problem of association as Locke conceived it was an ethical and pedagogical one, not a problem of psychological analysis." Hans Ruin attributes this point of view generally to English psychologists: "das praktische und ethische Interesse, das überall durchblickt." The purpose of the author, however, is to show that "the histories lay too much stress on this philosophical side of the movement and too little on its psychological contributions." It was James Mill who first clearly showed that in the succession of ideas, it is not the causal relation of the earlier over the later, but the permanent character of the order, which is the exact and important statement of the situation. This transition point clears the way for a more strictly psychological analysis of the problem, the history of which is traced in this volume. The author concludes with an excellent systematic analysis of the present status of the problem.

C. F. T.

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JAN 20 1922

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

VOL. XXXII JANUARY, 1922 NO. 2

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Published for the Editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager

London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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JANUARY, 1922

THE CHARACTER AND POLICY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY.

THE RT. HON. ARTHUR HENDERSON, M.P.

EVEN those who do not sympathise or agree with the Labour Party must take account of it, for, undeniably as even its enemies will admit, it is an important factor of increasing power in British and International politics. I welcome, therefore, the opportunity of explaining the salient characteristics of the Party.

It appears that some even among the intellectuals, particularly in America, believe the Labour Party to be essentially a party of manual workers. They seem to think, in the first place, that the majority of the British working-class adhere to the principles of the Labour Party, and in the second place, that those who belong to the Party and are not manual workers are merely adherents by an unnatural accident. Of course, it must be obvious to anyone who looks at the evidence that this is a misreading of the facts.

The Labour Party is a group of men and women of many different occupations who agree in having a common outlook and a common policy. The bond which holds the Party together is intellectual, not economic. It is to be explained by reference to political principles, not by reference to sources of income. It is, however, admitted that in a very true sense, it is a party of the working-class. If we divide society not into manual workers and others, but into those who live by working, and those who live by owning, then the working-class will include all workers by hand or

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brain, and the Labour Party may therefore be called a working-class party because its character depends upon the natural attitude of those who live by working as contrasted with the natural attitude of those who live upon the proceeds of ownership. Even this distinction, however, does not exclude the so-called capitalist from membership of the Party. For a man may approach social problems in a way that is not characteristic of those of his own economic class, and a man who lives by owning may very well believe that society would be better if no man were able to get without giving, to acquire goods without doing work. The dominant characteristic of the Labour Party is the result of the bond of association between those for whom the fundamental relation of men appears to be the work they do, one for another. As a historic fact, however, the Labour Party is pre-eminently a party of those who in another aspect are Trade Unionists, and this is an inevitable consequence of the fact that the outlook and attitude of those who live by working have been most definitely expressed and embodied in recent history by Trade Unions. It must not be forgotten that of the fourteen million who are workers in industry, only about seven million are in Trade Unions, and by no means all of these seven million are, even in the fervour of a General Election, adherents of the Labour Party. It does not indeed follow that if a man is a carpenter he must adopt the attitude towards life of his fellow-carpenters. He may indeed prefer the attitude and policy of a footman. Admiration for feudalism is not to be found only among those who benefit from it. The more active-minded industrial worker, however, naturally joins his fellows in a Trade Union, and, when he becomes politically conscious and active, naturally adopts the attitude and policy of the Labour Party. In this sense there is a natural connection between the Trade Unions and the Labour Party. Further, the members of the Labour Party are not as wealthy individually as members of other parties. Such wealth as is in their control is the result of the small accretions which build up Trade Union funds, and for this reason again it is natural

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that there should be an intimate connection between Trade Unionism and the Labour Party.

We may now turn to consider some aspects of its policy. There must be no doubt about the intentions of the Party. It proposes to assume, maintain and develop the government of Great Britain as soon as a majority of the electorate expresses the desire that it should. The Labour Party must not be thought of as a sort of permanent opposition. Its policy in opposition is quite definitely directed with a view to the possibility that it may have to assume power. For this reason its acts and its statements are qualified by a sense of responsibility, which is not unnaturally absent from those of more violent groups, who even in their most sanguine moments can hardly believe that they will be asked or allowed to take over the government of Great Britain, at any rate in the immediate or near future. It would be ungracious to comment from this point of view upon the criticisms of the Labour Party made by persons who must in their hearts be perfectly well aware that they will not have the opportunity, at least within any measurable distance of time, of carrying out those alarming transformations which they advocate. The sense that one may have to take over the administration of government adds to the annoyance with which the Party views the commitments of those at present in control, for, with the best will in the world, it may be impossible to govern in the future if the very instrument of government is blunted or broken before it passes into our hands.

This is one of the chief reasons for the attack of the Labour Party on the government with regard to unemployment and military expenditure. By the policy of the Coalition, we conceive we are being committed to a situation in the future from which it will be difficult to disentangle ourselves. Unemployment is for us a fundamental issue, for we regard it as essential that the efficiency of the workers and of the next generation should not be allowed to deteriorate simply because profits cannot be made during a period of industrial depression. If, however, great numbers, as

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at present, are for months idle, and even if those among them who receive some maintenance are not able to maintain their standard of living on the meagre pittance allowed, inevitably during the next ten years we shall find that the industrial productivity and even the capacity for citizenship has been seriously diminished. We do not therefore regard the treatment of the unemployment problem by the government as merely inadequate; we regard it as fundamentally unsound. And so also do we regard the policy of military expenditure. For, if the nation is committed to the present vast expenditure, five times as great as that of 1913, on military and naval forces, we may be unable to effect the drastic economies in unproductive expenditure which are essential to sound policy in the future.

Difficulties are being laid up for us by those at present in power; nevertheless, we intend sooner or later to take over the control of government. What then will be our policy? I shall speak first of economic policy. We aim at the establishment and maintenance of a greater efficiency in industry and agriculture; but the criterion of efficiency for us is not the amount of private gain which may be acquired by those engaged in industry and agriculture, but the quality of the public service performed by them. We view the production of goods as a public service, whether it be organised by the State or not. In some cases, as in regard to coal mines and railways, accidental circumstances and not abstract theory compel us to the opinion that such services cannot be organised as public services unless there is a national ownership or ownership by the State, but even in these cases, our aim is not simply a change of control, but a greater efficiency for public service.

In regard to agriculture, the Labour Party has devised a policy for increasing the utility of British agriculture. This will involve public, if not national, ownership of the land in a sense not yet clearly defined, and a greater independence of farmers in regard to landlords, and of agricultural workers in regard to both landlords and farmers.

With regard to trade, the point of importance for us is not

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whether the trader shall be helped or hindered or left to work his own sweet will, but how his enterprise can best serve the public needs. For this reason the presumption is always on the side of freedom; but as in regard to civil liberty, so in regard to industry and trade, freedom does not involve that the individual shall be a law unto himself. In regard to the organisation of industry, our first aim must be the prevention of misuse of the human instrument in production. Industry must be so organised as to diminish the evil effects of fluctuating trade, and to bear upon its cost of production the maintenance of the reserve of labour during periods of depression.

When we turn to politics as contrasted with economic programmes, the Labour Party is seen to be concerned first with the mechanism of elections. Even the cheapening of elections, which may seem of subordinate importance, will be an essential part of labour policy; for in spite of Reform Acts and Liberal Government Great Britain is still dominated in politics by the power of wealth. As regards the machinery for legislation, we shall have to overcome finally the obstacle to the success of the will of the people which is still to be found in the powers of the House of Lords. There is no valid objection from our point of view to one-chamber government.

Finally, in International policy we shall have to remodel the machinery of diplomacy and perhaps to curtail the military tendencies of some of our officials outside the Foreign Office. Our aim will be not simply the avoidance of war but the positive organisation of the Peace of the World. We shall enter into no secret agreements. We shall oppose, giving full publicity to the facts, attempts to exploit subject peoples or undeveloped countries. We shall aim not at the creation of any supreme power or World's State but at the co-operation of States as equals in the overcoming of such evils as famine and disease and in the development of all the resources of the world for the use of its peoples.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

LONDON.

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WHAT IS LIBERTY WHEN TWO OR MORE PERSONS ARE CONCERNED?

BENJAMIN IVES GILMAN.

SIXTY years ago an Englishman, John Stuart Mill, gave in an essay a definition of the word Liberty which has since become a commonplace of English thought. "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it." Nowadays in America the ideal is sometimes paraphrased in the maxim "Do as you please unless your pleasure interferes with that of others."

A complete reversal of previous ideas on Liberty was embodied in Mill's conclusion. In former times, he remarked, and even in the liberalism current in his day, "By Liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of political rulers." Before Mill wrote, Authority was thought the rule and Liberty the exception. Since he wrote, Liberty has been thought the rule and Authority the exception. His essay marked an enormous change in political thinking. The formula "A man should do as the powers that be prescribe, unless—" effaced individuality. The formula "A man should do as he himself chooses unless—" promotes it.

But the new formula, however antipodal to the old one, was likewise incomplete. What ought to happen when the pursuit of our own good in our own way interferes with others' pursuit of their own good in their own way? Should we have Liberty no matter which of the two ways prevailed? And if not, what resolution of the conflict could rightly be called Liberty?

Mill recognized that his thesis called for answers to these questions; but being chiefly interested to establish the thesis itself against the opposing principle, he contented himself with assuming that answers were possible. We ought

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not, he wrote, to push our own interests against the interests of others unless "compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference." Liberty then, according to him, is the social condition in which everyone follows his own inclination so long as it does not collide with that of any one else; and, further, in which conflicts of interest are resolved in the sense of imperative duty or allowable self-preference.

What shall be the criterion of imperative duty or allowable self-preference? Unless such a criterion be established Mill's definition, luminous as it is, remains a torso. The centre of gravity of social conduct is thereby shifted from conformity to spontaneity, but notwithstanding so great an achievement, its theory remains radically unfinished. A fundamental lack is concealed within this dictum of yesterday which has become the commonplace of to-day.

It is possible to give a definition of Liberty which at once determines a criterion of imperative duty and allowable self-preference, and exhibits Mill's main ideal as a special case. The definition may be phrased as follows: *Liberty consists in acting one's part in the resultant will of all whom one's purpose concerns.* If there are no others whom our purpose concerns, our right will be, as Mill asserted, to pursue our own good in our own way. But if there are others, and their interests conflict with ours, the imperative duty, the allowable self-preference will be dictated by the resultant will of all.

This phrase, "the resultant will of all," in turn needs definition. Let us suppose two persons with each of whom the pressure of various motives issues in a purpose, the two purposes proving in conflict one with the other. Then let us imagine that the two inner lives psychologically coalesce and become a single inner life having the two bodies for its habitat. There would ensue in this greater person a similar but doubled pressure of various motives issuing again in a purpose, but a purpose of which both bodies would become instruments, now acting in adaptation one to the other. Team work would ensue between the two bodies, as between

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the two arms of one body extended to move an object. Returning from this imaginary case to the actual world, let us suppose that the two persons, instead of psychologically coalescing, should each realize in fancy or imagination the motives of the other. Provided that each gives the same weight to the motives he fancies as to the motives he feels; and provided further that each adequately fancies the motives of the other, both will so far reproduce the imaginary case as to issue in the same purpose, to which the body of each will contribute its share in a co-operative deed. Under these two conditions the two persons will be guided by what is here called a resultant will. Multiplying the number of persons concerned will complicate the case but introduce no new principle.

Liberty, according to the definition above proposed, consists in the realization of this ideal. Each of those persons whom any one's purpose concerns is to act his part in the resultant will of all regarding it. The office of free government consists in seeing as far as it may that this co-ordinated action occurs. Every freeman may still be said to pursue his own good in his own way, but only through an enlargement of his personality which brings within it the relevant content of all the other spirits with whom he has to do. The resultant will becomes Mill's "imperative duty," and sets its limits to his "allowable self-preference." The modern American version of his definition will run "Do as you please, unless your pleasure interferes with that of others; *and then do as you would were you and they rolled into one.*"

This conception of Liberty implies two presuppositions already specified: first, that each individual gives the same weight to the motives he fancies as to the motives he feels; and second, that each adequately fancies the motives of others. The first of these presuppositions is what is meant by equality between persons; the second is what is meant by their fraternity.

The capacity of men to recognize truth rarely appears to less advantage than in the misunderstanding of the doctrine of equality which still persists among gentle and simple

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alike. Highbrows scout the doctrine as the foolish persuasion that it lies in any individual to be and do what any other can. Lowbrows welcome it as the gratifying assurance that "I am as good as you and if anything a little better." Nothing can be further than either from the true content of the principle. The real doctrine of equality affirms simply that a given interest ought to be accorded the same consideration in whatever personality it occurs. The familiar lines of Shakespeare, though not without poetical ambiguity, may be so interpreted:

> "And the poor beetle that we tread upon
> In corporal sufferance finds a pang as great
> As when a giant dies."

In plain prose, a given pang is the same pang whoever feels it. In the most general terms the veritable doctrine runs—a specified psychic phenomenon merits the identical regard whether it take place in A or B. The travesty runs—any manifestation of mind of which A is capable B is also capable of. Equality means no such vagary. On the contrary it expresses the identical nature of the inference we make every time the sight of a body of one or another kind inspires the conclusion that there is a soul, great or small, inhabiting it. According to the true doctrine of equality the Albatross is the equal of the Mariner, in that the whole distinction of superior and inferior between the two rests on an equal basis of observable fact and not on an unequal basis of mythologic assumption.

It would be naïveté to drop the false doctrine here. As a matter of fact the real difference between its upholders and its decriers is not intellectual at all, but moral. The Lowbrow knows full well in his heart that men are not equal in capacity; and the Highbrow full well that much of their inequality springs from unequal conditions. Both use the false doctrine to camouflage, the one a cry for help, the other his deafness to it. Dialectics will never end the strife, but only a moral reform; in the under classes an acceptance of such of their own limitations as are unavoidable, in the

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upper classes an intolerance of such limitations as they can remove from others. Meanwhile, dialectics by depriving both parties of the shelter of a false notion may hasten the end of their difference.

There is no difficulty in understanding the second presupposition, that of fraternity. Highbrows and Lowbrows alike know it as the sympathy one person may feel for another. It is the realization in one soul of the hidden life of another, the penetration of one spirit by another. It is that relation between different consciousnesses, imperfect and infrequent as it is in fact, in which the cynic saying "*Mal d'autrui n'est que songe*" no longer holds.

Equality and Fraternity are the two presuppositions of Liberty. A famous form of statement serves to compress the outcome of this essay into one sentence: And now abideth Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, these three; but the sum and substance of these is Liberty.

BENJAMIN IVES GILMAN.

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THE INDIVIDUAL FACTOR IN SOCIAL PROGRESS.

C. J. CADOUX.

THERE is no doubt that one of the dangers of a strongly devotional temperament is that it tends to isolate a man from his fellows and make him negligent of their welfare. Often "the religious fanatic has a vision of God that blots out the world and his fellow men."[1] The charge is exemplified in the random utterances of some of the leading mystics. "The inward Christian," writes Thomas à Kempis, "preferreth the care of himself before all other cares. . . . If thou attend wholly unto thyself and God, thou wilt be but little moved with whatsoever thou seest abroad": "whatsoever becometh others, neglect not thyself."[2] Brother Lawrence tells us that, on giving himself wholly to God, he began to live as though there was none but God and himself in the world, and that, though he prayed about the miseries and sins of men, yet, "knowing that God could remedy the mischiefs they did, when He pleased, he gave himself no farther trouble." The first thought of a modern Christian when he reads these words is that the attitude of mind they express is not by any means the true imitation of Christ or the genuine practice of the presence of God. Healthy and useful religious temperament, we say, must be marked by a feeling of moral responsibility for the rest of mankind, by a serious and urgent concern for the welfare of one's fellows. He who truly loves God must love his brother also: and love for his brother must mean a constant endeavour to rescue him from sin and suffering and to share with him the good gifts of God.

It is, however, only too obvious that those religious en-

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[1] Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*, p. 165. Cf. *Times Literary Supplement*, 30 Dec., 1920, p. 889: "Léon Bloy did not love his fellow men; perhaps that was because he loved God so much that there was nothing left over for human beings."

[2] *Imitatio Christi* II, v. 2, I, xxv, 3 fin; cf. I, xi, 1.

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thusiasts who have been careful to avoid the reproach of "splendid isolation," and who have gone out of their way to discharge their obligations as their brothers' keepers, have met on the whole with a very indifferent reception. The world has usually regarded its would-be reformers as tiresome cranks and dangerous fanatics. Often it has manifested a hasty impatience that is ready to reject what is new and unfamiliar simply on the ground of its novelty, like the coachman Goldsmith tells us of, who used to say, "right or wrong, he who disturbs religion is a blockhead, and he shall never travel in a coach of mine." More often the ground of opposition has been that the reformer is failing to mind his own business. Even Thomas Carlyle—himself a fairly vigorous reformer—could feel irritated by the reforming zeal of others. "Men speak too much about the world," he says. "Each one of us here, let the world go how it will, . . . has he not a Life of his own to lead? . . . We should look to ourselves: . . . That mania of saving worlds is itself a piece of the Eighteenth Century with its windy sentimentalism. Let us not follow it too far. For the saving of the *world* I will trust confidently to the Maker of the world; and look a little to my own saving, which I am more competent to."[3] In consequence of this frequent attitude of distrust and opposition, the story of the reformers constitutes a very sad chapter in the history of humanity. Society has given many of its benefactors small thanks for their pains. It has protected itself against them by any means that would serve. Even where it has not proceeded to extremes with them, it has often broken their hearts by dislike and indifference.[4]

It is, of course, not to be denied that there is something to be said on the side of the world in this matter. We must

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[3] *The Hero as Man of Letters.* It was said of Fichte's pupils that they were "infected with his accursed desire to regenerate the world" (Adamson, *Fichte*, p. 100).

[4] "The author of a great reformation is almost always unpopular in his own age. He generally passes his life in disquiet and danger" (Macaulay, *Essay on Mackintosh*).

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not, for instance, jump to the conclusion that, because all benefactors are would-be reformers, all would-be reformers are benefactors. We must admit society's right to criticize those who aspire to guide it, and to satisfy itself of their wisdom, as well as of their sincerity. It is probably true that many would-be reformers have actually been tiresome cranks and dangerous fanatics; and it has been a good thing that they did not carry many of their contemporaries with them. But there is in history quite enough evidence of a different kind to make us feel that the task of testing a reformer's credentials is a matter of urgent and painful interest, and that the grounds on which his proposals are to be accepted or rejected cannot be too carefully studied and understood.

It is the purpose of this paper, not to set out at length the tests which a reformer ought to be required to undergo before his counsel is accepted, but to discuss the validity of one test which is very commonly applied by the popular mind, and failure to satisfy which is usually deemed sufficient of itself (apart from any other objection, and in spite of any excellence) to warrant rejection. Let us suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that we have a real evil in society, an individual reformer or a group of reformers who are convinced that they know the way out, and an obvious unreadiness or unfitness on the part of the community to take that way. Is that unfitness or unreadiness or impossibility on the part of the community, taken by itself, a reason why we should dissuade the reformers from taking the way out themselves and from urging others to do the same? Nay, is it a reason why we should not ourselves join them in both efforts?

We should of course have to remind our idealist friends in the first place that the moral progress of society always is, normally speaking, a slow and gradual process.[5] In-

[5] Tolstoy, indeed, in *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, ch. x, argues that the rate of progress tends to become accelerated as it proceeds, so that a point may be reached at which vast masses will accept new truth in an extremely short space of time.

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dividuals may be converted from wickedness to righteousness in the twinkling of an eye; but society at large does not usually change in that way. The world's moral colour is the general average produced by the colour of each component unit, and can change only when a sufficient number of the units have changed. "One sinner that repenteth" makes the world better, but only in a minute degree. A building composed of many imperfect bricks or stones cannot be renewed all of a sudden: a sudden restoration will simply destroy it. In the same way, we cannot expect our world to reach the millennium in a single stride.

Again, we should need to urge that the lasting and satisfactory adoption of a new standard on the part either of society or of an individual, is and always must be relative to, and dependent upon, some inner renewal of the moral nature. Men must be made morally and spiritually ready, before they can improve their habits with advantage. It is quite true that they often appear to be led to change their ways for the better by such external appeals as the criticism of others and the compulsion of laws: these stimuli may claim a certain priority in some cases, more particularly, perhaps, in the reformation of those who are below the average moral level of their time. But if an advance beyond what society demands be attempted in some department of conduct, without the party concerned feeling sincerely that duty requires that advance, and without his being raised to that spiritual level on which it becomes imperative, the advance achieved will in all probability prove a hollow and short-lived thing.[6]

[6] "The fair-minded student . . . has learnt that it must be disastrous to force a society prematurely to a higher grade . . . all experience proves that attempts at a very rapid passage from one set of rules to a much higher set result in mere abrogation and not in progress" (A. Weir in *Hibbert Journal*, Apr., 1914, pp. 568 f.). "Programs hastily superimposed, before a general demand has been awakened for the values they aim to conserve, are foredoomed to failure. How often zealous prophets of a new day, lacking the steadying power that might have been derived from a better knowledge of history, have gone down to defeat chiefly in consequence of their determination to save the world by their favorite program in their own generation! But the mills of the gods grind slowly in the making of history as in the administration of justice" (S. J. Case, in *Journal of Religion*, Jan., 1921, pp. 16 f.).

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We should have in the next place to point out the bearing of these two considerations on the political aspect of moral progress. True morality is not advanced by the government passing laws or taking other steps which demand from people generally a far higher standard of conduct than they are yet able to appreciate and aspire to. The principle is an old one and has often been exemplified and observed. Akhenaten, the ancient king of Egypt, entertained advanced views on monotheism and peace, which were not shared by the vast majority of his subjects; and the result was considerable confusion in Egypt itself, not to mention the loss of the Egyptian conquests in Palestine.[7] Plato discusses in the *Gorgias* the impossibility of one who differs widely from the bulk of his fellow country-men on important points being able to take a large and successful share in the government of them.[8] It was the most exacting of all ethical teachers who implicitly justified Moses for legally demanding from the Israelites something less in the matter of divorce than the highest ideal really required—because of the hardness of their hearts. Lecky remarks, in the course of his panegyric on Marcus Aurelius: "He endeavoured by the example of his Court to correct the extravagances of luxury that were prevalent, and he exhibited in his own career a perfect model of an active and conscientious administrator; but he made no rash efforts to force the people by stringent laws out of the natural channel of their lives."[9] Carlyle chides M. Roux for representing the French Revolution as an attempt to realize the Christian religion: it was, he says, "a Gospel rather, . . . according to a new Fifth Evangelist

[7] H. R. Hall, *Ancient History of the Near East*, pp. 298-308, 345-350. Mr. Hall has no sympathy with the peculiar difficulties in which Akhenaten's position placed him, and most unfairly criticizes him as "the first doctrinaire in history, and, what is much the same thing, the first prig."

[8] Grote, *Plato*, ii, pp. 139 ff.

[9] *History of European Morals*, i, p. 252. "Do not hope," wrote Marcus Aurelius to himself (ix, 29), "(to realize) Plato's Republic. . . . For who can change the opinions of men? But without a change of opinions, what else (is there) than the servitude of men who groan, and pretend to obey?" À propos of Plato's Republic, Grote tartly remarks somewhere that there is no reason to regret that no serious attempt was ever made to realize it in practice.

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Jean-Jacques, calling on men to amend *each the whole world's* wicked existence, and be saved by making the Constitution."[10] Thackeray puts into the mouth of Pendennis a description of the humiliating way in which youthful advocates of universal reform give up their schemes as hopeless after a few years of agitation. "They submit to circumstances which are stronger than they—march as the world marches towards reform, but at the world's pace (and the movements of the vast body of mankind must needs be slow, —forego this scheme as impracticable, on account of opposition, that as immature, because against the sense of the majority—are forced to calculate drawbacks and difficulties as well as to think of reforms and advances—and compelled finally to submit, to wait, and to compromise."[11] It was said of Yuan Shih-k'ai that it was to little purpose that he could frame an intelligent and courageous policy for the government of China, when there were not enough honest men available in the country to carry it out.[12] Many an earnest moralist has dropped off from political activity with a bitter feeling of disappointment and even despair, such as Danton breathed on the eve of his execution: "O, it were better to be a poor fisherman than to meddle with governing of men."

[10] *Hist. of Fr. Revol.* III, v. 1. Cf. Macaulay, *Essay on the Comic Dramatists of the Restoration:* "When a government, not content with requiring decency, requires sanctity, it oversteps the bounds which mark its proper functions . . . a government which attempts more than it ought will perform less." Yet contrast Carlyle's warm eulogy of John Knox for trying to make the government of Scotland a theocracy (*The Hero as Priest*, fin): "That right and truth, or God's Law, reign supreme among men, this is the Heavenly Ideal . . . towards which the Reformer will insist that all be more and more approximated. All true Reformers . . . strive for a Theocracy. How far such Ideals can ever be introduced into Practice, and at what point our impatience with their non-introduction ought to begin, is always a question. I think we may say safely, Let them introduce themselves as far as they can contrive to do it!"

[11] *Pendennis*, ch. lxii. Cf. the remarks of Gladstone, in his early work, *The State in its Relations with the Church*, ii, p. 402: "A moral evil cannot be cured by a mechanical remedy. Changes of law, even for the better, require and presuppose, in order to be beneficial, a degree at least of moral assimilation, a desire for the thing to be enacted as a basis for the enactment, rested on which it may itself react upon and confirm the desire."

[12] J. O. P. Bland, in *Edinb. Review*, Oct., 1914, p. 435.

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No lesson could very well be more plain and unmistakable. But might not the Idealist reply: "I fully concede all that, and will not go back on my concession; but what after all does it amount to? I know society can move only at a slow pace; I know the heart must be prepared before conduct can be improved; I know it is no use trying to hurry up the Millennium by legislation. But is that any reason why I should not here and now act according to the best that I know, granting that from the point of view of society in its present condition such conduct will seem eccentric or disloyal or dangerous? Nay, is it any reason why I ought not to commend my convictions eagerly to others, and let them take their chance of getting accepted? Nay, further, is it any reason why you, whose only criticism of me is that I am in advance of my time, that I am a pioneer whom society cannot at present follow, should not take your place beside me, and so hasten the time when society will be able to follow?"

It is certainly difficult to see how society ever can or will progress in its moral standards, unless there is within it a minority of advanced and uncompromising moral idealists to lead the way towards better things and to keep alive the demand for them. And it is most important to notice in this connection that that wise and level-headed plea for slowness, which we saw to be so urgent in the case of society, has no force when we are speaking of an individual, who finds himself—it may be suddenly—challenged by a new moral ideal. Whatever other objections we may raise to the step he contemplates, we are guilty of a fallacy if we object to it on the ground that the whole community cannot follow suit by nine o'clock the next morning. To use again the analogy of the decayed building, while it is true that the renovation of the whole can progress only by very gradual stages, nothing is to be gained by replacing each faulty brick with one only a trifle better. For each faulty brick the builder substitutes one of the very best quality he can get, without any fear of ruining the building by too sudden a change.

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When, therefore, we read the sage words of Marcus Aurelius, "What is not useful for the swarm is not useful for the bee," or the great *ipse dixit* of Kant, "In all cases I must act in such a way that I can at the same time will that my maxim should become a universal law," we must needs add certain very pertinent qualifications in order to meet the possible unreadiness of society. A man may often feel called on to act in a way in which he knows it to be quite impossible for the generality of mankind in their present condition to follow him. In such cases, he wishes his maxim to become a universal law—but his wish is in the nature of a pious hope, which is to be realized at some future and possibly distant time date. Yet this must not deter him from obeying that maxim himself, inasmuch as his hope for the adherence of society to it in the future depends for its realization upon his obedience to it in the present. And for a precisely similar reason, it must not deter him from propagating his views among his fellow men.

It might perhaps seem that all this was so patently true and so generally agreed upon, that to spend words in attempting to prove it was a mere wasteful slaying of the slain. But if we look at one or two concrete cases, we shall see that some of the most confidently accepted ethical judgments may need to be revised.

Take first the attitude of Jesus to divorce. The very teacher who seems to have justified Moses for compromising as a legislator with the hardness of the people's hearts, did not hesitate absolutely to forbid his own disciples to practise divorce (that is to say, separation followed by a remarriage).[13] A standard, which could not then, and cannot now, be observed by society at large, was yet to be regarded as binding upon the followers of Jesus and, of course, upon

[13] I am aware that this absolute prohibition is denied by Dr. R. H. Charles in his recent book on the subject; and I differ from so high an authority with trembling—particularly as I have not read his book. Yet I cannot but feel that the uncompromising words of Mc x, 11 f. and Lc xvi, 18 represent the real judgment of Jesus, and that the saving clauses introduced in Mt. v. 32, xix, 9 owe their existence to the hardness of early Christian hearts rather than to anything Jesus himself said.

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those whom they should convert. The leaders of the Church to-day are right, therefore, in their adhesion to this exacting view; but when it becomes a question of framing political laws on the subject, the tacit but inaccurate Anglican assumption that the modern nation can be catered for as if it were a community of Christians naturally introduces troublesome complications.

There is no one who—in any ordinary circle of people—can be so sure of his reputation as an unmitigated faddist as the vegetarian on humane grounds. All sorts of reasons can be given—by those who feel it worth while to give reasons at all in such a case—for not being persuaded by his arguments: but among the most favourite reasons is the impossibility of visualizing a general and immediate cessation of flesh-eating without looking forward to a good deal of inconvenience and difficulty (in the matter of disposing of superfluous stock, etc.). But such an objection overlooks the obvious fact that a change of habit may quite well be catastrophic in the case of individuals and at the same time gradual in the case of society, and that this very gradualness —providing time as it does for a progressive adjustment to the altered conditions of social life—is as ample an answer as could very well be desired to the popular alarm about "being overrun," and so forth. Yet it is often on no better grounds than this imaginary alarm that persons defend themselves for refusing to trust their kind hearts, when it comes to a matter of diet. Could anything be more lame than the apologia of James Thomson who, after eloquently pleading against the injustice of slaughtering animals for food, continues:

> "Thus the feeling heart
> Would tenderly suggest; but 'tis enough,
> In this late age, adventurous, to have touched
> Light on the numbers of the Samian sage.
> High Heaven forbids the bold presumptuous strain,
> Whose wisest will has fixed us in a state
> That must not yet to pure perfection rise."[14]

[14] The Samian sage is the vegetarian Pythagoras. The passage occurs in Thomson's *Spring*.

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Yet another instance of the same distorted vision is the explanation usually given of the failure of the early Christian Church to forbid its members to own slaves. Thus Loring Brace writes: "For a Divine teacher to have proclaimed, then and there, the duty of absolute and immediate emancipation, would have plunged the Roman world into a "misery" beyond all bounds of conception, and would have let loose a war of extermination between masters and slaves, which would have turned Europe and Asia into a field of blood and slaughter."[15] Now this, of course, sounds very terrible, and the reasoning seems at first sight plausible: but when we consider seriously what would have been in all probability the consequences of the few Christian slave owners of Paul's time being required to emancipate their slaves as a matter of Christian principle, we see how utterly remote those consequences would have been from that avalanche of woe anticipated by Brace and others. There is no need to speak (as Wayland does) as if the Church could not have bidden Christian masters to free their slaves, without bidding Christian slaves—or worse still, slaves generally —to resist their masters. In view of the small numbers and influence of the early Christians, and their well-known ethical principles, we have not the slightest ground for say-

[15] *Gesta Christi*, p. 45. Similarly, Francis Wayland's *Elements of Moral Science*, pp. 203 f. ("If it [Christianity] had forbidden the *evil*, instead of subverting the *principle*; if it had proclaimed the unlawfulness of slavery, and taught slaves to *resist* the oppression of their masters; it would instantly have arrayed the two parties in deadly hostility, throughout the civilized world: its announcement would have been the signal of servile war; and the very name of the Christian religion would have been forgotten amidst the agitations of universal bloodshed"); Channing, *Works* (ed. 1843) i, pp. 27, 225, 250 ("Slavery, in the age of the Apostle, had so penetrated society, was so intimately interwoven with it, and the materials of servile war were so abundant, that a religion, preaching freedom to the slave, would have shaken the social fabric to its foundation, and would have armed against itself the whole power of the state. Paul did not then assail the institution. He satisfied himself with spreading principles, which, however slowly, could not but work its destruction"), 251 (approving quotation of the above passage from F. Wayland), ii, p. 433; Luthardt, *History of Christian Ethics* (E. T.), p. 259 ("To have done so [forbidden slavery] would have been a social revolution; for the whole order of society in the ancient world rested upon the institution of slavery"). More recent authors might be quoted in the same strain.

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ing that a slave war would have been launched, if the early Church had made a point of requiring all her members to refuse to own slaves. Brace and others have landed themselves in an absurdity through ignoring the conditions, subjective and otherwise, under which the Church, if it wanted to make the change at all, would have had to make it.

Our last illustration of the point at issue shall be taken from a still more controversial field—I mean, the question as to the Christian ethic of war. The problem is one with many ramifications, which—for the immediate purpose before us—must all be ignored, except one, viz: the question how far the fact that pacifism at any given moment is impracticable on a large scale because humanity is not ready for it, is a valid objection to the practice and advocacy of it by individuals. The unreadiness of society may indeed be a valid reason why a community so imperfectly Christianized as any of the modern nations cannot be pacifist in the Christian sense: and this may possibly be a sound reply to such proposals as those of Miss Royden in her book, *The Great Adventure* (1915). But is it an equally sound reply to the individual Christian? Suppose for a moment we could agree that war is, broadly speaking, unChristian, that the Christian method is to return good for evil and to try to overcome evil with good and take the consequences, that a Christian life of love and gentleness and service is a real check on the wrongdoing of others, and that the Golden Rule imposes on us the duty of defending others by the use of such means only as we, being Christians, would like others to use in defence of us. There is much here, of course, that is controversial; but supposing for the sake of argument that these positions were conceded, would it be right to urge on a Christian convinced of the truth of them, that, because the majority of his fellow men cannot at present do as he does, he ought to suspend the pursuit of his own ideal and do as they do? Unless the general plea of this paper be rejected, it follows that it would not be right to urge this course on him.

Nothing could exhibit more clearly the hopeless confusion

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into which arguments on the subject are apt to fall than the inconsistent use made of the hypothesis of a universal adoption of the pacifist's principles. At one moment, universal pacifism is extolled as the great, far-off, divine event, pending the arrival of which it is premature and impracticable and foolish for anyone to be a pacifist. The next moment, it figures in the argument as a terrible danger bound to land society in irretrievable ruin; and so, once again, the pacifist is wrong. It is a case of "Heads, I win; tails, you lose." Horrible pictures are drawn of what are called "the consequences of non-resistance" in certain arbitrarily selected sections of humanity, without any regard to the positive accompaniments of true Christian pacifism (in the form of love, service, and influence for good), to the subjective conditions on which it has to rest, and to the probable circumstances under which it will grow (*e.g.*, not rapidly and solely in one country, but at a roughly uniform rate in all); and then from these pictures it is argued that the pacifist is breaking the axiomatic principle which makes it everyone's duty to do what is best for society at large.[16]

If a course of action is the highest and best possible for the individual—and if it is also a right, though only a distant ideal for society at large—what more do we want to establish it as a thoroughly sound principle for the individual to follow and to propagate amid a dissentient world? Nay, what hope is there that this great, far-off, divine event of universal peace will ever come within our reach, except by the existence and the increase of a group of people who are determined to introduce it so far as their own lives and influence extend? No gradual evolutionary process in society can make a beginning—let alone reach full fruition—except through the occurence of a number of revolutions in individual lives. At all costs we must get rid of this paralyzing belief that in certain matters there must be no ethical advance on the part of the minority until the whole mass of

[16] A typical instance of this sort of argument may be seen in Dr. Rashdall's paper in *The Modern Churchman*, May, 1916, p. 54.

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the community is ready to advance on an even front. That is not the way in which great ethical advances ever have been, or are likely to be, made.

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EMOTION, BLAME, AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE IN RELATION TO RADICAL LEADERSHIP AND METHOD.

A. B. WOLFE.

IT is not possible exactly to define radicalism. It is a relative matter. The attitudes having to do with conservatism, progressivism, and radicalism grade one into another like the colors of the spectrum, so that it is impossible to say where the dividing line between any contiguous two should be drawn. Whether a given attitude is called conservative, progressive, or radical depends of course upon time and place, and upon the observer's scales of valuation and definition. In general, however, radicalism connotes advocacy of thoroughgoing change in the direction of innovation. Originally, in English politics it was a term of opprobrium, and of late there have not been lacking widespread efforts to universalize this early usage. It would be unfortunate were these efforts to succeed, or were the present popular tendency to regard radicalism and socialism as synonymous to become general, for we should then be put to the necessity of finding another generic term, applicable in all fields of human interests, religious, moral, æsthetic, as well as political and economic, to denote the social attitude based upon desire for thoroughgoing introduction of the new and perhaps untried and unfamiliar.

Thoroughgoing analysis will show that radicalism is in the main the result of some form of maladjustment between the individual and his social environment—a maladjustment manifesting itself in discomfort and restlessness. When this discomfort creates a desire for significant innovations in social organization and processes it is the parent either of progressivism or of radicalism. When desire for change is "balked" or obstructed, the resultant attitude is very likely to be a more or less uncompromising radicalism. It can be shown that the maladjustment or strain incident

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to balked desires or interests is removed or minimized by one of three processes: (1) repression of the desire, (2) sublimation, or substitution of other interests and transfer of attention to them, and (3) reinforcement.[1] In the latter case the attention is focussed on the obstructed desire or interest and the resources of the personality brought to bear for its realization. Desire-reinforcement is the main source of active, consistent, and sustained radicalism. Desire-reinforcement is brought about by determination to remove the obstacles to the specific desire or interest obstructed—not to obstacles in general. Since this is the case, its effectiveness in action depends upon the individual's ability to single out the real causes of obstruction, in order that his attack may be intelligently directed. It is therefore of importance to know under what mental strains and stresses and through what apprehensional biases the obstructions are perceived, and whether attention and attack are directed to causes or to symptoms. Effective radicalism depends in the long run on correct diagnosis. A sick person, no matter how skilled a diagnostician, may not be able to diagnose his own ailment correctly. Similarly an angry person can scarcely be expected to make a dispassionate evaluation of the causes of his anger. During the war, for instance, no sensible person expected an unbiased analysis of its causes or an objective estimate of the relative culpability of the various parties to it.

When a desire is balked or an interest impeded, the normal motor response which, in the absence of obstruction, would release the energy of the desire, cannot take place. The emotional accompaniment of such a situation is very likely to be resentment and anger—both productive of the impulse to blame and personal attack. There is always the impulse to kick, or at least to damn, the chair against which you have just barked your shin. The next impulse is to blame the person who left the chair in that place. It is not essentially different in a social situation involving obstruc-

[1] See "The Motivation of Radicalism," by the present writer, in *The Psychological Review*, July, 1921, pp. 280–300.

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tion of interest and activity. The normal, naïve, "natural" impulse is to blame some personal agency for the obstruction. And the natural, undisciplined method of attempting the removal of the obstruction is to make an attack upon these personal agencies. The success of the attempt will depend not only upon the character and force of the attack—the strength of the subjective reinforcement of the balked desire, and the objective organization of the attacking forces—but also on whether the right object of attack has been chosen.

Obstructions to desires and interests are complex and not always what they seem to the angry or "hurt" individual suffering from repression.

Obstacles to wish-fulfillment, *e.g.*, to desire for greater personal freedom, for higher standards of living, for real democracy in social control, for new standards in art and literature—in fact the obstacles to progressive ambitions and ideals in general—are embodied partly in the conscious personal opposition of people or classes who can best profit by things as they are, partly in impersonal historico-genetic causes, and partly in physical limitations.

Mass-poverty, for instance, in a country like the United States with "boundless" natural resources, may be due, as the socialists claim, to the unjust distribution of income and gross restriction of output attributable to "business enterprise" under capitalist-class domination. Here the fixation of responsibility—that is, blame—in personal or class terms may be at least in part valid. But mass-poverty in China, involving every once in a while starvation of some millions of people, cannot be attributed to any class conflict or corporate greed and inefficiency. It is patent that the causes there lie almost wholly in actual pressure of population on the land's utmost capacity to provide food. Further analysis shows that the cause of this redundancy of population lies in the historico-genetic tradition of ancestor worship, for which, certainly, no "blame" can attach to individuals. Granting, for the sake of argument, the socialist explanation of poverty in America to be substantially

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correct, it would follow that the capitalist-class, business-enterprise, restriction-of-output, production-for-profits obstacle to higher standards of living for the masses might be removed through the agency of blame-fixation amd militant attack, accomplishing the removal of capitalism from power. But no militant class conflict in China could by any stretch of the imagination remove the causes of starvation, which could be avoided only by a successful campaign of education for abolition of ancestor worship and the adoption of an intelligent policy of birth control.

Personalistic "blame" explanations of poverty are advanced both by individualists and by socialists. The latter fix the blame on the members of the capitalist-employing class and say that poverty is due to exploitation. The individualists place the blame on the poor themselves and assert that their poverty is due to individual shiftlessness. Both explanations contain some degree of superficial truth, but both are emotional explanations, and fail to satisfy or convince the critically analytical mind, which demands explanation not in terms of blame-fixation but in terms of mechanistic causation. The scientific, behavioristic student of poverty will want to reveal, on the one hand the social or historical causes of "shiftlessness," and on the other the historical and institutional causes or antecedents of "exploitation" and exploitative attitudes; and further he will insist on extending the search for causes to the possible limitations of the physical environment and of man's technological control over nature.

Where, and to the extent that, personal selfishness (as in the case of intrenched vested interests) or unbending personal bigotry is the effective cause of obstruction, personalistic anger-and-blame reaction, with the logically resultant militant attack (either force or propaganda) will prove the effective and probably the necessary method of radical action, unless the obstructing forces can be diplomatically or politically outwitted. Where, however, the causes are physical, impersonally institutional, and technological, the effective method can be militant, militantly propagandistic,

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diplomatic, or political only in so far as personal and class interest obstructs the carrying out of constructive technological reforms and advances. Unfortunately, one of the radical's most telling arguments in favor of militant revolution is the fact that personal and corporate interests do stand in the way of technologically constructive reforms, both in organization and in processes, which could be carried out in workmanlike manner were the properly qualified experts free to apply themselves, unhampered, to the task.

There are, then, but two fundamental methods of removing the obstacles to the attainment of the ends desired by progressives and radicals—conflict, and constructive cooperation. By the conflict method, personal- and class-interest obstructions are removed either by force, by political superiority (more votes and more political solidarity, greater skill in the political game), or by massed strength of organization in non-political lines. By the constructive method, the problems and difficulties of organisation and technical processes are critically and scientifically analyzed, and the technologists, whether engineers, medical men, economists or what not, set to work to solve them. Under the constructive method must be placed education of the people with regard to the actual nature of the obstructions, whether personal, institutional, or technological.

Now, while the motivation of most, if not all radicalism, in every field of human interest and activity, is to be found in desire-obstruction, and while anger and blame reaction is the natural accompaniment of such obstruction, it is clear that anger never in itself develops a reasoned policy, and that without a policy neither radicalism or reactionism ever accomplishes anything except discord and conflict. It should be clear that from individuals or classes in whom anger and the impulse to blame, produced by balking of desires, tend to take themselves out on the first, usually personal, objects at hand, trustworthy rational analysis of the situation or singling out of the real cause of obstruction cannot be expected. Individuals momentarily or chronically in such state of mental disequilibrium are incapable

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of critical objective analysis. Anger and its correlative emotions are the immediate motives to desire-reinforcement and to radical attack, but rational analysis (in the absence of intuitive understanding) must be the guide to procedure in removing the obstruction. Otherwise the only result of desire-reinforcement may be mere reflex and unreflective violence. The outcome of the balking of interests and of desire-reinforcement will therefore vary with different temperaments and the resulting radical attitudes will be characterized by different procedures.

An effective method must be the result of plan, objective, and discipline. Where the causes of obstruction are obscure, complex, and powerful, and intrenched in human habituation or in oppositions of assumed interests, the need of rational, intellectual discipline and leadership is as necessary to the effectiveness of a progressive or radical movement as is will or determination—the strong, consistent, and lasting reinforcement of desire.

It follows that in temperament, in training, and in discipline are to be sought the characteristics which differentiate the leaders from the followers in radical movements; and the specific kind of contribution which different temperaments are likely to make to progressivism or radicalism.

Contemporary psychologists seem to be exceedingly wary of types and classifications. To speak of mental "type" seems to them to smack of an *a priori*, unscientific attitude, especially if a classification suggests a division into emotional and intellectual types. This caution is perhaps due to the observed fact that the same individual may exhibit a hair-trigger motor responsiveness and a thoroughly undisciplined emotional attitude in one sphere of interests, and a calculating, rational intellectualism in another. The fact that the average mind is compartmentized, and addicted to glaring inconsistencies of attitude and method, makes classification seem futile, or at least dubious. All this may be admitted; and yet, not unscientifically, we may recognize different attitudes, different modes of response, different methods

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of attack, when some particular type of interest—say the economic—is balked. With regard to a particular situation, or a specific issue, it is difficult to see how it is possible to escape the conviction that some individuals react in a primarily emotional (praise and blame) way, while others react in a disciplined, rational, manner. Individuals may therefore be classified on the basis of the degree to which, with reference to a particular interest, they habitually subject their instincts and emotions to the control and direction of their intellects and reasoning powers, or in other words, upon the relative extent to which their conduct is determined by unreflective motor and emotional complexes and by judicial or scientific rational analysis. For the purpose in hand, Professor Giddings's classification comes nearest to meeting our needs.[2] He distinguishes four mental types, ideo-motor, ideo-emotional, dogmatic-emotional, and critically-intellectual. These types correspond roughly to motivation and control by sensibility, emotion, sentiment or belief, and impersonal rational intelligence, respectively.[3] The first three types react more to convictions involving personal praise and blame; the last to perception of impersonal causes. The first three, whether they happen to hold any definite conscious convictions as to "free will" or not, tend to reinforce their balked desires as if all obstructions were attributable to responsible personal agencies. The last type recognizes personal as well as impersonal agencies of obstruction, but regards the personal from the behavioristic, as it does the impersonal from the deterministic, standpoint.

We are now in position to understand more fully the significance of types of mind in relation to wish-reinforcement, both with regard to the nature of the obstacles to be removed, and as to the qualifications of radical leadership.

In the two lower types, the ideo-motor and ideo-emotional,

[2] A Provisional Distribution of the Population of the United States into Psychological Classes, *Psychological Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, July, 1901, pp. 337-349. Also Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology, 1906, pp. 236-239.

[3] Cf. Jastrow, *The Psychology of Conviction*, 1918, ch. 1.

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the fear-anger emotions attendant upon the obstruction of desire are most likely to find expression in blame. The obstruction is apprehended in terms of personal causation. Blame is in its nature personal, terminating upon supposedly responsible individuals, and may be followed by personal attack upon them. Practically always, there is an element of personification in the blame-reaction.

When natural persons are at hand to whom blame may be attached, the emotional temperament, undisciplined to the scientific method and attitude, makes them the scapegoats. Anthropology furnishes boundless illustration of this personalistic fear-anger reaction, from the blame and punishment of mothers of twins[4] to the burning of witches and the deportation of bolsheviks. These blame-reactions are naïve methods of removing the obstacles to wish-fulfillment, especially to the desire for safety. When natural persons cannot be blamed for an evil, supernatural personal agencies are created for the purpose, and the world is populated with evil spirits, devils, demons, and ill-dispositioned gods. Belief in spirits and gods then redirects fear-anger and blame to natural persons, who are held responsible for displeasing the gods and bringing down their wrath upon the social group. Uncritical, naïve personification, or personalistic symbolization, is by no means limited to naturefolk or to the realm of religion. The naïve socialist, however well-read in his Marx and Engels he may be, nevertheless welcomes the hog-jowled capitalist of Art Young's cartoons as a personal object, not wholly of a merely symbolical significance, upon whom his hatred may find momentary release. In the same way the conservative, his equanimity and comfort disturbed by labor unrest, vents his blame on the "agitator." It was noticeable that the armistice day parades in 1918 carried many black coffins labeled "the Kaiser," or "Wilhelm"—a striking example of symbolization and blame-fixation through personification. Respectable citizens blame the political boss for corruption and bad govern-

[4] Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, 2d edition, abridged, 1897, pp. 323-328.

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ment when the real responsibility should attach to their own apathy and absorption in their own selfish interests. Such personal scapegoats, found or created as objects for blame and hate, serve, in emotional minds, as definite stimuli of reinforcement and motor attack. They give definite objective for the aggressive disposition aroused by the balking of desire. In less aggressively emotional temperaments they are not so likely to stimulate motor attack. Such minds find release in objurgation or verbal attack, which serves in part as momentary release of anger complexes and in part as a defence mechanism against consciousness of fear and disinclination to fight—that is, against self-reproach.

We are now in position to understand that mere disorderly, violent attack upon institutions or persons who happen momentarily to be the termini of anger and resentment releases does not constitute radicalism. Discomfort, release of repressed energy, transference, and reinforcement may lead merely to hysteria and emotional slashing about, mob violence, and purposeless feudism. A lynching mob is usually composed of conservative citizens. The machine smashers in the English textile industries during the idustrial revolution were not radicals; usually machine smashing was the result of reflexive anger expressing itself in rioting.[5] Whatever else it may betoken the breaking up of Non-Partisan League meetings by members of the American Legion does not represent radicalism, nor does the widespread recrudescence of organized violence under the Ku Klux Klan.

Violent methods may be used in the interest of either radicalism or reactionism, but radicalism as a social attitude involves the persistent desire for thoroughgoing and fundamental innovation, usually against opposition. Explosive release of repressed desire or impulsive anger-and-blame attack will occasionally take place in the rank-and-file representatives of conservative and reactionary, as well as the

[5] In one instance, however, it seems to have been the outcome of a definite plan, organization, and reactionary motives. See Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*, 1907, p. 662.

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radical, attitudes. Nevertheless, violent action is to be expected somewhat more frequently in those social classes in which there is the greater amount and intensity of desire-repression and obstruction of interest and ambition. For these classes have, in consequence of repression and obstruction, the strongest emotional impulses to resentment and blame, and the broadest rational ground for desiring thoroughgoing change. The comparatively untutored masses may not know exactly what they want and may not be intelligent judges of the best means of improving their condition. Neither are they always reliable and persistent in their attachment and loyalty to particular programs of reform. They are in fact hard to organize and by the very reason of their many repressions and obstructions are not always conspicuously amenable to discipline in a common cause. In the absence of organization and the discipline of skilled leaders, their desire-reinforcement is directed largely at random, and is likely therefore to be relatively futile in bringing about effective change. That there is a vast reserve of energy damned up in the obstructed and repressed desires of the masses for a better way of living few will dispute. It is kept from effectiveness largely by the futile propensity to personification, personal blame, and pointless objurgation, which serve as partial, momentary, and somewhat rhythmic release of anger, and scatter, rather than focus, the energies of the obstructed interests. Ill-considered and ill-timed industrial strikes, and waves of popular zeal to "clean out" corrupt political rings or inefficient city governments are illustrations in point.

If the obstructed energy of these temperaments were to be released under organized direction and held to concerted action for definite objectives, it would obviously be a force not lightly to be held in contempt or trifled with.

Effective leadership and organization, holding the volatile-minded rank and file to a steady program, is supplied by the more persistent temperament of the dogmatic-emotional minds, whose motor and emotional releases are of a less hair-trigger type. Such minds are also given to intense

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resentments, but their resentment is steadier and often amounts to sustained moral indignation. They are given to personalistic fixation of blame, but they may also have very considerable perception of the non-personal causes of existing evils and obstructions and may consequently make use of the objective scientific analyses furnished by the relatively disinterested critical intellectuals not engaged in the actual "movement." In the characteristics of the dogmatic-emotional attitude we have, accordingly, the key to the explanation and the requirements of the actual, effective leadership of radical movements. Most active radical leaders, so far as concerns the movement that claims their major interest and attention, are of this type of mind. It is therefore desirable to review its salient characteristics with some care.

The dogmatic-emotional mind holds to its beliefs, valuations, and "principles" with intense conviction and unswerving loyalty. Its principles may have been arrived at through objective processes of investigation and inductive logic. Its observational and reasoning processes are more or less strongly influenced by its emotional interests, and, while usually biased by them, may be at times aided by them, *e.g.*, by sympathetic insight, where the colder critical-intellectual would fail to sense essential realities. In any case, its convictions, once formed, are held to with dogmatic persistency. Argument will not dislodge them. They become the premises of its reasoning, and, by emotional attachment, are placed beyond the reach of criticism. In the more intense dogmatic-emotional types, convictions are held to with religious devotion. We all know single taxers, socialists, "open shop" propagandists, defenders of the classics, advocates of vocational education, feminists and anti-feminists, high protectionists, eugenists, devoted Christians, and sincere atheists of this type.

The dogmatic-emotional mind is rarely cynical, as what passes for the critically-intellectual sometimes appears to be, for cynicism is an emotional complex serving as a defence attitude, and the dogmatic-emotional individual is usually

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something of a fighter. If it is ever pessimistic its pessimism is not the kind that paralyzes the will to action. It may be vindictive and domineering and it generally has an inward austerity and capacity for self-denial, which, however, may be disguised under a genial exterior. It may or may not be capable of deep and active sympathies. Where it is, they help to intensify its perception of social wrongs, and furnish part of the explanation as to why it is more persistently and intensely motivated by moral indignation than are the other, either lower or higher, mental types. It tends more than the intellectual to attach blame to persons or to classes of persons, and is more likely to conceive reform and revolution in terms of militant combat (*e.g.*, class struggle), or of diplomacy and political intrigue, than is the intellectual.

When such a mind gets set in a conservative channel it supplies the stalwart, sincere conservatives, who are so, not so much from personal interest, as from strong moral and intellectual conviction. Firmly believing that this or that institution is the foundation of social welfare, they oppose any essential change in it, and hold in more or less personal antipathy those who do not see it as they do. From the ranks of such sincere conservatives from principle, have been drawn, for instance, some of the staunchest defenders of private property, protective tariffs, the established church, manhood suffrage, and national military preparedness.

When, however, the dogmatic-emotional mind happens to get directed into the radical channel, either because of balked personal interests, or because its keen sympathy makes the wrongs and obstructed interests of others its own, it attacks institutions with vigor equal to that with which the dogmatic conservative defends them, and conceives an equally strong antipathy, expressed in terms of personal blame, toward those who represent and defend the offensive institutions.

Since the dogmatic-emotional radical holds to his principles, be they economic, political, or moral, with religious devotion, it follows that he will not easily be drawn off from

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the attempt to put them into practice. That is, he reinforces his balked desires with vigor and determination. Obstruction and opposition merely increase his reinforcement and intensity his resentment, until finally his "cause" is made a matter of truly religious significance, of religious hope, and may even come to have some of the mystical and militant accompaniments of religion in the narrower sense.

Not all dogmatic-emotional radicals become leaders, of course. But the emotional and intellectual qualities of this type of mind fit it for the development of the specific characteristics necessary in the successful active leadership of an unpopular radical movement. Such leadership calls for unremitting hard work, sacrifice of all narrow and immediate personal interests, indifference to rebuffs and to the misunderstanding, contempt, and insults of respectability, patience to withstand the strain of waiting, without pessimism or cynicism, during the long, slow period of growth of an unpopular movement, ability to visualize distant ends, capacity for organization and inspiration, and above all, such reinforcement of desire or interest as will create that quality of dogged persistence and determination which finally accomplishes the aim of the movement, if such accomplishment is humanly possible.

In this effective reinforcement of desire the combative instinct plays an important part. The active militant leaders of progressive or radical movements opposed by powerfully entrenched personal and corporate interests, probably must not only be motivated by deep desires strongly obstructed, but also somewhat amply endowed with the fighting spirit. Such a temperament has its advantages and disadvantages. It will avoid the refinement of analysis, the meticulousness of judgment, which sometimes put the intellectual in the position of Buridan's ass, starving between two haystacks for want of decision. It will proceed to push a plan of reform through to success against the determined obstructionist tactics of conservatives and reactionaries, where the more philosophical, critically-intellectual temperament would fail, either because of indecision

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and lack of personalistic aggression or because of inadequate desire-reinforcement.

The combative temperament is likely, in its vigorous attack upon the personal agents of obstructive institutions, to conceive the problem of reform or revolution wholly in terms of conflict or of politics, whereas the fundamental obstructions may be of an impersonal nature and may require for their removal not merely the combating or political outwitting of personal opposition, but painstaking scientific analysis of the whole situation. The less decisive and combative intellectualist may in the long run delve deeper in critical evaluation of the obstructions to progress, find the impersonal forces back of personal attitudes, and by attention to these more fundamental causes, lay the foundations to thoroughgoing social transformation while the more combative and emotional mind is planning a campaign to crush its enemies. It is evident that both types of leadership are necessary, as long as men are ruled by emotion so much more than they are by reason and scientific knowledge.

The purely critical and intellectual mind, did such a thing exist, would be devoid of any emotions save those involved in the functioning of curiosity, the pursuit of knowledge, and the instinct of workmanship. Actually, however, the only difference between the critical-intellectual and the dogmatic-emotional mind is that while the former may have strong conflict emotions and impulses they are so far as possible kept in subordination to the critical reason, to the spirit of scientific objectivity and balance, and to the instinct of workmanship. More especially are the combative tendency and the fear-anger complexes kept under control, in the interest of clearness of vision, analysis of the causes of desire-obstruction, and to lesser extent, of the rational evaluation of the desire itself. The critically-intellectual mind is typically the scientific mind, pursuing the scientific method and guided consistently by the one article of scientific faith—faith in the universality and dependability of the law of cause and effect. This means that it is thoroughly deterministic, and in its approach to psychology essentially

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behavioristic. Human attitudes and conduct must be as essentially the result of mechanistic sequence as are other phenomena of nature. Hence, there is fundamentally no room left for praise or blame, except as agencies of expedient social control, as devices in the management of men.[6] The scientist, bent on analysis and explanation, wastes no time in praising or blaming (personalistic relations), but pushes on to lay bare the larger and deeper impersonal causes operative both in institutions and technological processes and in the specific attitudes and behavior of individuals. The physical and impersonal obstacles to progressive desires, which are very likely to be overlooked by the dogmatic-emotional and lower types of mind, must be brought to due attention, if progress, even under the intense emotional devotion of the sincere and self-sacrificing radical, is to be surely grounded. Other obstacles—perhaps on the whole those of most significance and resistance—lie in "human nature," which it is the function of deterministic behaviorism to analyze. Fear, habit, personal interest, active combative opposition, all have to be met by the radical reformer or revolutionary on the field of practical human affairs, and they can be met more effectively by leaders who, through the results of scientific analysis of behavior, know their genetic and social causation than by leaders who act wholly or in larger part under the guidance of personalistic praise-and-blame philosophy and combat-attitudes.

Here, then, we arrive both at the critically-intellectual mode of desire-reinforcement and at the function of the scientific mind in relation to progressive or radical leadership. The scientific reaction to an obstruction to wish-fulfillment, even though that obstruction consist in the attitudes of persons, is not personalistic. The obstruction is taken "philosophically" and regarded with scientific interest. While as a man, with desires, emotions, interests, and passions like other men, the critically-intellectual in-

[6] Praise and blame, when indulged in by the critically-intellectual mind, are to be associated with the instinct of workmanship (organization, contrivance) rather than with the combative instinct.

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dividual is tempted to personalistic, blame-combat reaction, as a scientist he displaces personal blame with genetic explanation. As a man, his impulse is to damn the obstructive traits and persons; as a scientist his attitude is one of ordered curiosity. *Why* do these people assume the obstructionist attitude? And *is* the obstruction due wholly to the whims, habits, prejudices, and special interests of *persons?*

Having answered these questions to the best of his knowledge and research ability, having laid bare the real causes so far as he can, the critical scientist—also, be it remembered a human being probably with balked interests of his own and presumably not devoid of sympathy for the obstructed ambitions of others—may co-operate with the active progressive or radical leader to the extent of passing on to him the results of his knowledge, and of suggesting a workmanlike program, first for the removal of the obstruction, personal or otherwise, and then for the positive constructive organization and processes necessary to the realization of the obstructed interest.

This is probably as far as the typical critically-intellectual, scientific mind will, or should, go. In the interest of scientific objectivity it must protect its intellectual processes from the emotional strains and stresses of actual combat. It can furnish data, and to a certain extent sympathy and moral support, but it must ordinarily inhibit its very human impulses to objurgation and attack. It follows that the critically-intellectual fails to function unless the results of his work are taken up and applied by the active leaders. The only exception to this is found in those comparatively rare individuals who can lend their active aid, and actively take sides in public issues and movements, without losing their scientific, open-minded objectivity.

As a matter of fact, the open-minded critical intellectual, when his investigations and thought are turned to social organization and relations, very often does become a radical. In the first place he does not take popularly accepted principles uncritically, at their face value. He is "critical of premises as well as of logical processes." He is

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in position to see the scientific groundlessness of many popular superstitions, beliefs, and convictions. He notes a lack of correspondence between theory and reality. He sees into the chicane and claptrap of much of our public life and conventional posing. He has balked interests of his own—perhaps, for instance, restrictions on freedom of speech and of research—and he naturally turns the light of scientific analysis upon the causes and sources of these obstructions. He also, like others, may be a man of wide and sensitive sympathies, perceiving the unnecessary restrictions and limitations to which people less fortunately situated than himself are subject. If he be socially minded, he will, under some complex of motives probably derived jointly from sympathy and the instinct of workmanship, survey and evaluate the possible methods by which such limitations can be removed. Social injustice and exploitation will stimulate both his emotions and his intellectual processes, and social inefficiency will be offensive—and consequently stimulative—to his instinct of workmanship. Such a man, or woman, has to be constantly on his guard to keep a proper balance and relation between his sympathies and his critical faculties. The scientific necessity for a deterministic philosophy and a behavioristic psychology are the greatest aids in this task. Taking these standpoints, he knows, if he "explodes" occasionally in a tirade of objurgation of human obstinacy, selfishness, and ignorance, that such explosion is only a temporary catharsis for his overcharged or over-controlled emotions. When it comes to using blame as a social goad to get people to recede from their obstructive attitudes and tactics, he knows how to use it. But blame as fixation of responsibility in any other sense is replaced simply by the stream or nexus of genetic causation. Responsibility for obstruction, in this sense, is divided between personal characteristics, the influence of institutions and the mores ("the system"), and historical evolution.

Some very important practical considerations flow from all this. The way must be cleared for the full, free functioning of scientific research—co-operative if necessary—

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into the nature of the obstructions to progress; and no restriction must be permitted on the publication and popularization of the results. Finally, when we have a sufficient diffusion of substantially unbiased adequate knowledge as to the nature of the obstructions and the motives of the obstructionists, it will be time to call in the services of the constructive engineering minds, as Veblen and others are now so pointedly suggesting.[7] Perhaps, indeed, it is already high time they were called in.

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[7] *Engineers and the Price System*, 1921. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, 1920.

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HYPOCRISY AS A PATHOLOGICAL SYMPTOM.

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THE traditional school of ethics spent a great part of its time denouncing the hypocrite. Carlyle represented the opinion of his time when he characterized hypocrisy as the bane of morals.[1] The modern view, which sees in morals not a set of divinely-revealed truths, but a series of painfully acquired and ever-evolving rules more or less in accord with the changing conditions of human existence, cannot be so hard on the hypocrite. While from the point of view of sentiment, it cannot but condemn hypocrisy as a vice, yet when it is engaged in studying morals, it finds in this insincerity an invaluable scientific aid. The student of the social sciences—which are unfortunately still in a rudimentary stage—is interested in hypocrisy as a pathological symptom. Without stressing the analogy too closely, he compares hypocrisy in the social group to the sign of fever in a diseased body. Hypocrisy is an indication that the moral code is not in accord, or else is no longer in accord, with the precise needs of the collectivity. The proverb about hypocrisy being the homage that vice pays to virtue is in reality as childish an explanation of social phenomena as to say, in physics, that nature abhors a vacuum; many other homilies about the pharisees and the wicked represent just as futile an attempt to contribute to human wisdom.

The obligation of sincerity, of faithfulness to the plighted word, is implicit in every moral code. While the stuff of which morals are made tends to change with the social evolution of the community, the injunction of obedience remains the same. This is the only permanent feature of morality, and represents the only particle of truth in the popular belief that the moral code is eternal. And yet in the very nature of morality, the precept of truth-telling is the last to

[1] *Essay on Burns.*

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be fully obeyed. Its complete obedience depends upon the perfect adjustment of the rest of the moral code with the needs of the social organism. Such a condition has never yet been realized in the history of human society, and possibly never will be. The preachers who apologize for the supposed failure of Christianity with the argument that the doctrines of Jesus have never been really tried out are guilty of casuistry: no impartial historian has ever gainsaid the relative success of Christianity both as a religion and as a code of morals during the last two thousand years. But the admitted presence of large numbers of hypocrites who have contented themselves with an external observance of their professed religion furnishes an indisputable indication that the success of the Christian Gospel has never been complete.

The moral systems of philosophers have not fared any better. We may take the *Ethics* of Spinoza as a fair example of a moral code expounded by a thinker instead of a religious teacher. It has this initial advantage over Christianity: it is intended only for philosophers, strong-willed men who would be content to lead a life of the same austerity (not to be confounded with asceticism) as that which characterized the existence of Spinoza himself. The doctrine of this solitary Jewish philosopher is a code for the wise, and is of necessity incomplete since intercourse with the ignorant cannot be entirely avoided. In one of the propositions of the fourth book of the *Ethics*,[2] the free man is counselled to avoid the favors of the ignorant as much as possible. It is difficult to see how this advice can be carried out—if one is at the same time to avoid the hatred of these people—without the use of lies, white or colored as the case may be.

At another point,[3] Spinoza preaches obedience and conformism to the laws of his time, on the ground that "far more advantages than disadvantages arise from the common society of men." If this conformism means anything, it

[2] Book IV, prop. LXX.
[3] *Ibid.*, schol., prop. XXXV.

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implies not only the acceptance of the laws on the statute books, just or unjust as they may be, but also obedience to the social conventions, the unwritten laws which complement and interpret the formal decrees of the state and church. Judged from the standpoint of purist ethics, these conventions are in a large part hypocritical and dishonest compromises, and yet, try as one might, not even the most honorable of men can subtract himself from their sway. Spinoza himself consciously accepts the method of these social hypocrisies when he advocates humility—from which the wise man is asked to emancipate himself—as a wholesome thing for the masses.[4] His description of the masses' psychology can hardly have been meant for the mob's ears, and if this be prudence, it still contains the germ of hypocrisy. The inherent contradictions in Spinoza's doctrine which we have pointed out here are characteristic of the collective conscience[5] of his period, and it is to this philosopher's credit that he expressed the noblest and purest of the moral ideas prevalent in his day. It is a sign of the slow pace of moral evolution that the contradictions that lacerated the conscience of the righteous man in the seventeenth century are to a large extent still unsolved and are with us even today. We have superimposed the belief in democracy, which, unfortunately, has served only to drive the educated man's contempt of the mob below the surface.

The history of the Middle Ages records multiple instances of the ineffectual and disastrous attempt to combat hypocrisy by the strict application of the Christian moral code. No matter how well-intentioned the efforts of reformers, the

[4] Book IV, schol., prop. LIV.

[5] The term "collective conscience," invented by the French sociological school of Durkheim and M. Lévy-Bruhl, must be interpreted in a metaphorical sense. The phrase can perhaps be better understood when it is characterized as a hypothetical mathematical function in which the individual consciences represent the dots on the curve. Only the individual consciences exist in reality, or as M. Seignobos says, we really know of only one conscience, our own, and we grant the existence of other individual consciences by analogy with the one we know. By plotting the imaginery curve of the collective conscience we are enabled to determine empirically the upper and lower limits of the individual conscience.

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attack on social symptoms cannot remove the root of the unrest. If Christianity itself had nothing more to offer to the world than a condemnation of the hypocrisies prevalent in the Jewish temple, the mission of Christ might have proved as futile as that of Savanarola. A great deal of the bloodshed of the various inquisitions might have been avoided if both the heretics and the inquisitors had been less inspired with the letter of the Gospel texts and more with the spirit of their time.[6] In the quarrel between the Jesuits[7] and the Jansenists in seventeenth century France, the former are generally held up to ridicule as hypocrites. No doubt they may have been insincere, says M. Salomon Reinach,[8] "but looking closely at the facts, what Pascal denounced among the Jesuits, exception being made for a few pen flourishes, was *Modernism* in morals, the spirit in preference to the letter, in other words, progress."

When the objective study of social facts, so vigorously advocated by the French sociologists,[9] is more advanced, then the interrelations of hypocrisy and fanaticism in social pathology will be better understood. It would seem, however, that even fanaticism has sometimes served a useful purpose, much like a rash in medicine. For the trained sociologist, the appearance of hypocrisy is in itself a sufficient warning of the need of a moral readjustment. But for the general public, hypocrisy passes unnoticed until it provokes an explosion of fanaticism which finally focusses the moral issue before the community. This would seem to the modern mind to be the experience of the Protestant Reformation. The reforms of Luther and Calvin, both of whom revolted at the easy practices of the Catholic clergy

[6] S. Reinach: *Orpheus, histoire générale des religions.* Cf. ch. X.

[7] *Ibid.*, ch. XI, par. 31. "These Jesuits, so much vilified by the Jansenists, these authors of tracts on moral theology such as Sanchez and Suarez, were, in their fashion, quite profound psychologists, and both liberal and liberating moralists, to whom posterity would owe a deep gratitude if, like all the Jesuits, they had not used liberty itself in a spirit of domination, if they had not lightened the chains of the human kind but to enslave them better."

[8] *Ibid.*, par. 64.

[9] Cf. Durkheim: *Les règles de la méthode sociologique.*

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of their day, constituted a reaction to a more primitive Christianity. This reaction, which was naturally attended by violence and persecution, spent its force by the middle of the seventeenth century, when the contradiction between the outworn prescriptions and the changed conditions was clearly posed before the people. Thereafter, the evolution of the Protestant dogmas was much more rapid than that of the Catholic theology. But even to-day the doctrines of the Protestant sects are not completely free from contradiction: witness the laborious attempts that have been made in England and in America to reconcile the Old Testament version of Creation with the scientific theory of Evolution.

With the frank recognition of the necessity, or rather the inevitability of contradiction in any moral code will come also an end to the belief in the infallible authority of the conscience. The moral conscience of the individual is inspired not by God, but by the common conscience of the community, and, as M. Lévy-Bruhl so well points out, this collective belief is never at harmony with itself. It tends to become more and more out of harmony both with itself and with the social realities when the pace of sociological evolution is speeded up. "In societies of relatively rapid movement, such as ours, inasmuch as all the social series do not evolve *pari passu*, the resistance to change becomes particularly sensible for certain of them, and for morality more than for any other series. The general conscience feels its stability menaced by the common evolution of the social organization. It becomes alarmed instinctively at this menace, and it tries to parry it by an affirmation all the more energetic of the immutability of morality. An effort praiseworthy perhaps on principle, but one having for its necessary consequence a sort of generalized hypocrisy."[10]

The popular belief about hypocrisy, based on the reading of the Old and New Testaments, sees in it a vice peculiar to advanced societies, corrupted by frivolity and the love of pleasure. This confounding of the symptom with the dis-

[10] Lévy-Bruhl: *La morale et la science des mœurs*, p. 282.

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ease is more mischievous than instructive. Whenever a society is immoral, that is, whenever it finds itself forced by the complexities of the situation to violate its adopted code of morals, it is of necessity hypocritical.[11] The moment the code is openly revised to suit the particular instance of social abuse, then an end is made to that phase of immorality and hypocrisy. Unfortunately there is almost never a clean revision, but the degree of frankness with which a situation is recognized is roughly in inverse ratio with the amount of social immorality. It is a recognized truism that puritanism and morality do not necessarily go together. But it is wrong to suppose that a frivolous community is less hypocritical than a puritan society. What we have in the frivolous community is hypocrisy so generalized that it ceases to have its sting, and this is held by many to be equivalent to an open amendment to the code.

But even were this hypocrisy evenly distributed, protests M. Lévy-Bruhl, "the social consequences would be no less serious. In the first place, it vitiates and corrupts our moral education. . . . Every child is taught to profess verbally sentiments which he does not share in reality, and which he sees no one about him sharing. He is taught to hold the lie in horror, but it is practiced in this very teaching, and he is given the taste and habit of using it as well: strange school of morality! Moreover, the habit of affirming that we believe what we do not believe adds one difficulty more, and not among the least, to all those which stand in the way of our seeing things as they are. It renders both more painful and more rare the necessary effort to subordinate our imaginations to the objective knowledge of the real."[12]

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[11] The recognition of "usury" as a legitimate business practice is a case in point. Though the church and state both fought the taking of interest throughout the Middle Ages, the only result of their action was to drive the practice underground. To-day the taking of interest is regulated by statute and is endorsed by both public and private morals: hence no person commits an immorality when he demands a fair rate of interest on his loans, nor does he have to resort to hypocrisy to square his action with the moral code which he recognizes only externally.

[12] *La morale et la science des mœurs*, p. 284.

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M. Lévy-Bruhl does not content himself with flaying the abuses of hypocrisy. He sees a complete remedy only in the building up of an objective study of morals, out of which study we may in turn fashion the principles of a "rational social art." This, however, is not the affair of a day, and the eminent French professor offers us no advice as to the solution of our immediate moral problems, not even this problem of hypocrisy which his searching diagnosis has analyzed for us. Replying to the charge of his critics that he is subverting the principles of morality without doing anything to replace them, he insists that his power of verbal analysis can neither add to nor detract from the vitality of the moral code. Inasmuch as he seeks to safeguard the objective validity of his scientific principles, we may sympathize with his preoccupations. The student of the sciences of anatomy and physiology cannot devote himself to the art of cure. . . .

The thinking individual, however, cannot, in so far as the problem presented concerns him directly, entirely shirk its solution. The power of the individual upon the collectivity is in most cases infinitesimal: he cannot change the social conventions into which he is born. He cannot choose whether to be a hypocrite or not. Perhaps all that he can do is to subtract himself, as far as his special conditions will permit, from the more repulsive contradictions of the social code. And what is most important, he can recognize the facts for what they are, the knowledge itself soothing the pain which cannot be removed, and again, as the particular circumstances permit, he can communicate this knowledge discreetly to others.

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LEADERSHIP AND PROGRESS.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

I.

THE subject of this paper, Leadership and Progress, is indeed a very timely one and very properly it might be discussed directly and concretely with reference to the recent and still very present call for progressive leadership in our own country or the world over and to the important special and quite practical opportunities of leadership that the times are offering.

Certainly the call has been an urgent one; at least not less urgent, too, since than during the war. Moreover, the late political campaign, not yet forgotten, somehow has only emphasized, what more or less abstractly most of us are cognizant of, that political machinery is not always adequate to the real needs or representative of the real life of a people. The country's mood was what it was and the result at both of the two great conventions as well as with a certain peculiar justice at the final election was outwardly what it was, more reactionary than progressive, more conventional, expressing as it did the old routine and status quo, than real, neglecting as it certainly seemed to neglect the actual life and purposes which had come to expression and some formal realization during the war. Doubtless some good purpose has been served in that result. Beneath the social and political surface, however, in an unusual measure there has been a pressure of life not yet properly met. This paper was written in the spring of 1921.

Thus the signs of these post bellum times, covering the strenuous months since November, 1918, cannot be overlooked, however outward and official events would seem to have forgotten them; such signs, I mean, as are marked below and as doubtless will suggest more a cartoon of the times than a fair and accurate picture but as nevertheless

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are sufficiently to the point to demand full and candid consideration. Consider the great reaction following the war, I mean the general collapse, moral and economic and political, the world over, only expressed in different ways and degrees in different places; the assertive, however blind, conservatism, revealing an old order of things very much and doubtless very wisely on its guard; the new pacifism, very different indeed from the ante bellum or inter bellum variety, yet hardly more creditable, dividing both political parties and preferring dividends and other normalities to courage in meeting great issues, isolation to unavoidable responsibility and the fool's paradise of the *status quo* generally to the progress and even to the real security of civilization; the fiddling partisanship, the honor for which one may not presume to award, more mongering in its campaigning than honest and patriotic; the ouija board mentality or the general spiritualism—I know no better name for it—of people and press, that has brought so much "automatic" thinking, leaving very few thinking altogether honestly and quite independently, and that has turned suspicions and charges and mere wishes into realities, released from subconsciousness commonly suppressed passions and impulses and set up for belief as real and for action as worthy what has been ideally or unideally largely a fictitious world, any mysterious noise being as if an inspired communication from it; and finally, as counterpart, possibly as fortunate counteragent, of that reactionary but futile conservatism, an extravagant and equally abstract and impossible idealism, virtually a millenniumism not confined to Russia and so much affected especially by those who have suffered most from the tyranny of the past or from the privation and general hunger of the present and at once so deceptive and so alluring, so like a mirage and yet so impelling to "direct action" and unpremeditated adventure. Consider, I say, all these marks of recent times. Surely in them one reads an urgent call for leadership. The old order is not merely on trial. A new life is insisting on recognition and interpretation.

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As for specific opportunities of a progressive leadership at the present time these lie, for example, in our new nationalism, so real and so active to-day, although many still refuse to recognize it fully and squarely, and in the accompanying new internationalism, which, as league or association or union or understanding or conference for disarmament or whatever any of the various partisans would call it, must accord with the nation's new life; in the new status of labor, too, already now real and active, which requires not destruction of the present industrial system but only escape from industrial Toryism and candid and sympathetic recognition of labor's participation in industry, a change that, it seems to me, is quite analogous to political subjects receiving certain equal rights and, as security of these, the right to vote; and in development of a saner public mentality, that so we may be free from the mongering partisanship of the past years, from propagandism and "automatism," and get, among other benefits, generally not exceptionally a responsible and reliable public press.

II.

But, appropriate as such direct and concrete discussion might be, I defer this possibly for another time. My present purpose, although suggested by the conditions and opportunities indicated above, is largely only abstract discussion. In just what in general does real forward leadership consist? Whence, at any time, under any conditions and opportunities, comes a progresssive leader? This timely question I would answer quite abstractly; apart, then, from our nationally local affairs or from present affairs of the world at large; so far as possible, except for occasional illustration from present or past, without regard to actual conditions anywhere or anywhen. Such an undertaking has admitted dangers, but real advantages also.

General history seems to show for any one of all the many departments of life that the greatest leaders, indeed all real leaders or even, as I venture to believe, all individuals so far

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as they ever lead instead of just follow, are in some sense "born, not made," not machine-made. So are they in the noble company of the poets, of all geniuses. Genius is, of course, close to life and so "born." Even in the rare cases of apparent machine-production or selection, if any such cases there have been, the seeming result has hardly been due, whatever some may find, to the mere traditional, undisturbed social, political and intellectual machinery. Rather has this machinery shown a more discreet than valorous response to some released and overpowering vital demand. Doubtless, in a life which is always more or less of an adventure, good fortune will sometimes play a part. Formally chosen leaders have sometimes quite belied the conditions of their making. Still, in essential principle, which is what we now seek, great leadership of any sort is quite too vital and original or creative and is, while not "supernatural," at least quite too truly super-mechanical ever to be merely machine-made. A growing social life has abundant need of machinery of all kinds, political, economic, intellectual and the rest, but it would cease to grow had it nothing else.

What it is not to be machine-made, to be "born, not made," is not at all easy to say. You who now read may know or rather "feel" what it is. You would not be able to tell any one very glibly. So often used, the phrase is far from being transparent. In times past, in pre-evolution days, anything new and unusual had a very different accounting from that of to-day. Even to-day, for that matter, many people, failing to have adjusted their ideas or values to the time, may still think of birth in general and in particular historically and socially of the birth of the great as nothing less than a supernatural event, a miracle. All of us have looked down wonderingly into the faces of "new arrivals" or "little strangers" from another world and the great leaders have been looked up to in much the same spirit. In that spirit with its awe before the miracle of birth, such people, or we ourselves, would say that an individual, born to lead, was not a creature of his time; had no natural origin;

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was "ahead of his times," out of touch with them, in but not of them; in short, begotten not of the facts and conditions in actual and visible life, but of the Spirit; the Spirit of history, perhaps, or the great Spirit of an ideal civilization, provided this be so ideal as to be something independent of all natural causes. To-day, however, on the whole a very different view prevails. Evolution, even the newer evolution, which has perhaps more respect for wonders and creation, has dispensed with distinctly external and, in the orthodox sense, supernatural origins; being, if not at any point supernatural, at least decidedly supermechanical. To-day, while leaders and other specially vital agents are still not made, while new birth in general is still no affair of mere development-mechanics, known east of the Rhine, by the way, as *Entwickelungsmechanik*, perhaps not a bad synonym for *Kultur*, to-day a certain significant and effective co-operation of the vital forces and the merely mechanical, a certain timely and critical, always creative and *in parvo* or *in multo* epoch-making conjunction of broad free life and the machinery of life, is candidly and commonly recognized. Attending such conjunction, it is true, there are always disturbances, disorders of many kinds, often much suffering and tragedy: but these can be only the cost, as determined by the time and the mood, of the new life. Birth can never be easy. The adventure of it is far too great. To-day, then, the great visitors, even as the little ones, are candidly the results of important and natural, however mysterious and however strenuous, gestation and delivery; and, as I would add, they are more wonderful and, at least when the pains and labor of the birth are over, more honored and loved, not less so, on that account. Not just formally made, not conventionally received and recognized, they are also not too suddenly born nor too hastily exalted. How wonderful is nature in her own right, what a surpassing miracle there is in all natural birth, many people have still to realize. The natural birth of leaders, as of infants, is spiritually more inspiring, more worth while, than the miracle that used to be or be supposed.

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Can I make still clearer what I would understand by "being born, not made?" History, even very commonplace history, should be illuminating. The best and most widely known great leaders in the past certainly were not born in any sense of being suddenly given to history as if from outside and of not being affected at all by existing conditions and forces. Moses, real leader of his people into a new country and a new life, was also definitely an Israelite of the Egyptian captivity. Socrates, an intellectual genius, was still a Greek, an Athenian, who constantly showed, sometimes too well, that he had been to school to the talented but opportunistic Sophists of the fifth century, B. C. Ahead of his times in some sense, he nevertheless met his times in kind, with weapons then in vogue. What his discredited contemporaries were, he was also; skeptic, individualist, utilitarian, intellectual gymnast, logomachist. Simply they were only talented and conventional, he, real prince of them all, was the true genius, still dependent on their manner. Christ, in spite of certain modern sects, as forgetful and sectarian as modern, who would make him Presbyterian or Unitarian or what not, was in reality, whatever the depth of his experience and vision, a first century Jew of Bethlehem and Jerusalem; and the genius of Christianity, born then, has grown with history, not existed and persisted fixedly as something apart from it. Again, the Cæsars, from Julius to Constantine, were transition, pagan-Christian Romans. Napoleon was distinctly French; Lincoln was so superbly American; and so on. None of these leaders came to their several peoples and times or to their several departments of life, not one entered history, just at random and from outside, independently of conditions. Rather each came, as that most luminous phrase has it, "in the fullness of time." Each, it is true, was "born, not made"; yet for each one, in his own way and measure an epoch-maker, producing a new life not commensurable with the old life, there was an important and by no means easy period of gestation during which the formal, organized life, the machinery of life took an important part.

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III.

The fullness of time, so called, can be only the climax of the period of gestation and what this climax is, what conditions finally bring it about, may be shown in several ways. Thus, to begin with, in social and political life, as in life generally, there is at the critical time that special coming together, already referred to, of life and its machinery, vital interest and the formal and traditional visible organization. Any organization, meaning now any institutional fabric of an established social life, while in its origin marking some adaptation and articulation of life, can not fail, as it persists, to become too rigid and so to bring about a certain artificiality or duplicity, a certain separation of essential purpose or meaning and outer manner, of real end and acquired means, of life and its dress. Life always gets both broader and deeper than its adopted outward expression and so gets double, appearing one thing when it is another. Sooner or later, then, that division and the duplicity of it have to cease. The vital refuses to be so set aside or hidden, when not quite restrained, and it asserts itself in and through the formal; with the result that the classic, rigid organization gives way and there is a "return to nature." What had been clothing and protecting life at least no longer hides it. Fluency, adaptability, instability, open inconsistency, even violence and treachery come to be very general in the life of customs and institutions. Long accustomed associations and divisions are broken up. Uncertainty appears in the old lines of class or party or race. Normal living becomes a vital issue and even common reason and its logic suffer discomfiture if not complete undoing. Do you doubt that such changes are natural to life and history? Your own personal experience and common historical record must be my witnesses. Also our own times are quite eloquent. The growth of thought, too, shows something quite analogous to the growth of the conduct of life. Under whatever constraints of form and content, of method and meaning, thinking after a time has ever to develop its con-

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tradictions, paradoxes, inconsistencies. Like life, it gets quite too big or too deep and essential for any form of articulation and in the fullness of thought, as one might put it, any accepted manner or form has to break down and thought itself to become rather essential than outwardly and formally consistent. The inconsistency may give opportunity to much loose and irresponsible thinking, but also it may herald new thinking and great discovery. Thus the appreciative student of the history of thought feels neither surprise nor despair at finding great paradoxes, with much use of antitheses or of bold contradictions, among the Greeks in the fifth century, B. C., or in Christendom during the Napoleonic era and what followed, when—in each instance—both new thought and new life were coming to their birth. Consider, also, how at any time, when new life is due, among a people with the passing of the old standards there is always much confusing of reform and treachery, perhaps of salvation and malefaction—as if these two could ever really look alike!—or of real leadership and violence, obstinacy, arbitrariness. In actual history, again, familiar to us all and pertaining to great epochal changes, new life has been no respecter of Greek and Barbarian, Jew and Gentile, Roman and Peregrine, White and Black, narrow nationalist and foreigner. At such times, critical times, a period of gestation can be seen at its climax and new life to be near realization.

But, helpful as is such an understanding of the fullness of time, of gestation and the life that is not merely made but also born, that is superior to form and institution, although coming from or through these, there is, secondly, a way of putting the case which seems to me even more helpful. The gestation and the fullness of time, which bring new life to birth, are when there has come to the life of custom and institution, to what some would call the system, with a pressure no longer to be resisted the need of reading between the lines. It is true that such need is more or less pressing all the time. For long intervals, however, the meaning of life's pronounced and classic lines, of its outward system

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and routine, is and well may be pretty much taken for granted. Slight differences and issues and uncertainties may appear; but only with great crises, involving large, general and certain changes, very much, I submit, as in our own day, does the pressure become a real and general necessity, profound and irresistible.

Very plainly the lines of life are always destined to accumulate new meaning. New meaning, indeed, is even a purpose, not merely a destiny, of real life. In good time, too, the pangs and the strain of the new meaning acquired have to be felt. The very process, already described here, showing how custom and institution lose their form and rigidity, as well as their opaqueness, even to the point of open inconsistency and abnormality and startling transparency, has afforded indisputable evidence of this. Also it should be remarked that every individual person, although a conforming member of society, is an active agent of the accumulation and at any time may break out, giving evidence of his different life and experience. In miniature any formal gathering of persons, spite of the uniformities of dress and manner, of speech and interest, illustrates this. Always there will be some individual disclosures of differences of meaning for the accepted common routine. Some restlessness and some abnormality are as inevitable as desirable, possibly also as ominous in their time as they may be opportune. Much of the restlessness may be ascribed to mere nervousness, to a fatigue that has weakened control or to the more casual peculiarities of person for which society always makes allowance, even conceding some merit to them; but even this restlessness is a symptom of something more important and often it springs, not from nervousness or fatigue or personal peculiarity, but from a nobler and more positive disquietude due to some one's new and significant vision and purpose. There is a conventional intercourse among people gathered together with its many superficial outbreaks of individual experiences or adaptations and there is a quickening and creative intercourse with more important outbreaks; but in either we can see, ever

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present and developing, inner meaning for life's lines. The miniature case only illustrates a truth of all human association. The outbreaks may commonly be only sporadic; but, the conditions of outbreak being the heritage of all and all having their places and parts in one and the same life, the time must come when a general release will be required, and as was said, the demand be made that the general new meaning accumulated for the lines of life be read out and made articulate.

I am inclined to wonder if this inner life now under discussion and as to its presence and importance questioned, I am sure, by no one, be not in reality the subconscious or an important phase of the subconscious of which we are hearing so much in these days of psycho-analysis and anthropological revelation generally. Is it not, indeed, a symptom of the times and their crises that we are enjoying—is that quite the right word?—so much exposure? Yet, as I hasten to add, I wonder also if popularly and even by many of the experts who have told us about it, the subconscious have not been conceived quite too narrowly. Name though it seems to be for instinct or primitive nature, for suppressed desires and hidden and mysterious complexes, for long forgotten or even never consciously noticed experiences, for what when disclosed appears abnormal and irrational, I wonder if it should not be understood in a larger way or, again, if instinct and primitive nature and the various hidden complexes and mysteries of life should not be seen as not necessarily bases of at once abnormal and degenerate conditions but sometimes of coming and positively progressive new life. Suppression, of course, does breed and sooner or later exposes a so-called abnormal life, but this abnormal life seems to me of ambiguous significance. Often it may mean only so much breaking down, so much lost control and consequent unpleasant exposure, but sometimes conceivably it may mean real vision and promise of something new and worthy. Conditions securing a state of automatism in an individual will disclose the subconscious, as we are being made familiar with it; but man's creative and

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constructive will ought to be, to say the least, concerned with the subconscious also and with its accumulated complexes quite as much and quite as properly as his degenerate moods of relaxation, reaction and automatism. Ordinary professional psycho-analysis, then, may be only so much concern over pathological cases; but I have to think that there is a natural and even deliberate self-searching or self-analysis incident to all living under the suppression or say now under the control and direction of law and order. Out of such control, I mean, must come some real new vision. Civilization and its restraints are often referred to as causes of abnormal conditions, mental and moral, and doubtless they are: but also they do make for new life and fuller and better understanding as well. Super-conservative people, it may be suspected, will be prone to regard the sub-conscious, whenever exposed, as abnormal or "supernatural" and as significant only either physically and sensually or spiritualistically; but it may often have other more positive values. It may be potential with what is more civilized, mentally and morally sounder, than the conscious and normal life of the time. Psycho-analysis, then, need not be merely diagnostic and therapeutic, and the sex, which with special emphasis it reveals, the life-urge or the *elan vital*, however original or primitive, we may surely believe is as spiritual as physical, as capable of sublimating complexes as of degenerate complexes, as often a basis and earnest of progress as an evidence of degeneration. Also reading between the lines of life now appears to be a psycho-analytical undertaking; but it too, is not necessarily only diagnostic of trouble and therapeutic in its purpose. On the other hand, if the critical time, the fullness of time, when a clear reading between the lines is demanded, be a time of much mental and moral disease and exposure, this is not to be wondered at. An abnormal time must always have its growing pains, its growing troubles and its sacrifices.

Applied to familiar affairs in our own time what we have been finding about the accumulation and growing pressure of new meaning for the lines of life and the eventually crit-

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ical need of having this meaning openly read accords fully with statements made recently by Viscount Bryce among many others and with what any one of us knows well. Truly and irretrievably our country, not to say the world as a whole, is in a time potential with certain changes. Some see serious reversion and degeneracy, for there is so much that offends; some, progress; there is so much hope and ideal possibility. Inwardly and outwardly, offensively, too, and attractively, our life is now really different and the changes which are to come—just here possibly lying the real crisis of the time—can be in the main only that the accompanying consciousness and the assisting machinery of life may effect an adjustment of conscious purpose and organization to the new and, however unnoticed or still inarticulate, already active life that is ours. Simply we have come to the climax of a period of gestation, involving a most varied and expanding experience. Extensive travel, far-reaching commercial exploitation, hard and most searching struggles of capital and labor, years of the melting-pot and its deliberate but still very inadequate although very instructive attempts at Americanization, historical study, history being now world-history and no longer for any group just national or racial history or even just occidental history or just special history of any sort, most extensive scientific study and invention and last, but hardly least, the Great War giving brutal concreteness to our new world and its actual new life,—all these have put into the traditional lines of life such a pressure of new meaning that no one can wonder at the present unrest and confusion, at the sordid exposures and the great ideals in the changing, irresistibly new life of the day. Morally, mentally, economically, politically, is it indeed disease or progress that we are confronting? Whichever it be, we are, as to either, finding out our subconscious life.

IV.

Nor—witness again the brutal evidence of the Great War or especially many events since—has the new life or meaning, now forcing itself on our attention, been by any

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means only an inner thing. In saying that the fullness of time or the climax in the process of gestation was when need came to life to read between the lines, I was but using a metaphor that of course could not go on all fours. Thus in general at the critical time the new life, as in fact so much already said here has implied, must at least symptomatically be already at large and positively in the open, having its abundant witnesses in all the agencies of protest and opposition to the old order and all the abnormalities, degenerate or progressive. Such typical isms as anarchism, protesting individualism, skepticism, materialism, spiritualism, abstract idealism, natural to any crisis, are all signs if not always direct and active agents of it and, obstinate and concrete factors of life as they all are, they show not merely a new inner life but also a new environment. Accordingly the problem of the new time is no mere academic reading between old lines, to be accomplished in the cloisters or even in the legislative chambers of one's own isolated existence, but is an adequate and responsible and open recognition of the new facts and relations, an effective adaptation to the new environment, so to speak, "out there." In other words, again to speak directly of our own times, while it is still true that we already have a new life implicit in our old ways and pressing for clear articulation, we have also, as really an intimate incident of this and as a distinct challenge not to be denied, a new social and political, moral and economic environment. Reading between old lines, then, is only half of the need that is upon us. Naming new things, formulating our behavior with reference to a new world, the life of which we must now live and serve, is the other half. This new strange world, now so definitely and concretely a challenge, this new and still unchristened life, until recent times so beyond our ken, must be given its appropriate name, its honest and adequate accounting, from the vocabulary, from the social and economic and political ideas, at our command. Moreover, if you will but think a moment, you will appreciate that nothing more effectively than the

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naming of something outside and strange can insure that needed full inner reading of life's old lines. Nothing so well brings out of life what is really in it as the need of meeting something quite outside and new. With something strange to account for, one can no longer just pore over old formulæ for their merely consistent implications. The continued use of the old language in the new world calls for something much deeper.

Thanks to the Book of Genesis and Mark Twain, with possibly a little help from outside, we have a sort of myth or fable, which, as it is fully appreciated, will seem quite apt here and also will touch our theme with a pleasant humor. Old names or formulæ even for wholly new things, very fortunately, I am sure, are quite unavoidable, and are often as humorous as startling, whatever else may be said of them and their value. Humor, you know, is one of the acolytes of truth. But to the fable: Adam and Eve, as every one has learned by this time, once set out on a tour of the Garden for the special purpose of naming the various creatures in it. The task, difficult as it must have been, simply had to be undertaken. Practically everything was loose and strange in those days. For a while the couple got on without serious difficulty; but before one specimen Adam, the mere man, was more than ordinarily at a loss, hesitant and skeptical, quite unable to get the right name. The right name simply was not to be found in his pocket dictionary, to speak only figuratively. But Eve relied on her intuition or genius and this, most fortunately synonymous with one of Adam's ribs, was equal to the emergency. "Call it a galli-wasp," she exclaimed confidently; "That's what it is." "Really," protested Adam, "Why should we? How do you know it's that? We have never used that word that way before." "You dear old normal fool," retorted the man's rib, "Call it, I say, a galli-wasp. It's new and strange, I admit; but it just does look like one." And galli-wasp it has been ever since. Wonderful discovery, that made by Eve! Far and keen her recognition! The new and newly named never can be anything but the

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old reborn. Only, as the fable proves, it takes genius, far-seeing leadership, to name what is distinctly new.

Moreover, perhaps only parenthetically, with regard to the fable, some may take it very seriously and find no accident in the fact that it was the woman in that historic naming who lead the man home, giving him the familiar name for the strange creature. Certainly women are quite as progressive as men; they are really not more conservative, spite of a certain reputation to the contrary; but they are more easily homesick, domestic, intuitive, awake to the new as the real deeper meaning of the old; and so, at least by the fable, in times of crises and transition, when great leadership is called for, history should somehow provide specially for the important service of their intuition or domestic influence. Almost I wonder if it have not. Some one might well make a study of history from this point of view. How far in other historic cases of the naming of new things out of an old vocabulary, of bringing a new life into old lines or reading the old lines for their developed new meaning, has the influence of woman been a significant factor? If only to humor such speculation, one might infer, not only that every man who would really lead must have his Eve, but also that woman's part in the coming of new life cannot be supposed to be merely and narrowly biological.

That fable, if as a fable it really may be taken seriously, is obviously meant to be much more than a possible tribute to Eve and her persuasion generally. It is, too, more than just a humorous account of the great and important truth that new things in life and history must always be seen or met with old forms and so, as they are really new and outwardly obtrusive, must challenge intuition rather than mere reason, the common spirit of mere reason always being too conservative and legalistic. Only intuition can use the old without slavery to its letter. At least in the context of the present study of leadership and progress the fable suggests, besides those other things, perhaps as only a special inference from the important truth about the old

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for the new, that a progress, which calls at once for the inner reading of old ways and for the traditional accounting of strange things, must always show a certain genuine domesticity. What Eve really did, as has been suggested, was to lead Adam home or to make him at home in the presence of something strange, and progress without such domesticity, without a return, not to the mere roof, but to the great spirit of home, is only prodigality. There is real truth and so real salvation of thought or life only in the awakening that the new strange thing after all really looks like some old familiar thing. Riotous living, upheaval, violence may seek progress, but can not constitute it. In personal life the return home has been as important as adventure and in history, as many an historian has appreciated, "restoration" has served progress quite as much as revolution—provided, of course, the restoration has been something more than mere counter-revolution or mere reaction, provided it has been restoration with some real feeling for the new. Even reactionary movements hold a great truth, but a truth which their supporters are often the last to appreciate. Frantic returns home or runs to cover really are sometimes richly laughable, serving as they may the very progress they would avoid.

V.

To pause here in our study for a summing-up, we have found four important conditions of the birth of new life among a people: (1) the peculiar intimacy of traditional ways with life itself, with life's original instinct or urge, as shown by general confusion, fluency, inconsistency, abnormality and often startling transparency; (2) the critical or climactic pressure of the accumulated meaning of the lines of life with a consequent demand, as the time is full, that this meaning be read out; (3) the obtrusive presence and challenge of a new and strange environment which demands accounting, not by mere calculation and formal reason, but intuitively, and (4) the homing instinct sure to assert itself and, however confused and in its blindness

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given, as so often it is, to just such reaction as our own times have shown, sure also to come to understanding of itself and its real importance and, while Mark Twain and the people generally laugh, to espouse the progressive policies of its time.

These being the conditions of new life and its birth, it remains for us in this study of leadership and progress to discover the place and importance of the individual. The great individual, while of course manifesting characters that must be present, however latent, in all individuals and that, being at least latent in all, make the leadership itself possible, must be one who himself reflects those four conditions of new life; that is, who is actively superior to mere consistency and conformity as well as to the abuse or ridicule that his independence may invite, who with a reason which is subordinated to insight can catch inner and vital meanings, who without loss of the faith that has been his and his times' has the courage of new things, and who, able to go forward without betrayal of his origin and always mindful of his home, can make articulate and familiarly intelligible the needed new possibilities and ideals of his fellows.

Of such character, I submit, is the great individual. But while no one can portray the great individual and his leadership of a newly developed life, the person so described must seem more a fiction than a fact, more ideal than human and actual. Certainly for an accurate and cautious historian such a person would be hard to find in the flesh or in the "true" records. Only considerable glossing would make any one of any time able to pass the test. Not that history does not report leaders to us, but there is a difference between accurate history and a would-be appreciative history that often takes the will for the deed or fact. Moreover, as an interesting though hardly conclusive question, at any time has any individual in the opinion of his contemporaries generally quite met or even notably approximated our definition? Perhaps, then, leadership is after all only an ideal, a noble fiction. Perhaps, leadership never is real or accomplished contemporaneously, but is rather

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either a prophecy or a sort of after-thought or after-discovery, a great leader being rather the selection, almost the creation, of earlier or of later times than the recognized or demonstrated prophet and hero of his own. Great leaders, it may then be, in some sense never really are, but are either leaders that are sometime to come to deliver their peoples or that once upon a time walked among men. Such leaders, of course, only an appreciative, generous history could discover. If a leader has to be in any sense ahead of his times and, more than others, in any sense also loyal to the past, how can the accurate historians be any more successful in finding him than his own contemporaries?

Indeed I suspect that great individual leadership, like a common, general individualism, truly is a good deal of an abstraction, being more thinkable than findable; in other words, having a wider reach and deeper root than the merely findable things of space and time. Political philosophers have often compromised their own best ideas and purposes by failure to appreciate this. Rousseau's universal individualism, his absolute democracy, for example, was really only a great dream to be interpreted, not something to be taken literally as report either of an actual past, of an early Golden Age, or of a future social and political Heaven. In actual, contemporary life real leadership can not be wholly identified with any discoverable person nor is there ever, was there ever or will there ever be a condition of general unmixed individualism, pure and simple and unqualified, with its so oft proclaimed liberty and fraternity and equality for all and its bondage and service for none. But, past or present or future, the unfindable is not necessarily unreal.

From the abstractions of political philosophers to pass to so concrete a thing as the familiar, almost too familiar, party convention, will seem a bit sudden and not without some shock; but of life, as in this matter of individuals it is actually found or findable, we have in the convention an excellent although perhaps almost too sharply focussed illustration. Thus, to begin with, it really takes at least

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two conventions, either being for the other in near prospect or near memory, to make one. Naturally each always has the country in some measure but it has also the other in special measure in mind. Secondly, at either, there is a mobile, more or less kaleidoscopic confusion of factions and persons as well as of policies conservative and progressive. The recognized leaders, however proclaimed and however assertively independent or however patriotic for the old or the new, are always pretty much in the hands of their numbered—if only the number may become a majority! —and organized friends. Except for all sorts of generally hidden minor groups and personal rivalries and their petty leaderships, at least ninety-five per cent of all present are, taken in the large, docile sheep rather than bell-wethers. Yet no one, it is quite true, can be set down as wholly and absolutely either. So in actual and practical life are the two forces, the social and the personal, organization and individuality, closely interlocked. But, thirdly, here being where the country has some chance, there are always, as undercurrent, felt and in some measure necessarily responded to, in the consciousness of all, in the sensitive life of both conventions, the general life and interest and need of the time. Sometimes, too, the ideas and character and purpose of some insistent and unforgettable individual, here supported, there opposed, which making very little difference, may constitute a real power behind all the manipulation and machinery, all the deliberation and partisanship. Then, as for the outcome, I need say no more than that the chances seem to be quite against the first choice of any considerable faction in either convention being selected. Whichever party wins, too, in the final general election, the subsequent events are likely to show the outward victory superficial, heed being soon given to the real life and wish of the country. Fortunately any party is more candid and responsible, less in mere blind opposition, when in power than at the convention, although quite humanly and humorously it will get at such a result, when possible, through indirection and disguise, by back-door or

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window rather than at the front. In England, for example, the victorious conservatives have had a way, almost a habit, by all sorts of sinuous routes, although sometimes also boldly and openly, of appropriating the purposes and policies of those whom they have opposed; while the liberals, come into power, have always lost some of their liberalism; and what has been thus true in England well illustrates so-called practical politics the world over. Whether pessimist or optimist can get most satisfaction out of that fact I shall not try to say. Enough that, whatever the machinery, the deeper forces of life do seem to prevail and that there appears to be ample justification for the common and often great difference between history's later appreciation of events and forces and men of any time and the contemporary party-ridden judgments and accounts.

Also, in the whole story we can see how abstract and intangible is great leadership or individualism in general. Social organization and personal individuality never do or can exist apart. Outwardly at any time there are always many independent leaders, so-called with varying fractions of truth, and among them there may be preparing for the posthumous recognition of history a real and great leadership. Outwardly, again, there are always parties and factions, even great races and powerful nations, with their constraints and uniformities and their sheep-like personnels and, while more or less pressing in the personality of every sheep among them there will be some active individuality, in a small fraction or a large contributing its influence for a different life, there will always be the sheep and the sheep-folds, as well as all the articulate ways of life which these imply and without which, supplying as they do the necessary formal lines, the mediums, the methods and the language, of association and communication and exchange, leadership itself would not be possible.

In any selection of leaders, as in other matters, I may be reminded here that it is the voting majority of the people that rules. This is true or rather, like most things in-

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volving human affairs, only in some part true, a "half-truth." It is not the whole truth. At least there is a certain incongruity between an electoral majority rule with its selection of some individual, and real leadership. Real leadership, in the first place, as we should keep in mind, is not naturally a matter of outward, formal and merely contemporary selection; and, in the second place, only suggesting perhaps the peculiar utility of such democracy, formal majorities by the nature of the case, by dint of the manner of their mobilization, tend either to reaction or to revolution. In both reaction and revolution they have positive value; but they do not in themselves directly promote or foster constructive progress. (Progress needs both such democracy and some aristocracy, mass-play and real leadership.) History probably would show the forces of the two, of communally associated action and of aristocracy, including even personal loneliness, nearly if not quite equal in their importance.)

VI.

Very little has been said so far, except by implication, when the great leader was defined in that fourfold characterization, of the individual in general, of the size and character of the human person. Yet specific measurement and appraisal of the person are quite pertinent. How small any one of us is, counting only as one in millions, living a moment or two in eternity! How petty, too, and ignorant and prone to be selfish and mean! But also how great is anyone, always the possible leader of one's group and possible member of any group, there being no groups that are inviolable! Nothing, in short, can be smaller or meaner, nothing greater or nobler, than a human person. Perhaps the very possibility of smallness and mere selfishness is what gives significance to the greatness and the nobility, when these are realized. Josiah Royce, I remember, in the very possibility of evil found conviction of God. Lacking the courage to fail, as so often said, no one can ever accomplish anything deeply worth while. But suffice it now

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that, midst all his danger of smallness, the person can be great. On just what is this possibility based?

Many have thought of individuals as only the diminutive parts of the massive, overwhelming whole, or, again, as atoms independent and unrelated, each quite shut up within its separate and more component than composed self and, if at all social, social only for selfish reasons or under compulsion from either earth or Heaven. There has been, too, much popular acceptance of individualism as naturally even anti-social, aggressively opposed to co-operative living of any kind. But the atom, we are learning, is really in itself, however diminutive, big with the character and the forces of the whole solar system and the human individual, however small, if really alive, holds in himself all the elements and interests and agencies that belong to the whole fabric of society. Perhaps I ought not to tell any of my readers how great he is—theoretically, in native possibility! Perhaps, on the other hand, it is fortunate that the cosmic genius in any one of us is sometimes a bit hampered by the formalities of civilization. But, at least latent, in every individual there is the cosmic unity.

Surely it is the very genius of individuality to be social; but not just conventionally so. The genuinely social factors of individuality may be variously indicated and will doubtless seem significant in varying degrees. Very important indeed, although not likely at once to be generally appreciated, is the fundamental fact that every act of an individual, which shows him, as it were, breaking away from his conventional and uniformed associates, is an act of some special adaptation and all such adaptations are essentially social, while many of them may be ideally and progressively so. Some one has said that adaptiveness beyond mere convention is the very essence of real culture. Of course, to recall what was said of the possibility of doing wrong, of failing, the individual always may live specially and unconventionally by one of two ways, one known as the selfish way, by which he becomes, or tends to de-

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generate into, a mere sordid creature of physical, sensuous nature, the other the nobly personal way, certainly not less individualistic, by which he moves forward into greater breadth and depth of life; but it is worth observing that by either route the individual comes into the life of the whole; becoming by the former, the way of mere uncontrolled instinct, a helpless creature of nature; by the latter, the way of conscious and well-purposed will, what in the language of religion would be called a participant in the creative life of God. There is simply no such thing as an individual, however unconventional, be he instinct-impelled or will-guided, who can live, as an atom, to himself alone. The very genius of individuality is wholeness, degenerate or progressive.

Besides the essentially social, however unconventional, character of the special adaptations of the individual, there is to be remarked for our present purpose the very different quality of the life of the individual as an individual from that of the group. Breadth and narrowness, vitality and artificiality, facility or versatility and rigidity, hospitality and exclusiveness, humanity and institutionalism are some of the contrasts. "Personally I would do anything, but, as you know, I am an officer of administration and government." Personally and humanly soldiers exchange real courtesies across battle-lines; but as soldiers their exchanges are quite different. Was it not Rousseau who said, with a philosopher's violence of abstraction, that if there were only persons in the world, only free, unorganized individuals, there would be no battle-lines of any kind? Parties, factions, nations fight, not persons; not free, fraternal and equal persons.

Again, it quite belongs to the size and character of individuality that it puts emphasis on feeling rather than on reason; if selfish, on the feelings of sense, if nobly personal, on those of insight, of faith and the spirit. Reason and its formulæ belong primarily to the group and the institution; it is the faculty of law and order; but, taken abstractly, the individual, for good or for ill, is, not properly illegal or

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disorderly, but super-legal, the law being for him, not he just for it. The individual, too, may dream. He is naturally loyal to general principles, to the great free spirits of things rather than to any literal and formal pronouncements about them. He welcomes adventure, pursuing the impossible or rather—a much better word—the incommensurable. For his goal and the great adventure of it he has often been willing to die. He is, in other words, by nature a visionary, an adventurer, an impractical doctrinaire. Indeed I am sure there can be no real, genuine individuality without some of the inspiration of the impractical. In history the impractical adventurers, the great doctrinaires, although never formally chosen, have come to command their millions, while the practical men have served rather than commanded only thousands. The doctrinaires have inaugurated new epochs; the others, so much more "practical", have merely maintained old ones. So few of us realize the profound appeal of general ideas, of so called abstract generalities. Yet at critical times they always get wide vogue and they have great power. Love, Justice, Liberty, Humanity, Equality may sound dull, but theirs is a significant dullness. They are the life, too, of the individual, making him big and active with the whole of life, and they give him all men as his followers.

Time quite forbids that I should go on as I would. Still, may I add, before concluding, that in genuine individuality, belonging to its size and character, to its expansiveness, must always be three especially human gifts of truth: memory, imagination and humor. Memory only names once more what before I called the homing-instinct so important to effective progress. Without imagination the individual must simply betray his own birthright of freedom and adventure, of open-mindedness and, if I may use the word, open-willedness. But humor is a peculiarly human and personal gift of truth, especially when one can laugh at oneself as well as at others and perhaps above all when one can bear that others should laugh at one also. These three gifts of truth, I say, are special virtues of the

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person and marks of his size and peculiar genius, enabling him to be just such a reader of inner meanings and namer of new things as a progressive leader must always be.

In conclusion, if you have understood my measurement and appraisal of personal individuality, you will see how in all individuality lives something that is quite superior to the distinctions of place or time, of class or institution. Even races and whole eras are smaller than the individual. They divide life; he is a unity of it. They confine it; he frees it and makes it grow. And in time of crises, with the gestation that we have seen, as the preparing new life appears, some individual, leading the rest, is sure to be able to interpret or—must we rather say?—after his death to be found to have interpreted that life to itself. Real leadership does have to wait on time. In its own day, just because it is leadership, real and progressive, courageous and adventurous, impractical and insistent, it has to be in question and obscured, often denied and abused. The greater leadership be in its day, the more it will be made clear or proved outwardly, as in so many historic cases, afterwards. No real leader is ever without honor save in his own time. Even an ordinary person, it is to be hoped, possesses enough individuality in size and quality to make his success in some measure depend on the future. To live only for the day, not to build beyond knowledge, is hardly to live at all. In such living is no effective personality.

Would you have an illustration of great leadership? I take as recent a case as is safe. How great was Lincoln; how far-seeing; how above the mere law; how open in mind and will; how human; how gifted with humor, imagination and sense of home; and how insistent. Abused for his insistence; having enemies north as well as south, at home as well as abroad, he not so much was for his time as became for all time a great leader. Now not this country, but also England, and not the North but also the South celebrate him. His leadership, seeing deeply, progressive, assertive but, in spite of attacks and charges, not auto-

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cratic, was real and is now proved. Writes of him, or of all leadership, a great English poet and playwright:

"When the high heart we magnify,
And the sure vision celebrate,
And worship greatness, passing by,
Ourselves are great."

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

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PLATO AND THE MORAL STANDARD (II).

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

SO far we have examined Plato's position with reference to the following norms or standards to which actual reference is made in the Dialogues: (1) Universal assent, (2) The writings of the legislator, (3) Quantity of pleasure, (4) Æsthetic quality, (5) Expediency or benefit, especially to individuals, (6) Contribution towards the life of the social whole, (7) Orderliness, and (8) Adequacy and self-sufficiency. It remains to examine in the same way (9) Consistency and (10) Objectivity, before we shall be in a position to come to a final conclusion as to Plato's main standpoint *re* the moral standard.

9. Consistency.

Consistency is, in the first place, understood by Plato in a logical sense, as a standard of scientific method, or a principle governing the research of philosophical interlocutors, as they experiment in common and observe the logical sequences of an argument, following it whithersoever it may lead (Theæt. 154 D f., Soph. 230 B f.). If the various consequences of a given position contradict one another, that is a sure sign that there is some logical flaw in the position itself, and that the position in question must, by all who accept the standards involved in the dialectical method, be abandoned (Gorg. 460 E f., 509 A, etc.). If, on the other hand, all the logical consequences of a given position meet in a single point, or tend in one and the same direction, *i.e.*, are harmonious and consistent, they not only confirm one another, but strengthen and indeed in the end prove the truth of the position under discussion (Rep. 498 E). The ideal of method is thus that scientific thinking should exhibit the characteristics of identity of direction, concentration of evidence upon a single point, harmony and systematic unity (Polit. 285 B f., Soph. 253 B f.).

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The reason for accepting consistency as a standard for methodical or scientific thinking, is that consistency is a fundamental characteristic of the object of such thinking. The aim of scientific or methodical thinking is to discover a law, to disentangle the Idea from its sensory envelope, its "appearances," and study it by the clear light of intellect, not only in its own nature, but also in its relations to other Ideas (Soph. 259 E, Phileb. 16 D-E, etc.). Thus discovered, the Idea is found to be a "one in many," *i.e.*, to exhibit the characteristic of identity in diversity, or of consistency and systematic unity, and in their relations to one another the Ideas as a whole constitute precisely such a system (Phædr. 249 B, Soph. 254 B f.). Each Idea is different from each other Idea, but the ideal realm as a whole exhibits in the clearest possible way the attributes of unity in diversity, consistency, systematic harmony (Soph. 250 ff.). The object of thought thus possesses the characteristic of consistency in the highest degree, and can be approached cognitively only by a method which is capable of taking on this characteristic. Man possesses innately a certain kinship with reality. He has an *Anlage* in his mind which is identical in principle with the most fundamental law of objects. The problem is, so to develop this *Anlage* that the mind can fully apprehend its natural objects (Theæt. 185 D f., Rep. 490 B-C, etc.). Not every activity of mind will do. *E.g.*, sense-perception, which many regard as the proper instrument of knowledge, is hopelessly inadequate. Fluidity, instability, impermanence—its prevailing characteristics—are as such incapable of taking on fixity and permanence. Sensory experience and the world of ideal relationships are thus disparate, and no amount of using our eyes and ears alone will ever give us scientific knowledge (Theæt. 157, Rep. 529 B f.). So again of emotional and artistic experience, commonly regarded as the pathway to Truth. This goes somewhat further, for the artist feels his kinship with reality, and is actually capable, when truly inspired, of certain intimations and partial revelations of the ideal world. To these momentary visions he gives powerful expression in

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the form of rhythms and symbols, and his influence upon mankind is incalculably great. But intense feeling and enthusiasm are uncertain guides, and whether his individual visions are true or false, the artist, as such, does not know. In the absence of a consistent method and a scientific criterion, he frequently, in practice, selects the inferior and less valuable types of experience for artistic embellishment, and such failures in selection sufficiently indicate that following one's feelings is not the best way to seek knowledge of the ideal realm.[1] For the building up of scientific knowledge, then, sensory and emotional experience are inadequate, and it is necessary to seek a method which will develop to the full the human *Anlage*, and thus remain identical in principle with the object to be investigated. This method is to be found in strict analysis and synthesis, and the scientist uses this method, which is the embodiment of consistency, because, by its means, he is enabled to take up into his mind the systematic unity and consistency which are the most fundamental characteristics of the ideal world, *i.e.*, of the objects whose nature he desires to investigate.

It is not, however, in a merely "formal" sense that Platonic consistency is to be understood. Megarian logic has solved its problem when it has succeeded in establishing bare identities and bare differences. Not so with the Platonic dialectician. He rather investigates how far, and in what specific ways, *A* is identical with, or different from, other elements *B*, *C*, *D*. . . in the ideal world. It is not so much the abstract, as the concrete universal, which is under observation (Parm. 136 B–C, Rep. 402 C). The Platonic scientist does not satisfy the demands of his method by establishing, *e.g.*, the proposition that *A* is *A* (or *B* or *C*), but develops the concept which forms the subject of his discourse by expanding its intellectual context, *i.e.*, by expanding its concrete meaning in accordance with the demands of consistency. An example will explain what is meant. Let our

[1] Phædr. 244 ff., etc. Cf. Lodge, Reality and the Moral Judgment in Plato, *Philos. Review*, XXIX pp. 461-464.

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subject of discourse be the concept of the "philosopher." The philosopher is, by definition, a lover of truth. This means (1) that he loves *truth*, that he refuses to rest satisfied with appearances and opinions, but presses on until he reaches the end of the intellectual world and apprehends truth in its own nature (Rep. 490 B f., 532 A–B). It means further (2) that he loves *all* truth, that he refuses to remain satisfied with an amount of knowledge which is accurate enough so far as it goes, but does not cover the entire field. He loves the *whole* (Rep. 475 B, 485). It means further (3) that he *loves* the truth, that there is something in him which responds to its appeal, that he desires to possess it, to possess it eternally, to realize the fruits of it in his life, in his life as a private citizen or, if he finds himself in the right kind of state, also in the lives of those around him who willingly accept him as their leader (Symp. 205 E ff. Rep. 496 B f.). This example illustrates, perhaps sufficiently, how scientific method expands the concrete significance of an idea in accordance with the requirements of consistency. Understood in this concrete sense, consistency is a characteristic of every concept so far as it is an Idea, so far, that is, as it genuinely constitutes an element in the ideal world, and the function of scientific analysis and synthesis consists precisely in unfolding the meaning and relationships in the ideal world which belong to the particular Idea which happens to be the subject under investigation.

From this it follows that moral Ideas also, *e.g.*, the Ideas of Justice, Courage, Temperance, etc., possess this characteristic of being a one in many, of forming parts of a single consistent system, and are capable of intellectual expansion at the hands of the scientific student of ethics (Rep. 402 C, 618 C f.). But it should be noted that it is not in virtue of any specifically ethical quality that they are expansible—mathematical and æsthetical Ideas are equally expansible —but in virtue of their being Ideas and constituting, as such, portions of the ideal system. It is their ethical quality which, no doubt, gives them their moral significance, their impressiveness and importance for the conduct of life.

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But it is from their more general, metaphysical or ideal quality that they derive their consistency and expansibility. When, then, it is demonstrated that what is commonly accepted as a moral idea—*e.g.*, money-making, power-seeking, or the pursuit of pleasure as the goal of life and the supreme good—falls apart, in the hands of the scientific analyst, into elements which are disparate, *i.e.*, leads, when consistently expanded, to consequences which contradict one another, the argument proves, not so much that the ideal in question is lacking in ethical quality, as that it is lacking in logical quality. Thus, when it is shown that the ideal of money-making leads to a plutocratic and oligarchic organization of the state, and that a state ruled by such oligarchs eventually destroys itself, so that the ideal of money-making leads, not to success in money-making, but to financial ruin, if not to death, what is directly proved is that this popular ideal contradicts itself and is thus irrational, is not an Idea at all, cannot be regarded as forming part of the ideal system.[2] It follows from this, of course, that it is not a *moral* Idea either; but the point of the argument is, primarily, to deny that it is an Idea at all, in any final sense. So too of the argument against Thrasymachus. The point made is that systematic *pleonexia*, which *can* take place only under the supposition of a stable social order, is inconsistent with the order which it presupposes, and leads inevitably to the disruption of all social order, in this way destroying its own possibility. As an ideal for social leadership, it is thus self-contradictory, and cannot possibly constitute an element in the ideal system, of which consistency is so prominent an attribute (Rep. 351 B ff.). From this it follows that it is not a *moral* ideal either, but the refutation is directed, primarily, against its claim to be regarded as rational or as one of the ideal patterns which together constitute reality. It is with a clear consciousness of this that the Platonic Socrates sums up the discussion in the statement that, so far as the specific nature

[2] Rep. 422 ff., etc. Cf. Lodge, *op. cit.*, *Philos. Review* XXIX p. 360. So also justice consists in each element in the state being true to its own Idea, the Ideas in question constituting a perfect system (Rep. 433 ff.).

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of the moral Idea under discussion (Justice) is concerned, nothing definite has been discovered (Rep. 354 C). So too in the argument with Callicles, he states that he himself knows nothing as to the specific moral truths involved (*re* Temperance), but that he is convinced that such a position as has been maintained by Callicles is contradictory and irrational (Gorg. 509 A, etc.).

From these and from similar instances (Theæt. 150 B f., Rep. 338 E ff.) it follows that, for Plato, consistency is a standard, by reference to which the ideality, rather than the morality, of situations or proposed actions is judged. It decides their right to be accepted as ideals at all, *i.e.*, as fitted to take their place in the ideal system which constitutes reality, and to be regarded as fully rational. Thus understood, the term is employed in two main senses: (1) logical, *i.e.*, as one of the standards necessarily involved in the dialectical method. Two or more interlocutors, in order to come to grips with one another, in order to discuss at all, necessarily observe the requirements of consistency. In this sense consistency is used to test whether a given subject of discourse—*e.g.*, the Parmenidean "one," or pleasure or power claiming to be the chief good—can be discussed consistently at all, or whether it leads to contradictions which make discussion itself ludicrous and absurd (Euthyd. 303, Theæt. 161 E, Parm. 135 B–C). The second sense (2) is more metaphysical, less a law of thought as such, and more a law of ultimate entities, a law expressing the interrelationship of elements in the metaphysically real world of Ideas (Parm. 131 C ff., Soph. 251 D ff.). In this sense consistency tests the right of a proposed course of action to be regarded as real rather than as illusory, *i.e.*, tests the objective validity of the subject of discourse (Phædr. 247 C f., Parm. 132 D, Soph. 247). This second sense seems to be the more final for Plato. Interlocutors observe the requirements of consistency, not merely in order to discuss with one another, but especially in order that, by means of such discussion, they may establish contact with the ideal world which constitutes reality. In our search for the Platonic standard

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which serves to distinguish good from evil, we thus pass from the study of consistency in the logical sense to its profounder sense, in which it coincides with objectivity.

10. Objectivity.

From the time of Thales to the time of Plotinus, reference to the objective or the real as a final standard by which to determine the value of actions is characteristic for Greek thought. Everywhere around him, in the eclipses of the heavenly bodies, in the calms and sudden storms of the Ægean, in the rapid social and political developments from Magna Græcia to Persia, the Greek saw change, instability, a bewilderingly kaleidoscopic movement of life. On the outskirts of the Hellenic world, *e.g.*, among the Heracliteans of Asia Minor and the Sophists of the North and West, there was a tendency to see in life nothing but a struggle of conflicting wills-to-power, each equally arbitrary and subjective, a kind of atomistic individualism in which might made right and intelligence was a convenient instrument in the hands of the unconstitutional dictator for the Machiavellian deception of his less clever subjects as well as of his competitors for power. In Greece itself, under the influence of a historically successful imperialism at Athens, this doctrine found a measure of acceptance among the aspiring and half-educated scions of noble and wealthy families. But for the typically Hellenic thinker, Change always constitutes a challenge to seek for some underlying Permanent, a Reality of which the changing phenomena are but the Appearances, and the chief solution of the problem along these lines is found in the Dialogues of Plato.

The problem is, starting from the changing phenomena of experience, somehow to penetrate beneath the surface and discover the underlying reality, a reality which shall satisfy the demand of reason for unity, consistency, and meaning. The only way in which this problem can be solved is by the discovery and use of a method which will sift the phenomena so as to extract from them all of their content which can satisfy the ideal of consistency and systematic unity. This is

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the dialectical method, and in the hands of Plato it is used, with clear self-consciousness, for precisely this purpose (Polit. 285 B f., Parm. 136 B–C, Phileb. 16 D–E).

All experience, however illusory, however much a matter of "appearance," is at least partly objective, contains some reference to reality, although its reference to the final reality, the system of Ideas, may be indirect and implicit. For example, sensory experience, however fluctuating and misleading, does convey information concerning the physical object which stimulates eye or ear (Theæt. 163 B f., Phileb. 33 D), and the physical object certainly partakes of the reality which Plato ascribes to all objects which can act upon others.[3] Scientific method cannot, however, extract from sensory experience any kernel of reality which, while remaining at this level—*i.e.*, remaining a matter of direct sensory experience—will also satisfy the requirements of the method in the way of system, consistency, unity. There is no possiblility of erecting a structure which shall be both sensory and of scientific value. For in the hands of the dialectician sensory experience inevitably develops inconsistencies of all sorts, and the problems thus raised cannot be solved until we rise above the level of sensation (Rep. 522 C ff.). Judged, then, by reference to the standard of objectivity, sensory experience, so far as it remains sensory, fails to satisfy the demands of reason.

Unsatisfactory, however, as it is in this form, sensation yet furnishes the basis upon which something a little more helpful can be erected. Freed from the fluctuations of the sensation-process, made more permanent, and, as it were, standardized in the form of memories, such experiences (Theæt. 163 E f., Cratyl. 437 B), when synthesized with yet further sensations, can give us "opinion"—a kind of experience which expresses, in condensed and concentrated form, the meaning-elements common to many memories

[3] Soph. 247 D-E. Also the analogy in the "line" (Rep. 509 E f.) indicates that physical objects stand to their "images" as reality to appearance.

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and sensations.[4] Opinion, however, is not only less fluctuating than sensation. Containing, as it does, the elements common to many experiences of the same type, it tends to be also more consistent than the single sensory experience, and thus more nearly satisfies the demands of scientific method. And yet, there is a reason which prevents it from ever being fully satisfactory. Analysis and synthesis of our opinions, resulting in something which still remains opinion, leave us with a certain deficiency, a deficiency inherent in the nature of opinion as such. Opinion may be correct and true, objective and sound, and, so far, from a strictly practical standpoint, *e.g.*, as a guide to specific action, is satisfactory enough. If the opinion on the basis of which we act, is itself based upon reality, then our action reflects the true nature of the reality in question. *E.g.*, if we wish to reach a certain place, and if our opinion as to the route to be followed is correct, we shall reach the place (Meno 97). But the difficulty is that opinion, as such, is merely opinion, and contains in itself no criterion of its own correctness. It may thus, equally well, be false, out of touch with things-as-they-are. If our opinion as to the route to be followed is false, we shall not reach the place (Theæt. 187 D ff., Symp. 202 A).

Opinion, then, may be true, or it may be false. If opinions are false, no scientific manipulations can extract from them objectively valid conclusions (Polit. 278 D–E). Even if we imagine two false opinions accidentally so opposed to one another as partly to cancel out in such a way as to leave standing a statement which happened to be true, this result itself could be no more than an ungrounded belief, *right* opinion, possibly, but still only *opinion*, without insight into its own truth or falsity, and thus, as such, still unsatisfactory from a theoretical standpoint. If opinions are true,

[4] Phædo 96 B, Phileb. 38 B. Opinion may be based upon our own sensory experiences, or upon the experiences of others imparted to us in words (Tim. 51 D f., Theæt. 201 A-C).

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however, or at least largely true, Plato thinks it possible, by comparing them carefully, by a thorough analysis and synthesis to cancel out the false elements and to retain the positive element common to all the true opinions, and this method of sifting does actually result in giving us something satisfactory, for it gives us the Idea itself (Polit. 277 E f., 285 B, cf., Parm. 131 E). But so long as we remain at the level of opinion, the reality undoubtedly contained within the opinion cannot be extracted in such a way as to fulfil the requirements of the scientist. The reality which is finally extracted has raised us above the level of opinion, to the level of the Idea.

To the level of the Idea.—Yes, but not to the level of the Idea considered in its full nature as ideal. At the present level, which we may perhaps characterize as the higher level of opinion or the lower level of knowledge, the level of the special or departmental sciences (Rep. 533 B-D, etc.), the idea is still an empirical generalization. It is raised above the mere groping which precedes science, and has won its way through to a certain degree of clearness, but it is still empirical, still closely bound up with the masses of opinion from which it has been with difficulty extracted. That is to say, it is still grounded in sensory experience, still verified by reference to sensory experiments (Rep. 510 D–E). It may be compared with other ideas which fall within its own group, and may thus be slightly further loosed from its moorings in an experience which is still, in the end, sensory; but so long as these other ideas are at its own level, no amount of intellectual manipulation can make this level more than the level of departmental knowledge, a type of knowledge which is still partly "blind," *i.e.*, still devoid of the highest insight (Phædr. 250 A–B, Rep. 484 C. f., etc.). The standpoint and conclusions of the departmental sciences, resting, as they do, upon assumptions, upon something accepted, taken for granted, still retain to a certain degree the nature of "opinion" (Rep. 534 C), and it is only when, by a still wider synthesis of these assumptions themselves, the element which has hitherto been taken for granted is finally grounded, and

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grounded in a principle which is itself ideal and completely permeable to reason, that we reach the stage of perfect system, perfect unity, perfect consistency, perfect intelligibility. Reality is now envisaged as a system of all the Ideas unified and made intelligible in their interrelations by the supreme principle of their nature and organization, the Idea of Good, and in this vision demands of consistency and objectivity are fully satisfied (Rep. 511 B ff., 532 ff., Soph. 254 B–C). The problem has been solved.

This ideal vision is difficult for the individual to realize. But when and so far as realized, it is not something tenuous, formal, abstract, less vital than the ordinary human experiences at the level of sensation or opinion. On the contrary, these more elementary experiences are fragmentary, contradictory, overlaid with misleading associations which obscure what forces of insight we do possess (Rep. 527 D–E, Phileb. 58 A). The result of the sifting method of dialectic is to give us the genuine elements of reality which underlie the tissue of associations which constitute "common" sense, and these elements, separated out and apprehended in their interrelations, are concrete, rich, and vital in the highest degree. The experience of the dialectician is not a convenient epistemological arrangement of formal patterns expressive of unity and diversity, but is a rational, clear-cut experiencing of the actual, concrete structure of reality itself (Rep. 518 C f.). The Permanent underlying Change, the Real which underlies Appearance, has been finally discovered, and the source of superficiality, irrelevance, and deception has been finally removed.

When, therefore, it is stated that the value of conduct and character should be estimated by reference to the degree of objectivity which they manifest, what is meant is that conduct organized and directed by insight into the genuine structure of reality is not a house of cards, or the baseless fabric of a dream-illusion, but is firm as reality itself, is itself real and an organic portion of reality itself (Cf. Laws 903 B f.). A character which is formed upon the ideal patterns, takes up into itself, as constituent elements in its own structure,

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the principles discovered by scientific method. In fact, the philosopher gradually becomes the embodiment of the ideal system, each pattern which he discovers in the universe having its counterpart in his own mind, so that the macrocosm and the microcosm are, at least in principle, identical, the visible universe and the knowing mind being two expressions of one and the same system of Ideas (Rep. 472 C–D, 500 B ff.). It is because the philosopher has the root of the matter in him, that he is capable of understanding the universe, and the process of philosophic study is thus at one and the same time (1) development of insight into the ideal patterns and their interconnection in the universe, and (2) the development in his own character of structural lines corresponding precisely to the patterns and their interconnections which his insight is discovering. The character and conduct of such a man escape subjectivity and fallacy, are rational and objective in the highest sense (Rep. 490 B, 540, 613 A–B). When, then, it is stated that objectivity is a moral standard, it is meant that actions and characters are of value precisely so far as they express the genuine nature of a rational universe, and of a universe which is not only rational, not only satisfactory to the intellect, but is also existent, *the* universe which *is*, and is rational. This certainly constitutes a standpoint for deciding upon the value of actions, and it is impossible to conceive of one which could be more final. As Plato puts it, we have come to the end of the intellectual realm. For the philosophic judge, *i.e.*, for the finest and most highly trained reason, such a standard is final, absolutely true.

So far we have considered, separately and in detail, the evidence upon which universal assent, written law, pleasure, benefit, social solidarity, etc., are regarded as furnishing us us with moral standards, with criteria upon which we can rely in our attempts to distinguish good from evil. We should now be in a position to put together the results of these separate investigations, and, by summing up the evi-

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dence in a more general way, to come to a final conclusion as to Plato's general attitude on the moral standard.

As we look over the results of our separate studies, we note that nearly all the proposed moral standards have one thing in common: it is from the standpoint of opinion rather than of knowledge, that they are accepted as standards of value. As opinion deepens into knowledge or philosophic insight, they are seen to be inadequate and partial, pointing beyond themselves to another standard as more final, a standard which alone gives to them what moral significance they possess. In our more general summary of the evidence, we can thus take this as our single point of comparison, and can ask, in each case, what this final standard is, to which, by the verdict of philosophic knowledge, the special standard seems to point.

Let us begin with "universal assent." If we ask what is the exact content common to all opinions on moral subjects, and whence derived, we find that the content itself is highly general and vague, amounting to little more than agreement that there *is* a distinction between good and evil, that the distinction is of great practical importance, and that the good possesses characteristics such as independence upon externals, adequacy, desirability, etc. If we ask upon what this universal assurance is grounded, we find that it rests upon the general experience of the race, especially upon general social experience, and that this is the gradually sifted-out residuum of fluctuating sensations and associations. So far as these matters of universal opinion are correct—and Plato believes that, at least in these general matters, they *are* correct—this means that in the general experience of the race, a certain amount of reality has become sifted out from appearances, and that these general opinions are right and true, as being based upon the reality which is experienced even in the less valuable forms of sensation and association. The final standard, then, by reference to which the value of universal assent as a criterion is decided, is its objectivity, the degree to which the content of univer-

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sal assent corresponds to the nature of the real, *i.e.*, the ideal world.

So too legal enactments represent, to a large extent, the workings upon the community of forces such as hunger, disease, war, and trade, which are a part of physical nature—so much so, in fact, that the institutions of law derive a large portion of their objectivity from the objectivity of these great natural forces (Rep. 373 D f., Laws 709, 766 D ff.). The highest kind of law, however, is not an unreflective reaction to the stimulation of the environment, but is a deliberate attempt, on the part of the philosophic legislator, to reshape the constitution so as to reproduce, in its structure, the structure of the system of Ideas, and so far as he is successful,[5] law has not only the objectivity of nature, but shares also in the very essence of objectivity, the *ratio essendi* itself. The measure of his success, and in consequence the final standard by which the value of law itself is judged, is the objectivity of the result, *i.e.*, the extent to which legal enactments reproduce the structure of the ideal system.

So also with pleasure. Plato's position is that pleasure, which accompanies the functioning of our action-systems, is actually more pleasant, more intense and more durable, according as it is more objective, more real. That is to say, the organization of our action-systems which most nearly reproduce the organization of the ideal patterns which together constitute the metaphysically real world, is accompanied by a pleasure which is more real and genuine, not only in a metaphysical sense, but actually as experienced pleasure, than any pleasures which could accompany action-systems organized upon some plan which is not attuned to the nature of the universe. For these, being out of touch with things-as-they-are, would tend to be narrow and thus in conflict with themselves as well as ill-adjusted to their

[5] He is never fully successful (Rep. 473 A), for the material in which he embodies the ideal does not fully admit of this. The best he can do is to establish a legal system which will do for the time being. It will need constant revision (Polit. 294 A f., 299 E f., etc.).

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environment, and their hedonic tone would thus inevitably be inferior. Quantity of experienced pleasure, then, depending upon and thus representing the structure of the ideal world, can be used as a moral standard, as a test of the objective value of the different ends which men pursue. The final moral standard, however, which gives to "quantity of pleasure" its significance as a test of values, is objectivity, or the degree to which the organization of character corresponds to the organization of the real world of Ideas.

The case of æsthetical quality is, perhaps, not so clear. Essentially a matter of rhythms and balances and the ordered recurrence of accent, in a word, the introduction, into sensuous experience, of an intellectually apprehensible principle of order (symmetry) in such a way as to bring about a relatively intense emotional reaction, æsthetical quality is, of course, an attribute of whatever exhibits these characteristics. Ethical character, for instance, is an organization of sensuous experience in terms of an intellectually apprehensible principle; it is orderly, balanced, and harmonious, and makes a certain appeal to the emotions; it thus possesses æsthetical quality, and this is fully recognized by Plato. On the other hand, just as pleasure may be obtained from many sources, some of which are mutually exclusive (Phileb. 12 C f.), so also of æsthethical pleasure; and an actual study of the situations and character-types enhanced by the wizardry of the artist leads Plato to the conclusion that ethically inferior characters and situations, into which the element of contrast and conflict—an element ideally absent from the ethical character—enters, admit of a greater degree of æsthetical quality. There is therefore a difference between pleasure and æsthetical quality. For while different situations *a*, *b*, *c*, . . . *n*, all give pleasure to certain corresponding characters *A*, *B*, *C*, . . . *N*, a maximum of pleasure is produced by ethical situations, so that the pleasure experienced by the ethical character is quantitatively superior to that of the others. But with æsthetical quality, while any situations which are orderly in such a way as to intensify emotion, have this quality, actually the maximal

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emotional reaction is produced, not by ethical situations and characters, *i.e.*, not by what is orderly as such, but rather by what is emotionally exciting. Maximal artistic experience is compatible with a comparatively small amount of objective orderliness; and thus consistency (absence of contrast and conflict), as well as objectivity, is of less importance, in dealing with æsthetical quality, than in dealing with pleasure. There is thus no direct correlation between ethical and æsthetical quality. It remains true that the "rightly and nobly ordered mind and character" will always possess æsthetical quality; but it cannot be inferred that, because a given character is beautiful and affects the beholder like a work of art, it is also of high ethical quality. Æsthetical quality is always an accompaniment, but never a condition of ethical quality; and as it accompanies it only as a necessary consequence of the orderliness of the ethical character, which orderliness is dependent upon and representative of the ideal order, it follows that it is really the ideal order, or the objective, which gives to æsthetical quality whatever meaning it possesses as confirmatory evidence of moral quality. The final standard, then, to which the occasional use of æsthetical quality as a standard points, is objectivity, or the extent to which a given character or situation reproduces the orderliness of the ideal world.

The case of expediency or benefit is more plain. To benefit a man is to help him to realize his own Idea, to become more fully a man, more fully the embodiment of Justice and of the other qualities which go to make up the ideal of humanity, *i.e.*, to assist him to take up reality into his own life and thus become more nearly the embodiment of the ideal or ultimately real system. When therefore it is stated that expediency or benefit constitutes a standard by reference to which we can estimate the value of actions and characters, what is meant is that the degree to which an action realizes the ideal, embodies the objective and metaphysically real system of Ideas, is the final standard of value, and that anything which helps to bring this about,

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or is "beneficial," derives its value from this final standard of objectivity or realization of the ideal world.

The case of contribution to the life of the social whole is no less clear. While, at the level of opinion, it is possible to support class legislation, to aim at the interest of the stronger or governing class, through thick and thin with complete honesty of purpose, but with a certain weakness of insight, at the higher level of knowledge it is beyond doubt that the ideal for the social group is to be fully representative of the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, so that the individual citizen realizes his own Idea in harmony with the Ideas of the whole social group, and the group as a whole realizes, as completely as possible, the system of ideal patterns laid up in heaven, the City of God. The valuable thing here is undoubtedly the realization of the ideal system, and when it is asked, Does such and such an action contribute towards the life of the social whole? what is meant is, Does it contribute to realize the ideal life, to make empirically real on earth what is ideally real in heaven? The final standard here is thus undoubtedly objectivity, or realization of the ideal patterns which together constitute ultimate reality.

The case of orderliness can similarly be in no doubt. At the level of opinion, the orderliness of a psychic disposition, of obedience to the powers that be, of the starry heaven, etc., can be mistaken for trustworthy moral standards, though in themselves these may be, in spite of their relative orderliness, of but slight moral significance. But at the level of knowledge it becomes clear that it is ideal orderliness, the orderliness which is found in the mutual relations of the ideal elements which together constitute ultimate reality, which gives whatever moral significance and value attaches to human and physical laws. The final standard is thus clearly objectivity, *i.e.*, the extent to which the orderliness of an institution or character corresponds to and embodies the ideal orderliness, the orderliness of the final reality.

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So too with adequacy and self-sufficiency. While opinions may go so far astray as to invest the unconstitutional despot with these attributes of the highest good, from the standpoint of knowledge, to say that something is adequate and independent, is to say that it constitutes an organized whole, and that its principle of organization is identical with the principle which underlies the ideal or ultimately real system. It is thus objectivity, or its reproduction of the structure of reality, which makes the ethical character adequate and independent, and it is objectivity which, here also, is the real standard of the value-judgment.

Finally, consistency is understood by Plato, not merely as a logical principle or law of thought, but also as a law of things, a law which expresses the inter-relationship of the world of Ideas, and it is used, as we have seen, to test, not so much the morality, as the ideality of a proposed line of action, *i.e.*, to test its objectivity or correspondence with the ideal system which constitutes ultimate reality. The final standard, then, here also, is objectivity.

We are now in a position to sum up our conclusion briefly. The final standard of value, in every case, has turned out to be objectivity, or the degree to which a proposed course of action, or a character under investigation, is patterned upon the ideal principles which, for Plato, constitute reality. These principles are organized in terms of a single principle, the Idea of Good, *i.e.*, the principle of Value as such, value and reality being identified; and a character or an action has value, precisely to the degree in which it is based upon and tends to realize the principle of Value itself. Understood in the light of this final principle, *i.e.*, as expressions of ultimate Value or of the essence of Reality, universal assent, written law, quantity of pleasure, expediency, consistency, etc., can safely be used as proximate standards, by which to measure the value of actions and characters in particular situations and from particular standpoints. It is in this sense that they are used by the Platonic dialectician. But apart from such transvaluation in the light of this prin-

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ciple, they belong to the region of opinion, the region of twilight and moral blindness, and cannot safely be used as moral standards at all. It is insight into Reality, or the ideal realm and its principle, alone, which enables the philosophic judge to make value-judgments which are reliable and valid.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ANALYSIS OF MIND. By Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. vii, 310. Price, 16s. net.

The title of this book is perhaps slightly misleading. It is not a treatise on analytical psychology, but a series of lectures mainly on the significance and implications of recent theories of behaviourism. Many of the facts that are emphasized by the behaviourists are of course by no means new discoveries. It has long been a matter of general knowledge that many actions, both human and animal, that are apparently guided by rational choice have to be interpreted on a much lower basis. The awful consequences that would ensue to the centipede if it had to consider which leg is to "come after which" are familiar to most of us; and we are aware that many of the ostensible thoughts of human beings are little more than parrot-like repetitions of words. The behaviourists, however, extend the range of such interpretations so widely as almost, if not quite, to eliminate conscious purpose from the universe altogether. Obviously a view of this kind demands consideration from the ethical as well as from the purely psychological point of view. As Mr. Russell says (p. 27) "It is humiliating to find how terribly adequate this hypothesis turns out to be." It is humiliating because it seems to reduce human life essentially to the animal level and animal life to the level of physiological process. It only needs a slight extension of this levelling process to resolve physiology into chemistry and physics. Without absolutely accepting these apparent consequences of the behaviourist contention, Mr. Russell certainly makes very large concessions to it. It is well to note, however, that he urges that the acceptance of such a position does not necessarily lead to pure materialism; for, as he says in the Preface, "An old-fashioned materialism can receive no support from modern physics." The view to which he inclines is rather that of William James and others, "According to which the 'stuff' of the world is neither mental nor material, but a 'neutral stuff' out of which both are constructed." The use of the word "stuff," however, seems to bring the ultimate reality somewhat nearer to Matter than to Spirit; but this may be only a verbal objection. Obviously it would not be

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possible to discuss this doctrine within the limits of such a review as the present, but it may be worth while to notice some points on which Mr. Russell's statements appear to be open to criticism.

First, with reference to the suggested reduction of all laws of action to those of physics and chemistry. Mr. Russell refers more than once to the view of Mr. J. S. Haldane "that physiology is not theoretically reducible to physics and chemistry"; and he urges (p. 90) that "we ought certainly to require very strong evidence before admitting any such breach of continuity as between living and dead matter." It is significant that the reduction suggested is to "physics *and chemistry*." I should have thought that even in the case of chemical processes the behaviour of a compound could not be predicted from that of its component parts. In the case of a living organism the difference is so marked that the conception of "organic unity" has come to be applied generally to all wholes that cannot simply be treated as sums of their parts. The way in which this conception has been applied, for instance, by Dr. G. E. Moore to the consideration of values is well known. On the whole, it is surely still true that the *onus probandi* lies upon those who claim that the more complex unities can be directly explained by means of the more simple.

"It is clear from many instances," Mr. Russell notes in another place (p. 259) "that accuracy may be purely mechanical. The most complete form of accuracy consists of giving correct answers to questions, an achievement in which calculating machines far surpass human beings." He might have added that books often convey very accurate information, that a watch can sometimes be trusted to tell the time of the day, and that an æroplane is much better at flying than any man. But Heine's well-known gibe against the English, that their machines are like men and their men like machines, can hardly be said to be "humiliating" in its first member; and it is not even certain that it is so in its second. What can be done mechanically may very well be left to mechanism. We are then all the freer to perform without mechanism the more important things that it cannot achieve. At any rate, though Paley's watch is no doubt somewhat out of date, it would surely be strange that the perfection of a machine should be taken as evidence of the *absence* of intelligence. The answers that the calculating machine gives are supplied, in reality, by the man who designed it; and he had to give a good deal of thought to its construction.

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The discussion of Belief is one of the most interesting parts of Mr. Russell's work. On the general nature of Belief he accepts the statement of James—"*In its inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else.*" The plausibility which this view has seems to me to depend partly on a confusion between simple belief and the special kind of belief that is commonly called Faith (which appears to be a compound of simple belief and a sense of the importance of the thing believed). This confusion is more readily fallen into in German, where the word "*Glaube*" does duty both for the simple and the complex fact. In English it ought to be more easy to guard against it. The belief that $3+4=7$ does not appear to me to be emotional; but the belief of the Pythagoreans that 3, 4 and 7 are specially important numbers may very well contain an emotional element. Similarly, I can hardly think that there is anything emotional in the belief that London is situated on the banks of the Thames; but there may very well be an emotional element in the belief that London contains some undesirable slums which might with advantage be remodelled. The faith of the mystic or of the social reformer seems to contain something that is not present in the simple belief of the arithmetician or geographer.

In connection with Belief, it is interesting to note that Mr. Russell has somewhat modified his view of the correspondence theory of truth (pp. 271–3). As one of those who have expressed dissatisfaction with his previous statements, I may perhaps be permitted to say that his new statement seems much more acceptable. I still think, however, that it is somewhat misleading to speak of the truth or falsity of beliefs. A logical judgment or proposition, when its meaning is fully and clearly set forth, is either definitely true or definitely false. But a belief (even when not emotional) is a psychological, not a purely logical fact. It does no doubt contain a logical judgment, but usually qualified by perhapses and other modifying clauses, not always clearly apprehended; so that it cannot be said to be definitely true or false, but only more or less correct or erroneous. And it is very liable to change, especially when it contains an element of emotion. The beliefs of Philip drunk and Philip sober are notoriously apt to be different. This distinction appears to me to be of fundamental importance.

It is the duty of a critic to criticise, but he is also permitted

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the pleasure of appreciation; and I am glad to have the opportunity of stating that this book is characterised by all that versatility, openness of mind, brightness of expression, and aptness of illustration, that we have learned to expect in any work by Mr. Russell. As an instance of a particularly good statement, reference may be made to his treatment of the general nature of pleasure and discomfort (pp. 68–72) and I may conclude this notice by quoting a passage in which the ethical bearing of the behaviourist psychology is very well indicated: "When some desire that we should be ashamed of is attributed to us," he remarks (pp. 31–2) "we notice that we have never had it consciously, in the sense of saying to ourselves, 'I wish that would happen.' We therefore look for some other interpretation of our actions, and regard our friends as very unjust when they refuse to be convinced by our repudiation of what we hold to be a calumny. . . . We say: 'I desire to be kind to my friends, honourable in business, philanthropic towards the poor, public-spirited in politics.' So long as we refuse to allow ourselves, even in the watches of the night, to avow any contrary desires, we may be bullies at home, shady in the city, skinflints in paying wages and profiteers in dealing with the public; yet, if only conscious motives are to count in moral valuation, we shall remain model characters." The deceitfulness of the human heart has, of course, been long familiar to us; but behaviourism certainly helps us to see its explanation more clearly. The only doubt is whether the *seeing* of it is itself an instance of "behaviour" in the technical sense.

J. S. Mackenzie.

London.

A Study in Realism. By John Laird, M.A. London: Cambridge University Press; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. ix, 228.

Both for its matter and its manner this book should have a wide circle of readers. It is a shining example of how even in the midst of the most technical philosophical subtleties grace and wit may survive without any sacrifice of clearness and force. However the author may be physically constituted, he is mentally eupeptic, and he has been nourished evidently on a well-balanced diet. The resulting sense of reserve and poise adds greatly to the comfort of the reader.

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The author would probably resent being tagged with the label of any of the pre-existent species of Realists. He has points of agreement and disagreement with all of them. From the introduction I suspect the author would least resent the label of Neo-Reidism. He says: "If the shade of Reid could visit these regions to-day, it would greet Mr. Prichard of Oxford, but it would be startled by Mr. Alexander, bewildered by Mr. Russell, and distressed by Mr. Holt."

The fundamental thesis, that knowledge is of things as they really are, will hardly be satisfied with the essences which the critical Realists offer. His "are" includes existence as well as essence, the "that" as well as the "what." This is further implied in his criticism of Meinong's propositional objective as the subject matter of judgment. While the American Neo-Realists have neglected the subjective factor in knowledge, Russell, on the other hand, has given it too much of a rôle in his accounts of sense data.

The chapter headings are: Things We Perceive, Things Remembered and Expected, The Stuff of Fancy, The World of Common Belief, Principles, Values, The Mind, The Larger Outlook, and a well-done philosophic-literary "epilogue" on The Vision of Thales.

The assumptions of Professor Laird's Realism as he gives them are: (1) and most important, that "Things can be known as they really are," (2) and scarcely less important, "Matter is precisely what it appears to be when sufficient precautions have been taken to avoid confusion between the actual genuine appearances and the spurious. It follows, (3) that genuine appearances cannot contradict one another, and things cannot contradict one another. To say that things can be known means, of course, (4) that they can be known by us. But (5) as we are finite we can hope to know but a small part of the infinitude of existence. (6) We have no right to deny the assumption of psychology that any piece of thinking is a subtle web whose pattern was woven long before the days of our neolithic ancestors, and whose yarn even now is three parts spun in the blind loom of lines of branching nerves." So if we know anything "as it really is," we know it "despite the fact that we do not know much that pertains to its conditions and connections." A "thing" is "any entity whatsoever that can be apprehended by the mind." "Knowledge" is "a kind of discovery in which things are directly revealed or given to the mind." And

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"the mind"—there is an entire chapter devoted to "the mind." But the reader will find some difficulty in squaring the contents of that chapter, and what is said of it in the chapters on the "World of Common Belief" and "Principles," with the above statement of knowledge which, however, is frankly admitted "not to be very precise."

The task and problems of the rest of the book consist, of course, in trying to state our world and experience in terms of these assumptions and definitions. If in knowledge things are directly revealed or presented "to the mind," the only cognitive character and business of the mind is simply to receive these revelations and presentations. But it turns out, inevitably, that these "revelations" and "presentations" of things are very Pickwickian. For, before the mind can "directly receive" the presentation, it must for "most of our knowledge" work like the dickens for it with all the machinery of observation, inference, experimentation, etc. It is very much as if one should say: "Dear Mind: As a slight token of friendship, I present you with the largest diamond in South Africa. To be sure, I do not know where it is, and I am not sure just how you can be sure that you have found the really largest one, and of course somebody else may claim the ownership of it, but these are little minor details which I am sure will not be taken too seriously between friends."

And this recalls that Professor Laird finds that the Pragmatists do not "take knowledge seriously." To one with as keen a sense of humor as Professor Laird's, the Pragmatist's reply must be obvious. For of course what this charge amounts to is that the Pragmatist does not take the presentative Realist's conception of knowledge seriously. His own, indeed, he takes seriously enough. And if he does not take the presentative Realist's conception seriously it is because he finds that knowledge as a direct presentation and revelation does not take itself and its task "seriously." This lack of seriousness shows in the treatment or lack of treatment of error, always a crucial topic for presentational Realism. When, after trenchantly criticising the Neo-Realistic explanation, he faces the problem for himself, Professor Laird simply throws up the sponge in the statement (p. 103) that "it is impossible to explain error. We must simply accept this eternal possibility, and try to be as careful and consistent as we can." There is, of course, a sense in which error cannot be explained, the sense in which we cannot say why the universe is "such that" it or anything else

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should occur. But this is not the author's difficulty. He throws up his hand on error simply because he has no adequate working criterion for it.

In perceptive knowledge those perceptions are better intrinsically which are focal as compared with marginal percepts. But Professor Laird sees that "better" cannot be equated with truer (cf. the Theætetus), since false perceptions are as focal as true ones. In judgmental and inferential knowledge the problem is to remove contradiction from appearances, for "things cannot contradict each other." There is much to be desired here on the meaning of "contradiction" in mere appearances. How can mere presentations as such be in contradiction? Suppose the stick looks crooked and feels straight, what possible contradiction in this as mere presentation, unless one wishes to use the looks of the stick as a means to handling it.

At one or two points hopes are aroused in the reader that some additional light is to be thrown on that Cimmerian region of the relation of subsistential entities to existential things. But so far as I can see, these hopes are disappointed. We are assured that subsistential entities "hold of, apply to, are valid of," etc., existential things. But just what these phrases mean of one presentation as such in relation to another still seems a dark matter. They are left just where Plato left them in the Parmenides. But this is to be said, that Professor Laird is everywhere frankly conscious and vocal of these difficulties.

The limits of this notice forbid more than mere mention of the stimulating discussion of values. If the author should chance to see this notice, and should be oppressed by a sense of the futility of discussion within such limits, I assure him I share this feeling. I wish to say in closing, as I began, that this is a book which makes the reader hope for others from the author.

A. W. Moore.

University of Chicago.

Allied Shipping Control: an Experiment in International Administration. By J. A. Salter, C.B. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. Pp. xxiii, 372. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This book—one of a series of works on the economic and social history of the world war, edited under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—is an account of

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the organisation of shipping in Great Britain during the early stages of the war and of the development of that organisation into an international system. At the end of his account, the author—a high executive official, first in the British and then in the International organisation—deduces from his experience certain conclusions about international work. The book therefore has a double interest; the narrative part, which is the first authoritative treatment of the subject, will provide students of history with an exhaustive account of a most important economic factor in the war while specialists in shipping matters will, of course, find additional matter of interest. The chapters on International administration, however, will appeal to a wider public, especially as they break new ground.

We have in the earlier part the story of nothing less than a revolution in economic organisation brought about under war pressure. Government control gradually laid hold of almost all the British merchant fleet and came to use as some of its agents representatives of the very interests involved; the pressure of public necessity made the rigorous control of food supplies possible.

Other countries besides Great Britain had in the first two years of the war organised similar, though less perfect, controls of their merchant fleets. As the war proceeded it became evident to the Allies that national control was insufficient and that an immense saving of tonnage could be effected by co-operation. Thus there came into being the Allied Maritime Transport Council which from November, 1917, onwards co-ordinated the use of a pool of ships consisting of all the merchant shipping of the Allies. The Council only met four times during the war and was composed of ministers engaged upon other important duties; its effective organ was the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States and their staffs. These representatives, who did the heavy current work of arranging requisitions and distributions, had the further task of harmonising divergent national interests into one common policy during a period when the material in their hands was so inadequate that its wise or unwise use seemed to involve the very life of their countries. The much more difficult task was therefore thrust upon them of adjusting different national points of view. Helped largely by an intricate mechanism which is carefully described and appreciated, it was

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possible for each one in his double capacity of national representative and international official, to explain to his own government at any given moment the requirements of the international situation, while at the same time supporting in daily conferences with his colleagues the needs of his own country.

The closing chapters on the League of Nations form perhaps the most important part of this book and will also be the most interesting to the general reader. The author after having had all the encouraging and depressing experiences of inter-Allied co-operation has come out of them with certain definite, practical and hopeful proposals for future international work.

The idea of the League of Nations was engendered during the war by idealists who were first despised and then abused. After the Armistice, it was thought to enjoy—under the protection of President Wilson—a precocious success, but it was nearly buried forever by the selfish, unimaginative statecraft of the Paris Conference; since then it has continued to be the object of a campaign of depreciation.

Meanwhile the League survives—settling secondary disputes and doing some of the dirty work of reconstruction.

On the other hand there is being applied with some hope of success a negative test of sincerity—disarmament. But even if the world says "We will try and not fight," there remains the question "Will we co-operate?"

It is to this second problem that Mr. Salter makes his main contribution. For the inter-Allied organisation which he has served during the war had a positive end. Now as General Smuts pointed out shortly after the Armistice, no international organisation can hope to survive which does not aim at continuous, peaceful co-operation as its normal activity. Prevent war and you have done something; organize peace and you have done better still. In this latter task the world suffers under two disadvantages: inexperience and selfishness.

Up to a point sound administrative principles can counteract both. It is a common experience of international workers that they find national prejudices unreal and that they increasingly lose the sense of national distinctiveness. Every responsible government minister and official ought, through the preliminaries of education, through travel, through conferences, if possible through *permanent* association with his colleagues in other countries, to be permeated by such experience; and this can largely

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be brought about by setting in motion administrative mechanism of the kind advocated by Mr. Salter.

It is curious to observe in this narrative how effective co-operation developed through personal contacts and how national representatives came to realise the needs of countries other than their own. It is alarming, however, to realise—and this fact should not be underestimated—how often, when a solution depended on good will and not on insight, the Allies were forced into it by a common sense of danger greater than their individual selfishnesses,—usually described as "interests." Yet here again administrative machinery provided the occasion, if not the motive for compromising the issues. Mr. Salter's theme is that there is less danger of wars, when administrative machinery is so devised that international questions are treated in all but the final stages continuously and by experts, instead of being concentrated in the hands of bargaining Foreign Offices. The field of contact is thus circumscribed by the limits of personal competence and tends to become a field of enquiry; understanding is more likely; national *amour-propre* becomes less insistent.

Indeed we believe that here he goes to the root of the matter and that the future lies rather with free interchange of opinions between all kinds of public representatives than with the specialised diplomatic intrigues of those who in their hearts still believe in the old pernicious theory of the balance of power while public opinion forces them to do lip-service to another ideal.

ELLIOTT FELKEN.

PARIS.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Guido de Ruggiero. Translated by A. Howard Hannay and R. G. Collingwood. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 402.

This "comprehensive treatment of the whole development of philosophy in the last half century" is another volume in the "Library of Philosophy Series" edited by J. H. Muirhead. Equal portions are devoted to German, French, Anglo-American and Italian Philosophy, respectively. Obviously the author assumes that philosophies are nationalistic in character.

It is interesting to discover the author's position through his criticisms of both of the important French schools of to-day: he charges Durkheim with determinism, Bergson with unreflective-

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ness. The author has imbibed his Hegelianism through Spaventa and Croce, and cannot therefore treat of pluralism sympathetically; the contradictions and paradoxes are to be criticised not only because they are not coherent, but especially because they do not admit of those categorical values implicit in the developing concepts of science.

We are of course interested to learn what this man thinks of us. There is an emphasis on the work of Royce, whose great merit consists in seeing that knowledge explains possible experience through concentrating the whole of reality into actuality, definiteness and determinateness being achieved through the concrete universal. Ruggiero very much fears, however, that this will finally lead to the elimination of all abstract universality. As for the empirical phase, Pragmatism is summarily dealt with, its rise being viewed as "the most disquieting symptom of the present state of philosophical thought. . . . It is a turbid stream of rubbish, . . . bordering on comedy, if not charlatanism. . . . William James is a curious patchwork of good and evil, of seriousness and extravagance, and of decadence." Dewey and Schiller are dismissed with a word.

Because "no country can complain with greater justice than Italy of the way in which her intellectual life has been overlooked" especially by her own countrymen, the author feels justified in tracing the history of Italian Philosophy further back than any of the others. His first chapter deals with the period "from Machiavelli to Gioberti." The latter and Rosmini were of that school of individualism whose value is just coming to be known; so also, Spaventa shows in 1861, should many other Italians be regarded as precursors of the best of philosophical thought. Croce's great value as a philosophical interpreter of Hegel lies in the fact that he was introduced to this philosophy only after he had become mature through two other disciplines, Vico's historical and æsthetic speculations, and DeSanctis' views of literary criticism.

In his treatment of Logistic, Ruggiero falls under his own criticism: not only is his discussion woefully inadequate—he does not even mention the Neo-Realists—but he fails even to mention the more important contributions of the Italian School, particularly that of Peano. Undoubtedly this difficulty is due to the bias of the author. A more accurate treatment would have shown that although there are no sharp breaks in the continuity

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of certain schools, the relations among various schools may be difficult to trace. Any such deviation from the monistic point of view, however, would probably be regarded by the author as a case of "philosophical decadence."

C. F. TAEUSCH.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

SHORTER NOTICES.

THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD PEACE: Essays arranged and edited by F. S. Marvin. London: H. Milford, Oxford: the University Press, 1921. Pp. 191. Price, 9s. 6d. net.

This series of essays and lectures delivered at the Unity Schools in 1920 was arranged in conjunction with the League of Nations Union and introduces the League by stressing certain great and relevant periods of history, the Pax Romana, the Papacy of Innocent III, The French Revolution as a world force and the congress of Vienna, explaining each section cut across the strand of history in relation to the ideal of peace which was common to all. They are as good as can be expected within the compass of a score of pages, and especially Sir Paul Vinogradoff on the work of Rome, Mr. G. W. Clark on Grotius, Mr. H. W. C. Davis on the Papacy of Innocent III. The main thesis is the unification of mankind, and the implications of the fact that all the world has come into touch, and that cooperation is a growing quality. But what can be said of the contribution of Mr. H. G. Wells, added, perhaps, as a popular feature to the course? It is not long since he was turning in the *Salvaging of Civilisation* from the League and calling on men to turn their eyes from all such makeshifts and to concentrate on the more arduous ideal of human unity. Of the League of Nations he wrote then:

"The phrase has a thin and litigious flavour. What loyalty and what devotion can we expect this multiple association to command? It has no unity—no personality. It is like asking a man to love the average member of a woman's club instead of loving his wife.

"For the idea of man, for human unity, for one common blood, for the one order of the world, I can imagine men living and dying, but not for a miscellaneous assembly that will not mix—even in its name. It has no central idea, no heart to it, this League of Nations formula."

Though his aversion from the League of Nations is less trenchantly expressed in the present essay (it is merely termed "quite insufficient for the present necessity of Europe"), his ideal is clearly, a widely divergent one, that of the world state.

THE ORIGIN OF SEXUAL MODESTY. By Edward Westermarck. London: The Athenæum Press, 1921. (The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology.) Pp. 20. Price, 1s.

Professor Westermarck, who is treating the subject of this paper more fully in the forthcoming edition of his well-known *History of Human Marriage*, was, as he tells us, interested at an early date in the problem why the sexual functions should be wrapped up in a veil of secrecy, with the awful feeling of shame as penalty for improper exposure. His interest led to the writing of his book on the history of marriage, in which, however, the problem of sexual shame is dealt with in a few lines only.

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After mentioning instances of sexual modesty among primitive people in different parts of the world, the theories as to the origin of this sentiment are here examined. If the fear of the approach of an enemy were at the bottom of sexual modesty, might we not (Dr. Westermarck asks) expect to find a feeling of bashfulness also with regard to sleep, which implies a much greater degree of defencelessness and a much longer exposure to danger? Fear of being disturbed by rivals cannot have been the originating cause of sexual secrecy considering that men exhibit this feeling chiefly towards women, and that it is even more marked in women than in men. Fear of causing disgust in others has been proposed as a solution, but if the sexual function were intrinsically disgusting to outsiders, how could the feelings centring round it be the favourite topic of polite literature and the stage? (P. 6.)

He believes that the coyness which the female animal shows when she is courted by the male, is one root of the feeling, which would account for its peculiarly feminine character. But not the only root. The feeling against incest, or, more strictly speaking, the sexual aversion which prevails between members of the same domestic circle (with the exception, of course, of husband and wife) is an indication of a close connection with sexual modesty; and it appears to be the rule that sexual modesty is especially strongly developed in relations between members of the same family circle or kin. Dr. Westermarck bases his study of the whole question on wide survey and is able to dispose of certain one-sided theories, such as Mr. Keane's "original explanation" of the reluctance of the mother-in-law to meet her son-in-law by reference to the Patagonian practice of the head of the family dispatching some aged woman (a mother-in-law by preference) on the death of any young person. "Mr. Keane does not tell us (Dr. Westermarck adds) how it happened that the murder of the Patagonian mother-in-law caused a panic in mothers-in-law all over the world." The small paper is a valuable critical survey of the question and the summing up appears to be final, though the promised fuller treatment will be awaited with interest.

THE PLAY FUNCTION OF SEX. By Havelock Ellis. London: The Athenæum Press, 1921. (The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, Publication No. 8.) Pp. 12. Price, 1s. net.

This term (the play function of sex) was devised and used by Professor Maurice Parmelee (in a vaguer and more extended sense) in his *Personality and Conduct*. Dr. Havelock Ellis under this heading emphasises with his usual mastery and candour the immense importance for the individual of the development of erotic personality and for human society, of the acquirement of the art of love.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DAYDREAMS. By Dr. J. Varendonck. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 367. Price, 18s. net.

This is an exhaustive analysis of the "chains" or daydreams forged by what Dr. Varendonck calls the fore-conscious mind, of which a number are given. He succeeded in bringing to consciousness his own chains of thought originating in circumstances without the interference of will, and studied their peculiarities; and points out the characteristics they have in common. Daydreaming has relation with the dream state and also with what we may call inspiration of genius; it betrays preoccupations with unsolved problems, cares, or overwhelming impressions which require accommodation. "They all strive towards the future; they all seem to prepare

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some accommodation, to obtain some prospective advantage to the ego, in fine, they are attempts at adaptation; such is their biological meaning." They may assist the conscious mind, the unconscious ego, as Jastrow hints, perhaps watching over our safety when our waking thoughts are busy elsewhere. Another aspect is the cathartic, and it has been pointed out by others that daydreaming offers an escape from a censorship that is too stringent in its repression, and consequently constitutes a safety-valve for the action of strong affects.

J.

THE MESSAGE OF PLATO: a reinterpretation of the *Republic*. By Edward J. Urwick, M.A., Head of the Ratan Tata Department of Social Science and Administration, University of London. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. xii, 263. Price, 18s. net.

This is an attempt to reinterpret Plato's *Republic* in the light of the Vedanta philosophy. The author believes, like some other recent students of Greek philosophy, that Socrates and Plato were closely connected with the Pythagorean school. He accepts, moreover, the view of Schuré and others, that Pythagoras was one of the "Great Initiates," whose teachings were in the main concentrated in Egypt and in some parts of Asia. He thinks that Socrates and Plato, if not themselves "initiates," were at least in close touch with the mystical doctrines of the East, and that their utterances cannot be properly interpreted without reference to Oriental speculations. It would hardly be within the province of this JOURNAL to discuss these views, nor am I competent for such a task. It seems clear, however, that there are at least many points at which Plato's teaching may be profitably compared with that of Eastern thinkers. The social classes, for instance, that are recognized by Plato bear a close resemblance to the Indian castes, especially as these were understood in earlier times and interpreted in the Laws of Manu; and the general basis for the caste system that is expounded by such a writer as Bhagavan Das is very similar to that set forth by Plato. But Mr. Urwick's contention carries us far beyond such resemblances; and one would like to have fuller evidence than he supplies for the intimate connection that he postulates. Some further reference to Eastern writers and to the way in which Plato's doctrines were afterwards interpreted by Plotinus might have been interesting in this connection. In general, he contents himself with references to the Bhagavat Gita.

The chief interest of the book, of course, lies in its fresh interpretation of the *Republic*. I am disposed to agree with Mr. Urwick in thinking that the dialectical character of that work has, in general, not been sufficiently recognised. There has been too much tendency to accept the statements contained in any part of it as representing Plato's final view. This is undoubtedly rash—partly because it is uncertain how far Plato is reproducing the doctrines of Socrates, rather than setting forth his own; but still more because it is pretty clear that the views expressed in the later books must be taken to a large extent as superseding those that are contained in the earlier, and it is by no means easy to determine how far this super-session is intended to carry us. Especially, it is not easy to see how far the statement at the end of the ninth book and throughout the tenth must be taken as modifying the earlier statements. I agree with Mr. Urwick in thinking that they introduce a very considerable modification; and, in particular, that they are meant to transfer the emphasis from the state to the individual soul. That this change brings Plato's view nearer to Oriental thought than one might be led from the earlier books to suppose is, I think, very apparent.

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Whether it carries with it all the implications that Mr. Urwick seeks to bring out is more doubtful.

Whatever one may think of the details of Mr. Urwick's treatment, however, it is at least obvious that his book is written with great earnestness and enthusiasm; and it it may be expected to help very materially in bringing about a better understanding between Eastern and Western philosophy. It ought also to help the "general reader," for whom it is avowedly written, to realise some of the difficult and vital problems that are raised by Plato's writings, and that still await solution by the "specialist."

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

IN SEARCH OF THE SOUL, and the Mechanism of Thought, Emotion and Conduct; a treatise in two volumes, containing a brief but comprehensive history of the Philosophical Speculations and Scientific Researches from ancient times to the present day, as well as an original attempt to account for the Mind and Character of Man, and establish the principles of a science of ethology. By Bernard Hollander, M.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Pp. vi, 516, 361. Price, 42s. net.

The main object of this book is to set forth a general theory of the localisation of mental functions in the brain; but it includes a sketch (too slight to be of much value) of philosophical speculations from the earliest times, and an account of the history of physiology, with special reference to phrenology. The work of Gall is highly commended; and regret is expressed that its value was long obscured by the charlatanism of some of his followers—notably Spurzheim and Combe. In the second volume Dr. Hollander gives an account of his own very important researches, and indicates the general conclusions to which he has been led. The only part that is of special interest to readers of this JOURNAL is that dealing with the subject which, following J. S. Mill, he calls ethology. It will be remembered that Mr. James Ward contributed an article in criticism of Mill's view on this subject to one of the early numbers of this JOURNAL.

Ethology is, of course, quite different from Ethics. It is not concerned with the valuation of human conduct, but rather with the biological and other conditions by which human conduct is affected. What Dr. Hollander is specially concerned with is the localisation in the brain of impulses affecting conduct. He deals with the general nature of emotion and instinct, and more particularly with anger, fear, suspicion, the sexual propensity, parental and filial love, love of home and country, love of praise, self-esteem, etc., and he discusses the bearing of the results at which he has arrived upon the practical problems of education, the treatment of criminals and the insane, and similar questions. The value of his results can only be properly estimated by experts in physiology; but it is obvious even to a layman that Dr. Hollander has devoted a great deal of attention to these subjects, that his investigations have been carefully carried out, and that his conclusions are stated with due caution. The materials that he has supplied, especially with reference to the more abnormal aspects of human experience, are of very great interest. It is a pity that they are contained in a work so bulky and costly as to be inaccessible to many readers. Perhaps he may be induced to bring out his most important results in a more convenient form.

It may be well to note that Dr. Hollander does not consider that his theory of the localisation of mental functions in the brain involves a doc-

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trine of pure materialism and determinism. He believes that a human being is essentially "a soul" and that the bodily organism only supplies materials for its final choice. It can hardly be said, however, that his treatment of the more metaphysical aspects of the subject is very clear or fully thought out.

The book may be heartily recommended to all who are interested in the special subjects with which it is mainly concerned.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

IMPRESSIONS AND COMMENTS: SECOND SERIES 1914–1920. By Havelock Ellis. London: Constable & Co., 1921. Pp. 248. Price, 12s. net.

These brief and profound *aperçus* are various and individual in their appeal. I can only indicate which ones among them strike me as particularly happy and significant.

The descriptive anecdote on page 131, of the Woman's modesty which "has become courage and yet remains modesty" reminds me of the great campaign for the fundamental rights of women and of the unborn, which is still being led in America by the woman who initiated it; and perhaps most necessary of all, in these days of panic and impertinent legislative repression, is the sketch of Bishops and Archbishops in full cry (on p. 39): "What is the thirst for alcohol and morphia and all the poisons of the apothecary compared with the soul-destroying thirst for the poison of Laws?"

Freudians will find the essential message and *sane* values in psycho-analytic dogma compressed and crystallized into a page and a half, on "how great a part is played in the lives of men and women by some little concealed germ of abnormality";—compare the vividly discriminating and suggestive thumb-nail sketch of a pronounced and fine intermediate type on page 43. And the ethnic aspect of psychology has never been more fascinatingly illustrated than in the descriptions of East Anglian people and art, or the definition of the Somersetshire genius as expressed in Walter Bagehot and William Blake.

F. W. STELLA BROWNE.

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. By R. M. Maciver. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. vi, 186. Price, 6s. net.

Professor Maciver's present study suggests comparison with his earlier *Community*; and in both books the conception of social activities and the successive stages of society are considered and summarised. There is nothing controversial about his treatment; if he speaks slightingly of the ideas of Herbert Spencer, Benjamin Kidd or the Hegelian school as misleading, that is no novelty now; for State worship has had its day. "There is no mystery in the state, or in the community of which it is merely an organ; . . . society exists only in its members; if we pursue any social ideal which means anything else than the good of social individuals, we are pursuing a figment."

What, we may ask, is of value in this study? It certainly does not present sociology as a "general and architectonic" science, but rather gives us apt common-sense generalisations about society. But the historical presentment of the successive stages of society is definitely partial and unduly condensed, and the whole book is aimed somewhat low, even if written (as it claims) for the general reader. The obvious is never spared; and the general reader is offered the following food for thought: "No one can read history without being impressed by the changefulness of social conditions;

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manners and morals, customs and codes, seem part of the eternal flux." This eternal flux is so obvious that it surely need not be insisted on.

M. J.

LONDON.

THE RATIONAL GOOD; A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE. By L.T. Hobhouse, D.Litt., LL.D. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1921. Pp. 165. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

In this candid and persuasive work the basis and end of human action is considered, and the principle of a rational ethics. Is there, Mr. Hobhouse enquires, a rational and therefore a demonstrable standard of values to which men's actions and the institutions of society may be referred for judgment, and if there be such a standard (the rational good) in what sort of life is it realised, and what authority does it possess over the actual conduct of men? His answer is that the judgment "this is good" is the assertion of a fact as well as the expression of attitude, and the fact asserted is a harmony between feeling and experience. By harmony is meant, in the last analysis, a form of mutual support (p. 69). In describing anything as good, we assert a harmonious relation of which it is one term. "The term may legitimately be called good as pertaining to this harmony, but the concrete truth involves both terms in that relation," and "good," therefore, is a harmony of experience and feeling in the generic senses described, and any element—feeling or other experience—that enters into this harmony is called good by right of membership. The rational good is in the first place consistent throughout, not clashing with anything else reasonably held good, it also has an universal ground, and is objective;—that is, the judgment of the good must not depend on any peculiarity of the individual who forms it. Unfortunately, as Mr. Hobhouse admits, we cannot hope to attain the idea of rationality in the world as it now is, and he indicates that "of course you cannot be rational, but be as rational as you ever can be."

THE SALVAGING OF CIVILIZATION. By H. G. Wells. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 199. Price, $2.00.

Mr. Wells' daring consists not so much in the brilliance of his idea—others too have felt that "a resolute push for quite a short period now might reconstruct the entire basis of our collective life"—as in the detailed working out of a project so conceived.

It is a sovereign super-state, and not a league of nations, which is to be the object of this vast reorganisation. It is to this that Mr. Wells' educational reforms are to be directed. Existing governments are to be regarded merely as local trustees for the coming human commonweal. Thus only will the world of political thought approximate the present advanced status of science. That the project can tap the springs of human motivation is shown by the cases of Christianity and Islam—Mr. Wells of course forgets that both had a hostile field upon which to feed—and the more recent experience of Mr. Wilson.

C. F. T.

WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE. By Pierrepont B. Noyes. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 99. Price, $1.50.

The author was the American member of the Rhineland Commission to which the Allies gave supreme authority in the occupied regions of Germany, hence speaks from first-hand information. He is attempting to

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overcome the "dangerous optimism" resulting from American indifference to and ignorance of the "impending tragedy" in Europe. We are taking the opposite extreme of our pre-war attitude by regarding the larger economic problems of reconstruction as mere matters of further financial miracles. "Little progress has been made toward European restoration . . . nor can any be made without our help." Even Britain cannot take anyone else into her boat without sinking it; while France is unwilling to let Germany become economically strong, the only chance she has of receiving an indemnity. The proposed fifteen-year "hostile occupation" of the Rhineland by France is "certain to prove a curse to the world," largely because of the temptation to organize "Revolutions" which have no popular support. The Continent is due for a social or political debacle which will eventuate in a general economic crash. France, Belgium, Poland, and Italy are launched on militaristic programs that restore Europe to the old-fashioned "bargainings" that have ever proved her undoing. If we persist in refusing to enter the League of Nations, we "commit a crime against the peace of the world." The author urges the cancellation of France's debt to us, but disagrees with Keynes that a similar procedure should be adopted toward Great Britain. The reader may not agree with some of the opinions or speculations of this book, but the facts presented are of such a nature as to give anyone pause who wishes to know more of the truth about present conditions in Europe.

C. F. T.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRY. By Frank Watts. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 240. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

The factor of the human element in industry to which insufficient attention was paid of the early "efficiency engineers" was not neglected by English thinkers such as Robert Owen; soon after the arrival of the Industrial Revolution, and more than half a century ago Ruskin sounded an appeal to the scientific study of human nature in industry and economics. But the prevailing temper of the period was materialistic, and labour continued to be organised on the principle that man might be safely treated as a mechanical unit of a machine and little more. Mr. Watts's book is a summary, in an enlightened and impartial spirit, of the important branch of the psychologist's work in an ordered society in selecting scientifically the right man for particular forms of employment; and emphasises the growing strength to-day of the general desire among both employers and employed for the reversal of the tendency which the early scientific management undoubtedly accelerated, that tendency which was making it increasingly necessary for the workers to adapt themselves both mentally and physically to the demands of the machinery they were called on to work or to feed. When this reversal has been carried out to the extent that machines have been modified to fit men instead of men modified to fit machines, the work of factory can be planned involving no initial human wastage, and providing for an upward passage of human ability through the various departments. Chapters II to V are mainly a historical summary of what has been done in the case of Industrial fatigue and its elimination by motion study, vocational selection, and scientific management and labour. The concluding chapters deal with the less specialised psychological problems of industry, such as industrial unrest, and contains suggestive proposals for the reorganisation of industry, psychologically considered.

E. F.

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MIND ENERGY: LECTURES AND ESSAYS. By Henri Bergson, translated by H. Wildon Carr. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920. Pp. x, 212. Price, 10s. net.

A welcome translation of *L'Énergie Spirituelle*, which is not merely authorized, Professor Wildon Carr tells us in his preface, but has been revised by M. Bergson himself. The book consists of a collection of seven lectures and essays centred about the idea of a spiritual energy which uses and overflows the body but is not of it. It contains the Huxley Lecture on "Consciousness and Life," delivered at Birmingham in 1911; an essay on "Soul and Body"; the presidential address of 1913 to the Society for Psychical Research; a lecture on "Dreams," given in 1901; a brilliant article on "False Recognition," published in 1908; another on "Intellectual Effort," published in 1902; and a closely reasoned paper submitted to the Geneva Congress of Philosophy in 1904 on "Brain and Thought: A Philosophical Illusion."

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to the unity of impression produced by this collection; or to the persuasiveness which the clarity of style and abundance of apt illustration imparts to the work. The last three chapters, in particular, ought to be well pondered by all non-Bergsonians. There may well be explanations less favourable to the main thesis of the whole work, of the fact that intellectual effort implies not only images and their manipulation, but also an idea ("scheme") of a different kind. An admission that in intellectual work we are aware not only of particular images but also of a structure of universals embodied in them would fit the facts and have quite other philosophical consequences. Nevertheless the many suggestive lines of thought here presented both deserve, and would repay, careful consideration.

A. E. HEATH.

PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. By E. S. Hartland. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. vi, 180. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Hartland gives in this readable and convenient form a restatement of the facts and arguments leading to the conclusion that the earliest ascertainable method of deriving kinship is through the woman only, and that patrilineal reckoning is a later development. The matriarchal theory had hardly been seriously considered up to the seventh decade of the nineteenth century, when Bachhofen and McLennan broke new ground with *Das Mutterrecht* and *Primitive Marriage*. The theory was elaborated by Professor Giraud-Teulon in 1884 and corroborated by Professor Robertson Smith in the following year. At the close of the nineteenth century the work of Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen among certain primitive tribes in the centre of Australia and then a more extensive examination of the aborigines of North America gave an impetus to the attack on the universal priority of maternal kinship. Mr. Hartland exhibits and summarises the evidence for matrilineal kinship in different parts of the world, and concludes that wherever in the Eastern hemisphere there exists a concurrence of matrilineal and non-matrilineal features in the same society, the matrilineal features are always the more archaic, which raises a strong presumption that this is also true of the Western.

THE CASE OF KOREA. By Henry Chung. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1921. Pp. 365.

Two things impress one in reading this volume. One is the thoroughgoing analysis of the situation in the Hermit Kingdom. The author's treatment includes the earlier diplomatic relations and the later and more

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recent movements to restore independence, together with the dominant part played by Japan in the "political and judicial oppression," "economic exploitation," "intellectual strangulation," "imposition of social evils," and "persecution of the church." The second feature of the book is the objective character of the evidence. Very few of the descriptions are given in an opinionated manner; practically all are drawn from Japanese or foreign sources, and formulated in practical, even legal, phrasecology. The currency of this work in America will require not only explanations, but perhaps even overt acts indicative of the good faith of the nation which Mr. Chung so masterfully indicts.

C. F. T.

THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY. By R. H. Tawney. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 242. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

This small book is a forcible, and we might almost say a religious, plea for other motives and other principles in society. The day of the acquisitive society is over, and the day for a functional society seems to Mr. Tawney, at hand— a society in which industry and property and economic activity will be treated as functions, to be tested, at every point by their relation to a social purpose. And every function should be directed to a certain purpose, it must be "an activity which embodies and expresses the idea of social purpose."

The application of the idea of function would eliminate the surpluses which are the subject of contention to-day and would make it evident that remuneration should be based upon service, not upon chance, or privilege, or the power to use opportunities to drive a hard bargain. To the cry of increased production the answer is "Produce what?" Food, clothing, house-room, art, knowledge—or some of the superfluities which "should not have been produced until other articles had been produced in sufficient abundance or should not have been produced at all?"

The true cause of industrial strife is that if men recognise no law superior to their desires, they must fight when their desires collide. The problem is a psychological one. But experiments such as that of the Manchester Building Guild, organised not for profits but for the discharge of professional duties, have demonstrated the existence of the self-discipline of responsibility and professional pride, under conditions in which the committee is governed by representatives of the building trade unions, together with administrators and technicians, thus including craftsmen and professional elements in a single organisation. The standard of zeal, efficiency, and *esprit de corps* shown in contracts undertaken by such guilds are said to be strikingly above what is normal in the industry.

F. B.

THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY. By James H. Leuba. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. Pp. xxviii, 333. Price, $2.50.

A reprint of the book published under the same title in 1916, the content remaining practically unchanged. The heart of the book consists in the statistics given in Part II, showing that the belief in God and immortality is not prevalent among men of learning. The first publication of these figures, we learn in the preface, resulted in uncritical acceptance or unsupported denials, and were used as goads to conversion by orthodox prelates; most secular agents were silent as to the meaning of the figures. The author regards this as an indication of the degree of intellectual freedom we have attained, and hopes by this republication to dispel the clouds of

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ignorance hovering over us. The bulk of the book, however, is given over to an interpretation of these statistics, for which only a few are qualified intellectually; and of these few—the figures themselves show—only a small portion regarding the matter as of paramount interest.

C. F. T.

THE NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE. By Andrew A. Bruce. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 284. Price, $3.00.

The "Revolution of 1906" was directed against the "outside" domination exercised over Minnesota and the Dakotas by various railroad, elevator, insurance, and banking interests centered in the "throne-room" at St. Paul. Certain factors ordinarily regarded as potent, but which were not, according to the author, pertinent to this situation, are: tenantry, poverty, illiteracy, urban congestion, and industrial difficulties. Not only had there been a growing objection among the farmers to excessive rates and the manipulation of prices and grading, but there was also felt to be too little manufacturing and diversification of crops, whereby the fertility of the soil was rapidly becoming exhausted.

A reversion from this reform movement to standpat methods brought, in 1915, the more extreme "Non-Partisan League." Its leaders are or were mainly Socialists, whose guiding purpose is the acquisition of power rather than wealth. This is effected through a machine which operates very much like those of the forces with which it had to contend. Most of the resulting legislation is regarded by the author as "unobjectionable," although the details he gives would warrant a more positive description. The movement is shown to be essentially agrarian, and cannot therefore maintain for long its attempted liaison with industrial labor.

The book is severely and adversely critical of the "N-P-L," the author presenting his case as an advocate rather than as a judge, though his opinion is that "there has been too much calling of names"; "the question is purely a business question. It is one of expediency rather than of law or right." Evidently an unfair situation called forth an extreme mode of treatment. Out of it all has come a respect for and appreciation of the farmer's co-operative movement as an effective and desirable means of correcting many flagrant abuses.

C. F. T.

READINGS IN EVOLUTION, GENETICS AND EUGENICS. By Horatio Hackett Newman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921. Pp. xviii, 523. Price, $3.75, postage extra.

The book consists largely of excerpts, some long and some short, from both the older classical evolutionary writers and the modern writers. Professor Newman has himself written many introductory statements, connecting passages, criticisms and summaries, in order to make a unified presentation. Of particular interest to ethical students are Part IV, Genetics, in which the most recent facts and theories of Mendelian doctrine are critically presented, and Part V, Eugenics, in which the bearing of present knowledge upon social problems is considered. The book has brought together into a single volume authoritative discussions which would otherwise have to be sought for through many publications.

J. H. T.

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THE TREND OF THE RACE. A STUDY OF PRESENT TENDENCIES IN THE BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZED MANKIND. By Samuel J. Holmes, Ph.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1921. Pp. 396. Price, $4.00 net.

The present volume is the outgrowth of a course of lectures on Eugenics which has been given for several years in the University of California. Its aim is to present an account of the various forces which are at present modifying the inherited qualities of civilized mankind. Some of the leading topics are: Heredity in relation to mental defects, disease, crime, mental ability; the birth rate, selective influence of war, sexual selection, alleged influence of order of birth and age of parents upon offspring, racial influence of industrial development. The treatment is critical and carefully selected bibliographies at the close of each chapter enable the reader to look further. A valuable book.

J. H. T.

PROSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES. VOLUME 1—PRIOR TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WORLD WAR. By Howard B. Woolston, Ph.D. New York: Century Co., 1921. Pp. xiii, 360. Price, $2.50.

This is the first volume of two, published under the auspices of the Bureau of Social Hygiene, which together will cover the subject from the earliest times in the American colonies to the present. The second volume will be published later. The historical chapter is very brief. The larger part of the book describes the chief aspects of prostitution: the prostitute herself, the segregated district, resorts, venereal disease, courts, reformatory agencies, constructive social forces. It does not present much that is new to those who are familiar with Kneeland's volume on New York and the Report of the Vice Commission of Chicago, except in the way of more recent data and a broader area of observation, but it is useful in this respect. The second volume ought to be still more significant.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AID-TO-MOTHERS LAW IN ILLINOIS. By Edith Abbott and Sophonisba P. Breckinridge. Legal Series No. 7. Children's Bureau Publication No. 82, U. S. Department of Labor. Washington: Government Office, 1921. Pp. 176.

The chief conclusion drawn by the authors from their careful study of the working of the Aid-To-Mothers Law is that all social legislation that is left to 102 different local authorities without any supervision and without any help from the state must fail. The Mothers' Pension Law can only be administered by good social workers. Many rural counties can neither secure these nor pay them. State aid is the only solution for the poorer and more backward counties.

NEW HOMES FOR OLD. By Sophonisba P. Breckinridge. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1921. Pp. xii, 356. Price, $2.50 net.

This volume is one of the series of Americanization Studies under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation. The introduction states that for the final drafting of a considerable portion of the study the members of the editorial staff organized by the Corporation are responsible. The investigation follows the immigrants into their homes and studies their family relationships, their housekeeping, their problems of saving and spending and of

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care of children, and gives an account of the immigrant organisations and of the various agencies which have been organised or developed to enable the immigrant to adjust himself to American life. An appendix gives typical menus in immigrant families. The book is valuable not only for its information, but for its interpretation of practices and attitudes which are often little understood.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921. Pp. xxi, 1040. Price, $4.50, postage extra.

Chiefly a volume of selections which, however, are grouped and accompanied by introductions, summaries, and statements of problems, so that the authors regard it as a systematic treatise. Selective bibliographies are given at the close of each part. Some of the more important topics are: Human Nature, Society and the Group, Isolation, Social Contacts, Interaction and Forces, Competition, Conflict, Accommodation, Control, Collective Behavior, Progress. The materials gathered from a wide range of sources and representing varying and often contrary or divergent points of view, and the Topics and Questions supplied with each chapter afford the basis for stimulating class discussion.

WOMEN PROFESSIONAL WORKERS. By Elizabeth Kemper Adams, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921. Pp. xiv, 467.

This book marks the rapid progress in the extension of the professional fields open to women. It is designed for young women trying to select their occupations, for those who advise them, and for those who are interested broadly in social conditions. Of especial interest to those concerned with the newer occupations of public service are chapters on Community, Civic, and Social Services; but the whole book is of great value, and is likely to prove a best seller among college women.

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE FROM THE REFORMATION TO THE PRESENT DAY. By Ferdinand Schevill, Ph.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1921. Pp. xiv, 663.

This is a new edition of a standard work, with additional chapters bringing the record of events down through the Great War, and the subsequent peace.

THE NEW WORLD. PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Isaiah Bowman, Ph.D. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Co., 1921. Pp. vii, 632.

This book by the Director of the American Geographical Society, illustrated with numerous maps and engravings, is designed to afford some of the necessary information for an understanding of the new world that has come about, or at least has come into the ken of Americans, since the war. It opens up what is largely an unknown world to those whose only knowledge of geography has been derived from the older sources or from the fugitive publications of the war, and is an example of the new type of studies which America must make if it is to face intelligently its responsibilities.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

VOL. XXXII APRIL, 1922 NO. 3

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Published for the Editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager

London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1922

WHY CHINA HAS NO SCIENCE —AN INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORY AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.[1]

YU-LAN FUNG.

In one of his articles published last year in the *New Republic*, Professor Dewey, said:

"It may be questioned whether the most enlightening thing he [the visitor] can do for others who are interested in China is not to share with them his discovery that China can be known only in terms of itself, and older European history. Yet one must repeat that China is changing rapidly; and that it is as foolish to go on thinking of it in terms of old dynastic China as it is to interpret it by pigeon-holing its facts in Western conceptions. China *is* another world politically and economically speaking, a large and persistent world, and a world bound no one knows just where."[2]

It is truly a discovery. If we compare Chinese history with the history of Europe of a few centuries ago, say before the Renaissance, we find that, although they are of different kinds, they are nevertheless on the same level. But now China is still old while the western countries are already new. What keeps China back? It is a natural question.

What keeps China back is that she has no science. The effect of this fact is not only plain in the material side, but

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[1] In publishing this paper I take the opportunity to thank many members of the faculty of the Philosophy Department of Columbia University for encouragement and help. By science I mean the systematic knowledge of natural phenomena and of the relations between them. Thus it is the short term for Natural Science.

[2] *The New Republic*, Vol. XXV, 1920, New York, p. 188.

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also in the spiritual side, of the present condition of Chinese life. China produced her philosophy at the same time with, or a little before, the height of Athenian culture. Why did she not produce science at the same time with, or even before, the beginning of modern Europe? This paper is an attempt to answer this question in terms of China herself.

It is beyond question that geography, climate, and economic conditions are very important factors in making history, but we must bear in mind that they are conditions that make history possible, not that make history actual. They are the indispensable settings of a drama, but not its cause. The cause that makes history actual is the will to live and the desire for happiness. But what is happiness? People are far from agreeing in their answers to this question. It is due to this fact that we have many different systems of philosophy, many different standards of value, and consequently many different types of history. At the end of this paper I shall venture to draw the conclusion that China has no science, because according to her own standard of value she does not need any. But before we come to this conclusion, we have first to see what the older Chinese standard of value is. In doing so a general survey of the history of Chinese philosophy is indispensable.

I

At the end of the Chow dynasty, the emperors lost their power to control the feudal princes who began to regard themselves as independent, and the land was subjected to warfare. It was an age of political confusion indeed, but of great intellectual initiative. It was equivalent to the Athenian period of mental vigor in Europe.

Before attacking the different types of Chinese ideals, for the sake of convenience I shall introduce two words which seem to me to indicate respectively two general tendencies of Chinese philosophy: They are "nature" and "art," or, to translate more exactly, "nature" and "human." To illustrate this I cite from Chuang Tse a passage:

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"What is nature? What is human? That ox and horse have four feet is nature; to halter the head of a horse or to pierce the nose of an ox is human."[3]

Thus "nature" means something natural; "human" means something artificial. The one is made by nature, the other by man. At the end of the Chow dynasty there were two tendencies representing these two extremes and a third representing a mean between the two. The one said that nature is perfect in itself and that men are self-sufficient and need no help from outside; the other said that nature is not perfect in itself and that men are not self-sufficient and need something outside in order to be better; the third made a compromise. These three main types of ideal did not appear one after the other, but rather arose simultaneously, and expressed at one time the different aspects of human nature and experience. Now according to the "Book of Han," at the end of the Chow dynasty there were nine branches of thought: Confucianism, Taoism, Moism, the School of Religion, the School of Law, the School of Logic, the School of Diplomacy, the School of Agriculture, and the Miscellaneous School. But among them the most influential at that time were Confucianism, Taoism, and Moism. In almost every book written at the end of the Chow dynasty, we are informed that these three were struggling for existence. To illustrate this I cite from the polemic speeches of Mencius, a great defender of Confucianism at that time:

"Philosopher emperors cease to arise; the princes of the states give reins to their lusts; and the scholars indulge in unrational discussions. The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the world. The discourse of the people has adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo. Yang's doctrine is: each one for himself; then there will be no king. Mo's doctrine is: love all equally; then there will be no father. To have neither king nor father is to be beasts. . . . If the doctrines of Yang and Mo are not stopped and the doctrine of sages not set forth, then the perverse speakings will delude the people, and stop the path of benevolence and righteousness. When benevolence and righteousness are stopped, beasts will be led on to devour

[3] From the chapter entitled "The Autumn Floods." Compare with H. A. Giles' translation in his book, *Chuang Tsu, Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer*. London, 1889, p. 211.

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men and men will themselves devour one another. I am alarmed by these things and address myself to the defence of the doctrines of the former sages, and to oppose Yang and Mo. . . ."[4]

Now Mo Ti was the founder of Moism, and Yang Chu was the disciple of the founder of Taoism, Lao Tse. This passage seems to me to be a vivid picture of the state of war existing between these three powers. They were not only struggling for existence, but each one of them had the ambition to conquer the whole empire.

To illustrate their doctrines a little more in detail I choose Lao Tse (570 B. C.?–480 B. C.?), Yang Chu (440 B. C.?–360 B. C.?), and Chuang Tse (350 B. C.?–275 B. C.?) to represent Taoism; Mo Tse (Mo Ti, 500 B. C.?–425 B. C.?) to represent Moism; and Confucius (551 B.C.–479 B. C.) and Mencius (372 B. C.–289 B. C.) to represent Confucianism. Referring to the three tendencies which I just mentioned, Taoism stands for nature, Moism for art, and Confucianism for the mean. It seems to me that in every aspect of their doctrines, Taoism and Moism were always at the two extremes and Confucianism in the middle. For instance, with regard to their ethical theories, Mencius agrees in arranging them in a scheme as I do. He said:

"The doctrine of the philosopher Yang was: each one for himself. Though he might benefit the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not do it. The doctrine of the philosopher Mo was: to love all equally. If by rubbing smooth his whole body from the crown to the heel, he could benefit the world, he would do it. Tse Mo held a mean between them. By holding it without leaving room for the changeableness of circumstances, he resembled them in maintaining his one point to the exclusion of others."[5]

It goes without saying that to hold the mean while leaving room for the changeableness of circumstances is the only right way of action. It is exactly the teaching of Confucianism. I shall make it clearer a little later.

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[4] James Legge's translation, with some modification. See the *Chinese Classics*, second ed., London, 1895, Vol. II, pp. 282–83.

[5] James Legge's translation, with some modification. See the *Chinese Classics*, Vol. II, pp. 464–465.

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II

The teaching of Taoism can be summarised in one phrase: "returning to nature." The omnipotent Tao gives everything its own nature, in which it finds its own satisfaction. For instance:

"In the northern ocean there is a fish, called the Leviathan, many thousand li [6] in size. This Leviathan changes into a bird, called the Rukh, whose back is many li in breadth. With a mighty effort it rises and its wings obscure the sky like clouds. At the equinox, this bird prepares to start for the southern ocean, the Celestial Lake. And in the 'Record of Marvels' we read that when the Rukh flies southwards, the water is smitten for a space of three thousand li around, while the bird itself mounts upon a typhoon to a height of ninety thousand li for a flight of six months' duration. . . . A cicada laughed, and said to a dove: 'Now when I fly with my might, it is as much as I can do to get from tree to tree. And sometimes I do not reach, but fall to the ground midway. What, then, can be the use of going up ninety thousand li in order to start for the South?'" [7]

This passage is cited from a chapter entitled "The Happy Excursion" from Chuang Tse's work. It shows clearly that both the great Rukh and the small cicada are perfectly satisfied, each with his own excursion. They continue to be so as long as they live in accordance with their nature without imitating artificially each other. So everything is perfect in its natural condition. Art simply disturbs nature and produces pain. For, as Chuang Tse said:

"A duck's legs, though short, cannot be lengthened without pain to the duck, and a crane's legs, though long, cannot be shortened without misery to the crane, so that which is long in nature cannot be cut off, nor that which is short be lengthened. All sorrows are thus avoided." [8]

Yang Chu's egoism, therefore, is not selfish in the ordinary sense of that word. He was simply teaching that every man should live as his nature wishes to live; but he need not impose upon others what he thinks to be good. So he said:

"If the ancient by injuring a single hair could have rendered a service to the world, he would not have done it; and had the world been offered to a

[6] The "li" is about one-third of an English mile.

[7] H. A. Giles' translation. See his *Chuang Tsu*, etc., pp. 1–2.

[8] From the chapter entitled "The Joined Toes." See Giles' *Chuang Tsu*, etc., p. 101.

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single person, he would not have accepted it. If nobody would damage even a hair, and nobody would have the world for profit, the world would be in a perfect state."[9]

Another passage from Chuang Tse:

" 'Tell me,' said Lao Tse, 'in what consist charity and duty to one's neighbor?' 'They consist,' answered Confucius, 'in a capacity for rejoicing in all things; in universal love, without the element of self. These are the characteristics of charity and duty to one's neighbor.' 'What stuff!' cried Lao Tse, 'does not universal love contradict itself? Is not your elimination of self a positive manifestation of self? There is the universe, its regularity is unceasing; there are the sun and the moon, their brightness is unceasing; there are the stars, their groupings never change; there are birds and beasts, they flock together without varying; there trees and shrubs, they grow upwards without exception. Be like these; follow Tao; and you will be perfect. Why, then, these struggles for charity and duty to one's neighbor, as though beating a drum in search of a fugitive? Alas! sir, you have brought much confusion into the mind of man.' "[10]

Thus the Taoists see only the good aspects of what is called the state of nature. Every kind of human virtue and social regulation is to them against nature. As Lao Tse said:

"Cast off your holiness, rid yourself of sagacity, and the people will benefit a hundredfold. Discard benevolence and abolish righteousness, and the people will return to filial piety and paternal love. Renounce your scheming and abandon gain, and the thieves and robbers will disappear. These three precepts mean that outward show is insufficient, and therefore they bid us be true to our proper nature: to show simplicity, to embrace plain dealing, to reduce selfishness, to moderate desire."[11]

The government, if the Taoists need any, must be extreme *laissez-faire*.

"As restrictions and prohibitions are multiplied in the country, the people grow poorer and poorer. When the people are subjected to overmuch government, the land is thrown into confusion. When people are skilled in many cunning arts, strange are the objects of luxury that appear. The greater the number of laws and enactments, the more thieves and robbers there will be."[12]

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[9] From the chapter, "Yang Chu," in the work of Lieh Tse.

[10] From the chapter entitled "The Way of Nature." See Giles' *Chuang Tsu* etc., p. 167.

[11] Lionel Giles: *The Sayings of Lao Tsu*, p. 44.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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Government should imitate nature:

"The Tao in its regular course does nothing and so there is nothing which it does not do."[13]

This is because Tao lets everything work for itself in its own way:

"Therefore the sage said: 'So long as I do nothing, the people will work out their own reformation. So long as I love calm, the people will be right themselves. So long as I am free from meddling, the people will grow rich. So long as I am free from desire, the people will come naturally back to simplicity.'"[14]

So what man ought to do is to accord with his nature and be content with his destiny. To illustrate this passive nature of Taoism I cite from Chuang Tse:

"Tse Lai fell ill. . . . Tse Li went to see him. Leaning against the door, he asked the dying man: 'Great indeed is the Creator! What will he now make you to become? Where will he take you to? Will he make you the liver of a rat? or an arm of an insect?' Tse Lai answered: 'Where a parent tells a son to go, East, West, South, or North, he simply follows the command. The Yin and Yang (the two forces of nature) are more to a man than his parents are. If they hasten my death and I do not quietly submit to them, I shall be obstinate and rebellious, but they are not mistaken. The great mass of nature makes me to be moved with the body, to be busy with life, to be at ease with old age, and to be at rest with death. Therefore what has made my life a good makes also my death a good.'"[15]

Knowledge is of no use and can do only harm:

"Our life is limited, but knowledge is not limited. With what is limited to pursue what is not limited is a perilous thing."[16]

What we need and ought to know and to get is the Tao, but it is in us. It is like the God of the pantheistic philosophy. So what we ought to do is to know and to control ourselves:

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[13] James Legge: *The Texts of Taoism* (in the *Sacred Books of the East* series). London, 1891, Pt. I, p. 70.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[15] From the chapter on "The Great Master," Giles' James Legge's *Texts of Taoism*, Pt. I, p. 249.

[16] From the chapter on "Nourishing the Essence of Life." *Ibid.*, p. 198.

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"He who knows others is clever, but he who knows himself is enlightened. He who overcomes others is strong, but he who overcomes himself is mightier still."[17]

Besides, we have to use an altogether different method to know and to get the Tao. Lao Tse said:

"He who devotes himself to knowledge seeks from day to day to increase. He who devotes himself to Tao seeks from day to day to diminish. He diminishes and again diminishes till he arrives at doing nothing. Having arrived at the point of doing nothing, there is nothing which he does not do."[18]

As Tao is already in us, it can be known not by adding something artificially to it, but by taking away what has been artificially added to it before. That is what Lao Tse meant by "diminish." So the arguments of those who were simply interested in intellectual exercise were to the Taoists of little value. Thus in Chuang Tse's book one passage reads:

"To wear out one's intellect in trying to argue without knowing the fact that the arguments are the same is called 'three in the morning.' 'What is three in the morning?' asked Tse Yu. 'A keeper of monkeys,' replied Tse Chi, 'said once to his monkeys with regard to their chestnuts, that each was to have three in the morning and four in the night. But to this the monkeys were very angry, so the keeper said that they might have four in the morning and three in the night, with which arrangement they were all well pleased.' "[19]

Thus Taoism stood for nature as against art.

III

The fundamental idea of Moism is utility. The sanction of virtue is not that it is natural, but that it is useful. In the book bearing Mo Tse's name one passage reads:

"Righteousness is what is beneficial to us. Benefit is that which we are glad to have."[20]

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[17] Lionel Giles: *The Sayings of Lao Tsu*, p. 44.

[18] James Legge: *The Texts of Taoism*, Pt. I, p. 90.

[19] From the chapter on "The Identity of Contraries," H. A. Giles: *Chuang Tsu*, etc., p. 20.

[20] From the first of the two chapters on "Definitions."

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Thus Mo Tse's position in ethics was essentially that of utilitarianism. He was also a pragmatist and an empiricist. He said:

"For argument there must be a standard. If we argue without a standard, it is just like fixing morning and night on a moving circle: we cannot know clearly whether it is right or wrong, useful or harmful. For testing an argument there are three standards. What are these three standards? They are: to trace it, to examine it, and to use it. Where trace it? Trace it in the authority of the ancient philosopher kings. Where examine it? Examine it in the facts which the common people see and hear. Where use it? Put it into practice and see whether it is useful for the benefit of the country and the people. These are the three standards for argument."[21]

Among these three standards, the third seems to be the most important. So Mo Tse taught the doctrine of universal love, because it seemed to him to be the most "useful for the benefit of the country and the people." To let him speak for himself, I select from the chapters entitled "Universal Love":

"The business of the benevolent man must be to strive to promote what is advantageous to the world and to take away what is injurious to it. At the present time, what are to be accounted the most injurious things to the world? They are such as the attacking of small states by the great ones; the inroad on small families by the great ones; the plunder of the weak by the strong; the oppression of the few by the many. . . . Let us ask whence all these injurious things arise. Is it from loving others or advantaging others? It must be replied 'No'; and it must likewise be said 'They arise clearly from hating others and doing violence to others.' Do those who hate and do violence to others hold the principle of loving all, or that of making distinctions between man and man? It must be replied, 'They make distinctions.' So then it is the principle of making distinctions between man and man, which gives rise to all that is most injurious to the world. On this account we conclude that that principle is wrong. . . . There is a principle of loving all which is able to change that which makes distinctions. . . . If the princes were as much for the state of others as for their own, which one among them would raise the forces of his state to attack that of another? He is for that as much as for his own. . . . So then it is the principle of universal, mutual love, which gives rise to all that is most beneficial to the world. On this account we

[21] From the first of the three chapters on the "Absurdity of Predestination."

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conclude that that principle is right. . . . Others may say, 'It is good, but it is extremely hard to be carried into practice.' But how can it be good, and yet incapable of being put into practice? . . . I apprehend there is no one under heaven, man or woman, however stupid, though he condemn the principle of universal love, but would at such a time (the most dangerous time), make one who held it the subject of his trust. . . . I apprehend there is no one under heaven, however stupid, man or woman, though he condemn the principle of universal love, but would at such a time (the most dangerous time), prefer to be under the sovereign who holds it."[22]

This shows that the doctrine of universal love is not only advantageous to others, but to those as well who act according to this principle. In the book that bears Mo Tse's name three chapters are devoted to describing the disadvantages of war. War is not only injurious to the conquered, but to the conqueror as well. Even occasionally some of the states may make profit at the expense of others, it still cannot be justified. He compared this to medicine. There is medicine; if ten thousand people use it and only four or five are benefited, it is surely not a good medicine. Mo Tse stood for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

He also, unlike the Taoist, knew the imperfection of human nature. Mankind is too shortsighted to see its own interests. Men cannot be convinced that loving others is advantageous to themselves and selfishness can do only harm. So, Mo Tse, again unlike the Taoist, saw the need of authorities to regulate human action. He taught that there is a personal God. Men should love each other, not only because so doing is advantageous, but also because it is the will of God. Even belief in the existence of spirits and ghosts as the invisible watchers over men's conduct is upheld as a valuable aid in maintaining morality.

The function and authority of the state are likewise emphasized by Mo Tse as aids to a right life:

[22] Up to the present time there is no English translation of the book bearing Mo Tse's name. But these three chapters on universal love were translated by James Legge in the introduction to the work of Mencius. See the *Chinese Classics*, Vol. II, pp. 108-111.

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"In ancient times, when mankind just began to enter the world and had no political association, every one had his own righteousness. If there was one man, there was one righteousness; if two, two righteousnesses; if ten, ten righteousnesses; the more men, the more righteousnesses. Every one considered his own righteousness as right and others' as wrong. Therefore, people were against each other. . . . The world was in disorder and people were like birds and beasts. They knew that the reason that the world was in disorder was that there was no right leader; therefore, they elected a wise and able man to be their emperor. . . . Then the emperor ordered the people, saying: 'If you hear what is good and what is not good, tell all of them to your superior. What your superior considers as right, all of you must consider as right; what your superior considers as wrong, all of you must consider as wrong.'" [23]

This is altogether different from the Taoistic conception of the state. Besides this, Mo Tse also emphasised the importance of education. In the book that bears his name, one chapter is entitled: "What is Dyed," in which one passage reads:

"Master Mo Tse saw one dyeing silk. He sighed and said: 'Dyed in blue, the silk becomes blue; dyed in yellow, the silk becomes yellow. What it enters changes; it changes its color accordingly. By entering five times, it is turned into five colors. Therefore it is necessary to take care of the dyeing.'" [24]

Following this he cited a long list of facts to show how some men became good by associating with good men, and others bad by associating with bad men. Human nature seems to him to be a *tabula rasa* and its color depends entirely on how one dyes it. This again is very different from the Taoistic conception of human nature.

In contrast with Taoism Mo Tse denied predestination. Reward and punishment either by God or by the state are the results of men's voluntary action. If the will is not free, men will not be responsible for their bad doing, and will not be encouraged to do good. They will think, as Mo Tse said:

"He who is punished is predestined to be punished but not because he is bad. He who is rewarded is predestined to be rewarded but not because

[23] From the first of the three chapters on "The Preference of Uniformity."
[24] From the chapter on "What is Dyed."

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he is good. Therefore if they become princes, they will not be righteous; if they become ministers, they will not be loyal. . . . "[25]

Thus Mo Tse worked out many devices for making people good. His ideal is to have the greatest number of population, with the necessary external goods, living together peacefully and loving each other. Mo Tse said:

"When a philosopher governs a country, the wealth of that country can be doubled; when he governs the world, the wealth of the world can be doubled. It is doubled not at the expense of others, but by utilizing the country and by cutting off useless expenditures. . . . What is it that is not easy to be doubled? It is the population only that is not easy to be doubled. But there is a way to double it. The ancient philosopher kings had a law saying: 'When the boy is twenty years old, he must have a home; when the girl is fifteen years old, she must have her man. . . .'"[26]

This is Mo Tse's ideal of progress. Progress is possible not by struggle and competition, but by universal love and mutual help. To this I must add that the ideal of Mo Tse is not a Platonic one. Mo Tse was too realistic to be content to put his pattern in heaven. He was ready to fight against anything that seemed to him to be incompatible with the increase of wealth and population. He taught economy of expenditure because, as he said:

"Philosopher kings do not do those things which increase the expenditure but not the profit of the people."[27]

He was also against music and fine art, because they have nothing to do with the fact that:

"People have three troubles: those who are hungry but have no food; those who are cold but have no clothes; and those who are tired but cannot rest."[28]

He was also against the Confucianist teaching of the luxurious way of burying the dead and the three years' mourning on occasion of the death of parents. Because people ought not spend their time, energy, and wealth in this way; in doing so,

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[25] From the first of the three chapters on "The Absurdity of Predestination."
[26] From the first of the three chapters on "The Economy of Expenditure."
[27] *Ibid.*, second chapter.
[28] From the chapter on "Against Music."

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"The country must become poor; the population must become small; and politics must become corrupted." [29]

These steps probably represent the decisive attitude of Moism to oppose nature. Indeed if one sees things wholly from the point of view of intellect, music and fine art are really of no use at all. If we know that death is a natural process, what is the use of mourning? Suen Tse said:

"Mo Tse was blinded by utility, and did not know refinement." [30]

This criticism is quite justified.

Anyway, Mo Tse was certainly a philosopher who taught men to find happiness in the external world. He did not think, as the Taoists did, that men are most happy in the state of nature, and that what men need and should do is to return to nature, instead of turning away from it. He knew, in contrast with Taoists, that men in nature are imperfect, foolish, and weak; that, in order to be perfect, strong, and wise, they need the help of the state, of virtue, and of a personified God. So in his philosophy there was a strong sense of progress and of the future. In the book bearing his name one passage reads:

"Pung Ching Shin Tse said: 'The past can be known, but not the future.' Mo Tse said: 'Suppose that your parents are at a place one hundred li from here, and meet some trouble: they ask you to go to them within one day; if you can do so, they will be alive; if not they will die. Now there is a good car with a good horse, and a bad horse with a car with square wheels. I ask you to choose between them. Which one will you take?' 'I take the good car with the good horse in order that I may be able to arrive earlier' was the answer. Mo Tse said: 'Then why do you say that you cannot know the future?' " [31]

This is indeed a good illustration of utilizing the past to control the future. The spirit is scientific. In the book bearing Mo Tse's name there were several chapters devoted to what we now call logic or definitions. They

[29] From the chapter on "The Economy of Burying."

[30] From the chapter on "The Elimination of Blindness" in the work of Suen Tse.

[31] From the chapter "Lu Wen."

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must be the product of Mo Tse's followers, if not of the master himself. They contain many definitions which are sometimes interesting and scientific. For instance:

"Space is that that covers different places. Duration is that that covers different times. Cause is that after getting which a thing can be. Circle is that one middle has the same length to all sides. Energy is that by which a form arises." [32]

There are many others like these, which seem to be germs of science. Indeed Mo Tse was famous also for making machines to defend the city-wall, to which several chapters in the book bearing his name are devoted.

This is all I wish to say to support my statement that Moism stood for art as over against nature. Now let us turn to the third system, Confucianism.

IV

Confucianism, as I said before, is a mean between the two extreme standpoints of nature and art. But at the time immediately after Confucius, there were two types of Confucianism. The one, represented by Mencius, stood nearer to the extreme of nature; the other, represented by Suen Tse, stood nearer to that of art. The teaching of Confucius himself was nearer to the extreme of nature. So afterwards Mencius was and is considered as the true and legal heir of Confucianism. Here I follow tradition in choosing Confucius and Mencius to represent Confucianism, but shall discuss Suen Tse in another place and shall consider him as another philosopher in Chinese history who attempted to develop the art line of Chinese thought.

Confucius, as Mencius said, was a "sage of time."

"When it was proper to go away quickly, he did so; when it was proper to delay, he did so; when it was proper to keep retirement, he did so; when it was proper to go into office, he did so:—this was Confucius." [33]

So Confucius emphasized discrimination of situations. It is not a first question whether I should love a person in

[32] All are selected from the first of the two chapters on "Definitions."

[33] James Legge: *Chinese Classics*, Vol. II, p. 371.

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such and such a way or not; the first question is who that person is. Mencius said:

"In regard to the inferior creatures, the superior man is kind to them, but not loving. In regard to people generally, he is friendly to them, but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his relatives, and friendly to people generally. He is friendly to people generally, and kind to creatures." [34]

He said again in another place:

"Here is a man, and a stranger bends his bow to shoot him. I will advise him not to do so, but speaking calmly and smilingly, for no other reason but that he is not related to me. But if my brother be bending his bow to shoot the man, I will advise him not to do so, weeping and crying the while, for no other reason but that he is related to me." [35]

Thus was developed the doctrine of loving with a difference of degree, as over against that of universal love on the one hand and that of each for himself on the other. We ought to love with difference of degree, because it is human nature. Thus one passage in the work of Mencius reads:

"E Tse said: 'According to the principle of the learned, we find that the ancients acted towards the people as if they were watching over an infant. What does this expression mean? To me it seems that we are to love all without difference of degree; but in practice we begin with our parents.' Seu Tse reported this to Mencius. Mencius said: 'Does E Tse really think that a man's affection for the child of his brother is merely like his affection for that of his neighbor? . . . Heaven gives birth to creatures in such a way that they have one root, and E Tse makes them to have two roots." [36]

Human nature, according to the teaching of Confucianism, is essentially good. This seems to have been a tradition even before the time of Confucius. Because human nature is originally good, so the sanction of virtue is its being admirable and desirable. Thus Mencius said:

"Men's mouths agree in having the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying the same sound; their eyes agree in recognizing the same beauty; shall their minds alone be without that which they similarly approve? It is, I say, reason and righteousness. The sages only apprehended before

[34] James Legge: *Chinese Classics*, Vol. II, p. 476.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 427.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 258–259.

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us what our mind also approves. Therefore reason and righteousness are agreeable to our mind, just as good food is agreeable to our mouth." [37]

In another place he said:

"What is desirable is what is called good." [38]

But, although human nature is originally good, it is not to be inferred that men are born perfect. They cannot be perfect until their innate reason is completely developed, and their lower desires are wholly taken away. Thus Mencius said:

"The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of benevolence; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of modesty and complaisance is the beginning of propriety; the feeling of approving and disapproving is the beginning of wisdom. . . . Since all men have these four feelings in themselves, let them know how to give them their development and their completion, and the issue will be like that of fire which has begun to burn, or that of a spring which has begun to find vent. If they have their complete development, they will suffice to love and to protect all within the four seas. If they be denied their development, they will not suffice for a man to serve his parents." [39]

And to develop reason on the one hand is to diminish the lower desires on the other:

"To nourish the mind there is nothing better than to make the desires few." [40]

So in order to develop men's natural faculties, they need some positive organization. The simple Taoistic way of returning to nature is not sufficient here. Therefore the state is indispensable:

"In the Book of History it is said: 'Heaven having produced the people in the lower earth, appointed for them rulers and teachers.' " [41]

But teachers and rulers are not to be separated. Most of the Chinese political ideals are the same as Plato's. King must be philosopher; philosopher must be king. This is

[37] James Legge: *Chinese Classics*, Vol. II, pp. 406–407.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 490.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 203–204.
[40] *Ibid.* p. 497.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

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especially emphasized in the Confucianist's conception of the state. The chief duty of the state is first to maintain a certain amount of wealth to enable people to live, and then to teach them. Thus one passage in the Confucian Analects reads:

"When the Master went to the state of Wei, Yen Yew acted as the driver of his carriage. The Master observed: 'How numerous are the people!' Yew said: 'Since they are thus numerous, what shall be done for them?' 'Enrich them,' was the answer. 'And when they have been enriched, what more shall be done?' The Master said: 'Teach them.'" [42]

Moreover in a state, teaching is more important than enriching. In the Confucian Analects another passage reads:

"The Duke King of Tse asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied: 'The prince is prince, the minister is minister, the father is father, and the son is son.' 'Good,' said the duke, 'If, indeed, the prince be not prince, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the son not son, although there is food, can we enjoy it?'" [43]

As for the individual, external things are determined by destiny. Therefore in the Confucian Analects we read:

"Death and life have their determined appointment; riches and honors depend on Heaven." [44]

And Mencius said:

"When we get by our seeking and lose by our neglecting; in this case seeking is of use to getting, and the thing sought for is something which is in ourselves. When our seeking is conducted properly, but the getting is only as destiny determines, in this case our seeking is of no use to getting, and the thing sought for is that which is without us." [45]

Therefore, what man should do is to seek what is in himself. The fact that he is not able to control what is outside him does not make him imperfect; he is given by Heaven the godly reason within him, in which he can find truth and be happy. So Mencius:

"He who has exhausted all his mind, knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven. To preserve one's mind and nourish one's

[42] James Legge: *Chinese Classics*, Vol. I, pp. 266–267.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 256.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[45] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 450.

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nature, is the way to serve Heaven. When neither a premature death nor a long life makes any difference, but he waits in the cultivation of his character for whatever comes; this is the way in which he establishes his Heaven-ordained being."[46]

In another place he said:

"All things are already in us. Turn our attention to ourselves and find there this truth; there is no greater delight than that."[47]

In this point Confucianism is much nearer Taoism than Moism. Happiness and truth are in our mind. It is in our own mind, not in the external world, that we can seek for happiness and truth. We are self-sufficient, if only we develop our innate power. To learn is to cultivate our character according to our rational nature, not to make intellectual exercise or simply to remember mechanically what the books said.

We have now completed our general survey of the three original types of Chinese ideals. We have seen that in the theory of existence, the power that governs the universe, to Taoism is the omnipotent Tao or Nature, to Moism is a personified God, and to Confucianism is the Heavenly Reason. In the theory of the state, Taoism needed a "laissez faire" government, if any; Moism needed the state to regulate the different individual opinions, and Confucianism needed it to develop men's moral faculties. In the theory of life, Taoism said that human nature is perfect in itself and that every one should only live in accordance with one's own nature; Moism said that human nature is not perfect in itself, and that one should love all equally in order to make possible the prosperity of all; Confucianism said that although human nature is good, one needs efforts to "develop," to "nourish," and to "complete" it, and that although one should love others, the difference of natural relation should be considered. In the theory of education, Taoism taught a return to nature, Moism taught control of the environment, and Confucianism taught the way of

[46] James Legge: *Chinese Classics*, Vol. I, pp. 448–449, with some modification.
[47] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 450–451.

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self-realization. These seem to me to have justified my statement that in the history of Chinese thought Taoism stood for nature, Moism for art and Confucianism for the mean. We have seen that they struggled bitterly for existence. The result of that great war was the complete failure of poor Moism, which soon disappeared once for all. The causes of the failure of Moism were unknown; but, I think, the chief cause must have been the defect of the system itself. To illustrate this I cite from Chuang Tse a passage:

"Mo Tse composed the treatise 'Against Music' and the subject of another was called 'Economy in Expenditure.' He would have no singing in life, and no wearing of mourning on the occasion of death. He inculcated universal love and a common participation in all advantages, and condemned fighting. . . . The teaching of such lessons cannot be regarded as a proof of his love for men; his practicing them in his own case would certainly show that he did not love himself. But this has not been sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Mo Tse. Notwithstanding, men will sing, and he condemns singing; men will wail, and he condemns wailing; men will express their joy, and he condemns such expression. Is this truly according to men's nature? Through life toil, and at death niggardliness; causing men sorrow and melancholy and difficult to be carried into practice, I fear it cannot be regarded as the way of sages. Contrary to the minds of men, men will not endure it. Though Mo Tse himself might be able to endure it, how is the aversion of the world to it to be overcome?"[48]

Truly the aversion of the world to Moism had not been overcome, and people turned their back from it after the disappearance of the enthusiastic, great personality of Mo Tse himself.

But, as already noted, there was another man at that time, who, although different from Mo Tse, tried to develop the art line of Chinese ideal. He was Suen Tse (269 B. C.?–239 B. C.?), who considered himself as the true successor of Confucianism. He taught that human nature is absolutely bad and that to make it good is the duty of ruler and teacher. He condemned Chuang Tse as:

"One who was blinded by nature and did not know human."[49]

[48] From the chapter "The World." James Legge: *Texts of Taoism*, Pt. II, pp. 218–219.

[49] From the chapter on "The Elimination of Blindness" in the work of Suen Tse.

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According to his own ideal, he would conquer nature instead of returning to it:

"It is better to treat nature as a thing and regulate it than to consider it very great and always think of it. It is better to control nature and use it than to follow and admire it."[50]

This is nearly the same as the Baconian conception of power. But, unfortunately, his pupils did not develop his thought along this line. They carried out their master's political philosophy and carried it too far. In the third century B. C. Shi Hwang Ti, or the "First Universal Emperor," of the Chin Dynasty, unified again warring states into one, and Li Si, the disciple of Suen Tse, became the Premier. He helped the emperor in every respect to unify the empire and carried the authority of the government to an extreme. Having abolished the existing feudalism and thus absolutely unified the empire politically, he took a step farther to unify the people's thought. He burned books, killed scholars, and ordered the people to come to the state or government professors to learn things. Thus the emperor became an extreme tyrant and the people rebelled. Suen Tse's teaching, together with the Chin Dynasty, disappeared soon and forever.

V

After the Chin Dynasty the "art" motive of Chinese thought almost never reappeared. Soon came Buddhism, which again is a "nature" philosophy of the extreme type. The Chinese mind oscillated among Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism for a long time. It was not until the tenth century A. D. that a new group of men of genius succeeded in combining these three, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, into one, and instilling the new teaching into the Chinese national mind, which has persisted to the present day.

Because this new teaching started in the Sung Dynasty, it is known as the "Learning of Sung." These philosophers

[50] From the chapter on "On Nature" in the work of Suen Tse.

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themselves claimed that their teaching was the genuine Confucianism. But it must be a new Confucianism, if it is Confucianism at all. Most of its representatives were at first believers in Taoism and Buddhism, and afterwards came back to Confucianism. Then they picked from the "Li Ki" as their textbooks two chapters, to which few scholars had paid any attention before that time. Truly it was their merit to call attention to these two chapters, "The Great Learning" and "The Doctrine of Mean and Common," which embodied Confucianism in a very systematic way. I cannot refrain from citing from the "Great Learning" certain passages, which were regarded till very recent time by the Chinese people as the sole aim of life. The passages are:

"The doctrine of the Great Learning is: to enlighten the enlightened virtue, to make people love each other, and to stop at the supreme good. . . . The ancients who wish to enlighten the enlightened virtue in the world first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their own states, they first regulated their own families. Wishing to regulate their own families, they first cultivated their own character. Wishing to cultivate their own characters, they first rectified their minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they first sought to be sincere in their wishes. Wishing to be sincere in their wishes, they first extended their wisdom. Such extension of wisdom lay in the investigation of things."[51]

This in a few words gave an admirable exposition of the Confucianist aim and art of life. The philosophers of Neo-Confucianism picked out these passages and unconsciously read Taoism and Buddhism into them. They differed from the original Confucianism in that they set up what they called the "heavenly reason" as over against "human desire," conceptions which were really suggested by the ideas of "Norm" and "Ignorance" in Buddhism, and were never spoken of very much before this period. According to the genuine Confucianism, as we have seen, although human nature is good, the good is only a germ or a "beginning," to use the term of Mencius, and much effort is needed to "nourish," to "develop," and to "complete"

[51] James Legge: *Chinese Classics*, Vol. I, pp. 356–358, with modification.

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it. Now according to Neo-Confucianism, the heavenly reason, though covered by human desires, is as perfect as ever, and men need only to remove these desires, and the true mind, like a diamond, will shine itself. This is very like what Lao Tse called "to diminish." Yet Neo-Confucianism differed from Taoism and Buddhism radically and attacked them seriously. It held that in order to "diminish" human desire and to recover the heavenly reason, it is not necessary for one to be in a state of complete negation of life. What is necessary is to live according to reason, and it is only *in* life that the reason can be fully realized.

Now these philosophers set out to investigate the "things," of the above quotation, and faced immediately the question: What are these things? This gave rise to two types of Neo-Confucianism. The one said that the "things" are all external things and affairs. It is impossible to investigate all of them at once, and no one carried this interpretation into practice, not even the interpreter, Chu He, himself. The other said that "things" refer to phenomena in our mind. This interpretation was more successfully carried out. There were many subtle and convincing arguments from both sides, and all of them made some great contributions to the theory and what may be called the art of life.

This period of the history of Chinese philosophy was almost perfectly analogous to that of the development of modern science in European history, in that its productions became more and more technical, and had an empirical basis and an applied side. The only, but important, difference was that in Europe the technique developed was for knowing and controlling matter, while in China that developed was for knowing and controlling mind. To the latter technique India has also made a great contribution. But while the Indian technique can be practiced only in the negation of life, the Chinese technique can be practiced only within life. Arts differ according to the difference of ideals.

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But these controversies are not important for the present purpose. What concerns us here is the ideals that direct the Chinese mind, not the methods of realizing them. We may, therefore, say that so far as the ideal or aim is concerned all types of Neo-Confucianism are the same: the ideal is to diminish the human desire in order to recover the heavenly reason, and that is all.

VI

Such is the Chinese idea of good. In the history of mankind Mediæval Europe under Christianity tried to find good and happiness in Heaven, while Greece tried, and Modern Europe is trying to find them on earth. St. Augustine wished to realize his "City of God," Francis Bacon his "Kingdom of Man." But China, ever since the disappearance of the "nature" line of her national thought, has devoted all her spiritual energy to another line, that is, to find good and happiness directly in the human mind. In other words, Mediæval Europe under Christianity tried to know God and prayed for His help; Greece tried, and Modern Europe is trying to know nature and to conquer, to control it; but China tried to know what is within ourselves, and to find there perpetual peace.

What is the use of science? The two fathers of modern European philosophy gave two answers. Descartes said that it is for certainty; Bacon said that it is for power. Let us first follow Descartes and consider science as for certainty. We see at once that if one is dealing with one's own mind, there is at first no need of certainty. Bergson says in *Mind Energy* that Europe discovered the scientific method, because modern European science started from matter. It is from the science of matter that Europe gets the habit of precision, of exactness, of the anxiety for proof, and of distinguishing between what is simply possible and what is certain.

"Therefore science, had it been applied in the first instance to the things of mind, would have probably remained uncertain and vague, however

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far it may have advanced; it would, perhaps, never have distinguished between what is simply plausible and what must be definitely accepted."[52]

So China has not discovered the scientific method, because Chinese thought started from mind, and from one's own mind. Is it necessary for me when I am hungry to prove to myself with roundabout, abstract, scientific method that I am desiring food?

Besides, Chinese philosophers considered philosophy as something most serious. It is not for intellectual information, it is for doing. Chu He, the philosopher of Neo-Confucianism, said that the sages would not tell what virtue was like; they simply asked you to practice it; as they would not tell how sugar was sweet, they simply asked you to taste it. In this sense we may say that Chinese philosophers loved the certainty of perception, not that of conception, and therefore, they would not, and did not translate their concrete vision into the form of science. In one word China has no science, because of all philosophies the Chinese philosophy is the most human and the most practical. While the philosophers of the West are proud of their clear thinking and scientific knowledge, the Chinese philosopher would say with Marcus Aurelius:

"Thanks, too, that in spite of my ardour for philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of a professor, or sit poring over essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculations."[53]

. . . "Nothing is more disheartening than the weary round of spying anything, probing (as Pindar says) 'the depth of the earth,' guessing and prying at the secrets of our neighbors' souls, instead of realising that it is enough to keep solely to the god within, and to serve him with all honesty. . . ."[54]

But, although in comparison with the West China is short of clear thinking, in compensation she has more rational happiness. Bertrand Russell said in the *Nation*

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[52] H. Bergson: *Mind Energy*; Translated by H. W. Carr; New York, 1920, p. 102.

[53] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: To Himself; translated by G. H. Rendall; London, 1910. I, 17, p. 9.

[54] *Ibid.*, II, 13, p. 15.

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(London) that the Chinese people seem to be rational hedonists, differing from Europeans through the fact that they prefer enjoyment to power.[55] It is because of the fact that the Chinese ideal prefers enjoyment to power that China has no need of science, even though science, according to Bacon, is for power. The Chinese philosophers, as I said just now, had no need of scientific certainty, because it was themselves that they wished to know; so in the same way they had no need of the power of science, because it was themselves that they wished to conquer. To them the content of wisdom is not intellectual knowledge and its function is not to increase external goods. To Taoism, external goods seem to be something that can only bring confusion to man's mind. To Confucianism, while they are not so bad as Taoism supposes, they are by no means the essentials of human welfare. Then what is the use of science?

It seems to me that if the Chinese people had followed Mo Tse identifying good with useful, or Suen Tse so as to try to control nature instead of admiring it, it is very likely that China would have produced science at a somewhat early time. Of course this is only a speculation. But this speculation is justified by the fact that in the books of Mo Tse and Suen Tse we do find the germs of science. Unfortunately or fortunately this "art" line of Chinese thought was conquered by its opponents. What is the use of science, if intellectual certainty and the power to conquer the external world are not included in the idea of good?

One question may be raised: Why could Europe turn its attention from heaven to earth, whereas China at the same time could not turn from the internal to the external? To this I answer: No matter whether the people of Europe tried to find good and happiness in heaven or in earth, their philosophies all belong to what I called the line of "art." Before the establishment of Christianity, Stoicism,

[55] Vol. XXVIII (1921), p. 505.

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which seems to me to be the "nature" line of European thought, taught man to serve his god within. But then came Christianity, which taught man to serve his God without. Man was no longer a self-sufficient being, but a sinner. Accordingly the European mind occupied itself in proving the existence of God. Philosophers proved it with the Aristotelian logic and by the study of natural phenomena. Philosophy and science, according to most philosophers of scholasticism, even Roger Bacon, were needed to explain the contents of the Scripture. Modern Europe has continued this spirit of knowing and proving the outside, only changing God for "Nature," creation for mechanism—that is all. There is a continuation of history, but no clear demarcation between mediæval and modern Europe. Both try to know the outside world. They first try to know it, and after getting acquainted with it, they try to conquer it. So they are bound to have science both for certainty and for power. They are bound to have science, because they all suppose that human nature is imperfect in itself. Men are weak, foolish, and helpless. In order to be perfect, strong, and wise, they need something that is to be added artificially. They need knowledge and power. They need society, state, law, and virtue. Besides they need the help of a personified God. But how about what I called the "nature" line of thought? If everything good is already in us for all eternity, what use to search for happiness in the external world? Will that not be like what the Buddhist said about a beggar asking for food with a golden bowl? What is the use of scientific certainty and power?

To speak of things in abstract and general terms is always dangerous. But here I cannot refrain from saying that the West is *extension*, the East is *intension;* and that the West emphasizes what we *have*, the East emphasizes what we *are*. The question as to how to reconcile these two so that humanity may be happy both in body and in mind is at present difficult to answer. Anyway, the Chinese conception of life may be mistaken, but the Chinese

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experience cannot be a failure. If mankind shall afterwards become wiser and wiser, and think that they need peace and happiness in their mind, they may turn their attention to, and gain something from, the Chinese wisdom. If they shall not think so, the mind energy of the Chinese people of four thousand years will yet not have been spent in vain. The failure itself may warn our children to stop searching for something in the barren land of human mind. This is one of China's contributions to mankind.

YU-LAN FUNG.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

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ETHICS AND LOGIC.

NORMAN BOARDMAN

THE loosening of the bonds of moral authority has brought with it a prevalent conception that ethics is a matter of expediency. Idealism has fallen into disrepute to such an extent that the term is synonymous with "dreamism." This is particularly true in the realm of politics. The change from an enthusiastic internationalism to a "safe" nationalism has been marked and complete. If it is a far cry from the France that fought and bled for civilization to the France that spoke in the Washington Conference it is a far cry from the America that sent Woodrow Wilson to Versailles in 1918 to the America that sent him to exile in 1920. Both recognize the ethics of logic apart from the logic of ethics. The ethics of logic makes the practical *ideal;* the logic of ethics makes the ideal *practical.* The one finds right in immediate self-interest; the other projects self into the future to find its right as related to self-interest. We censure France but glorify ourselves! If France were as fortunately situated as are we, she, too, might escape the condemnation of the world. If it is not safe for the United States to abandon its cherished policy of isolation, much less ought it to be safe for France to relinquish its heavy armaments. "Right" is determined by expediency in both instances. We cannot blame France for being unwilling to take a risk which we are unwilling to take ourselves.

The political problems of law and freedom, authority and liberty have their ethical counterparts in the relationship between the practical and the ideal, the conservative and the liberal. Just as freedom may degenerate into licentiousness and authority to tyranny, so may liberalism in its revolt against rigidity of moral standards become so liberal that it ceases to have any standards. There is no right and wrong; neither is there good nor evil. The world becomes neutral regarding these terms. The philosophy that "there

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is nothing fundamental except to be able to see that there is no one thing that is fundamental" without intelligence in its application and a conscience in its interpretation, may rob the world of values and leave it moving, just moving, like Professor Perry's negro, without any place to go, just leaving the place that it was at. (Conscience and intelligence are here used for a purpose to be brought out later in the discussion.) Authority is equally as dangerous. A scoundrel may often hide under the garb of idealism, and absolute standards only become the tools by means of which he accomplishes his mischievous ends. At the close of the war the interests of humanity suffered because of special interests hiding under the guise of patriotism. A reconstruction of the world upon a peace basis might have been possible had it not been for the appeal of special interests to lofty motives. Never has a nationalistic patriotism been so well exemplified as in the case of the German people in the recent World War. Between the abuse of freedom and the abuse of authority there is not much choice. Socialism with all its weaknesses could not get the world into much more of a mess than has nationalistic capitalism.

If the choice between two abuses were a necessary one there would be little hope for getting rid of war. History would continue to move from pole to pole. If there now seems to be an apparent lack of standards, it by no means follows that the reaction will take refuge in authority. Such an assumption fails to recognize the rôle of intelligence in guiding the social process. Indeed, intelligence is too much alive to permit such a reaction. But does intelligent direction necessarily mean progress? Yes and no, according to our conception of intelligence.

Does intelligent adjustment necessarily mean *better* adjustment? better being used in an ethical rather than a purely practical sense of the word. Intelligence may have two meanings, a narrow and a broader meaning. In its narrow meaning it is strictly logical, *i.e.*, it seeks an adjustment to an immediate situation; it is the ability to adapt oneself to a new situation. In its broader sense it is ethical,

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i.e., it not only seeks an adjustment to a new situation but it seeks a social adjustment. Here someone will interrupt to say that there is no *purely practical* or *strictly logical* situation. An intelligent adjustment, if it be intelligent, will be both logical and ethical. An ethical adjustment that is not logical simply is not ethical, nor is a logical adjustment that is not ethical really logical. This is true in the world of oughtness but does it square with the facts?

A man may see an object that he would like to possess. He does not have the means to obtain it. He commits robbery in order to obtain the desired object. He handles the situation in such a way that he is not caught in the act. If by intelligence we mean merely the ability to adjust the individual more satisfactorily with reference to an object this was a highly intelligent act. The same is true in the use of business methods that are anti-social but which as yet have not been labeled as crime. Tommy O'Connor is intelligent but his kind does not make desirable citizens. A man may be able to do many things legally that he could not do morally. The more shrewd and clever he becomes the more intelligent he is. According to this conception of intelligence it simply becomes a matter of what one can get by with. Competition in armaments represents intelligence directed toward destructive ends. Efficiency is an index to intelligence but it does not spell progress unless it is preceded by the word *social*.

Perhaps ethical adjustments apart from practical considerations are not so numerous as are the logical adjustments apart from moral considerations but they are not difficult to find. Although war is concrete in its beginnings, it is usually necessary to indulge in a mass of meaningless ethical abstractions in order to wage it successfully. The concepts of Justice and Democracy are a case in point. It is rather a perverted conception of humanity that would regard modern warfare as humanitarian but it was, nevertheless, a war for Humanity, despite the fact that practically every concrete piece of humanity was suffering and bleeding to the core. A rather peculiar conscientious paradox is

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apropos in this connection. A conscience may be so keen that it ceases to be a conscience. Rather than accept anything short of perfection, unnecessary suffering and hardships are endured. This is a false idealism and fails to recognize the problematic character of moral situations.

An ethical situation is like a logical situation in that it involves a problem. Both represent an incomplete, an unfinished situation. The ethical situation presents a conflict of ends, of values; the logical situation presents an end toward which a means is sought. An ethical element may be involved in a logical situation. In this case the various means for bringing about the desired result become conflicting immediate ends. Logic asks: "How can this situation be met?" Ethics asks: "How ought it to be met?" The can and the ought may coincide but not necessarily so. The ethics of logic considers the "what" as well as the "how" of a problematic situation. Is the object sought a worthy object? What value does it possess? The narrow use of intelligence inquires neither as to the "how" nor the "what" of its object. It simply seeks an effective "can." It is to prevent the pursuit of an illegitimate object either in a legitimate or illegitimate way or the pursuit of a legitimate object in an illegitimate way that logic needs ethics.

Absolute standards in ethics fail to recognize the problematic character of moral situations. The attitude produced does not lend itself to logical treatment. Moral convictions are necessary but unless a string is tied to these convictions so that they may be changed for a given occasion, all hope for a scientific attitude toward the situation is thereby precluded. The problem is made to fit into a principle—and often times it will not fit—instead of using the principle to throw light on the problem. There is so much good in its opposite, and even so much good in the very evil itself in a moderate form, that it is only through abstraction that absurd enthusiasm can be gained for principles. The placing of ethics in a logical situation minimizes the conflict of opposites and may eliminate it. England and France hold conflicting views regarding German

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reparations. The one sees the European situation as primarily economic, the other as primarily political. Each is right from its viewpoint. The result might be a war for principle on both sides but it would be a very unintelligent method of procedure because it would fail to recognize the problematic character of the European situation. Without the introduction of the logical factor into a moral situation, war is inevitable. Ethics needs logic to give its principles meaning.

Metaphysics reaps no more mischief than when it attempts to treat morals apart from a given logical situation. It sets up an abstract virtue which it is wrong to compromise. The ideal, instead of growing out of the situation, is artificially thrust upon it. It consequently has no meaning but gains power only as an abstraction. Does anybody know where *Justice* was located at the Paris Conference? Fitting a moral problem into a logical situation, principles, instead of being unyielding and unbending ends, become guides for the formation of hypotheses. They help to interpret the data and may even serve as data themselves. The ethical ideal becomes the logical hypothesis, *i.e.*, it is the idea the acting upon which points toward the bringing about the best results out of the given situation. Virtue is not compromised but it, itself, arises out of the situation. It is the hypothesis or idea. The idea and the ideal are one. The ideal gets its meaning with reference to the problem.

A logical situation may be an ethical situation but unless logic recognizes ethical principles as data for the problem, its solution will be merely logical. The adaptation may be regarded as intelligent and yet be unethical. The logical idea in this case is not the ideal for the problem. The student who does dishonest work in an examination has the problem of getting through the examination. If this is all he wants and he can get by with dishonesty better than with fair work, the idea has logical value. With reference to his problem as he sees it, it is a good idea because it meets his needs. The narrow use of intelligence would regard this as

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a true idea. It is a true idea and it is a good idea with reference to the problem as stated but is it *good*? Unless the *good for* is with reference to something that is *good* we do not call it good. Here the end sought was legitimate but the logical and ethical values become distinct due to the narrow statement of the problem. Likewise a lawyer who has as his problem that of defending a guilty man, may win the case and be highly esteemed for his intelligence.

An ethical content is not involved in all problematic situations. Problems of research and problems of constructive work may not have ethical aspects but may take on such before solution or completion. An individual may be involved in a moral situation but not recognize it as such. He is not morally blameworthy unless it is a voluntary act on his part. He may be morally judged, however, and blamed for his stupidity in failing to recognize his responsibility in the outcome of the situation. An individual may be judged ethically as to his conduct and yet be ignorant of the moral situation in which he is involved. This is true in the case of the lawyer who looked upon his problem purely as a professional problem but did not consider its ethical aspects. A well-intentioned individual may be regarded as unintelligent because he fails to recognize the problematic character of moral situations. If his convictions are such that he cannot get along peacefully with his fellows, he may be regarded as unintelligent because of inability to make necessary social adjustments. He may be quite unaware of the fact that his intelligence is being measured by the sublimity of his convictions.

Failure to see the relationship between ethics and logic is one of the prime causes of war. The ethical aspects of logical situations are frequently overlooked in daily adjustments and the logical aspects of ethical situations are ignored when the crisis comes. "We will answer with guns" in reply to Von Hertling, may have awakened great emotional thrills and received great moral applause but it could hardly be regarded as an intelligent response to a problematic situation. It cut short the possibility for a scientific

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treatment of the situation. Peace needs the logic of ethics and War the ethics of logic.

That an ethical adjustment is not ethical unless it is logical and that a logical adjustment is not logical unless it is ethical are true but it does not follow from this that ethics can be reduced to logic nor that the logical and the ethical are synonymous. The ethical ought to be logical and the logical ought to be ethical just as duty and desire ought to coincide. That these do not always coincide is a commonplace experience. That individual interests and social welfare ought to coincide is also true but this is not always the fact of experience. Simply to say that they do so coincide does not make it so; likewise with the relationship between ethics and logic. Intelligence in the narrow sense will not mean progress; it will not keep us from war. Intelligence in its broader sense implies a conscientious intelligence. Intelligence without a conscience is as undesirable as an unintelligent conscience. To be able to see rightly logical and ethical values with reference to the right object at the right time, at the right place and in the right way, is a mark of intelligence. It is a persistent problem of Philosophy, of Sociology and of Education, yes, and of History.

NORMAN BOARDMAN.

NEW RICHMOND, WISCONSIN.

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"REAL LIFE."

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

"Brought up in considerable luxury, sent to a first-class public school, at the age of eighteen the young man had been thrown upon his own resources by a rascally solicitor who was also his guardian. Without any trade or profession, he had known what it was to go through the bitterest depths of poverty in London. . . . He saw himself again within measurable distance of the old and dreadful privations. . . . 'Oh for a chance!' Charlie murmured to himself. . . . 'Oh for a chance to get out of all this, to live, to rise from the mud into some sphere of life which is real and actual, where things go on and where a fellow can have a chance.' "

(RANGER GULL: *The Ravenscroft Horror.*)

IT is unusual to imply that one's present life need not be "actual," and I do not know what professional philosophers could make of it. But the claim that a certain life is not "real" is common enough. Where we contrast real blankly with unreal the professional philosopher may still hesitate, but to distinguish degrees of reality is respectable even for him, and the popular philosopher would usually be willing to accept this version if he knew of it. I wish to examine the ideas which may guide us when we judge, "This, and not that, is specially real."

One kind of life is real because "things go on and a fellow can have a chance." We are testing it by fulness of content,—that is more real which has more in it. Charlie desires to get out of poverty in order "to live"; a girl wants to leave home "to see life." They say of the old restricted ways, "This is not living."

Sometimes we are thinking chiefly of the chance to express more of our self. In our present position we may be confined too closely to one bit of it (though no position could enable us to live simultaneously throughout the whole of our potential nature; we could not use all our muscles at once or wear all our clothes). Or habit may restrict us more closely than our circumstances do. We get into the way of living in one small part of our personality

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and being there we may seem to live very frankly and sincerely, because we are acting spontaneously from a few selected ideas and sentiments.[1] The effect may come from middle-aged custom or from youthful inexperience, as when we say of a youth that he "has not found himself yet," and therefore is not living his real life.

Sometimes "more in it" refers to emotional vividness. "I want to live" may express a need for excitement or adventure or bodily pleasures, or for the experience of love. When we are very sleepy, or when our nerves are numb from a shock or exhausted from overstrain, or in certain kinds of insanity, the whole world seems unreal to us because it cannot make us feel. Or sometimes it is not exactly emotion but personal interest that makes life real, the unreal is what bores us. A young teacher who had given up teaching for settlement work told me enthusiastically that this was living, while teaching little girls was not. As she afterwards turned with still greater enthusiasm to take up mechanical dentistry, I cannot bring her distinction under any other rule.

Like every other clue to reality, this fulness may be carelessly interpreted. Experience, for instance, may be sought in yielding to impulse and never in guiding or controlling it. And here we may find ourselves passing over into using a different test;—one which we shall find lying on the borders of each idea in turn, a temptation which recurs continually in professional as in amateur philosophy,—the belief that the real consists of the primitive, the unworked; what would be if nothing had superseded it. Thus the life of impulse, or of sensuality, or again the life of an explorer or pioneer, may be taken to be "life" in an exemplary degree first because it is interesting or emotionally exciting (or is thought to be so), and then because it is "natural." Perhaps the two ideas are combined by the people who say that the war introduced us to the realities of life; though these people may also have another kind of

[1] A remark of Paulhan's, in *Les Mensonges Conventionelles.*

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fulness in mind,—the muchness of a thing that crashes into our world; of something that we cannot cope with.

The test of primitive naturalness, of course, will quickly go wrong if we forget our historical knowledge. The life of the sensualist and the life of the modern soldier have both been shaped by an elaborate society with a very long history. No animal has anything like either of them.

2.

When professional philosophers speak of degrees of reality, fulness of content is one of the tests which they offer, and the test paired with it usually "harmony." That is more truly real which is more harmonious internally and in better agreement with all around. In matters of knowledge and opinion we all use this test. What contradicts itself cannot as such be real, and what contradicts its context shows unreality somewhere. In matters of living the professional philosopher uses it, and the amateur sometimes tries to use it, but I believe he finds it difficult and elusive. It turns quickly into other tests in his hands.

Anything that simplifies life and opinion may appear specially real. In this respect also to many persons the war seemed to bring reality, because it swept away division of mind and hesitation over what should be thought or done. Tangles and divisions within ourselves disturb us. Paulhan in *Les Mensonges Conventionelles* describes what he calls the lie in the will. "To will is to affirm as real an act or a state of the self which is not real yet, but is to become so." "The essential falsehood of will consists in putting aside and denying the ideas and sentiments which resist the decision; in acting as if they did not exist!" "Morality commands simulation when she enjoins acts in accordance with the moral ideal which has not yet become part of our personality." (Pp. 112, 131.) Now this resolves itself easily into that other test, "the real is the primitive and the unworked." Finding a disharmony in ourselves, we correct it most readily by sacrificing our latest acquisitions. Thus people speak of "the nature coming through," or they

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beg a self-controlled person to be his "real self" for a moment, though they do not mean to accuse him of hypocrisy.

Another way of applying the harmony-test is different outwardly but not very different in theory,—the ascetic's way. We seek inward harmony through simplification and the extinction of desires; cutting down more and more. Thus by a different approach we come again to exalting the "natural" life of the pioneer or the peasant.

3.

Just now we spoke of begging a person to be his real self "for a moment" or "for once." But in another sense this is impossible, for his most real self is his *representative* self: what he usually is; what we may expect to find him. Similarly it is on the typical or model member of a species that we model our idea of the specific nature. "You're not a real boy," we say, "if you don't like climbing." The poor man's life is more real than the rich man's because most men are poor. Judge Brack denies Hedda Gabler's suicide, with the sound of the shot still in his ears, because "people don't do these things."

This test by representativeness might be explained as a simple kind of harmony-test, in fact as its easiest application. That life is most real which conforms to most of our experience. Or we might take it as a special way of finding fulness and significance. "A man's common life," we might claim, "expresses most of his real self, and the life of humanity expresses most of human nature." "This ordinary person, the plain man, is the most real Englishman."

Clearly we may be misled by this. Is it in the average man of the time, or in Plato and Pheidias, that we are to look for the most real spirit of Greece? Muchness in space and time will be no fair substitute for the idea. Yet the test may often give good sense enough. To decide whether a man is really a fine fellow, we may fairly ask how often he has behaved as such in the last fifteen years. And we rightly feel significance and richness in experiences which are common to ordinary human beings.

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4.

The real, we have been saying, is the representative, the typical. Instead of taking this as a kind of fulness or a kind of harmony, we may take it as one form of a third test, the test of *position*.

Obviously the representative term of a series has a special position in that series. It is the mode, or the median, or the average; it stands in the middle. But we can go deeper than this. The life that is really representative is "full" and "harmonious" because it is full of the main current of the general life and in harmony with the motion of that main current; it is not a waning pool or a backwater. Or, to change the metaphor, the truly representative is the *structural*. Love and motherhood and manual labour are common to so many millions because they belong to the main frame of life and bear up everything else. The craving for love to make life real is not merely desire for emotion to fill up emptiness, or for satisfaction to appease disharmony, nor is it merely the wish to be like other people. It is the craving to belong to other people; to be necessary; to feel oneself part of a whole.

5.

We can find many examples of the test of reality by position with or without its deepening into the idea of structure. Of two conflicting opinions, for instance, we often say that the truth will probably lie in the middle. The phrase is a bad one, since it makes both opinions merely false, and substitutes a third on the same level. "There is some truth on both sides" is harder to picture but better in idea. What we need is the structural notion. Truth ought to be found on a different plane, beneath the errors or above them, in such a position that it will show us how each opinion grew, and what of reality is revealed in each.

Sometimes the idea of structure is evident at once, and then it is important but may be badly managed. We find it in the commonest phrases of realist policy, where real life is "working the machine," or "pulling the wires," or

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"knowing the ropes." We have to ask here, How big and how deep a portion of reality have we got hold of? With all its wires, was the old diplomacy "in touch with reality?" and how much of the real history of Europe is given by the history of its *Realpolitik?* We may sympathise with the politicians when we remember how hard it is in our private lives to cope with the subtleties of "what is practical," and to know what is coming to something and what is not. An ingenious sermon on the text "He hangeth the world upon nothing" describes a man who has boasted all his life of knowing the ropes, and who finds in the end that there are no ropes.[2] And Newman's epitaph pictures him turning forever from the practical politics of Rome and England *ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem.*

We must notice in passing one very important use of the structural-position test, in the distinguishing of *imagination* from reality. Imagined objects may be full of light and colour, but they stand by themselves, isolated from the physical universe; and imaginative feeling and impulse is similarly isolated in our self, not forming part of the main current which leads up to action in the physical world. But this subject belongs to technical rather than to popular philosophy.

So far we have spoken only incidentally of reality as opposed to pretence. Let us turn to this now: "These pearls are not real," we say, meaning not that they are a hallucination, but that they are not something which they claim to be.

6.

One of the most important ways of being unreal is that of the sentimentalists, of whom the classical analysis is contained in Bosanquet's essay on "Right and Wrong in Feeling."[3] "The sentimentalist has his interest, not in the significance of an idea or perception, but in that excitement of feeling which the idea has power to arouse in him. . . .

[2] Watkinson: *Unfamiliar Texts.*

[3] In the *Civilization of Christendom.*

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To feel for the pleasure of feeling . . . is the note of sentimentalism." "In the strictest moral sense the sentimentalist is always an impostor, because he himself and not his ostensible object is always the centre of his feeling. The frauds of sentimentalism are simply the climax of a mental state which is fraudulent through and through." Fancy-feelings make a convenient field for this voluptuousness. The pressure on us to abuse them is greatest in the unsatisfied times of youth, when our instincts are awake yet unfulfilled, when we are solitary and not self-sufficient, shy and awkward and helpless yet not humble. The sentimentalist need not include himself among his objects, but to do so gives him another convenient and interesting field. We can look at our self sentimentally or voluptuously, with feeling which is "not the direct reaction to the object" but "an echo artifically sustained for the pleasure of the sound." Such looking differs from true self-observation because its aim is pleasant experience and not the discovery of truth. We are not necessarily trying to deceive ourselves, but neither are we trying to enlighten ourselves;—we are merely indifferent to any facts which do not yield us the feeling we want. Thus it is a far easier business than real self-observation. This greater ease has an odd little result, for the sentimentalist tends to feel that the voluptuous way of seeing himself is the only possible way, and that to renounce it would be to blindfold his inward eye.

Voluptuous self-contemplation is often reinforced by the thought of an audience, sometimes quite vague and sometimes including known persons. If we are comfortably self-absorbed and unperceptive we may find it quite possible to use the persons actually present for our imaginary audience. This is common in the "showing-off" by young children, and my own memories make me believe that psychologists seldom allow enough for this disposition between three and eight years old. Children's unperceptiveness is intermittent, however, with intervals that are painful to recall.

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Sometimes it is hard to decide whether we have the fraud of sentimentalism or only imagination and dramatising of the clean kind. Here, for instance, is a puzzling little passage from Mrs. Bryant's *Teaching of Morality*,[4] "The lesson on character goes home of its own accord when the self-consciousness of the learner . . . awakens to appropriate the idea of that sort of person . . . the child feels that he would like to act and *to feel himself acting like*, for example, the brave heroes of Thermopylæ . . . to feel himself like one of them. The emotional glow which accompanies this idea of self as so and so, transmutes the bare idea into a practical aspiration to do likewise." As this stands I think it harmful. All that Mrs. Bryant needed, I believe, was that the pupil should enter into the feelings of the persons described, and should feel emotion in thinking of such persons. The child glows over the heroes and feels that he would like to share their life,—their acts and feelings. Unless he is a sentimentalising child, he will not proceed to the complication of feeling-that-he-would-like-to-feel-himself-doing this.

Here again are some interesting and difficult passages from the essay on "A sense of the Dramatic," in *A Student In Arms*.

"By 'a sense of the dramatic' I mean, getting outside yourself and seeing yourself and other people as the characters of a story. . . . You see the romance in your own life. . . . If you have a sense of the dramatic . . . you will understand the romance of being an uncle. You will disburse your largesse with an air of genial patronage and *bonhomie* which will endear you to the boy forever. You will go away feeling that you have both been a huge success in your respective parts. The artist will see himself, not as the hero of the story, but as one of the characters. . . . The soldier sees himself, not as an individual hero, but as a loyal follower, who is content to endure all and to brave all under a trusted captain. . . . The most perfect form of Christianity is just the abiding sense of loyalty to a divine Master—the abiding sense of the dramatic which never loses sight of the Master's figure and which continually enables a man to see himself in the rôle of the trusted and faithful disciple, so that he is always trying to live up to his part."

[4] P. 38.

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I think that Mr. Hankey is confusing when, like Mrs. Bryant, he lays such emphasis on *seeing oneself* in the rôle that one is trying to play. During the stress of working, surely, the object contemplated will be simply the rôle-to-be-filled. I believe there is a confusion in psychology here, which we might correct with little harm to the essay. But beyond this, I believe that the writer does not fully realise how easy it is to slip into getting your drama cheap. Again, "the artist will see himself, not as the hero of the story, but as one of the characters." If one is looking at oneself, with a romantic motive, I believe it takes an unusual simplicity and modesty (like Mr. Hankey's own) to keep these relative positions. If one does not actually slip into the centre, it is still hard for most of us not to see ourself as a rather sympathetic character. A little tampering is so easy when we contemplate for any other purpose than scientific truth; and the whole point of the ancient and honourable image of the moral drama is that we must not tamper with the rôle. "Thine it is to act well the part that is allotted to thee;—to choose it is another's."

Possibly during the last century we have become more suspicious of even a distant approach to cheap drama or sentimental self-appreciation. It would be impossible for a modern writer to give, except ironically, some of the excellent descriptions which Adam Smith seems to give in good faith. "That moderated sensibility to the suffering of others . . . which does not disqualify us for the performance of any duty . . . the melancholy and affectionate remembrance of our departed friends—*the pang*, as Gray says, *to secret sorrow dear*—are by no means undelicious sensations. Though they outwardly wear the features of pain and grief, they are all inwardly stamped with the ennobling characters of virtue and self-approbation." [5] The psychology is indisputable, but one hardly sees now why the ennobling inward stamp should be endorsed by the ethical writer. "The friends of Socrates all wept when he

[5] *Moral Sentiments*, Part 3, Ch. 3.

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drank the last potion, while he himself expressed the gayest and most cheerful tranquility. Upon all such occasions the spectator makes no effort, and has no occasion to make any, in order to conquer his sympathetic sorrow. He is under no fear that it will transport him to anything that is extravagant and improper; he is rather pleased with the sensibility of his own heart, and gives way to it with complaisance and self-approbation. He gladly indulges, therefore, the most melancholy views which can naturally occur to him concerning the calamity of his friend, for whom, perhaps, he never felt so exquisitely before the tender and tearful passion of love. But it is quite otherwise with the person principally concerned."[6]

7.

When we suspect fraudulence in ourselves or others,—whether it is the divided attention of the sentimentalist, or the woolliness of irrelevance or fluency, or the hollowness of merely conventional assumptions or principles,—our impulse is to counter it by severe practical tests. We want to press the point: to penetrate the armour; to "give him something to attend to"; to break through or to break down. We come suddenly back to the formula "reality is what lies beneath"; "it is what remains when you break down all you can." Now this means that we sometimes actually go counter to our other tests of representativeness and harmony. We take a kind of disharmony and untypicalness to characterise the most real self. Here, we say, we have the bed-rock; the last resort. Almost perversely sometimes we refuse to be sure that the man has really been living at his full depth, beyond all convention or assumption, until this disharmony has appeared. From Aristotle's magnanimous man we react to the testing of Plato's saint. We hesitate perhaps even over the beautiful description of the Happy Warrior, who

> "while the mortal mist is gathering, draws
> His breath in confidence of heaven's applause."

[6] *Ibid.*, Part 1, Section 3, Ch. 1.

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It contrasts too directly with the cry through the mist, "My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

This demand for "rock-bottom" has its own dangers, as have all the other tests of reality. In the first place, we ought to distinguish between pain and behaviour towards pain. Mere suffering is no more sufficient than mere happiness to make a man real; at the best it can only dig down to a bit of personality which is not big enough to be called a self, and which will be covered again the moment that the grinding point is removed. Therefore R. H. Benson gives an absurd solution of a well-set problem in *The Sentimentalists*, when he supposes his fraudulent hero made genuine by mere persecution, with no moral reaction implied. In the second place, we cannot test the whole round of character by any one means;—the trial which presses in one part will not press in another. "After I had been shut up for four months in a siege, daily exposed to shells, bullets, fever and starvation, I felt no relief when the relief came, but rather a dread of confronting the perils of ordinary life." [1] In the third place, to seek reality only in extremity is like seeking the thing in itself by stripping off all its qualities. We have to grow to become our real selves, rather than to cut down.

Perhaps this gives us the clue. "Pressure" and "bed-rock" are wrong words; what we want is the man's full stretch, his reach and grasp, his utmost. Not only in trials but in every kind of experience (and every kind is needed), our reality is found in the most that we can do. In fact the unreality in our life and in ourselves is best looked on, not as an artificial building-on, but as a coming short. Whether it shows itself as inadequacy or as disharmony, or as unrelatedness, or as any kind of falsity, it is the easy way and cheap buying. "Real life" takes all our lives.

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[1] H. W. Nevinson, *Essays in Rebellion*, p. 20.

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GUILD SOCIALISM AND THE INDUSTRIAL FUTURE.

REXFORD G. TUGWELL.

I.

"Each age is a dream that is dying,
And one that is coming to birth."

THIS passage was quoted by Mr. Cole in his *Social Theory*, forerunner with *Self-Government in Industry* of his present statement of Guild Socialism.[1] He felt, he said, that it was "profoundly true." The dream that is dying is obviously the old *laissez-faire* industrialism; the one that is coming to birth is that view of future economic institutions which is peculiar to the Guild Socialists. In a real sense Mr. Cole has made himself a special prophet. We have a right to ask with what reason.

This particular statement of the Guild-Socialist belief is attractive in its reasonableness, in its experimental attitude toward the actual machinery of the future economic system, and in its lack of very dogmatic schematization within its own set limits. Of course, Mr. Cole would not have us ranging into the uncharted regions beyond his assumptions; but within these, we are given to understand, we are relatively free to make suggestions. Whatever criticisms of Mr. Cole's work are to be made, have to be qualified, then, by saying that he is indefinite where definition would presume upon individual intelligence; and that where he is precise in prophecy he is equally clear in saying that if we do not like his suggestions, we are free to look for others, provided the essential aims are gained. Mutable small arrangements are not worth bickering about; to Mr. Cole they seem possible in a certain fashion which he presents but, one gathers, there is no point in all the intricate ar-

[1] *Guild Socialism.* By G. D. H. Cole. New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1921. Pp. ix, 202.

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rangements of his scheme which it would disturb him to have otherwise. Mr. Cole would like very much to be the architect who determines the form and scope of the industrial edifice; but the interior decoration is altogether unimportant.

One evidence of his feeling against general conformity in smaller matters is to be found in his constant insistence on the necessity for considerable local autonomy and his cautions against the too great dominance of large coördinating bodies in purely local production problems. Coördination to him is a rather necessary evil in large scale industry. But what coördinating has to be done must be with a harmonizing, not a dominating, purpose.

Nevertheless, although Mr. Cole is not insistent on the perfection of detail in his economic scheme it is clear that he cares deeply about it. There is a warm affection for Guild Socialism apparent in every line of his book. And after all a scheme is a scheme no matter how respectful its prophet may be to the intelligence of others. It may be treated as such.

II.

An attempt to show the possible application of functional representation in a going industrial society must suggest, among other things, ways of selecting managers, of keeping a real discipline while the new freedom comes in, of reorganizing the basis and methods of rewarding industrial effort and of solving the perplexing problems involved in the relations between the makers of shoes and the makers of ships, makers of sugar and makers of iron.

By keeping constantly to the minutiæ of industrialism, showing exact changes possible to be made exactly, indicating if not second and third, at least first steps, Mr. Cole might have been convincing. This was the kind of book Guild Socialism needed. It is yet to be written. Mr. Cole discusses all these problems but not concretely. The steps are flattened out into two levels with uncertainty between; so that it is still true, as some critics have

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remarked, that Guild Socialism is a Panacea, a Utopia. There is one level on which we move at present; there is another at which we may arrive; but we still must ask *how*.

If functional representation is at all an essential part of Guild Socialism, although it is but a small beginning, it must be admitted that the rather widespread development of plant unions in America is a first step toward this sort of positive worker's control. The movement has not gone far; but if one is looking for first wavering steps, it is significant. There is not much of a theory of the thing with us; it has no literary apostle; it has not been dignified into a school of thought. But it works astonishingly well in certain places (the Dutchess Bleachery at Wappinger's Falls, for instance). American industrial managers, even most workers, would not like to have it called a step toward Guild Socialism, wherein they perhaps differ from the British (though it is doubtful); and there is, indeed, a crude wisdom in this. Social theorists are apt to assume that a first step implies a more or less rapid development to a logical end. Men in charge of actual arrangements know better. For industrial arrangements there is the harsh test of present efficiency in a going system with its rigid and hampering pecuniary limits. One step, perhaps, but not necessarily a second because a theory was implied by the first.

Guild Socialists might learn a great deal by studying the mental processes of the men who manage industries. For one thing they would discover that there could be no more effective damper to a promising movement toward real worker's control than to call it functional representation or, worse yet, any kind of Socialism. For another there would be the fact, surprising in contrast with the first, that many managers of industry, American, at least, look forward with some eagerness to a greater and greater employee participation in the managing and owning functions, although they might greatly resent the formulation of the generalization that seems to flow from this attitude. Perhaps one reason for this is a disbelief in the managerial

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ability of the untrained and therefore inexpert; and perhaps a feeling that not all workers can be fitted for a share in management. Most industrial liberals would rather each step should be tentative and without implications for future policy.

One psychological theory upon which the Guild Socialists lean heavily is a demand for freedom. But in reality this demand for freedom is nonexistent as such. There is a whole series of phenomena of revolt against restraint; but these are blind kicks against restriction. To say that there is abroad a demand for freedom is to postulate the force of an unrelated idea which in reality has no steady power in the minds of men. Theorists are on safer ground when they stick to the position that human nature makes certain demands on economic institutions and that in the long run these must be met because revolt after revolt will smash any institution which bears down too hard on the irreducible elements of human nature.

However, Mr. Cole is not wholly consistent about these matters. He does do lip service to demands for freedom, men's love of one another, ideas of service and the like, but when we try to see why it is that he has cared to formulate a theory of institutions it is clear enough that he has been governed by a feeling that institutions matter because they either thwart or further the expression of human impulses. This is defensible from one point of view and infinitely better than building upon a demand for freedom, but one may still inquire whether this is not stressing too much the institutions of society. For after all they can never be anything but lagging expressions of common will, perpetually out of date, made so because the generation which created them remains to administer and defend them.

III.

Mr. Cole himself said in *Social Theory:* "Democracy is only real when it is conceived in terms of function and purpose" (p. 193). Can a theory of institutions envisage a satisfactory purpose? It is the particular not the general

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environment that furnishes the real stimuli and means of expression. It is the bread, the shoes, the fur coat, not the institution of the market, which give satisfaction. The market only furnishes a more or less efficient way of getting bread and shoes and fur coats into people's hands. Economic purpose is to be discovered by asking ourselves first what we want; we may then inquire the best way to get it. Finally, and probably not until after a trial, we inquire whether the satisfaction is worth the cost. Thus we may adapt institutions to our needs and discard the more costly, the less useful and the outworn.

When does a set of institutions fit our purposes? The answer is, never! We have to progress away from institutions continually, constantly redefining what we want, constantly experimenting with ways of getting it, constantly weighing cost against satisfaction. The managers of industry will create the institutions; it is no part of the work of the theorist, the philosopher. By devising whole sets and schemes of future institutions they subject to the institution the real thing in which the satisfaction lies and in terms of which purpose must be defined. The purpose we must formulate and consider cannot be put in institutional terms; it must go behind institutions to goods and services.

The Guild Socialist arrangements as Mr. Cole conceives them would be highly flexible and perhaps useful, though an industrial technician would have been in a position to make them definite, but purpose is to be defined in satisfactions and a theory of institutions is not fundamentally purposive.

And as for the function by which the satisfactions are to be provided: a change of system cannot change the fact of the machine or the fact of the "division of labor," nor can it wholly eliminate monotony, fatigue and consequent revolt. All that can be said for Guild Socialism is that it presents a tentative suggestion for a better expression of our present economic activities. Admittedly a long time will be consumed in growing into the new arrangements. But in this long time will the course and plan of our in-

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dustrial life be changed? This problem is not raised by Mr. Cole; but it will have to be raised.

Behind Guild Socialist theory there is a broad assumption of a certain kind of a system for which the projected arrangements will be better than those we now have. This is perilously close to two sets of static premises. Certainly the industrial premises are static. They are: (1) large, crowding populations, (2) rather highly urbanized life and (3) widespread organizations of factories and workshops. This is what we have now; and, although we may grow, it is assumed that the growth will and can be of only one sort. The institutional premises are more dynamic. Institutions may be made anything; but Mr. Cole would probably not deny that he feels sure of the desirability of an ultimate triumph for the Guild Socialist plan. And this may turn out to be an absolutist attitude, because it is to be foreseen that Mr. Cole will judge experience from now on by its effects on Guild Socialism.

What is the justification for these assumptions? Simply the further assumption that Malthusianism is a correct statement of tendency, reinforced by diminishing returns, and that history will repeat itself. Populations will increase until the seats at nature's table are filled; returns from agriculture and industry will refuse to increase in proportion to the effort and material we invest; cities will grow; industries other than agriculture will attain such swollen proportions that the workers in them cannot be fed. There will come war, famine and pestilence—as they have come before—unless we adopt Guild Socialism.

But is it not thinkable that we may turn aside from all this? That our development may be of another kind altogether? Our increasing nearness to the practical uses of solar energy, of radio activity, of the differences of temperature of the sea at different depths, of the wind and waves, the possibilities of new fertilizations of the land and the certainty of vast possibilities of the increase of food supplies—these may carry us into an industrial future we can neither predict nor suggest.

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The large factory unit will lose much of its economic superiority as we progress away from coal to the use of more easily transported power. If the decrease of costs is a great part of the reason for large-scale industry, it is quite possible that we may be rapidly returning to an era of home manufacture. This would break down the cities overnight. It may also be that by voluntary reduction of the birth rate predictions based on the past growth of population may be entirely upset. We are not justified in saying that man will not do what he has never done. This is only to say that ultimate schemes, however reasonable or mutable, must be built on ultimate premises in industrial life. And it is never safe to admit static ultimate premises.

In a wide sense there seems to be implied in the elaboration of a whole future scheme of intricate industrial arrangements, such as Guild Socialism becomes in Mr. Cole's hands, a kind of imagination that ranges only within preconceived limits. Was it not this sort of limitation that caused Santayana to remark: "A great imaginative apathy has fallen on the mind. One half the world is amused in tinkering obsolete armor as Don Quixote did his helmet; deputing it, after a series of catastrophes, to be at last sound and invulnerable. The other half, the naturalists who have studied psychology and evolution, look at life from the outside, and the processes of nature make them forget her uses"?

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SPECULATION, LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE.

ROBERT J. HUTCHEON.

THE word "speculation," to the impassioned social reformer, is like red to a bull. All his latent belligerency against things as they are is roused into strenuous action when he hears the word or reflects on the crazy mentality and the reckless activities it stands for. And there is a great deal in speculation as we have known it and still know it in modern capitalistic countries to justify such wrath. Most students of economic history are willing to admit that our present capitalistic system has succeeded, as no past system ever did, in producing an immense volume of economic goods and services, but its defects are almost equally glaring and of these none is more obvious than the evil of speculation. It is quite conceivable that the capitalistic system may rid itself of this evil and still maintain its main structure but, as the last four years have shown, it has not yet done so. The horrors and tragedies of war did not sober the minds of the people to the point of making them content with the regular returns of daily industry. When money is easy, people seem to be as ready as ever to plunge into the wildest schemes for making wealth over night, to risk all on the chance of large and quick returns.

Because of the bad odor which speculative "booms" and gambling on the produce- and stock-exchanges have generated, the moralist who knows little if anything about economics condemns all forms of speculation without any discrimination whatsoever. Perhaps he has paid a visit to the Stock-Exchange in New York or the Bourse in Paris and has seen the wild gesticulations and heard the excited shouting of the brokers as they bargain with one another there and, with this picture in his mind, has concluded that speculation is a form of insanity or, if he cannot go that far, at least something akin to the chattering of apes in the

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tree tops. But such wholesale condemnation carries no conviction to minds that are patiently investigating the whole subject with the desire to see things as they really are. Such persons are not content to stand in front of a produce-exchange or a stock-exchange and curse them for their evil deeds. They wish to know the whole story of speculation, to see why the exchanges arose, to discover what economic functions they have performed and to relate them, if possible, to the broader phenomena of human life with which they are already familiar. While the bewildered spectator of the stock-exchange, on one of its wild days, sees in its activities nothing but the antics of madmen, the serious student becomes more and more aware, as he studies, that the forces which he sees in such feverish activity there are the same forces that he is familiar with in daily life, only in a more concentrated, intensified and artificial form. It is sometimes said that to know all is to forgive all. Such a sentiment carried to the extreme and acted out in life would disarm us in the presence of aggressive evil. But if we may not say that to know all is to forgive all, at least we may say that to know all is to condemn and fight with discrimination and to that end it may be worth while to discuss once again "speculation, legitimate and illegitimate," even though to many readers it may be nothing more than threshing old straw.

The broad fact of life in which all speculation is rooted is the fact of risk. It may conceivably be true, as the mechanistic philosophers contend, that the universe is a vast machine and we but cogs in it, but at least it does not seem so in actual experience. If a machine does not break down, we can predict what it will do for a long time to come but in human life we know not what a day or an hour may bring forth. No doubt human life is law-abiding but the factors in it are so numerous, so complex, so varied that prediction is impossible. There is hardly a phase of it into which risk does not enter. Every new home is a venture. Every mother risks her life in giving birth to her first-born child. Every choice of trade or profession is a sort of

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challenge to destiny. Every religion, every philosophy is a spiritual and intellectual forecast. Every international treaty is a hope. There is too much evidence of law and regularity in the world to warrant the statement that chance is king but at least uncertainty is everywhere and every human being who wishes to be more than a cog in a machine must venture out into the unknown.

Nowhere is risk more obvious than in the economic aspect of our life. Through all stages of social evolution man's struggle for a livelihood has had its ups and downs. In the fishing and hunting stage men must have had hard luck now and then as fishers and hunters have to-day. In the pastoral stage epidemics and storms must have often played havoc with the herds and flocks. In the early agricultural stage the return to labor must have been almost entirely dependent on the weather, for the methods of cultivating and fertilizing were very primitive. Nor has risk been eliminated from the modern world although our methods in agriculture, commerce, manufacture and finance have been improved beyond the wildest dreams of our great grandfathers. Indeed in some respects our risks to-day are greater than those of a much earlier time. The early makers of cloth, for example, made it from the wool of their own sheep to meet the definite needs of their own families. In a sense, they controlled both supply and demand. No transportation and no elaborate machinery were required. The whole process might be carried on, indeed was carried on, within the same family or clan. They manufactured directly for their own needs out of raw materials which they themselves produced.

How different to-day! No man knows through whose or how many hands the shirt or the shoes he wears had passed before he bought them. All he knows is that the hands were very numerous. The farmer, the sailor, the railroadman, the machine-maker, the spinner, the weaver, the tanner, the garment-maker, the shoemaker and a long list of other workers had to do their part, in utter ignorance of one another, before the shirt or the shoes could be handed over

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the counter to him. We do not go to our merchants and order the articles we desire far in advance of our need of them. That is, production does not go on in response to definite demands. It goes on before desire has expressed itself and its amount is determined by some one's guess as to what the demand will be. The time that elapses between the beginning and the end of a productive process may cover years and the journeys and transformations that an article often undergoes in the course of the process would, if known completely, stagger the imagination of the simple person who buys things across the counter without asking how they came to be. Indeed production in anticipation of demand is one of the fundamental characteristics of our economic system. Risk or speculation or venturing out into the unknown is an inevitable accompaniment of economic specialization and division of labor. The farmer has no absolute guarantee of a harvest when he sows his grain or plants his trees and vines. The retail merchant has no guarantee that demand will take from his shelves all the goods he buys from the wholesaler. The manufacturer has no guarantee when he manufactures for stock that he will find customers for his goods. All of them alike produce in the hope of effective demand but no power on earth can guarantee that the demand will be what they desire.

The risk is greatest at the two ends of the productive process, the supply of raw materials and the demand over the counter. The merely mechanical part of the productive process, that is, the manufacture of raw materials into goods ready for use has its unforeseen accidents, no doubt, but human ingenuity and inventive genius have reduced these to a minimum. Man has such control over the power of steam, water and electricity and such skill in creating and using machinery that, given the raw material of production, he can make out of it almost what he pleases. If the whole productive process were as much in his power as the manufacturing part of it, there would be no such thing as speculation at all. Risk would be eliminated. The economic life might be turned over more and more to machinery and

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human beings could dedicate their lives for the most part to play, culture, travel and religion.

But as soon as man steps out of the back door of his manufacturing plant to look for his raw materials, he finds himself in a world which he does not and never will be able to control. His wool comes, perhaps, from Australia and its abundance and price will depend on the amount of the rainfall, which determines the quality of the pasture in that far-away country. Or if he uses cotton, his supply will be determined partly by the presence or absence of frost in the cotton-belt. If he is a miller, he keeps his weather-eye open, for the rainfall in the wheat-belt will determine how much he must pay for his wheat. If he mines for gold or silver or ore or coal he never knows when the vein he is working will peter out. If he is an oil-producer, he never knows when his well will cease to flow. If he is a fisherman, he cannot foresee when the luck will turn against him. As we have already said, man's control over the manufacturing process and over the agencies of transportation is stronger with each new decade but face to face with the weather and the uncertainties of the treasures that lie buried under the surface of the earth, he is brought up short and made to feel the risks of his existence. Inside the factory, he is lord and master. Outside the factory he is a dependent creature and can never be sure of the amounts of wool, cotton, wheat, sugar, coffee, fruit, oil, natural gas, gold, silver, copper, etc., that nature will give him in return for his labor. As a producer of raw materials, uncertainty dogs his footsteps every day.

And there is another factor in the supply of raw material that causes him trouble. People want flour from the miller every day. They also want, if not every day, at least at every season, cotton and cloth from the textile manufacturers. But nature does not supply the raw material for these goods every day. They come only once a year and, as we must pick berries when they are ripe or go without them in the winter, so the manufacturer must secure his raw material when it comes on the market or at least make

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a contract for it some considerable time before he is likely to use it.

Here, then, at the supply-end of the productive process we have two great uncertainties: on the one hand, the weather and the possible petering out of the mines, oil-wells, gas-wells, etc.; on the other hand, the irregular nature of the supply as contrasted with the regular nature of demand. Manufacturers must make contracts for their raw material months before they use it in the manufacturing process and without any guarantee that the price will not fall in the meantime.

At the other end of the productive process, that is, the demand-end, the risk is no less real. The desires of human beings are as fickle and unpredictable as the weather. The psychologist is no more reliable than the weather-prophet. Demand changes with the fashions and fashions change so rapidly that it is difficult for the conservative person to keep up with them. The weather also has its effect on demand. A hot dry summer sends the demand for muslins and cottons up and the demand for rainproof goods down, a cool wet summer just reverses the demand. The general prosperity of the community also has its effect. In war-time, when wages were high and we were all deceived by the fictitious prosperity of the country, demand mounted and mounted, following the prices up and up, but once the balloon of prosperity had burst, demand fell to a point where it was too small to keep all our factories going. Again, demand is profoundly affected by influences that are only temporary. During the war the demand for shells, rifles, bayonets, guns, masks, ammunition, ships, submarine-chasers, aeroplanes and all the other weapons of war, as well as for blankets, socks, shoes, clothes, sweaters and many other kinds of wearing apparel, was limited only by our capacity to produce them. Now that the war is over that particular demand has dwindled and will dwindle still farther if we succeed in agreeing with other nations to limit armaments. Again, demand for an article is always limited by the possibility of using something else in its place. If

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woolens go too high, people use cotton. If wheat flour is dear, they use rye or barley or rice. If the price of butter soars, they use oleomargarine. If they have to pay a high price for the legitimate drama, they go to the movies. If they cannot afford real diamonds, they use brilliants. And so on *ad infinitum*. Demand is a flirt and cannot be long depended on. And yet flirt though she be, industry cannot wait until she has expressed herself. Someone must guess as to what she will want and set the wheels of his factory moving to satisfy her when her voice is once heard.

The whole productive process might be likened to a bridge resting on two piers. The bridge itself or the manufacturing part of the productive process is sound or nearly so. But the two piers—supply of the raw materials and demand over the counter—are constantly shrinking or expanding and so render the whole bridge more or less unstable. And yet it is quite impossible for human ingenuity to stabilize the two piers. Unless we are willing to scrap our whole specialized system of production and go back to the patriarchal stage of industry, when each family produced its own raw material and manufactured only for its own needs, we must face the two great risks already described. Someone must run the risk that a change in the supply will lower prices and thus make the cost of production greater than the price obtainable for the manufactured article. This risk might be overcome if society were to extend the cold-storage principle and store away an immense accumulation of raw materials in the fat years, which could be drawn on when the supply of the current year was low, but as yet we have no storehouse for such an accumulation and no guarantee that it might not be as costly to maintain it as to take the risks as they come. Someone also must run the risk of making a wrong estimate of demand, for no man or nation of men can foresee with certainty what effective demand over the counter will be. Conceivably this risk also might be eliminated. If every human being the world over could and would determine and express his demands for the next three or four years to his grocer, baker, butcher,

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shoemaker, garment-maker and to all the other individuals and the companies from whom and which he is accustomed to buy goods and services, we might stabilize the demand-end of the productive process. But such a determination beforehand of individual demand is quite impossible. It is easier and better to run the risks we are fairly familiar with than to experiment with so impossible a scheme.

Granting that the risks described are inevitable, our next question must be: who is going to assume them and what reward is he likely to ask for so doing? It is just at this point that the speculator enters. The speculator is society's risk-bearer, and the reward he asks for his service is the profit he makes when his estimate turns out to be a correct one. As the economic process has become more and more complex, society has had to resort to highly specialized workers and the speculator is just a striking instance of specialization. He bakes no bread; he manufactures no cloth or cotton or flannel; he knows nothing or at least need know nothing of the technique of any industry; he handles no raw materials in a physical way, and yet he performs a genuine service for all the men who do these things. At the supply-end of the productive process, especially, he bears the risks which would hamper the manufacturer if he had to bear them himself.

In order to be free to devote his entire attention to the technical process of manufacture, the manufacturer can use several devices to get rid of risk. For example, he can manufacture only to order, charging a price which will enable him to make a profit over the cost of the raw material at the time when the contract is entered into and the cost of manufacture. But while this is possible to a few firms in an industry or even to a whole stage in an industry, it is never possible to an industry as a whole. The tailor may keep samples rather than cloth; some manufacturers may weave patterns, send them out to possible customers and make cloth only on demand and never for stock; but if we follow the goods in their passage from one stage of the industry to another, we will inevitably find someone who

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cannot wait for orders if he is to have any part in the productive process at all.

Or, again, the manufacturer can get rid of risk by dealing in futures. When he buys raw material at a certain time and price for delivery at a certain date in the future, he runs the risk of a fall in the price before his contract calls for delivery, in which case he might have to manufacture at a loss. But by a simple device he may protect himself against that risk. He can sell the same amount, for the same time ahead, at the same price, so that what he loses on his purchase he gains on his sale or what he gains on his purchase he loses on his sale. In other words, in order to insure himself against risk, from a fall in price, he foregoes the possibility of gain from a rise of price or, as Professor Seligmann has put it, "the business man resorts to speculation to free his business from speculative influences."

But have the risks been abolished by this dealing in futures on the part of the manufacturer or importer? Not at all. They have simply been turned over to the speculator. While the manufacturer or importer sacrifices a possible gain in order to insure himself against a possible loss, the speculator risks a possible loss in order to make a possible gain.

He works in the following manner. He gathers from all possible sources such as trade-papers, consular reports, market-reports, agents, travelers, etc., all the information he can about the supply of and the demand for the articles he deals in, and, then, on the basis of his interpretation of the information, he forecasts price-fluctuations and buys or sells as his judgment dictates. If he expects prices to go up, either because the supply is likely to be small or because the demand is likely to be great, he buys now, for present delivery or future delivery as the case may be. His buying now tends to send up the price at once and as the price goes up consumption is checked, that is, instead of having a feast and a famine as might be the case without the speculator, society consumes a scarce commodity at a slower rate—while it misses the feast, it escapes the famine.

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And more than that, by checking consumption or making supply and demand harmonize better over a period of time, he lessens the price-fluctuations or prevents the price from going as high as it would have gone if society had wakened up some dreary morning to find that the supply of the goods in question was lower than anyone had supposed.

On the other hand, if his forecast is that prices must go down because supply is likely to be plentiful or demand low, he sells now for future delivery. He has none of the goods he sells in present possession but he is confident that, when the time for delivery comes, he will be able to buy from others what he needs to meet his own contracts at a lower figure than he has contracted for. As a result of his selling prices go down, consumption is stimulated, the stock of the article now in existence is used up and, when the new stock arrives, society is able to get the greatest possible satisfaction from it because of the systematic spreading out of the supply over the whole season.

The speculator, then, when he knows his business, performs a very useful social service. He helps to establish an equilibrium between supply and demand. He promotes an expedient rate of consumption by stimulating it when the supply promises to be abundant and checking it when the supply is likely to be small. He makes the daily market price conform to the seasonal market price and thus minimizes the very price-fluctuations out of which he draws his profit. Thus he stabilizes the economic life of the community as well as secures for it the largest possible satisfaction from the goods consumed. Of course he does not set out deliberately to do this. He is not often a philanthropist, in his business relations at least. The shrewdest speculator makes mistakes now and then and every mistake costs both him and society dear, for then price-fluctuation is greater than it would otherwise have been. But when he is a genuine specialist and informs himself carefully concerning the probable supply of and demand for the raw material he deals in, he is an essential part of the economic mechanism and deserves a reward for his risk-taking.

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I have contended thus far that the genuine speculator who speculates with his own money performs a useful public service,—he bears the risks which the manufacturers and importers are eager to escape and, when his estimate is correct, he stabilizes the economic life of the community by minimizing price-fluctuations. But legitimate speculation passes into illegitimate gambling about as easily as marriage passes into divorce among the movie-actors. Our next step, then, will be to follow the stages of "the rake's progress" and to see how a necessary social function becomes a public nuisance and even a grave social malady.

The least guilty form of illegitimate speculation is buying and selling by a genuine speculator on insufficient capital. According to Bradstreet's Review about 40 per cent of the business failures each year are due to lack of capital, but in the ordinary business-world the failure of one firm does not necessarily involve other persons. If one store closes its doors its customers can easily find what they want elsewhere. But when a speculator fails for lack of capital, he almost inevitably involves others. He has sold to his customers for future delivery goods which he cannot buy when the time for delivery comes because he has made a wrong estimate of the price and has not enough capital to bear the loss involved. In the meantime, his customers in their turn, expecting him to fulfill his contract, no doubt made contracts with their customers to supply them with manufactured goods at a certain price. Hence when the speculator fails them and they must go anew into the market for raw material and buy what they need at a higher price, it is often impossible for them to fulfill their own contracts except at a loss which ruins them. The speculator as a risk-bearer cannot escape the possibility of loss now and then, and he owes it to the business community with which he deals to have enough capital to assume the whole risk and not throw part of it on his customers who are virtually paying him to take it off their shoulders.

The most guilty form of illegitimate speculation in which the professional speculator indulges is manipulating the

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market or producing artificial price-fluctuations. The criminal character of this treachery to our economic system may be inferred from the fact that one trenchant writer compares such speculators to wreckers who falsify the coast-lights to mislead ships. Most men would consider lynching almost too easy a death for the latter offenders but the former generally escape with their booty without any punishment whatsoever, because the general public has no appreciation of the disastrously anti-social character of their conduct. Perhaps the speculators themselves are not fully aware of the damage they are causing society.

To see the full significance of this kind of speculation, let us recall how production in our present economic system is regulated. How does the farmer, the producer of raw material, the importer, the manufacturer know when the community wants a certain commodity? There is no central committee sitting in New York or London or Paris or Berlin to which he can apply for information. He cannot collect the information from the prospective buyers themselves. And yet he produces blindly unless he can get some indication of what is actually desired. The indicator he follows is price. It may not be an ideal indicator. Indeed some economists contend that market-value or price is not a good guide to the best use of the productive powers of society, inasmuch as it tends to the production of luxuries rather than of necessities since luxuries yield the greater profit. But, whether ideal or not, price is the indicator that the producer must follow. When the price of a commodity is high, he concludes that the supply is low or the demand large and increases his production. When the price is low, he concludes that supply is abundant or demand small and decreases his production, or at least does not increase it. To falsify the indicator, that is, to cause an artificial fluctuation of price without any relation to the equilibrium of supply and demand is to throw the whole producing-world into confusion.

Now, that is exactly what the professional speculator does when he manipulates the market. After a careful

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study of the whole situation, he concludes, let us say, that the supply of a certain raw material in constant demand is going to be scarce and therefore that the price, when this fact becomes known, is sure to go high. He wishes, therefore, to get as much as possible of the supply into his own hands. How does he, or rather, let us say, how does the syndicate to which he belongs, go about it? It scatters false reports about the amount of the supply in sight, that is, it gives people to understand that the supply will be abundant and the price low. It backs up its false reports by selling for future delivery and thus forces the price down. Others, less well informed, on seeing the downward trend of the generally reliable indicator, price, also sell. Their selling forces the price still further down and stimulates consumption,—in this case against the social interest since the supply is small. But, as the prices fall towards the lower levels, the manipulators themselves buy secretly and in a scattered way until they get a considerable portion of the supply within their control. Then at the psychological moment they buy quite openly and, as open buying always causes prices to rise, they are able to force the price of the commodity they deal in to a higher level than it would otherwise have reached. Thus by falsifying the indicator, price, they confuse the whole economic situation, ruin many of their business rivals and force the whole community to pay more for a commodity than would have been necessary, had speculation followed its more usual legitimate course. Our present economic system has many sleepless enemies attacking it from the outside but their blows are harmless compared with those dealt against it from within by its own professed friends. It is not surprising that Professor Henry Clay has likened them to wreckers who falsify the coast-lights.

Thus far I have discussed only the illegitimate speculation of the professional speculator. From the moral point of view, no doubt, he is the most guilty man on the exchange, for he knows what he does and deliberately chooses the evil. But for every big deliberate wrecker of the economic system

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there are a thousand petty gamblers who may be considered less guilty than he only because they do not generally know as clearly as he the social meaning of what they are doing. These are the so-called "lambs" or "fliers" or outsiders who have made no professional study of the markets or of any one commodity, who have no intention of actually receiving or delivering the goods they buy or sell, and who have seldom more than enough money (and often not enough) to maintain the margin they must put up on the price of their purchases. How large this kind of speculation is may be seen from the fact mentioned by Hadley that "the sales of certain commercial staples such as wheat, cotton, or petroleum in the New York market in some years are fifty times as great as the actual deliveries, and of the transactions in stocks, perhaps an equally small proportion represents purchases for investment." All these transactions can possibly mean, from a business point of view, is betting on the future price of commodities or of stocks. They are not based on careful study; they have in view no *bona fide* business; they are not forms of investment; they are simply bets or gambles, rendered possible by the standardizing of the great commodities such as cotton, wheat and wool, by the homogeneity of all the stocks of the same company of the same grade and by the fact that there is always a market and a market price for such things. The business-community, by standardizing commodities and stocks, aimed only at making possible an easy and rapid transaction of legitimate buying and selling but the gambler exploits the social machinery for his own speculative, individual ends.

The evil of such speculation does not consist in what is called trading on margin. Any form of buying on credit is really trading on margin. The farmer who buys land on a mortgage is working on a margin. The real evils are to be found elsewhere. In the first place, such speculation maintains in existence a parasitic class of brokers who are not needed at all for legitimate speculation. If it were not for the large flocks of lambs who come up to the markets

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every year to be sheared, most of the brokers whose labor is now wasted would have to become producers in order to get a living. In the second place, it is the outsiders or fliers who make possible the manipulation of the market by the professional wreckers. The glittering misinformation which is sent out by these men is meant to deceive the "lambs," and the ease with which they can be deceived puts a premium on the manipulation of the prices by the operators. As a consequence of their ignorant, though often self-confident, gambling, not only does the professional operator absorb their margin but through them hurts the community by causing unnecessary price-fluctuations. In the third place, such gamblers speculate with money which ought to be kept safe and not risked at all. To a man with a salary of, say, $2,000 per year, a loss of $500 does more harm than a gain of $500 does good, inasmuch as the loss is taken out of the necessaries of life whereas the gain is only added on to the luxuries. This would be true even if the losses and gains balanced, but of course they do not balance. Pitted against the professional operator the "lambs" have no chance and though now and then one of them may make a lucky hit and thereby set on fire the imagination of his neighbors, as a class their fate is to be shorn and exposed naked to the cruel elements. In the fourth place, the gambling habit exercises a demoralizing influence over the minds of all who indulge in it. It keeps them in a continuous state of feverish excitement; it distracts from the steady work on which their welfare as well as that of the community depends and it encourages in them a reckless, anti-social individualism which seeks only its own gain and pleasure, no matter what the cost may be to the group to which they belong.

To sum up all I have said in a few words: speculation has not only a legitimate but also a necessary place in our modern business-world. The speculator is only a highly specialized risk-taker and risks are inevitable so long as supply of raw materials and demand over the counter are uncertain. We may always test the legitimacy of specula-

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tion, therefore, simply by asking whether or not it tends to adjust supply and demand to one another and thus secure the best rate of consumption by the community. All forms of commodity-speculation which, with or without intention, tend to destroy the equilibrium of supply and demand are unquestionably anti-social and illegitimate. With almost equal certainty we may say that speculation in stocks is harmful. We may except speculation in the stock of new companies, for here the speculator may be helping to launch an enterprise that will serve a social end, but at least marginal speculation in the stock of old companies where the supply is fixed and therefore does not need to be adjusted to demand serves no useful social purpose and for the four reasons already given may be classed as illegitimate. The case concerning speculation in land is almost equally clear. While the area of land is fixed, land-usefulness and land-availability are not. Hence when the speculator in land actually brings buyer and seller together, when he ferrets out the possibilities of making land more useful, when he makes land accessible and therefore available by road or tramway or railroad, in a word, when he increases land-usefulness and land-availability, he serves a social purpose and is worthy of a reward. But when he merely buys land in the hope of a rise in price without doing anything to promote its usefulness or availability, that is, when he simply takes part in a speculative boom, he not only performs no social service but, by helping to keep land out of use and by promoting violent price-fluctuations, is guilty of a real social disservice.

What cure or cures we may ultimately find for the evils of speculation it is difficult now to foresee. The great danger in all drastic measures of reform is that while destroying the bad kinds of speculation we may do serious injury to the good and necessary kinds. The Exchanges themselves may do a great deal by constantly revising and rigorously enforcing their rules. The State may do something by gathering and making public all the information available concerning the great staples, by enforcing pub-

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licity of all stock-transactions and by extending its present legislation against gambling and betting to certain forms of stock-speculation. But after all the great source of illegitimate speculation is the rashness, greed, and gullibility of the general public, and these states of mind cannot be legislated out of existence. What is needed is a great moral and intellectual crusade against the low moral standards and the economic ignorance which the gambling practices of to-day show to be characteristic of so many people. It is their crazy worship of wealth, their unthinking and unethical eagerness to make something out of nothing, their unreasoning passion to get a place or to keep their place in the social whirl that drive so many people into the gambling habit. The only sure cure for that habit, therefore, is a new and sounder philosophy of life. The new generation must learn that the way to happiness lies, not through great fortunes legitimately or illegitimately made, but through work and home and friendship and art and music and literature and religion. If we could only get our children to see and practise that simple but profound lesson, the illegitimate speculation which is so great a curse to-day would begin to disappear because the source from which it now flows would be dried up.

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THE MODERN WORLD-ORDER AND THE ORIGINAL NATURE OF MAN.[1]

DANIEL BELL LEARY.

I

"WE shall be able," wrote Descartes, "to find an art, by which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens and all other objects, as clearly as we know the various trades of our artisans, we may be able to employ them in the same way for their appropriate uses and to make ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. And this will not be solely for the pleasure of enjoying with ease and by ingenious devices all the good things of the world, but principally for the preservation and improvement of all human health, which is both the foundation of all other goods and the means of strengthening and quickening the spirit itself." We have come to know the forces; we have, in a measure, mastered nature; but as for the rest of the program, we have, I contend, fallen far short. The modern world-order is but partial order; it is mere external tidiness; "The best is yet to be, The last of life for which the first was made."

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[1] A selected bibliography, covering the field of this brief essay, falls into three parts. First, those references applying biology or psychology to the problems of the individual and the group; Tead, O., *Instincts in Industry;* Wallas, G., *The Great Society,* and *Human Nature in Politics;* Lippmann, W., *Drift and Mastery,* and *A Preface to Politics;* Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War;* Veblen, T., *The Instinct of Workmanship,* and *Theory of the Leisure Class;* Thorndike, E. L., *Educational Psychology* (particularly Vol. I.); McDougall, W., *Social Psychology;* Marot, H., *The Creative Impulse in Industry;* Metchnikoff, E., *The Nature of Man,* and *The Prolongation of Life;* Parker, C., *The Casual Laborer;* Watson, J. B., *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist;* Loeb, J., *The Mechanistic Conception of Life;* Cory, H. E., *The Intellectuals and the Wage Workers;* Paul, E. and C., *Creative Revolution;* Russell, B., *Why Men Fight,* and *Proposed Roads to Freedom;* Walling, W. E., *Larger Aspects of Socialism;* Barnes, H. E., *Psychology and History;* Goldenweiser, A. A., *History, Psychology and Culture;* Bernard, L.L., *Transition to an Objective System of Social Control;* Woodworth, R. S., *Dynamic Psychology;* Pillsbury, W. B.,

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This quotation from Descartes exemplifies an ever-recurring reaction to the world and the society in which men have lived and toiled; it is but one example of the constant swing from one extreme to another. Two fundamentally different syntheses, two radically opposed generalizations, have had, at different times, the allegiance of men and women,—one, the romantic, mystical protest against nature and the world-order, and the other the scientific, classical, severely cold, intellectual jubilee. They overlap, they are seldom "pure," they contend, they rise and fall in relative strength and appeal, but each still speaks for supremacy. At the present moment, there is little doubt, the scientific attitude, the love for facts, the reverence for classification and description has the upper hand; we live in an age of science. Salvation is to be found in knowledge, here and now; the senses are supreme, particularly if they have had, in their investigations, the aid of instruments of precision. Romanticism and mysticism have had too little to show compared with the wonders of science; nor have their claims led to the same pragmatic *control* of affairs; science can *do*, whereas non-science may merely *feel*, and make vague promises for the future.

Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism; Partridge, G. E., *The Psychology of Nations;* Schneider, H. W., *Science and Social Progress;* Baldwin, J. M., *Darwin and the Humanities;* Conklin, E. G., *Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men;* Paton, S., *Human Behavior;* Martin, E. D., *The Behavior of Crowds;* Hayes, E. C., *Sociology and Ethics;* and many others.

A second group, of more philosophical nature, includes: Perry, R. B., *The Present Conflict of Ideals,* and *Present Philosophical Tendencies;* Holt, E. B., *The Freudian Wish,* and *The Concept of Consciousness;* Spaulding, E. G., *The New Rationalism;* Holt, Marvin, etc., *The New Realism;* Dewey, Moore, etc., *Creative Intelligence;* Mackenzie, J. S., *Elements of Constructive Philosophy;* and many other titles in the field of the newer realism.

The third group is more definitely Freudian, but in the wider sense: White, W. A., *Foundations of Psychiatry;* Rank and Sachs, *Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences;* Freud, S., *Totem and Taboo;* Abraham, K., *Dreams and Myths, a Study in Race Psychology;* Adler, A., *Study of Organ Inferiority and Its Psychical Compensation;* Bradby, M. K., *The Logic of the Unconscious Mind;* White, W. A., *Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After;* Kempf, E. J., *The Autonomic Functions and the Personality;* and many others, particularly in the field of abnormal psychology.

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But the vision of Descartes has been forgotten; science has indeed fulfilled its promise of control, but the purpose of that control has been lost sight of in the tremendous complexity of the wonders that have been laid bare. Man and nature have been divorced, and science has become, instead of the servant of man, his veritable taskmaster; human values are sacrificed to the ideal of "impersonal knowledge"; Man has become a recording device in the service of the environment. Even where science has apparently concerned itself with human values it has done so in what may properly be called an "inhuman," *i.e.*, an impersonal, way. Medical science, for example, has lengthened, tremendously, the span of life; has made it possible, by virtue of the control of disease, the disposal of waste and sewage, the elimination of birth-dangers, the discovery of antiseptics and vaccines, to live a healthier and a longer life. But the problem of Descartes is still thereby untouched; life is not, merely in virtue of its length, thereby valuable, enjoyable, desirable. Not yet has science intimately concerned itself with the *quality* of existence, with those inner sanctions which make life worth while, or with the outer conditions which would bring them about.

II

The present, then, is the era of science, of the fact valued as a fact, of interpretation and description in terms of quantity, organization, relationships. "It is commonly held," writes Veblen in *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, "that modern Christendom is superior to any and all other systems of civilized life. Other ages and other cultural regions are by contrast spoken of as lower, or more archaic, or less mature. The claim is, that the modern culture is superior on the whole, not that it is the best or highest in all respects and at every point. It has, in fact, not an all-round superiority, but a superiority within a closely limited range of intellectual activities, while outside this range many other civilizations surpass that of the modern occidental peoples. . . . The modern

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civilized peoples are in a peculiar degree capable of an impersonal, dispassionate insight into the material facts with which mankind has to deal." Science has become the court of appeal;—facts, it would seem, are indisputable.

The sincere inquirer, however, is perturbed at finding that the court of appeal,—science,—has not been quite as disinterested, as dispassionate, as broad and as thorough as first impressions and the propaganda of the partisans would indicate. The world of reason has indeed been quite thoroughly surveyed; the world of men, the province, so-called, of psychology, has yielded, too, its quota of facts; but the facts connecting them, the facts of the full, active, creative and living being are, as yet, less valued, less known, less investigated. "Other ages and other cultural regions" are indeed held to be lower, yet the estimate is based primarily on just the absence of such a system of facts; and it never occurs to anyone except, perhaps, the speculative reader and student of history, to compare the living values in terms of concrete returns to human beings associated in significant work one with another of, say, 500 B. C. and 1920. We confessedly have no art comparable with previous art; our literature is not to be ranked with that of many previous periods, nor our architecture, nor our music, nor our dress, nor, perhaps, our entire summed-up reaction to the universe as a home and a scene of adventure and progress.

Yet when we survey the social fabric that has inherited the conception of science and reason as the ideal and the goal of human activity, we are a bit at a loss to account for the quite evident turmoil and disintegration of that fabric. If science is the sum and substance of the task and province of man; if man is, by nature, training, historical inheritance and present choice, first and foremost a scientist, a surveyor of the world in terms of quantities and their group relationships, how comes it then, that he finds himself in such a strange and unsatisfactory world as even a casual survey of civilization to-day, shows us? Is science, in the light of the evidence, historical and contemporary, to be in any

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sense held responsible; either directly, as the immediate cause and occasion of the existing unsatisfactory and indeed intolerable conditions, or indirectly, in that attention to matters too purely descriptive and scientific has led human activity and human devotion on a false and unfruitful path? This is indeed a shibboleth; and as we answer we show our allegiance. From the point of view here being developed the answer is emphatically "Yes" in both senses; science has both directly precipitated the present in that it has made possible much of the recent barbarous "scientific" war, with its resultant train of evils, and indirectly, in that it has consistently, until recently, refused to consider, as worthy of scientific notice, the problem of human life in its essentially human aspects. In the world of descriptive formulæ, in the huge accumulation of facts as the reason apprehends them, man and his world have disappeared.

III

Who are the present "saviours" of the universe? Who are they, who, dissatisfied with a pre-eminently rational and factual world-order, have thrown off their allegiance to it and set out, in olden style, to create another world,— one more germane to their natures and aspirations, their desires and their purposes? Surely not the scientists, not the logicians, not the adepts in pure reason, not the collectors of facts, not those who have most laboriously striven to add yet one more generalization to the already incredible number which we have. We find rather our present saviours among the non-scientific, among the perhaps too radically emotional, among those who swear by "intuition," revelation, tradition, any and every principle but the principle of sufficient reason and the accumulated facts to support it. We need but to read such things as the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx, or his contributions to the papers of his period, the present utterances of Lenine and his followers, who carry on the same strain of thought and endeavor, the *Preamble* of the I. W. W., Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*, the writings of Loria, Pouget, Bakunine, and so on in an endless succession.

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It is here, strangely enough, that we find little or no attention to facts as facts—no fact of society or of history is so refractory that these enthusiasts cannot wrest from it the meaning and the doctrine they wish, and which they have, often, conceived before the facts were woven to support it, and it is here, too, that we find the most determined attempt to direct the universe, the real universe of man; the attempt, motivated with the strongest of human energies to "remould it nearer to the heart's desire." It is a strange condition of affairs, but one hardly to be criticized in the light of the development of science and the world of reason with the attendant neglect of the world of human affairs.

Some significant quotations, here, should be of interest. ". . . the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange, not in the *philosophy*, but in the *economics* of each particular epoch" (Engels). "It is not beliefs and ideas in general that constitute a factor in history, but only the special beliefs and ideas of the proprietary class. Beliefs and ideas were present in the hearts and minds of the slaves, the serfs and the wage-earners, but these beliefs and ideas have not had the least effect upon the march of history, for they have always been repressed by the beliefs and ideas of the patricians, the feudal lords and the capitalists" (Loria). One is well justified in wondering, in the light both of these quotations and the recent and contemporary action in terms of the ideas they present, whether the future will be as emphatically characterized by reason and science as the immediate past and present, or whether the conscious and bitter disappointment they depict will spread so far that a new world-order will be constituted. It is no idle question; history, it will be remembered, is but a swaying of values and emphases, and here is no mere wordy dissatisfaction of a rival science, of a competing metaphysics, but the cry of human beings in action, hunting in a pack what they have been as yet unable to get. To them the modern world-order is no order; to

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them other passions than the passion for knowledge and facts exists, to them no far-off millennium suffices to still the insistent inner desire for more and better life. Man, to be sure, is at times reasonable; but to think does not exhaust his activity, nor name all his functions.

If we seek for the philosophy of this reaction we find it, at its best perhaps, in Bergson, though Sorel too has many general principles in his *Reflections*. "Intelligence," writes Bergson, "applies itself to all things, but it remains outside them." "Philosophizing just consists in placing one's self, by an effort of intuition, in the interior of concrete reality." "Instinct . . . is a faculty of utilizing and constructing organized instruments. Intelligence is the faculty of constructing and utilizing unorganized instruments." While this, in itself, reflects the present protest against the results and the methods of pure thought and reason, it is rather the application of the protest in the concrete field of human endeavors that is significant of the possible changes in human surroundings and the present world-order. Sorel, in his *Reflections on Violence*, makes the application; and it is worth a sober and serious comparison with the methods and technique of science; a comparison that takes account, however, not only of "facts" but of emotions, purposes, ideals, whole-hearted activities. ". . . the general strike," he writes, "is indeed what I have said, *i.e.*, a body of images capable of invoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against modern society. Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the noblest, the deepest and the most moving sentiments that they possess; . . . We thus obtain that intuition of socialism which language cannot give us with perfect clearness — and we obtain it as a whole, perceived instantaneously." What can we say of all this? To call it mere nonense does not do away with it even as a mere "fact" for investigation; to call it emotional does not do away with the additional "fact" that emotions have a cause, and often, too, an uncanny way of "working themselves

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out" into action in support of or in congruence with them; to call it "unreasonable" is as useless; the fact persists and needs better consideration. The general conclusion is clear; in the minds of the adherents of these doctrines, or in their hearts, if you prefer the phrase, the promise of science has not been fulfilled, the world has not become even approximately as the "vision of fulfilled desire" conceived it, and since science has not made the promised reconstruction, the conclusion is drawn that it cannot.

IV

The world of reason is, indeed, a curious world; quantity, relationship of one quantity to another, an external description of concatenated events, a world with neither First Cause, nor Final End, a world entirely necessary, and from the beginning quite definitely to be as it now actually is, and with every event of the future quite as definitely a necessary sequent to the present total situation and the events which will, also necessarily, come in between; a world where success and failure are determined in advance, but where, curiously enough, the element of striving and loafing is a determined part of the determined sum total,—a world, in short, that is not at all the world which naïve inspection and lifelong unphilosophical experience declare it to be. A world of reason, but in another sense a very unreasonable place! Yet on what has such a conclusion been based; what is the nature of the evidence which has shown our universe to be so emphatically and undoubtedly a most undesirable home for human activity,—where yet that human activity is a seemingly necessary part of the whole? Nowhere has science *found* a real cause, nowhere has she definitely and unmistakably *shown* the necessary connection between even two events;—science has only description to show, to point to proudly as the sum and substance of the centuries of work and organization; a description, to be sure, which enables us to find our way about in the manifold details and intricacies of the universe and its many perplexities, but which, far from being a final and irrevocable revelation of the nature of

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the universe, is but a guidebook to its curiosities and its points of interest and value. It is, in a sense, a huge card catalogue of the things which one should know before undertaking a serious project; things one should *know*, to be sure, but the knowledge of which does not in any sense exhaust the full meaning of a project undertaken. The "facts," then, of science are not at issue, and are indeed among the most valuable of the inheritances of the present era, but in the facts, search as we will, we do not find the man.

With the facts then we have no quarrel; though, as is apparent, they are not quite as immutable as it would sometimes appear, nor is the present less characterized by changes in the "facts" than previous eras. We need not, to carry this to extreme, assert that the facts are as we make them, as we designedly find them; the present argument, it will be remembered, is not epistemological; it takes for granted as a theory of knowledge, that we *do* know things as they are, or at least *can* so know them, though that knowledge may grow more complete from time to time; it is sufficient to realize that we do find them very often different to-day and to-morrow, for more important and fundamental issues of our argument are involved. Science is, in the main, at least in its earlier stages in any given field of activity, analytical rather than synthetic or constructive, and in so being has, undesignedly perhaps, but none the less thoroughly investigated and described not the Universe as a whole, but selected portions thereof, neglecting many areas, until but recently, and some even to the present moment. Yet the world does not seemingly function as such a mere conglomeration of associated but uncoördinated parts, but as a whole, and the investigation which draws conclusions about the sum total from an examination of parts, is either false in its conclusions, or must establish the verity of the principle whereby it may judge of all from a part. Knowledge of a *this* plus a *that* plus a *something else*, however accurate our knowledge of each, in so far as it really is such separate knowledge, tells us nothing of their coöperative meaning and associated activity. This particular habit of separate

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investigations, with resultant accumulations of facts in separate departments of research, is emphatically open to question in the special separation of man and nature. As science and reason would have it, Nature is a field for investigation by Man, both Man and Nature being conceived though not always directly and overtly stated as separate, and separably subject to investigation. Man and Nature, as stated in an earlier section, are viewed as partners in a seemingly transitory sense, not at all as merely opposite aspects of an inseparable and evolved and constantly transforming unity, each aspect of which has both contributed and received modifications in the course of their mutual and differential evolution. However true the facts, the observations and the relationships of fact to fact obtained on such a basis; however accurately they depict certain aspects of the universe,—the mathematical or quantitative, say,—they miss the *whole* quality and significance of the world we live in in as decisive, if not momentous a way as the acknowledged inefficient and *un*scientific thought of primitive man. Facts are valuable facts only in relation to an observer, a human being, and when stripped of all such human reference and made, as it were, "facts in themselves," they become ipso facto, devoid of meaning, until again brought into human relationship via some given human purpose, some plan, some intention which, while using the fact, colors it with things quite other than the merely descriptive and numerical characteristics of the world of pure reason. In the mind of a human being with a purpose ahead of him, facts become "humanized" and quite other than "facts in themselves," and it is in this wider sense of the word facts that science may yet come to be the actual creator of the promised world of the earlier period; but much more reinterpretation and much more reorganization lies between than is roughly indicated above.

But this method of isolation and consequent loss of human value has led to even graver consequences in the division of the nature of the human being himself into a so-called "knowing" or intellectual ability plus an emotional

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activity plus sundry other abilities and capacities or aspects of being, and then ranking as of first and prime importance the results and the products of the "knowing" faculty. This knowing faculty, so it would seem, in the light of the edicts of the world of reason, is the one and only action or ability of a human being which gives as a result knowledge of the universe; all else is "subjective," transitory, unsatisfactory, temporary, personal, and mingled with error and falsehood. When we can measure, describe, and in a wholly external and objective way be conscious of an object, then and only then do we truly know it; such at least is the statement of the followers of the world of reason. But let our emotions, our wishes, desires or impulses enter into an investigation: let an effort to ascertain the truth become confused with traces of such things, and the result is,—nothing; nothing, at least, in the eyes of science and the world of reason. Yet when we survey the course of the evolution of man from the lower animals, we find no place at which there has been a definite creation of intellect: rather a gradual growth in the complexity of both structure and function, where increased complexity of structure has been accompanied by a correlated growth of complexity in behavior, so that we can, very properly, doubt that worms, say, exhibit much in the way of syllogistic reasoning, but are quite at a loss to show when and where a definite beginning was made in intellectual forms of behavior toward the universe. Intellect, that is, is rather a result, a gradual accumulation of many other kinds of behavior, with a corresponding parallel increase in the delicacy and retentiveness of nerve tissue; with the result that in man, as a late product of evolutionary development, the process is so complex that we call it thinking, and endow him with a "mind." But all life has conduct, of one sort or another; all life makes some adjustments, has some sensitivity, and we can hardly deny to such life that, in some sense, and a very fundamental sense at that, it "knows" the universe. It reacts, it accomplishes purposes, it survives, it perishes, it propagates,—and in a less complex and detailed way, in a less descriptive and concep-

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tual sense, it has "knowledge." We can hardly go back to the days of Descartes and call all but human beings mere automatons, mere machines. On any such basis of reasoning we would need include the thinking human being also;—nor to be sure, has science been found unwilling to this. When we smell a rose, when we handle it, when we buy it to decorate our own or someone else's person, do we not know it; or is our knowledge of it exhausted by a description of it in terms of light vibrations, the molecular weight of its component parts, the formula of its perfume, the weight it has as an individual specimen? Does reacting to it as an object of beauty, as something that we think gives us "hay fever," as something that expresses our love or devotion,—does none of this have any significance in the world of human affairs, and is none of this *knowledge*, because it is so intimate, so personal, so transitory, so mingled with the human and the social?

To sum up, then, and avoiding the very evident metaphysical implications which bristle throughout all the foregoing, we must realize with increasing clearness that we are become, through age-long inheritance, beings of a highly complex nature, with many "action patterns," many types of conduct, of which the intellectual is but one, and that life and living is not "for" any particular one of them, but, on the contrary, they are all "for" life and living. We do not live in order to think, nor yet to express emotions; rather we think, if we can, in order to live, to preserve the life we have not asked for, and we react emotionally for the same wise "reason," perhaps, though the reason is an afterthought. Science we shall always need; there is no solution for the present situation in terms of *un*science, superstition, or a purely primitive emotional and wishful attitude toward an unknown and feared world; but the new science must be humanistic in its clearly visioned purpose of reconstruction. There must be no sitting by the wayside of knowledge to merely gaze in wide-eyed wonder at the findings of human research, but careful haste to evaluate and apply them to human problems. MacIver, in writing of an associated

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problem, says, "Science provides the means, but we badly need enlightenment as to the ends they serve. Science shows the road to productivity, but productivity for what? If by our social indifference and lack of direction we increase productivity by means which degrade the producer, what good is that to society? . . . Productivity is justified only by the welfare it makes actual."

V

The present has seen or is about to see a rediscovery of man and society. We are, as it were, astonished to find that man is so complex, so curious, so sensitive, so easily deranged, so readily misled,— and yet so easily understood, if we but give him, as man and as member of a group of human beings, the intensity and consistency of study that we have given to his environment. And the present rediscovery of man and society is a psychological one; man and his social aggregations are no longer described in terms of atoms, forces, physical and chemical formulæ, no mere phrase of "distributions of energy," or "increases in heterogeneity" will satisfy the inquirer or the investigator; man and his world, both individual and group, are explained and described in terms of feelings, thoughts, wishes, impulses, instincts, emotions, purposes, ideals, and a whole coterie of such qualitative concepts. The most trivial things, to a first attention or acquaintance, have seemingly had the most tremendous effects; not only in the life history of a given man, but in the longer history of a group or a large society; and we can readily see, in the light of our present knowledge, that this has always been so and perhaps always will be. We have become aware, in perhaps a more intimate way than was given to any previous age, of the drama of the individual life and its complex results when compounded with other such individual dramas in the tremendously complex interaction of many individuals in a group. Yet science has hitherto had little or nothing to say of all this; it is essentially not a matter of mere quantitative results or summaries; we do not know the nature of human

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consciousness by stating the norm and the deviation therefrom; we know the nature of consciousness by its fruits and its co-ordinated activities.

The new man is the strange product of a disinterested scientific investigation with all the paraphernalia of instruments, laboratories and experiments; it is the product of science, however, and as usual, only in the descriptive sense, for no science as yet (if we exclude sociology and education as not coming within the province of science), has undertaken to use that knowledge for the rehabilitation of human values in a reconstructed world. Nor can this statement be made too often; for the tradition is still with us that in accurately describing a given subject of investigation, in plotting its relationships to other existing subjects of a similar type, and in giving also, perhaps, its evolutionary history, we have exhausted the investigation. It is rather the contention, here, often reiterated, that with the attainment of such a stage of knowledge, the investigation and the solving of the problem have but begun. What, then, has the laboratory brought forth? In a sense, a new Frankenstein; for it is just in terms of the new psychology that the whole quarrel has started, and it is in terms of the structure of the newly discovered man that we must answer the questions he and his ancestors have from time immemorial asked. It is in no new sense that man and men ask, What is the purpose of life? How am I to fill my days? What is my relation to my neighbor and to the community? These are age-old questions, and they have been answered with age-old sophistries, with words that have, at times cleverly, and at times clumsily turned the edge of the questions. But this time, in the light of the new knowledge of man and his nature, we can, if we will, answer with truth and exactness. And our answer, if it be honest, reverses many of the old answers, and we find man, not knowledge, man in his dynamic activity, to be the heart of the universe; a universe which has no meaning except with reference to man and his nature, for "meaning" is a human term.

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What, then, is the nature of man? Again we cannot follow out in all the ramifications and technical details the new story of the new man; a brief summary must suffice. A man is both a repository of past racial and biological activities and experiences, an accumulator and organizer of new experiences on such a basis, and finally, a dynamic instrument of reaction in the light of purposes and desires, some of which he has also inherited and some of which are the product of his personal span of existence and consciousness. The first element, the racial and biological, results in certain propensities to act thus and so in a given situation; that is, given a situation in the environment, man will, apart from training and personal experience, tend to act in a given manner. This, in the young child, is relatively simple, but the course of personal experience and growth often complicates, without destroying the original element, such primitive modes of response. Emotions, instinctive activities, reflexes, are such types of conduct, and it needs but a very little unbiased observation of self or neighbor to form a very wholesome estimate of both the power and the variety as well as the frequency of action based in whole or in part on such inherited bases. The second element, the accumulated and organized elements of experience, again offers a fertile field for observation and experiment; how much of what, as adults, we do and desire to do, is based on very early, and perhaps forgotten experiences, complicated, it may be, by the first, more fundamental element of racial inheritance?

But the third element, projected dynamic action, on the bases of both personal and inherited possibilities, must needs be emphasized as much, if not more, than the other two, for man does not act merely or always, or perhaps even oftenest, "from the past," on the basis of the past, just as past, but from a purpose, visioned in the future, from a dissatisfaction with the present, and from a perception that, with the materials both of his own nature and the external environment, of which he is so vital and intimate a part, he may reconstruct, reorganize, and bring about that situation

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which will more nearly satisfy the desires and purposes which flow through him. His efforts are, to be sure, conditioned by that past, limited in many directions, unlimited perhaps in others, but effort and the consequent results soon show both the limits and the free fields of open possibilities.

The whole man, then, the "new" man, in the psychologic meaning of the term, is no mere seeker after knowledge,—nor happiness either for that matter,—but an immensely complicated system of reactions, a psycho-physical instrument, directing its efforts and energies to the attainment of purposes, some remote, some near, some simple and some complex, succeeding and complicating one another in an infinitely varied way, never, in a practical sense of the words, the same in a given individual, and never duplicating themselves in separate beings. To state the whole description of the previous paragraph from the inner or neurological point of view, we find that, at any given moment, certain of the systems of neurons associated with the mechanism and manifestation of a given action (be it instinctive, emotional, learned or what not), are "ready to act"; they are physiologically and biologically in a state of well being, they are well fed and, as it were, on a hair-trigger. Under such conditions, if the environment offers the proper stimulus for the inherent response of the nerve group in question, it "goes off," we perform the action in question, we function as our nature has been ready and poised to act,—and the result is biological and psychological satisfaction and well-being so far as that portion of the whole system is concerned. When we are hungry, when our digestive system is ready for food, when we, in common terms, and with no competing desires to complicate the situation, desire food,—to eat is pleasant, and not to do so is unpleasant;—and the terms pleasant and unpleasant have no further significance than the biological one already given. Pleasantness in a response implies the condition of readiness, and the condition of readiness implies the pleasantness for the subsequent response, and the union of the two will continue till the response is due not to a readiness of the neurons involved, but some external

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condition of force or necessity. On the contrary, to eat from mere formality or social pressure, when the system is not ready to function in that way is unpleasant; and again the terms have, here, simply biological and neurological significance. It is the same for any other activity in which we indulge or are able, on the basis of heredity or experience and habit, to indulge in; to be awake when the system calls for sleep, to be forced to sleep or to pretend sleep when action is preferred, to sit when we desire action, to exercise when we are neurologically ready for rest, to restrain an emotion when we would, on the above basis, rather express or experience it, to be forced to show the external signs of sympathy when we feel none or its opposite, all these are but random and elementary examples of the facts involved in the activities of human beings in their daily lives, and would, in each case, involve the biological unpleasantness which we have described above. Other similar elements of biological significance enter into the full explanation of the well being of man's inherited and acquired system of reactions, purposes and desires, but such details do not concern us here.

It is in the application of these principles to the field of ordinary everyday life that their significance becomes apparent, and the glaring defects of our social system become clear. A number of books treating of just this biological and psychological error in our social structure have recently appeared, and their number is constantly increasing. And it is noteworthy that philosophy and psychology, in the instances of many recent contributions, seem to share to a considerable extent both the field of their research and discussion, as well as the methods they use and the conclusions to which they come; indeed, it is difficult at times to say whether a given text is primarily a psychology or a philosophy or even a sociology. They constitute a partial bibliography for the present article. (See note on first page of this article.)

Examples illustrating the statements of the last paragraph are not difficult to find. To name, specifically, only a few

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of the instincts or innate capacities for acting or wanting to act in a certain way, when the stimulus is offered, or wanting to so act through inner readiness even when the external stimulus or situation is lacking, we find, among others, the following: the instinct of gregariousness, the herd or group tendency; the instinct of curiosity, the tendency or desire to manipulate, examine,—to make; its close associate, the tendency to be mentally active, to think, to ruminate; to be kind, to act as a parent, to be motherly, fatherly, in an unsophisticated sense of the terms; to acquire, possess and own, to collect; to hunt; to be afraid; to be angry, to fight; to be a leader and to dominate; to show off, to be vain; to follow and be subordinate; to revolt at physical confinement, compulsion or force; to be sexual, to be attracted by the other sex; as well as more complicated abilities and capacities, partly native and partly learned, which do not concern us here. Even the above, to be sure, simple as they may appear, are perhaps to be later analyzed into still simpler and more primitive "responses" to "situations," due to the nature of the organism and its organization.

On the basis of the argument presented, which is in turn founded on the objective evidence of the laboratory work in psychology so recently done, it is quite evident that social and industrial life, as at present organized, most emphatically does not offer adequate opportunity for the exercise of these mechanisms, nor for the resultant well-being of the individual. For example, many of our men and women can never, under present conditions, become parents, nor even in the absence of that satisfy the instinct of sex, at one and the same time one of the most primitive, one of the most imperious and one of the most repressed in our social structure. And it is to be noted that, whether rightly or wrongly, the present Freudian analysis holds that much social inefficiency as well as downright abnormality and non-social action on the part of individuals is due to a mis-functioning or lack of functioning of this and associated mechanisms. Nor can an instinct of workmanship be used in the monotonous, simplified, uninteresting work of many

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of our industrial workers; the strike, at least, is their own creation, and in addition to offering satisfaction to still other mechanisms, also gives some exercise to the instinct of workmanship, leadership and self-assertion. So with the rest; one and all, as responses of the normal human being they do not find the appropriate stimulæ in the world of present-day conditions; we all, whatever our social position, whatever our place in the present complexities of civilization, find ourselves balked, time and time again, and in every given direction, by a taboo and a restraint which has grown up under the influence of a one-sided emphasis on certain human abilities and certain human products. The world of reason and the products of science do not offer, in any sense of the words, an outlet or a stimulus for the normal, complete functioning of the normal complete human being; they satisfy but one mechanism,—the capacity, and the desire to manipulate, to examine, to think. But it will hardly be asserted by even the most ardent defender of the present world-order that it is given to all of us, or even to any considerable part of the present social body, here or in Europe, to think in a purely or emphatically constructive and professional sense, in a new or productive direction and hence to find in such activity a wholly satisfying outlet for all the inherited proclivities and abilities. We who have, in any sense of the words, preserved, even approximately, our normal capacities and abilities and who still function as approximate wholes, can only give praise and thanks to the relatively rich and generous environment in which we have grown up.

It is always a matter of proportions. Contrast with the normal state of a normal human being such pictures as Parker presents in his analysis of the *Casual* (unskilled) *Laborer*. "The powerful forces of the working class environment which thwart and balk instinct expressions are suggested in the phrases monotonous work, dirty work, simplified work, mechanized work, the servile place of labor, insecure tenure of the job, hire and fire, winter unemployment, the ever found union of the poor district with the

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crime district. . . . If we postulate some sixteen odd unit psychic characters which are present under the laborer's dirty blouse and insistently demand the same gratification that is with painful care planned for the college student, in just what kind of perverted compensations must a laborer indulge to make endurable his existence? A Western hobo tries in a more or less frenzied way to compensate for a general all-embracing thwarting of his nature by a wonderful concentration of sublimation activities on the wander instinct. . . . The balked laborer here follows one of the two described lines of conduct: First, either weakens, becomes inefficient, drifts away, loses interest in the quality of his work, drinks, deserts his family; or, secondly, he indulges in a true type-inferiority compensation and in order to dignify himself, to eliminate for himself his inferiority in his own eyes, he strikes or brings on a strike, he commits violence or he stays on the job and injures machinery. . . . His condition is one of mental stress and unfocused psychic unrest, and could in all accuracy be called a definite industrial psychosis. He is neither wilful nor responsible, he is suffering from a stereotyped mental disease." A rather serious yet ludicrous culmination of an age which long ago promised so much, and promised it in the name of all humanity, and to the end of physical and spiritual well-being; and a rather serious indictment of the science that knows so much and can do, in a human sense, so little!

VI

What, then, can be done; and on what basis; and to what end? What can be done is to change the environment which confronts the human being from his birth to his death, the social environment, that is; for it is in it rather than in the fabled "Nature," red in tooth and claw, that we live as human beings; the basis is the new knowledge of human nature; the end, the realization of the old promise of science and the world of reason. In no uncertain sense psychology is the present "science of the sciences"; born, to be sure, of an older science, imbued with its methods, but rich in a new

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knowledge that can turn the older knowledge that produced it to human and wholly human ends. But though the end is clear, the means for attaining it are not, though several steps in such a reconstruction may be briefly indicated. Parker writes, with the same problem in mind, "The dynamic psychology of to-day describes the present civilization as a repressive environment. For a great number of its inhabitants, a sufficient self-expression is denied. There is for those who care to see, a deep and growing unrest and pessimism. . . . If we are to play a part in the social readjustment immediately ahead, we must put human nature and human motives into our basic hypotheses. Our value concept must be the yardstick to measure just how fully things and institutions contribute to a full psychological life. We must know more of the meaning of progress. . . ."

The first step would seem to be an even more complete analysis and understanding of the fundamental characteristics of human beings, as individuals and as groups, together with an accurate understanding of what situations call forth the responses which have been thus ascertained, and an estimation of the present environmental and social conditions favoring such responses or inhibiting them. This would be but the crude material, the *sine qua non* of a reconstructive period; we need, as has often been said, a criterion of progress, a goal to which to work, as well as a principle by which to organize our efforts. But this again, by the very nature of the case, and on the basis of the argument which has been constantly advanced here, must be a concept made up of human characteristics, of generalizations about human nature, of opportunities and openings related to the human nature which so ardently desires to "progress," and which has sought such devious ways to do so. We can, to retain the level of the present discussion, and to avoid the necessity of purely academic arguments and issues, refer to the often quoted maxim, "the greatest good for the greatest number," and suggest that it be understood to mean "the completest functioning, biological and psychological, for

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each human being consistent with the same functioning for every other, and the consequent modification of the social environment to so permit." This, while vague enough, at least gives real content to the phrase of the older maxim, "the greatest good," for in the latter the "good" is quite undefined, whereas in the biological and psychological senses of the term it is quite apparent, as has been shown, what is "good" and what is "not good." It is, moreover, also quite apparent that it is no longer a matter of an a priori sketch of what is possible for the individual to do, what is permissible for the single unit to respond to and to express, but rather has become a problem, subject to control, of trying our various situations, and seeing the actual results. We need not dogmatize, we need not lay down "reasonable" rules, we need but experiment and see, and do so in a broader and more social sense than we have ever done before. In his *Proposed Roads to Freedom*, Russell depicts just such choices, such bases for trial and experiment, such new states of associated living as have not been tried, and we stand to gain or lose by adherence to or by avoidance of this sort of flexibility in our societal evolution. Science and history, for example, may give us the facts about the growth and the present state of property, marriage or what not; psychology can and does give us the facts as to the relation of property and original human nature; but nothing but experiment can tell us what fundamental changes in the present system would do for the individual and the group. Such experiments are being made; in the light, perhaps, of knowledge and research and a study of human nature, in Russia, though a study of the present evidence would indicate, rather, that the present experiment there is more in the nature of a tremendous psychic reaction to intolerable conditions than a carefully thought-out program of social experimentation, carefully watched and jealously evaluated; a most excellent and telling example of just what repression and lack of psychological and biological freedom and health will result in, when the repressive barriers are removed or weakened. Russia is emphatically an example of the con-

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tentions of the present paper, as even a brief consideration of her social and cultural history shows. So we need, as has been said several times, careful experiments and watchful manipulation of social and human activities, in the method but not with the aloofness and bias of science rather than a mystic and emotional, perhaps hysterical swamping of all that the present age has inherited and so carefully developed and increased. That the present situation of man in society is intolerable to all but a chosen few is apparent; that it will change, and that a different society with different values and emphases will appear is as inevitable as the end of the individual life and the succession of a new quota of individuals with some of our prejudices and some of our ideals; *how* it will change, and *to what* it will change are problems that demand our most whole-hearted interest and activity, for on us depends part at least of the resultant civilization, part at least of the coming revised schedule of interests and methods, institutions and freedoms.

Another element in any reconstruction is candid self-examination; a weighing of our social and societal fitness and worthiness; a determination of what we as individuals are doing and have done to hinder or help the development and functioning of other human beings, in our respective positions of social, economic or professional power and influence; of what we are prepared to do, as individuals and as associated members of active groups, to investigate, report, experiment, and venture; what we are prepared to lose that others, ourselves included, may gain. It is particularly as teachers that we can function for the reconstruction of society, for the coming of the essentially human society, where repression will be at a minimum, and where the emphasis will be on creative activity, biological and psychological self-expression, tempered only by the equally biological and psychological desire for companionship of equal nature; for the class-room offers, in spite even of "courses of study," unequalled opportunity for the development of whole-human-beings, with its selected environment, its minimization of the severer consequences of error, and

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its possibilities for experimentation. Educational theory has come near to being the fundamental social and philosophical theory of the recent years, for the inherent problem of education is just the problem of the present paper, and no problem more closely touches the welfare of the individual or the group than the problem of the meaning and the conduct of life.

Still another element is a pooling of interests on the part of the many separate sciences, and the adoption, consciously and explicitly, of an essentially human point of view, human in that it overtly recognizes that knowledge and knowing represent but partial and infrequent activities of human beings; and human in that it recognizes Nature as a portion of Man, and that results obtained and measurements made in the former are, in the last analysis, of value only in the light of immediate or remote use on behalf of human beings; human in that it directs attention not merely to the quantitative aspects of both human nature and the human environment, but that it recognizes also the qualitative elements of existence. One can well imagine a huge Committee of Social Welfare and Progress, to which all significant material and all new discoveries would be, as a matter of course, forwarded, and where, in the light of the respective member's reaction, representing every and all scientific and social interests, the essential meaning and value for present social and human plans would be extracted, and situations and conditions adjusted to meet them, to make them actual. Such a social clearing house has been a dream in many periods of history; such, perhaps, will be the outcome of the present social dissatisfaction, which has resulted in the criticism and the destruction, in part, at least, of every institution; such would be, indeed, a vindication of science and the accumulated results of its years of research in the world of reason; but a vindication that will be won only on the basis of a consideration of the *human significance of knowledge* which the immediate past has not shown.

DANIEL BELL LEARY.

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO.

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DISCUSSION.

Rationalism and the Sex Instinct.

As an adherent of rationalism I should like to take issue briefly with the article by Professor Stoops in the October, 1921, number of this Journal. This article indicates that the Freudians, to which school Professor Stoops subscribes, either hold widely different opinions of rationalism or are changing their opinion. Numerous writers have contended within the past few years that reason is a minor factor in conduct; that it merely frames explanations for intentions determined by instinct. What a different view is that presented by Professor Stoops! According to him rationalism and other intellectual schools have directly or indirectly caused a "dualism between the sex life of the race and the volition of the individual" (p. 41); and have at times "suppressed the most volcanic of all instincts," that of sex (p. 44).

This view is of course much nearer the truth than is the other, and a still further advance will have been made when these writers come to realize that, while reason has occasionally erred on the side of asceticism or that of licentiousness, it has in the main followed the normal temperate course; and that during the past hundred years or more it has vigorously championed the normal sex life, the beauty of love, and the institution of the family, vanquishing the opponents 30 to 50 years before Freudism appeared on the scene.

Let us now state the position of rationalism. Reason not only governs the intellectual processes; it also determines the instincts. The instincts do not persist except in so far as they conform to reason. Now, physical hunger is rationally a comparatively continuous urge, since the bodily tissues need replenishing daily or oftener. But the sex instinct is not rationally a continuous urge, since in the higher animal life and in human life, with the low mortality, its exercise for the propagation of life is needed at only a few intervals. The pressure of natural law and civilization tend gradually to restrict the sex function, and to punish with venereal disease, overpopulation, famine, and war, all perversions and excesses.

The sex instinct normally is far less powerful and less continuous than the Freudians contend. It is aroused in children and

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stimulated in adults not so much by its own spontaneous urge as by erroneous teachings and suggestive scenes and customs—in other words by perverse intellectual methods. Its total energy in the aggregate dynamics of life is small. It can be overdeveloped and be caused to draw on and weaken other forms of energy and thought; but there is little evidence that it is ever transferred or sublimated. Rather, the increased energy supposed to come from sublimation is the normal operation of the other faculties when the sex excitement is allayed. The long-distance activities in rearing children and maintaining the home are inspired in the main, not by the sex instinct, but by rational ideals.

Knowledge, pleasure, conscience, individuality, and freedom, says Professor Stoops, are not ends in themselves (p. 59). The chief fundamental ends, he argues, are the maintenance of life through the hunger instinct and the propagation of life through the sex instinct. He appears to reverence what he calls "the old abandon, the old immediate joy, in the flow of the tides of the race" (p. 42). Just what this philosophy means and involves one is reluctant to say.

Vigorous issue should be taken with the idea, held by him and in one form or another by a great number of other writers, that "the advent of reason occurred but yesterday in the history of the race." The fact is that all through the life of humanity, the development of plant and animal life, and the infinite cosmic eons, reason, in part immanently, in part consciously, has determined the ends of existence and has regulated the numerous faculties and energies in the interest of all. So in the future it must wield control, including the regulation of the sexual processes. Not within a hundred years has a representative rationalist failed to uphold the normal sexual life, and it is to be hoped that in the next hundred or thousand years none will advocate a development beyond the normal.

CYRUS H. ESHLEMAN.

LUDINGTON, MICH.

REPLY BY PROFESSOR STOOPS.

Our critic is not attempting to understand sex; he is trying to defend rationalism. "The instincts do not persist except in so far as they conform to reason." Is this the explanation of the crowding of the birth-rate in China and Japan to the limit of

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economic subsistence? Does our critic hold that because birth-control exists in our cities this means that "natural law" and "civilization" are in a corresponding fashion "restricting the sex function"?

We did not assert that "reason is a minor factor in conduct." Reason is a precious achievement of evolution. But reason of an experimental sort is one thing, and an *a priori* reason which "determines" out of existence whatever does not "conform" to its own preconceived standards is another thing.

Hunger and sex are basic ends, but there are other ends such as religion, the state, vocation and art. These ends, however, exist because man has certain needs and cravings, and not because of some *a priori* determining principle of rationality. Reason of an experimental sort which organizes the instinctive dispositions and correlates them in their relations to the environment is perhaps the most valuable thing in life.

J. D. STOOPS.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE MEETING OF EXTREMES IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. By Bernard Bosanquet, Fellow of the British Academy. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. xxviii, 220. Price, 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

The productivity of Dr. Bosanquet is astonishing; some may even think that he works a little too rapidly. Perhaps it may be conceded that there is some tendency to sketchiness in his treatment of great subjects and an occasional elusiveness in his style; but one cannot but wonder at the extent of his knowledge, the comprehensiveness of his surveys, the many-sideness of his appreciations, and the calm and tolerant spirit with which he regards the widely divergent modes of thought with which he deals. In the present work he is concerned with various recent types of Idealism and Realism. Like a good many others now, he does not care to describe his own philosophical attitude by either of these highly ambiguous terms; and his main object in the present work is to show that extreme interpretations of either side of the antithesis tend to lead to similar misconceptions. Most of what he has to say about this lies somewhat outside of the province of this JOURNAL; but he makes some references to ethics that have a good deal of interest. It may be well to quote the most important passage (pp. 186–7).

He begins with the following extract from Professor Hoernle's recent work on *Neo-Realism and Religion*—"[Neo-realism] shares the belief in the perfectibility of the world ('Meliorism') with the Pragmatism of James and the Instrumentalism of Dewey. In eliminating from religion all supernatural elements and identifying it with the hope of and the endeavour for a more glorious future for mankind, it presents the same marriage of Naturalism and Philanthropy which was characteristic already of Comte and Mill and the 'religion of humanity.'"

"Everywhere, in fact," Dr. Bosanquet proceeds, "we have a popular movement as of the ethical societies. And this I take for an important symptom. Those who have had actively to do with institutions of this type know how simple and how attractive their attitude to life can be made to appear. You admit that there is duty and happiness, and a world to be made better, it is

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not necessary to decide how far—and, *voilà tout.* All can co-operate, all can sympathise, up to a certain point. And I call their frequency and the general appeal of the moralistic attitude an important symptom of the one-sidedness of the spirit it represents, because, as Professor Alexander's acute insight informs him, it does not supply a really adequate solution of the problem. The passions for nature, or beauty, or morality, or truth 'may be happiness enough in the lives of some and serve them in place of religion, but they are not the religious passion and only simulate it.' It seems to me quite plain that this verdict covers the whole of the neo-realistic and neo-idealistic pretensions to a religious attitude, excepting, so far as we have seen that it recognises the special relevant experience and its speculative foundation, Professor Alexander's own. The point is that for the ethical attitude man's perfectibility is taken as realised in the unending series of events. This is an obvious contradiction, which no conception of endless approximation is able to remove."

It will be remembered that some remarks of a similar kind are to be found in Dr. Bosanquet's earlier book, "Some Suggestions in Ethics." It will be remembered also that in his other recent book, "What Religion is," he has given a very striking exposition of his own conception of the religious attitude. Members of ethical societies can hardly fail to be impressed by such statements from one who was for many years the first chairman of the committee of the first ethical society in England, and also by the statement that he quotes from Professor Alexander (*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 407), who was one of the most valued lecturers in the same society. Perhaps there is some exaggeration in the criticisms that have been directed against such societies, especially as referring to that particular society; for I believe most of the leading representatives of that society (including, no doubt, Dr. Bosanquet and Professor Alexander themselves) were well aware that the ethical attitude by itself is not a satisfactory substitute for religion. But it is, of course, true that the last quarter of the 19th century, during which most of the ethical societies grew up and flourished, was a time of metaphysical agnosticism. This attitude began somewhat earlier in Germany. Matthew Arnold's saying about Goethe's conviction—"Art still has truth, take refuge there,"—only half true for Goethe, could never have had much acceptance in England. Its English equivalent was "Morality still has truth, take refuge there."

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This was preached by Matthew Arnold himself, as well as by Carlyle and Ruskin and many others, and it resulted in the very remarkable stream of ethical writings that appeared in England at the end of the century. The new century has taken on a somewhat different colour, partly in consequence of the deeper agnosticism that has been directed against morality itself by such writers as Nietzsche, Samuel Butler, and many others, and partly by the development of more constructive theories of metaphysics. Dr. Bosanquet and Professor Alexander have certainly been among the greatest architects of such new constructions; and they have earned the right to criticise those laggards who have not been able to advance along with them.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

MORAL THEORY: an Introduction to Ethics. By G. C. Field. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1921. Pp. x, 214. Price, 6*s*. net.

Within its self-imposed limitations—it is an introduction to Ethics as opposed to a manual—Mr. Field has written a stimulating criticism. To begin with, the ethical theories of Kant and Aristotle are criticised, as represented in the *Ethics* and the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*. He finds Aristotle wanting in his final exaltation of the life of contemplation to the position of the supreme end; and Kant's view vitiated by a fundamental fallacy in the false assumptions from which he starts. He starts (as Mr. Field puts it) from the assumption that what is good must be good in itself, apart from all relations to anything else. And in consequence of this he is forced to assume that the mere intellectual apprehension of the moral fact is sufficient to move us to action. But we must maintain against this that the simple intellectual apprehension, the bare knowledge of anything can never move us to action. And consequently the idea of a good in itself is incompatible with one of the most deeply recognised characteristics of the moral fact, namely, that it is somehow a reason for action. There follows an acute analysis of the Kantian fallacy in other forms, as exemplified in Mr. G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (p. 52). The latter part of the book is occupied by an attempt to see whether it would not be possible to arrive at a satisfactory result by a modification and development of the theory of Aristotle.

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Mr. Field sees that the main difficulty of ethics is to state the moral fact without isolating it from other facts; but he will not have the moral fact whittled away, or reduced to something else. For what he christens the psychological fallacy in ethics rests upon a too exclusive application of the point of view of psychology to ethics. When applied to ethics, it is apt to assume that we ought to be able to find the moral fact in or among the facts of experience from an inspection of the actual desires, emotions and feelings which are or have been experienced. It is felt that if morality exists at all, it must be reducible to some form or some compound of these; which "amounts to saying that if there is such a thing as morality at all it must really be something other than morality," and it tries to shew how morality is to be derived from experience *minus* morality. This is the position of Mr. G. Pitt Rivers, in *Conscience and Fanaticism*. But the moral philosopher would absolutely deny this assumption. He would deny that it allowed for the facts of experience; and would say that if we had not got the specifically moral experience to start from, it would be absolutely impossible to deduce it from anything else. "Ethical investigation, if it is ever to get anywhere, must start from its own data." The book concludes with the application of Mr. Field's conclusions to various minor "standing dish" problems, which are ingeniously and aptly discussed. Among others he analyses the ordinary belief that there is some special moral value in doing right when we do not "like" it. He points out that this belief arises from the fact that disagreeable attendant circumstances are a simple test of virtuous motive, but do not increase the moral value of the action.

N. C.

SHORTER NOTICES.

NATIONAL WELFARE AND NATIONAL DECAY. By William MacDougall. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. viii, 214. Price, 6s. net.

The case for eugenics is presented here by Professor MacDougall from a psychological standpoint as a supplement to biological studies, and is relieved against an historical background. The book resumes certain findings of mental anthropology, and indicates their bearing on the problems of national welfare and national decay. The danger discussed in its pages is that of the deterioration of the innate qualities of the population, especially in the two countries that Professor MacDougall knows best, England and America. The difficulty is that civilised societies breed from the bottom and die off at the top; hence many nations, after a long period of upbuilding, decay, the process being described as the "parabola of the peoples," for the rise and fall tends to resemble the

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trajectory of a stone thrown obliquely from the hand, a long ascending curve, an almost flat summit, and a steep decline. In considering the question what social class has the most vitality, he cites a strong body of evidence which proves that the social stratification which exists in modern communities is positively correlated with a corresponding stratification of innate moral and intellectual quality. This proposition, maintained by eugenists, has for the first time received support by applying the methods of experimental psychology. Among other evidence, Professor MacDougall gives the results of tests made among children of one city arranged in four groups according to the occupation of their father, viz.: professional, executive, artisan and labour. The results are stated in terms of the percentage of children of each group who scored a mark higher than the median mark, and are as follows: Professional group, 85 per cent; executive group, 68 per cent; artisan group, 41 per cent; labour group, 39 per cent. But this specially gifted professional class is deliberately infertile. This infertility is most marked in the United States where, according to Professor MacDougall, this class seems to practice and cultivate the principles of birth control more assiduously than any other class of persons in the civilised world, while *mirabile dictu* they maintain laws which forbid the extension of the knowledge of such principles to the mass of the people. E. F.

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE. By L. T. Hobhouse. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 208. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This book contains Professor Hobhouse's application of the ethical principles stated in his book, *The Rational Good*, but the new work is in a sense complete in itself. It deals brilliantly with such old problems as those of duty, liberty, equality and justice; and also gives detailed ethical principles in relation to so-called "economic" issues such as property-owning and payment for service. The conception of the moral good as a harmony reached through or by reason underlies the treatment of all the problems, but the book is also full of illuminating judgments of practical importance. The writer, unlike many of our philosophers, is in close touch with the issues faced by ordinary men in the affairs of life, and yet his thinking is always clear and consistent. The book should prove of value to all students of social problems, and especially in correcting the barrenness of "economic" theory by an insistence on ethical principles.

C. D. BURNS.

LONDON.

THE FRUITS OF VICTORY: a Sequel to the *Great Illusion*. By Norman Angell. London: Collins, Sons & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. xviii, 338. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

Mr. Norman Angell's *Great Illusion* attracted considerable interest, and it was said that it was one of the few among the mass of printed books that counted as acts, not books. "The *Contrat Social* (wrote Lord Esher) was indisputably one, and I venture to suggest that the *Great Illusion* is another. The thesis of Galileo was not more diametrically opposed to current ideas than those of Norman Angell." Now after five and a half years, he has come back to stir the dust of controversy, and to point out that he had not been among those who prophesied smooth things.

The argument is conveniently summarised at the beginning of the book. He starts from the premise that man is an unreasoning, fighting animal, having a deep-rooted instinct to the assertion of preponderant

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power. This impulse has been unguided and unchecked by any adequate realisation either of its anti-social quality, the destructiveness inseparable from its operation, or its ineffectiveness to ends indispensable to civilisation. The failure of preponderant power on a nationist basis for indispensable ends would be self-evident but for the urge of instincts that warp our judgment. He hopes, however, for a new political tradition that will bridle this instinct, as the tradition of toleration disciplined religious fanaticism. Here everyone is on the side of Mr. Angell, who concludes that if ever the passions which gather round the patriotisms disrupting and Balkanising Europe are to be disciplined or devoted to a better social tradition we must face without pretence or self-deception the results which show the real nature of the older political moralities. "We must tell truths that disturb strong prejudices." In the *addendum* we are on more questionable ground. It might have been expected that the war would have provided text enough for Mr. Angell's new book, and that he would have contented himself with pointing out the hollowness of the fruits of Victory. But we learn that before the war the British Government should have "proposed measures to remove the economic and political causes which were part at least of the explanation of German aggression" (p. 352). Those conversant with Germany's policy at this period know that any *rapproachment* on the part of Great Britain was steadily discouraged. M. J.

WHAT NEXT IN EUROPE? By Frank A. Vanderlip. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922. Pp. vi, 308. Price, $2.00.

Mr. Vanderlip is impressed first of all with the importance of a better understanding of the affairs of Europe and the Near East on the part of America. "We like to call ourselves 100 per cent Americans, and forget that this may mean 100 per cent provincialism. The very thing that we blame Europeans for, an exaggerated national ego, which is playing such a large part in their disorganization, is a trait which we ourselves have highly developed." He therefore discusses the financial and economic conditions of Europe, urges the surrender of the extreme nationalistic conception of the supreme sovereign right of nations, speaks hopefully of the "new vision of labor," and approves its aspirations for a better organized economic world. With regard to the debts of the Allies of the United States, he rejects the proposal for an outright cancellation, but would instead have all the money paid on such debts used in Europe itself to establish a revolving credit fund, to promote types of constructive large-scale enterprise in Europe and the Near East, which now cannot be undertaken, whether in agriculture, in transportation, or in education.

A REVISION OF THE TREATY. A Sequel to the Economic Consequences of the Peace. By John Maynard Keynes. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Pp. viii, 242. Price, $2.00.

This *Sequel* presents nothing new in principle, but follows the varying arrangements as to reparations which have been announced from time to time since the Treaty. Cancellation of the Inter-allied Debts and a reduction of Reparation Debts are regarded as fundamental to any satisfactory restoration of international trade and reconstruction of Europe. The inherent contradiction of demanding payments and at the same time exercising ingenuity to prevent these payments, for fear of their possible injury to home industries, applies to the United States as well as to the Allies.

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SECRET DIPLOMACY. HOW FAR CAN IT BE ELIMINATED? By Paul S. Reinsch. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922. Pp. 231. Price, $2.00.

Dr. Reinsch gives a historic survey of diplomatic policy during and since the 18th century up to the present time, and then proceeds to argue strongly for the abolition of secret diplomacy, which he regards as a historical survival from the period of the absolutist state. He urges this, not merely for the improvement of the diplomacy, but for the education of public opinion and for the cultivation of a more international mind. "If democracy means anything, its significance for the welfare of humanity must lie in the value of allowing constantly more and more minds to participate in the great things of the world."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR. By Professor A. G. Pigou, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. x, 251. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

Economic processes under normal conditions have been studied by British economists since the time of Adam Smith with the hope that by carrying out well and truly this task of positive analysis—"this economic anatomy and physiology"—they might inform and improve the practical work of government. But for the economist, the strained and stressed economy of the war has also formed a great reserve of experience and to the body of political economy hitherto read is added the political economy of war. Professor Pigou's earlier chapters are non-technical, and with disarming suavity he enumerates among the causes of war, the desire for domination for its own sake apart from any economic advantages it may confer, the desire for profitable markets, the influence of financiers in search of profitable concessions, and of the armament ring. Later, he comes to grips with his subject in chapters devoted to taxes versus loans and the aftermath of internal debt. Credit expansion was found by belligerent countries a convenient way of raising revenue but, says Professor Pigou, the method is inherently bad. The lesson to be learnt from the war is that adequate taxation during its progress is essential, for at present the volume of interest debt left over after the war can only (he foresees) be reduced by a large immediate special levy, for which he gives a long and carefully-reasoned defence (pp. 189, etc.)

M. J.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. By R. N. Gilchrist. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921. Pp. xi, 799, Price, 18s. net.

A text-book designed for the use of Indian students, covering the course presented by Calcutta University, and avoiding, therefore, Greek and Latin quotations, as the Indian student is, as a rule, unacquainted with these languages. The survey is compact, efficient, impersonal and up-to-date, though as Professor Gilchrist tells us, political events during 1920 moved rather more quickly than his printing presses. The earlier chapters cover the theory of political science and forms of government in general, while separate chapters deal with the history of the government of the European countries, Japan and the United States. That on Japan will be of interest to many to whom the present and historical development of that country is unfamiliar; while the study of the new constitution of Germany is characterised as an unique document, not a normal constitution, a social or political document calculated to inspire the German people with new ideas of government functions and with hopes of a complete social reconstruction.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF CITIZENSHIP: an Introduction to Civics for Adults. By E. M. White. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 128.

This is an excellent introduction to the subject with which it deals. It contains much valuable material, and is clearly and brightly written. The general point of view is that of Comte and Leplay. In detail it owes much to the work of Professor Patrick Geddes. The writer, perhaps wisely, eschews metaphysics; but some of the scornful references to that subject might have been omitted. Those who desire a more metaphysical treatment might with advantage read along with it such books as *The Principles of Citizenship* by Sir Henry Jones and *Social Purpose* by Principal Hetherington and Professor Muirhead. There is a good bibliography at the end of the book and it is illustrated by some interesting diagrams. Altogether, it is probably the best general introduction to the study of citizenship that has so far been produced.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

ADDRESSES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. By J. J. Putnam, M.D., with an introduction by Professor Sigmund Freud. The International Psycho-analytical Press: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. x, 470. Price, 18s. net.

Dr. Putnam was the last survivor of a group of men who founded the American Neurological Association, and was one of the pioneers of American neurology. In the last fifteen years of his life his interests shifted to clinical psychology and he was not only the first American to interest himself in psycho-analysis but soon became one of its most decided representatives. The papers here collected, which were written between 1909 (the year of his convinced adherence to psycho-analysis) and the end of his life, include two studies of Sigmund Freud, to whose theories of repression, infantile sensuality and fixation Dr. Putnam continued to adhere. The concrete examples of his interpretation of dreams, and exposition of psycho-analysis are far from convincing, for example the interpretation of the dream of a child who seemed to be in a big empty hall looking for his parents. As Dr. Putnam admits that he can say "little about the personal life of the dreamer," there appears to be no corroboration of the fantastic structure of symbolism he raises. It is characteristic of Dr. Putnam that he finally demanded that psycho-analysis as a science should be linked on to a philosophical system, and he could never be brought to see how it could be possible to take the results of psycho-analytical investigations quite empirically. It was a considerable disappointment to him that his view made no headway among his colleagues, and as to this linking up it seemed (as Professor Freud writes) more prudent to wait.

F. B.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND SOCIOLOGY. By Aurel Kolnai. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922. Pp. 185.

An effort to apply psycho-analysis to the interpretation of social and mass phenomena, and in particular to anarchist communism. In this latter the author finds an expression of infantilism, including the magical belief in the omnipotence of thought. Marxism gives a materialistic and scientific turn to the œdipus complex, which appeared in Christian ideology. Social reforms may be regarded as the canalization of the libido toward useful ends.

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TWELVE ESSAYS ON SEX AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. By Wilhelm Stekel. Translated and edited by S. A. Tannenbaum. New York: The Critic and Guide Co., 1922. Pp. 320. Price, $3.00.

These essays relate largely to personal hygiene. Such topics as Sexual Abstinence and Health, Insomnia, Suicide, Obsessions, Exhibitionism, Kleptomania are treated with especial reference to the discovery of causes and the appropriate cure.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1919. Supplementary Reports of the Investigators to the Commission of Inquiry, The Interchurch World Movement. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1921. Pp. x, 346.

This volume gives the sub-reports of the various investigators on which *The Report on the Steel Strike of 1919* was based. It is highly instructive in its information as to the Under-cover Men, the attitude of the Pittsburgh newspapers, civil rights in western Pennsylvania, and other topics covered by the report. It shows how little the newspaper accounts of the steel strike could be depended upon for giving any accurate notion of the actual facts as to the strike, to say nothing of reporting the point of view of the strikers.

HOW MUCH SHALL I GIVE? By Lilian Brandt. New York: The Frontier Press, 1921. Pp. xi, 153.

This essay received honorable mention in the competition for the Karelsen Prize of 1920 on the subject "What Can a Man Afford?" It surveys on the one hand the actual giving for philanthropic and allied purposes, and on the other the efforts made in the past to answer the question of how much we should give. Finally the present situation is canvassed, and certain guiding principles suggested.

THE PLAY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. By Clarence E. Rainwater. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1922. Pp. xi, 371. Price, $2.75, net; $2.90, postpaid.

This volume is stated by the author to be "an analysis of the play movement in the United States." "The term 'play' is used to embrace most of the activities occurring in social and community centers, in community music, drama and pageantry," as well as in playgrounds for children. It traces the origins and successive stages through which the play movement has passed. It does not include consideration of such types of play as college football or professional baseball, or golf and tennis as played in social clubs. It provides, however, a comprehensive survey of certain general trends and development in the various types of play organized under philanthropic or community auspices.

PSYCHOLOGY. A STUDY OF MENTAL LIFE. By Robert S. Woodworth. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1921. Pp. x, 580.

Although intended primarily as a text-book, this volume may well be brought to the attention of the readers of the JOURNAL, for it not only embodies much recent material, but also presents the subject in such thoroughly readable fashion that it would seem to be the best available source for the general reader to inform himself on the present stage of the science. In an unusual degree it avoids technical terms and uses the

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language of every day and of general literature. Such recent material as that of Freud is given its place, but in sane perspective. It deserves, and will undoubtedly have, wide use.

A New System of Scientific Procedure. By G. Spiller. London: Watts & Co., 1921. Pp. IX, 441.

Mr. Spiller is well known to all interested in ethical questions through the admirable work that he has done in the organisation of Moral Education Congresses, as well as by his writings on a World Religion and other subjects. His new book has no special bearing on Ethics; but the study of logical methods is, of course, as important for Ethics as for any other subject. His book is a very comprehensive study of scientific procedure, illustrated by copious references to the most widely different subjects. It is written throughout in the spirit of Bacon, to whose memory it is dedicated. If it has a fault it is perhaps that of over-elaboration. It may be thought, for instance, that a long discussion of the question whether Shakespeare was really the author of the works that are commonly ascribed to him, is somewhat out of place in a logical treatise. Still, it is a good illustration of the way in which scientific methods may be applied to a subject in the treatment of which they have commonly been conspicuous by their absence; and it may certainly be doubted whether the Shakespearian authorship of the plays has ever been so convincingly established. Another subject to which Mr. Spiller applies his methods in a specially interesting way is education. Referring to such cases as those of J. S. Mill and Karl Witte, he contends that it ought to be possible to impart some of the most important elements of education at a much earlier age than is at present common. All that he says on this subject is extremely interesting; and this is only one of the many valuable discussions that the book contains. It ought to appeal to many readers who are not usually attracted by treatises on Logic.

J. S. Mackenzie.

Lotze's Theory of Reality. By the Rev. E. E. Thomas, M.A. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921. Pp. I, 217. Price, 15s. net; $5.00 net.

The work by Sir Henry Jones on Lotze's Theory of Thought is well known and highly valued. It was planned, if not actually written, while its author was Professor of Philosophy at University College, Bangor. This continuation of his work has been produced by a graduate of the same College. Though not as brilliantly written as the earlier book, it is a solid and interesting piece of work showing a good deal of critical acumen. It contains some account of Lotze's general influence on philosophical thought, especially on the Ritschlian Theology; but it has not much direct bearing upon Ethics.

J. S. Mackenzie.

London.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. xxi. London: Williams & Norgate, 1921. Pp. iv, 246. Price, 25s. net.

The presidential address by Dr. Inge discusses the question whether we are justified in saying that the Time series is necessarily and absolutely irreversible. "If," he writes, "the positions of earlier and later, and of past and future, belong to appearance, and not to reality, the real order

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will be a series, but a series without change and without time. The Time series will be a mode of appearance of a series which may be really logical or teleological. The real world may be a congeries of articulated systems, each of which taken as a whole has a meaning to which every part of the system contributes equally. If this is so, Time and Space will be the warp and woof of the canvas on which the world of appearance is spread out and dimension of time must be co-ordinated with the dimension or dimensions of space." He holds that if we were entirely travelling through Time we should not be conscious of it. "The knowledge of sequences is not itself a sequence, nor in a sequence" (p. 11). It is the will that appears to be involved in the Time series and to commit us to travelling in one direction, and the Will "seems to be the principle of Becoming, become self-conscious." The Time succession seems therefore to belong to a half-real world, and we are partly in and partly out of it.

Other papers of interest are Professor Hoernle's plea for a phenomenology of meaning and Mr. C. A. Richardson's analysis of the "New Materialism." In the latter paper, Mr. Richardson finds the most deeply-marked fissure between different schools of thought in the gulf between Spiritualism and Materialism. The main characteristic of this new aspect of materialism is the position it assigns to sense-data. The "material" of the new materialism is not constituted by hypothetical entities—the molecules, atoms and electrons of science—outside experience, but by entities which enter into experience, *i.e.*, sense-data, which are regarded as physical, not mental. The prophets of the new materialism are bent on getting rid of mind from the scheme of things and contend that the subject or self has no concrete existence; a group following Mr. Bertrand Russell is moving rapidly towards the position that a subject is nothing but the series of those particulars which would formerly have been said to stand in a relation of presentation to the subject. He points out that the source of the difficulty which Neo-realists find in admitting the existence of the subject lies in the fact "that the latter cannot be an object of acquaintance in the way that a sense-datum can be an object of acquaintance." Yet why should not I (the subject) be aware of my own existence? "It seems to me," Mr. Richardson adds, "to imply an order of certainty at least equal to any certainty of the sense data I perceive. I am *acquainted* with sense-data; I *realise* my own existence." Whatever the term employed the fact which it expresses is the most intimate, immediate and concrete fact in the experience of every person. E. F.

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The third International Moral Education Congress is to be held at Geneva July 28th to August 1st, 1922. In connection with the two previous congresses of 1908 and 1912, important volumes of studies in moral education were published. It is hoped that Americans will be interested to attend and take part in this congress. Dr. Felix Adler and President Nicholas Murray Butler are American members of the International Executive Council. The President of the congress is Sir Frederick Pollock. The Honorable Secretary is Mr. F. J. Gould, whose address is Armorel, Woodfield Ave., Ealing, London, W. 5.

Note. The essay printed in the last Journal under the title "What is Liberty when two or more persons are concerned?" was received from the author with the title "What is Liberty?" The author now writes that the addition, which for lack of time was not submitted to him, is inaccurate, as the conception of Liberty reached in the essay covers the case also when but one person is concerned.

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

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Published for the Editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager
London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JULY, 1922

RELIGIOUS VALUES AND THE PRACTICAL ABSOLUTE.[1]

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES.

ONE of the striking facts in the studies of the psychology of religion which have appeared since the beginning of this century is the measure of agreement as to the nature of religion. It is commonly supposed that religion is the subject about which there is the greatest divergence of opinion and that these differences emerge most violently when the attempt is made to formulate exact definitions. It may therefore be taken as an evidence of the substantial contribution which the science of psychology has made that we are now in possession of a working definition of religion. This definition centers upon the concept of values. In Höffding's phrase it is the conservation of values. For Coe it is the determination and the effort to realize the highest social values. In the recent Philosophy of Religion by W. K. Wright it is "the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions." All of these definitions show the marked tendency of psychology away from the old faculty theories and away from the standpoints of intellectualism stressing belief, and of feeling which made religion primarily a matter of emotion. The agreement lies in the application of the functional or behavioristic point of view.

[1] Read as the president's address at the annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, held at the University of Nebraska, April 14–15, 1922.

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Religion is thus regarded as an active striving toward the realization of desired ends or felt values. That these ends are ideal and social in character may also be included in the agreement. Religion is therefore conceived as a practical interest as contrasted with science and philosophy which are reflective. This paper undertakes to deal with these values of religion in respect to two questions: First, specifically, what are they? Second, why are they accompanied by such a sense of validity in the active effort to realize them?

I.

In stating what are the values of religion, it may be said at the outset that religion has no values of its own. The values of religion are also other kinds of values at the same time,—economic, political, social or æsthetic. This, of course, is not peculiar to religious values. Moral values are not exclusively matters of ethics. All moral problems are at the same moment problems of business, of political science, of eugenics or art. It is needless to say here, though the neglect of the fact constantly leads to difficulty, that the phenomena with which any specific science deals are also, from other points of view, the legitimate material of various scientific and practical interests. Religion, then, should be understood to find the values which it cherishes, in the stream of actual, concrete experience.

It may be assumed also, though less casually, that these values of religion, imply an order of values of differing degrees of importance in all human societies where religion is found. James observed that the individual's consciousness is, in normal experience, "figurate." So accustomed is the mind to working with patterns and meanings that it is restless and irritated when confronted with materials which do not fall into some appreciable order. When attention is directed to them it is disconcerting if the objects along the roadside at dusk do not take their places readily in the familiar classification as trees, or men or animals. If a teacher puts random lines and figures on the blackboard before a

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class of students they will seek for a meaning, an intelligible arrangement. Even in dreams some semblance of the form and structure of waking mental life appears. Not only does man respond to the environment with this organizing, systematizing activity of apperception but he also displays characteristic emotional reactions in reference to the objects and situations with which he has vital experience. In the hunting stage, when the savage is driven by meat hunger, it is not difficult to appreciate the fact that the sight of the bear or deer should elicit intense emotional excitement; or that the cry of an enemy warrior should stir him with fear and rage; or that the call of his mate in distress should rouse him to frantic effort.

The studies of many tribes in relatively low stages of cultural development disclose interest-patterns and scales of values of a very definite character. Among the natives of Central Australia the food interest is dominant. Generosity in sharing food is a prime virtue. Infanticide is common but is apparently due to the difficulty of nourishing the infant and an unweaned older child at the same time. Marriage relations also hold a very important place and within their complex system the marriage relation is strictly observed. Their sense of obligation and their fortitude under suffering appear conspicuously in the observance of their food and initiation ceremonials. The regard shown for the sacred places and the *Churinga*, or sacred objects of these ceremonials, further indicates the most important concerns of their interest. For the head-hunters of Borneo, life reaches the apex of its ecstasy and meaning in capturing heads from neighboring tribes. It is said that "they find therein the complete expression of their ideals of life, of their highest conceptions of value." It is not difficult to realize how a code of approved conduct and a scale of manly qualities could develop out of that supreme and dangerous interest. For the Todas, life organizes around the care of the buffaloes and the habits involved in that occupation determine the relative importance of personal qualities and conduct. The Shinto religion exalts two characteristics of

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the Japanese, cleanliness and joyousness. "In Shinto," King observes, actual personal dirt is worse than moral guilt. "To be dirty is to be disrespectful to the gods." The festivals of Shinto are very merry and, so to speak, seriously promote light-heartedness. For example, in one of the festivals, when the offerings are brought in procession before the shrine, the village chief calls out in a loud voice, "According to our annual custom, let us laugh."

While, then, the interest-patterns of various peoples differ very widely the important thing is that where there is any tension or struggle whatever, there comes to be an organization of ends, of conduct and of values. The highest of these values are the foci of the ceremonials and they are determining factors in moulding the conceptions of the gods. To say then that religion is the "consciousness of the highest social values" is to employ a formula which is applicable to all organized societies, however they may differ from one another in the particular values they cherish or however their values may change by addition or loss, by enlargement or deterioration. The only qualification of this formulation of religion in terms of the highest social values which seems to be required is in the case of religions extended beyond the culture in which they were indigenous, or in the case of religions which have become static and unresponsive to the growing life and the new social values of an expanding civilization. The zeal of missionary propaganda has shown instances of the artificial imposition of the ideals of one religious tradition upon the mores of another people, and the rapid expansion of Greek reflective thought made it impossible for the religion of an earlier age to assimilate the new conceptions and the new evaluations of life. But where the customs and institutions of a people unfold under the influence of a settled habitat and through the processes of normal development there emerges a scale of values, often modified from age to age but presenting in the upper ranges those values which are the chief concerns of religion. This was impressively true of the Egyptian people who through a vast historic existence

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and many different dynasties held in the foreground a dominating interest in the future life.

The existence of a hierarchy of social values in the earlier stages of human life is, from the instances cited, sufficiently illustrated for the present purpose. With all the diversity noted, a general principle of explanation commends itself. This principle is the influence of the environment, physical and social. The values have been those which evolved in the process of securing a living from such animals, fruits and products of the soil as were available; in the accidental fixation of attention upon accompanying phenomena of the chase or warfare or social relations or natural events; and in the influence of conspicuous persons, such as chiefs, kings, and medicine men. These earlier stages are under the sway of custom and the value scales which develop are relatively unconscious and wholly uncriticized.

A radical difference appears when the rule of custom begins to be felt to be inadequate and the questioning intelligence is called forth. This critical process in its beginnings was most acute and most complete among the Greeks. Plato's Dialogues are the glowing record of that achievement. The same process in different terms and with a different emphasis occurred among the Hebrews, and the writings of the great prophets Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Jeremiah preserve that history. Confucius and Buddha performed a similar task for the cultures of their inheritance. In all of these there is a common work performed. It is the deliverance of the human spirit from the bondage of blind custom and the assertion of a conscious, selective determination of values in the interest of a more rational and a nobler human existence. That birth of reason did not at once abolish all superstition, magic, and abject obedience to custom. But it did open a new conception of the world and of human institutions. From that day to this it has offered to educated men a world view, and has stimulated increasing numbers of people to pursue larger ideals and to devote themselves to the realization of more clearly conceived values. Not the least important of the

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results has been a critical survey of the traditional cultures of all tribes and peoples. It is now possible to see how naïvely and how unconsciously those cultures grew up out of the conditions and accidental circumstances of tribal existence. It is also possible to make new estimates of these customs in terms of the new standpoint of more critical reflection.

I am aware that some of the most diligent students of the folkways do not attach importance to any criticism which may be passed upon the mores in the light of such comparative studies. Professor Sumner was so impressed by the diversities of the folkways and by the force of use and wont in modern societies that he seems to have thought that every standard of judging social values could be nothing but the opposition of one set of conventions against another. Perhaps he meant rather to say that the problem is so complex and our methods for dealing with it so little developed that any solution is at the present time quite hopeless. In reference to the attempts or the hopes of statesmen and social philosophers in the direction of manipulating institutions and mores "as an architect or engineer would obtain data and apply his devices to a task in his art," Sumner thinks a fallacy is included which is radical and mischievous beyond measure. "We have as yet," he says, "no calculus for the variable elements which enter into social problems and no analysis which can unravel their complications. The discussions always reveal the dominion of the prepossessions in the minds of the disputants which are in the mores. We know that an observer of nature always has to know his own personal equation. The mores are a societal equation. When the mores are the thing studied in one's own society, there is an operation like begging the question. Moreover, the convictions which are in the mores are 'faiths.' They are not affected by scientific facts or demonstration. We 'believe in' democracy, as we have been brought up in it, or we do not. If we do, we accept its mythology. The reason is because we have grown up in it, are familiar with it, and like it. Argument would not touch this faith."[2]

[2] *Folkways*, pp. 97 f.

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One is tempted to turn his own words upon the author and say that this is just Professor Sumner's prejudice about the futility of criticism and the marshalling of facts. It might be thought to be the attitude of a mind so wearied by ruminating among conflicting and contradictory mores that it was overwhelmed and paralyzed and helpless to do anything but to succumb to the detached view of its own inquiry and to refuse to make any judgment whatsoever. "What man of us ever gets out of his adopted attitude,"[3] he exclaims. Yet in another passage he insists upon the critical attitude as the only guarantee against delusion and deception and the only means of finding out whether propositions correspond to reality.[4]

At least I may assume that most academic persons accept the latter position as the truer and recognize a very great debt to the modern students of the mores for the wealth of information and the amount of disillusionment they have furnished. Two results of the application of scientific criticism to human experience would generally be admitted. One is the addition of a new dimension, as it were, to human life. Those who participate in the self-analysis and social analysis which present knowledge makes possible feel that such knowledge is itself a value. Human history, in any adequate sense of the term, has only recently begun to be written. But the mind furnished with even a high-school course in ancient and modern history is released from its narrow limits of present time and place and from the bondage of a merely provincial outlook. Similar emancipation is afforded by the study of literature and science. There is therefore a great difference between the mind of the wisest man of the Arunta tribe of central Australia as described by Spencer and Gillen, and the mind of a sixteen-year-old boy just finishing a high-school course. The latter may have no greater native talent and he may lack certain kinds of personal prowess and resourcefulness but he is so far superior in his understanding of nature, of his own inheritance, and of himself, his body and mind and sur-

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[4] p. 633.

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roundings, that he is like a being of a different order. However much he is trained in the customs of his people he is also greatly emancipated and has at hand the means of still greater freedom. A society whose individuals are enlightened persons of that kind sets up a conscious and a consciously criticized process of education for its members.

A second result of the application of scientific criticism is the new emphasis upon the value of human life itself. Many a custom-ruled society has paid more deference to animals and trees and stones than to human beings. But in all the peoples where reflective morality has appeared, in theory at least, man and his social relations have had first consideration. This was particularly true of the Greeks and the Hebrews. The central problem of the greatest of the Greek philosophies was that of the development of man, of his mind that he might know what is good and find it, of his powers in the arts that he might create and enjoy beauty, of his sense of justice that he might live harmoniously and happily with his fellows. A human life guided by reason, brave, temperate and just, was the ideal of all schools of thought. That ideal wrought into a profound philosophical statement, embodied in enduring literature and sculpture, has been an inspiration to all succeeding culture in the western world.

The Hebrew prophets remained closer to the religious traditions of their race, but they insisted on complete liberation from those things which did not contribute to individual and social righteousness. Jeremiah rejected the old conception of social solidarity, in which the children are bound by the sins of the fathers, and conceived the individual himself to be responsible for his deeds. Like Hosea, he renounced animal sacrifice and exalted personal righteousness. Isaiah championed the cause of the poor and the oppressed and looked for deliverance through a king of justice and wisdom. Through the idea of a covenant relation man was raised to a new dignity and made to share in the moral code which he voluntarily accepted. The faith of the heart and the effort of active will were the

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means of attaining the fullest measure of life. Thus Hebrew religion, like Greek ethics, transcended the inherited mores by a new conscious attitude which rejected the external authority of tradition and magnified those ideals of conduct which were approved in the experience of the individual and the common life.

From this development of reflective thought sprang new ideas of a universal society and the projection of inclusive political organizations. The military campaigns of Alexander the Great represented the endeavor to organize the known world into a single state. The Stoic philosophers acted upon the conception of a universal kinship of human beings and announced themselves as no longer merely citizens of Greece but citizens of the world. Their assertion of a common rational life for all mankind clearly marked the conscious attainment of a new standpoint which in principle relegated the old tribal loyalties and customs to a lower order of existence. The Roman Empire created the external structure of political unity and Christianity became the spiritual sponsor for its realization in the soul of the individual. It is unimportant here to determine which influence contributed most to the common end but certain it is that the human world, as a conscious, universal reality came into being in the age which produced the Stoic philosophy, the Christian religion and the Roman Empire. The difficulties in the way of the practical fulfillment of the demands which such a comprehensive social and spiritual order imposed were indeed vast. They are only to be appreciated by an intimate knowledge of the struggles which the succeeding centuries witnessed,—struggles in councils of church and state, on battle fields, and in cloistered retreats of scholars and saints. It is not strange that man was compelled through a millennium and more to think of his universal life as belonging in heaven while his troubled, confused experience of change and imperfection was bound up with this present world. But the significant fact is that he possessed the universal at all and that he clung to it as the very substance of his life.

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The Renaissance was the birthday of the universal in the concrete experience of this mundane sphere. At first it was announced only in terms of physical science, in the conceptions of natural law, and of the uniformity of nature. Bacon and Hobbes and Descartes did not admit that they were setting up a rival to the celestial universal. Their world of science was so novel and seemingly so different from the world of scholastic faith that they did not themselves realize the conflict they were preparing for their successors. By various dualisms and compromises men still held to the celestial verities of permanence and order while working out the laws and hypotheses of the earthly sciences in wider fields and by fruitful discoveries. At length the old essences and entities and occult forces were discarded, the divine right of kings was challenged, and the light of reason outshone the light of supernatural revelation. But still nature remained, governments attained new stability, and illuminating spiritual ideals commanded allegiance.

What I am concerned to point out is that a new scale of values came with this reflective life, a scale of values which is characteristic of the reflective life wherever it is developed, and which stands in sharp contrast to all customary-tribal value systems. It is true that tribal customs still survive in modern life but in so far as they have not stood the test of reflective assessment, they are just survivals and belong to the primitive world. It seems therefore that those who have been so diligent in setting forth the variations of primitive customs might have been more instructive and less confusing if they had remarked the difference between the custom-ruled life of our remote ancestors, including our "contemporary ancestors," and the life of those whose culture comprises, however dimly, the philosophical and scientific inheritance.

As a statement of the scale of values of civilized society I quote a passage from James' well-known description of the hierarchy of the selves. He says, "A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the various selves which men may seek in an hierarchical scale according to their worth. A cer-

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tain amount of bodily selfishness is required as a basis for all the other selves. But too much sensuality is despised, or at best condoned on account of the other qualities of the individual. The wider material selves are regarded as higher than the immediate body. He is esteemed a poor creature who is unable to forego a little meat and drink and warmth and sleep for the sake of getting on in the world. The social self as a whole, again, ranks higher than the material self as a whole. We must care more for our honor, our friends, our human ties, than for a sound skin or wealth. And the spiritual self is so supremely precious that, rather than lose it, a man ought to be willing to give up friends and good fame, and property, and life itself."[6] In other passages he identifies this spiritual self with the widest possible ideal social self. The counterpart of that conception is a social order in which the individuals seek mutually to build up that type of character. Hence social sympathy, mutual aid, co-operation for the attainment of the common good is the great ideal of the modern world and becomes the central aim of religion.

Christianity, from the first, centered attention upon the value of the human soul but it could not regard the natural order of society as consistent with, or conducive to, a spiritual existence. It therefore learned to endure this present temporary, physical state and to prepare the soul for a heavenly realm of pure and changeless bliss. Very slowly did the humanism of the Renaissance affect this view of the individual. For a long time the changes wrought by science and industry and social reorganization were thought to pertain only to outward, material conditions, and consequently to create only stronger earthly bonds about the soul. But gradually the antagonism of body and soul relaxed under the genial influence of the new learning and the physical came to be regarded as at least a condition of mental and spiritual vitality. Medicine and hygiene at last won a decisive victory. Religion generously founded hos-

[6] *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 314.

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pitals and clinics not merely under the claim of "good works" but also as means to health of soul. In every direction as science and secular life yielded practical advantages religion more and more freely supported their claims. Religion has become the champion of better government, better education and better art. Instead of being complacently obedient to the powers that be, she has often helped to turn them out of office and put in others. Instead of despising the wisdom of this world she has endowed it in numerous colleges and universities. New appreciation of the fine arts, of poetry and the drama, of music and the dance, of play and recreation has developed. Nor are these tendencies due to mere unconscious drifting away from old habits. They are cultivated on principle, with the conviction that the full rounded development of all the natural powers of human life is the supreme good. No longer does this development relate to some hidden essence, or latent force, or occult power of personality. It does not proceed by mysterious rites but rather by cultivating a sane and responsive life in the midst of vital social relations. Religion has learned to direct attention to the ideal of democracy, recognizing that this ideal fundamentally involves the qualities of neighborliness and genuine respect and love of fellow man. Just what these attitudes demand in any age and especially in an industrial and urban society like ours is not easy to determine. To find out what these claims of understanding sympathy are, becomes as urgent a need of religion as of social settlements and bureaus of charity.

Therefore along with this social idealism of democracy there is demanded the scientific spirit of inquiry and experimentation. It is in this connection that religion is undergoing the greatest readjustment. Having been accustomed, like politics and family life, to respect the authority of established routine, it is difficult to accept the spirit of free inquiry, to undertake novel, social experiments. But this method is gaining favor everywhere by the results it

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shows. Religious people are told that they should test prophets by their fruits and that wisdom is justified of her children. That encourages the use of experiment. Through it man comes to rely more upon himself and gains in power and responsibility. That makes for growth in character. Religious leaders are beginning to appreciate these new values of the social-scientific spirit. They see that all external authority, whether of custom, or of institutions, or of a revelation from heaven, hinders the creative spirit and the development of a responsible will in man. It is in the interest of this intelligent, responsible freedom for all the members of society that religion attaches positive value to the fact that it has no infallibility left,—no infallible Bible, no infallible Pope or Council, no infallible creed or conscience or reason or person. Strangely enough the attainment of that conclusion has already become the starting point of new and vital movements in religion, movements which sincerely and reverently make the values of a democratic-scientific social order the genuine and dominant values of a new religious faith and hope. Neither Catholic nor Protestant Christianity has ever consistently accepted the implications of a real democratic-scientific social order. It is highly improbable that either will ever be able to do so. Therefore Christianity faces a new epoch, an epoch which requires that she identify herself completely in spirit and purpose with the highest values of modern democracy and science. What that involves cannot be known in advance. One cannot know beforehand what love to one's neighbor will entail. He can only find out as the days unfold their experiences. Therefore democracy is always a venturesome and interesting experiment. Freeing slaves and giving votes to women are no more the end of certain processes than they are the beginning of others. Neither does the scientific inventor know what the effect of his invention will be. Certainly that was true for the inventors of the gas engine which made possible the automobile and the airplane, with astonishing effects upon social and industrial life.

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II.

The second question of this discussion is, Why are the values of religion accompanied by such a sense of validity in the active effort to realize them? This question is peculiarly pertinent in reference to such values as have just been discussed. The explanation of the seeming validity of established customary values is that it arises from familiarity and long repetition. Such values, through long use, have accumulated sanctions and authority. But is this the whole story? Is there not something else in the nature of practical conduct which is even more important in accounting for the sense of the validity of religious values?

The point referred to is the nature of the practical judgment at the moment of action. The definition of religion as a practical endeavor to realize values implies that it is primarily a matter of action, an affair of overt deeds. In this respect it is sharply contrasted with the reflective attitude of philosophy. Now it is characteristic of overt action that it requires the definite selection of an end or plan. Since only one plan can be followed at one time, the one chosen must be carried out as if it were the only possible one and as having, at least at the moment of action, absolute worth and validity. If a person cannot bring himself to choose one line of action with such definiteness and exclusiveness then he either does not act at all or acts without force and effectiveness. He wabbles and hesitates and vacillates. He does not make the clear-cutting, forward thrust of successful action. The man of affairs, the captain of industry, becomes habituated to quick decisions and to prompt and vigorous action. He is said to have a firm will, to be a man of strength, and force of character. His manner takes on the attitude of settled conviction. His words are few and terse but fateful. He tends to be an absolutist. At the other extreme is the man of reflective habits. His tendency is to analyze, to deliberate, to balance contrasting views, to see the other side of every question. He develops a Hamlet-like hesitation. In every situation

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he is given to questioning whether it is better to be or not to be, to act or not to act. So long as he refrains from action he may enjoy the contemplation of the alternatives, of the numerous possibilities which play through his thought. The approach of the moment when he must act is repellent because in order to launch himself into the objective deed he must abandon all but one of his cherished potentialities. This line of inquiry has led me to the conception of the *practical absolute*, the absolute of the moment of action and the absolute of predominantly practical modes of life. While looking through the writings of the logicians with this conception in mind I came upon the following passage in an article by Dewey treating of different stages of logical thought. He says: "The nearer we get to the needs of action the greater absoluteness must attach to ideas. The necessities of action do not wait our convenience. Emergencies continually present themselves where the fixity required for successful activity cannot be attained through the medium of investigation. The only alternative to vacillation, confusion, and futility of action is ascription to the ideas of a positive and secured character, not in strict logic belonging to them." [6] Bosanquet also remarks that "the only really categorical, concrete, moral judgment is that which determines what the course of action is, by adopting which we can be equal to the occasion; and the predicate of this judgment is a course of action." [7]

These observations may throw light upon the fixed character of the religious values of early society and may also furnish a suggestion as to the way in which new elements in the development of modern culture, especially the method of modern science, achieve the sense of absolute value. As is now well known the life of primitive man was one of action more than of reflection. Such reflection as he experienced was rather of the nature of reverie, of day-dreaming and fancy. This flow of imagery was

[6] Dewey: Some Stages of Logical Thought; *Philosophical Review*, Volume IX, Number 5, September, 1900.

[7] Bosanquet: *The Psychology of the Moral Self*, p. 113.

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largely bound down to the patterns and events of the more strenuous and thrilling moments of action, as in the chase or battle. Hence the mental life, either in times of leisure or stress, had little opportunity to become released from the absoluteness and fixity of action. Durkheim has undertaken to show how the unconscious "collective representations" of primitive man became the rigid framework of the conceptual life, the categories of space, time, causality and the rest, and that these categories were the counterpart of the habits of action, binding customs, generated by the necessities of man's struggle for existence. This suggests a deeper reason for the authority of religious attitudes than those explanations which refer its absoluteness to its natural conservatism or to the fact that it is a product of custom or of revelation.

This deeper reason lies in the nature of religion as a life of action. It has always been marked by the struggle to meet emergencies, to make safe the food supply, or the marriage relation and childbirth, to ward off evils in times of crises, in illness and death and war. Religion reflects the desperate conflict man has had to adjust himself to his world,—the world of physical nature and even more to the world of his troubled imaginings. He has had to battle demons and ghosts, devils and sprites and relentless furies in a thousand shapes. Or the struggle may be represented from the other side of the shield as the urgent effort to attain relief, to enjoy happiness, to gain paradise, to found a city which has foundations, to build an eternal kingdom. Religion is ever waging a warfare, conducting a campaign, striving for fuller life. Even its contemplative life has followed this pattern. It has dreamed of victory after battle and of those who have come up through great tribulation into triumph and peace. It has therefore lived constantly by the use of the absolutes of action. And these absolutes have been of the most absolute kind because the values for which the actions were precipitated were felt to be of the profoundest importance.

From this point of view it may be possible to gain a better

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understanding of the conflict between science and religion in our modern world. Science has invaded the precincts of religion, too often in its narrower conception of itself merely as a critic, a detached reflective investigator, instead of coming in its larger function of helping to find and to realize whatever practical and vital ends man's nature craves. In its narrower rôle it has been irritating and confusing to the practical spirit of religion. In its larger function it is felt by all enlightened religionists to be a friendly and most useful ally. This is not to minimize the chastening effects of the application of science to religion. In its friendliest mood science is a strenuous physician and surgeon producing a powerful catharsis and amputating limbs and removing organs decadent and useless, or infected by superstition. Not a few have thought the patient never could survive the treatment. Because religion has been so bound up and permeated by the magic and tribal custom in which it was born it has been the conviction of many who knew its beginnings best that the coming of science would be its death. But events do not justify that prediction.

It is, however, a vital question as to how religion is to adjust itself to science. The other distinguishing characteristic of our time, the democratic ideal, seems to lie much closer to religion as we know it, for democracy is a practical endeavor, and it seeks to realize the development of the individual which is already enshrined as the highest value of religion. One approach for the hospitable reception of science by religion is through the practical advantages which science already offers for carrying out the democratic and practical religious program of good will and social amelioration. Medical science has been appropriated in that way. Educational sciences have also found their place in religious schools. Technical and applied sciences of many kinds have been used freely. The difficulties have arisen at those points where the method of science has led to general conceptions which conflict fundamentally with the prevailing religious philosophies. Notable examples are found in geology and its effect on biblical cosmology, in

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biology and its theory of evolution, and in historical criticism and its implications for the doctrine of revelation. But a difficulty, deeper than all these, lies in the method itself, for science cannot be content simply to help in fulfilling the ends which religion sets up. It will insist in passing criticism on the ends themselves. This means that if religion is to be thorough in appropriating and furthering, as its own values, the highest values of society, it must accept unreservedly the value of science both in its method and in its results. Applying this principle to the ideal of democracy it means that religion cannot satisfy the demands of the situation by imposing a preconceived type of society as the final goal for which we are to strive. Democracy is a genuine adventure of faith and we cannot know where we are going until we arrive. Science helps to survey the situation before the experiment is made. It presents, on the basis of past experience, and by the prognostications of trained imagination, the various possible lines of action and their probable outcome. But it is compelled to yield all of its possibilities but one at the moment the experiment is put into action. And it must allow that one to be acted upon with all the wholeness of heart and sense of absoluteness which efficient action requires. After the plan has been tried, or as its successive steps occur, science may make new observations and prepare for further specific action and so on in a continuous process of growing experience.

In this way science has won over various fields of experience in recent years. One knows the physician is not infallible but trusts him nevertheless. Oil and mining investments are known to lack perfect security yet the man who invests in them parts with his money at the moment of purchase with as much finality as perfect knowledge could warrant. Manufacturers put out their latest product as the "acme" or the "perfecto" or the "ideal" and when they discover some means of improvement they advertise a new model and without embarrassment proclaim it as perfection. The extent to which this use of a practical absolute may be carried is illustrated by a well known type

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of oil stove for cooking purposes which bravely bears in conspicuous letters across its front this legend: "New Perfection, Number 62."

There are indications that religion may eventually reach such an attitude where the practical absolute of action will be accompanied by a process of reflective reconstruction in the direction of an expansive social ideal. In the past, religion has often accepted, though grudgingly, modifications of its values in response to the growing life of society. But the modifications have been ascribed to other influences than reflective thought. Thereby men have excused themselves from the responsibility of the situation. They have at times held to the doctrine of progressive revelation but too often have conceived the process of revelation as ending at some point in the past, and providing no method of dealing with new conditions in the living present. In those religious systems which have announced new revelations from heaven in times of crisis, there has been no reliable means of understanding the revelation nor of determining whether it was applicable to the case in hand. And there were often conflicting revelations for the same perplexity. The scientific method of meeting human problems is radically different. It claims no infallibility, but does actually take hold of the concrete difficulty and endeavors to find a working solution in the light of all the facts. In our society this method is already yielding results so encouraging and so full of promise that the projects of expert social engineers are beginning to be thought of as guides to new social values which are genuinely religious. When facing the emergencies of the vast, insistent demands of some great social problem, like the war, or the famine in Russia, a plan of action matured in the light of all available experience and human sympathy, approves itself to all right minded men as absolutely the thing to do. It is the practical absolute. It proclaims the sure way of salvation and discloses beyond doubt what must be taken as the categorical imperative of the divine will.

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DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

IT IS a pleasant but mistaken belief that a nation can have a democratic government at home and yet be tyrannical abroad or oppressive to other nations. The fate of foreigners and men of subject races seems to many to make no difference to housing or education or what is vaguely called by the benevolent "social reform." In actual practice, however, it should be plain that if some of us or our agents oppress foreigners or subject races, these oppressors will be more ready and more able to oppress "us." If we all join armies used for foreign conquest, we cannot expect foreigners to give up all thought of conquering us, and therefore we must live under arms, that is undemocratically. The foreign policy of a government thus affects very intimately the prospectsof domestic reform.

If the government is for the sake of all the governed, the results of its action must be good for all and not merely for a select group; and foreign policy, therefore, in support of foreign investment, if it is good, must be proved to have good results for all.

It is not well, however, to be indefinite about our conceptions of justice or of wealth and well-being. The interests of all are the interests of a number of persons of whom "the few" are some. The interests of the few are in foreign investment very obvious, but the interests of all are not. For this reason perhaps and not because of any ill-will, governments attend to the few who are vocal and certain of their purpose. The trouble is that the general well-being is not clearly expressed and is perhaps hardly conceived in definite terms. This general well-being must, however, be the criterion for judging of the action of governments in foreign policy. It will, therefore, be necessary to discover what are the good and bad effects of

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foreign investment upon the people whose government supports the investor.

There are two distinct issues. One is the economic effect of investment abroad; the other is the effect, economic or political, of a foreign policy connected with this investment. The two cannot indeed in real life be disentangled; but it does not follow, if investment abroad is good for wealth, that foreign policy should, therefore, be guided by the investors.

Many results, some good, some bad, follow from foreign investment. It is sometimes argued that if taxation at home increases, capital will go abroad; but this may not be on the whole objectionable, and, if the capitalist would follow his capital, it might be a positive advantage; for a country needs most, not spenders, but workers. That, however, is too abstract an issue. The fact is that the investment of capital abroad may be an advantage to a country. For example, it tends to increase the trade and manufacture of the country from which the investments come. The reason is not economic, but psychological. Where British capital is invested, there is a tendency to use British local management and British organising ability; and from this follows a tendency to order British goods for the new enterprise. This effect, however, does not always follow. Capital from England invested, for example, in the United States may lead not to orders for British goods, but to orders for American goods. But indirectly it must come round to British exports of goods, or orders upon foreign goods to which British investors are entitled as interest. French capital invested in Russia did not much increase the French export to Russia. But on the whole, either directly or indirectly capital developing a new country increases the demand for goods in that new country. Capital invested abroad may therefore increase employment at home; and in some cases more employment than the same amount invested at home. For example, capital in Argentine railways may lead to orders for steel rails and locomotives, in the making of which many are employed,

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whereas capital on a farm at home would employ a smaller number.

Secondly, it may be good for a country to receive income from investment abroad. If this income is ill-distributed the distribution may destroy all the good which might result from this income; but in the abstract the income is a payment for the service of providing capital, and this payment should have a good effect.

Thirdly, it tends, on the whole, towards peace if the interests of different nations are intertwined. Men who have property in another country do not desire that country to be ruined by war. Again, because the same enterprise may include some property in one country and some in another, the owner may begin to realise that many different countries have the same interests in producing goods and enjoying their use. The brotherhood of man is not so good a basis for peace as the common desire for boots; for it is easy to believe that a foreigner is not a man, but less easy to believe that he will not buy boots. It is good, therefore, politically for those at home if they do not have to arm to the teeth owing to the connection of some of their number with property in a foreign land. Hence rhetoricians sometimes oppose the connections of two countries through finance; for example, Clemenceau on 10th February, 1911, said in the Chamber of Deputies:

"This new policy of *rapprochement* with Germany is born in financial circles. I do not wish to speak ill of financiers, but I believe that they are more at home in finance than in the foreign policy of France. They have no machine for weighing the imponderables—the sentiments, the passions, the ideas which make nations act. They see only what is saleable: and that is not enough." [1]

M. Clemenceau in 1911 evidently thought that financial connections would tend towards peace.

A foreign policy, developing or maintaining foreign investment, may for these reasons be in the interests of all the people, in spite of the fact that some gain directly and others indirectly, if at all, and in spite of the fact that some

[1] *Journal Officiel.* 11th Feb., 1911.

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gain very much more than others. But it must be understood that no general rule can prove that any particular investment should be supported by foreign policy. Each case has to be considered by making a balance of good and evil effects; for all that has been shown so far is that some maintenance of foreign investment may be beneficial. It is in that far good for the foreign policy of the country to be connected under the existing system of private property, with groups investing abroad.

The effects, however, of foreign investment upon the domestic situation may sometimes be evil. In the first place a people may be burdened with taxation to maintain armed forces for the defense or improvement of the property abroad of some of their fellow citizens. A classic example is the Boer War. The preparation for war and war itself may arise from foreign investment; and both of these are evil in the domestic sphere. If war must be prepared for, there must be less energy and less money, for more civilized activities. If war must be fought, the liberty of the individual, freedom of association, and a free press must all suffer.

The standard example of how expansion abroad for financial ends leads to confusion at home is to be found in the history of France during the activity of Jules Ferry from 1881 to 1885. In 1869 the Bey of Tunis had established a financial Commission on which there were a French inspector of finances, nominated by the French Government, and representatives of creditors, two delegates elected by the creditors of each of the three nations, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Tunis went bankrupt in 1870 which gave France an opportunity to intervene, and in 1884 the international Commission disappeared and France took over the debt and the resources of the country. The "success" in Tunis drove Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria, and French foreign policy thus consolidated the Triple Alliance against her. The result in France was an increasing expenditure on armaments and more waste of youth and brains in preparing for the inevitable war.

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There are many examples of wars arising from foreign investment, the Boer War, the Spanish-American War, the Tripoli War, and the many small wars of France in Northern Africa. Clearly each war has many causes and it could not be reasonably argued that even the wars named were entirely or even mainly due to foreign investment. These wars, however, were partly due to the operations of those who controlled foreign investment upon the organisation of diplomacy and the tendencies in foreign policy. Their effects on the lands when the wars were fought may be omitted from the discussions here, for we are here concerned only with their effects upon domestic affairs.

The foreign investor sees a danger to his property or he sees a chance of improving the value of that property by the use of the power and wealth of his government. Perhaps he is cynical; perhaps he is simple-minded; but he manages somehow to identify the interests of his "country" with his interests in gaining more wealth, and the government, that is to say the political group in the ascendant at the moment as well as the officials, are easily persuaded that the interests of the country are at stake. Officials like to be important and politicians generally need something "showy" for advertisement. The newspapers live on crises. Commotion pleases everyone—at least for the moment. Thus the evils of war are endured by the mass of the people for the sake of the gain of a few.

The Boer War, for example, would generally now be regarded as having had evil effects upon the people of England; but the war was brought about largely through the operation of capital abroad. In the Transvaal there were the Eckstein group, Werner, Beit & Co., with capital investments in 1899 valued at over seventy-six million pounds. The Consolidated Goldfields Company of which Cecil Rhodes was a leading spirit belonged to this group. There were also J. B. Robinson with nineteen mines and fourteen millions of capital; and finally the Barnato firm.[2]

[2] Hobson, *The War in South Africa*, p. 191 sq.

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These groups controlled the Press and gave to people in England highly coloured versions of what was going on. The advantages apparently in view of these interested groups were control of the labour market under a government more amenable than that of the Boers and perhaps an Imperial idea of aggrandisement and expansion of economic life in which they would be largest sharers. The war came about according to plan and the people of England paid the price.

That is what happens when foreign investments result in war; but this, of course, is exceptional. The evidence does not show that this is the normal result of foreign investment. Indeed war seems to result only when the investment is in a country with a weaker government than that of the investors. There have been many cases of default in the payment to investors in Europe by public authorities in the United States of America; but foreign policy has not yet led in such cases to war or the threat of war. It seems, therefore, that this evil result of foreign investment only can follow when the investment is placed in what are called "undeveloped" countries.

Another evil result of foreign investment may be the denuding of domestic enterprise or the defective development of domestic resources. If the pull of higher returns or investments is all that matters, then investments abroad may make investments at home too few.[3] The rate for capital at home rises as a result of the higher rates offered abroad and industry and employment at home are therefore diminished or are less than they might otherwise have been. There have been many complaints in France against the export of French capital on the ground that French industry is thereby weakened; and some have even suggested that the government should prohibit or limit the export of capital for this reason.[4]

Again, investment abroad sometimes ensnares the people abroad to the group of financiers at home, and this re-

[3] C. K. Hobson, *Export of Capital*, p. 37 sq.

[4] Lysis, *Contre l'Oligarchie financière.*

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acts upon the domestic situation even when the financial group, having secured predominance then stands, and asks its fellow countrymen to stand, not for war, but for law and order.

It is unpersuasive to preach peace among nations if your income from rubber shares is raised by slave labour. It may be wrong to use force; but you cannot prove it if your wealth depends upon the subjection of other peoples to the force of your armies; and many pacific persons do not refuse to derive advantage from a situation which they condemn.

Again, the income from investments abroad comes not to the people as a whole, not to the state, as representing the people, but to a few. This tends to the enrichment of the few and perhaps to the greater difference between their wealth and the meagre incomes of the majority. It is, however, argued that the many gain as consumers, *e.g.*, cheaper food in consequence of investments in Argentina. But the enrichment gives to the small groups increased political power. They have the Press, the motor cars for election time, the ability to pay agents, the best means for forming and expressing the only vocal "will of the people." But the source of their wealth is unknown. Wealth got from foreign lands is generally wealth got in secret and absentee owners are often worse for the land they inhabit than for the land they own, but do not burden with their irresponsible expenditure.

A further result which may be thought in the main bad is that capital invested in enterprises in undeveloped countries may use labour there to undersell the products of labour in the more highly industrialised countries. Thus the cotton manufacture of India, using Indian labour, may in the end limit if not extinguish the Manchester cotton trade. The jute industry of India, itself the result of the investment there of British capital, may make it impossible to continue the jute industry in Scotland. A shipbuilding firm from the Clyde has recently moved its works to Vancouver partly, at any rate, to avoid labour difficul-

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ties; and economists and literary men have already prophesied that the higher paid worker of Europe would be thrown out of employment as soon as it became practicable to use in industries negroes, the Chinamen or the Malays.[5]

Foreign investment may thus have the effect of degrading the standard of life of the majority of the wage-earners in the countries which export capital.

The Basis of Foreign Policy.

Foreign policy is already affected by partial and momentary judgments of the good and evil flowing from foreign investment. Although no large principles have been accepted generally, and although no principles at all seem to be permanent, the influence of governments has in fact been directed sometimes because of the known effects of foreign investment; but because each government is regarded as acting for the sake only of the people who directly influence it, the action of governments has been generally directed to preventing the export of capital. The interest in view is mainly that of the country which might export capital, not the interest of the undeveloped country or of the world at large: and therefore it is the effect upon the domestic situation which seems to be in the minds of those who regulate foreign investment.

Thus the French Government requires that no capital shall go abroad at any time without official registration and license. At one time, when foreign investment was a new phenomenon, it was totally prohibited; for it was felt that the capital so exported would be a loss to France; and even now the control by the French Government over French investment abroad is dominated by the crudest conceptions of the interests of France as a whole.

By a royal ordinance of 18th November, 1823, foreign *government* loans were permitted to be quoted on the Bourse.

[5] Dr. Dillon in the preface to his book on the Peace Conference seems to advocate this use of cheaper labour; and Dr. Inge, Dean of St. Paul's, has recently urged that the danger of this cheap labour is a reason for lower wages in Europe.

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A letter of the Minister of Finance of 12th August, 1873, confirms this ordinance and notes that the *Chambre syndicate* of the Bourse must inform the Ministers of Finance and of Foreign Affairs of any new issues of capital proposed. The official recognition of other foreign issues, not state loans, dates from an imperial decree of 22nd May, 1858; and the Minister of Finance in a letter of 16th October, notes that the government can veto any issue. Rules for the new issues are laid down by decree of 1880 and 1893; and Article 5 of the former runs— "The Minister of Finance may in any case forbid the dealing in any foreign security in France." In two ways, therefore, foreign investment is controlled by the French Government. First, the *Chambres syndicates* of the "agents de change" operate, in their rules for new issues, under a law which gives them power to exact certain conditions. Secondly, this Stock Exchange must inform the government of proposed new issues and the government may refuse permission.[6]

The French Government sometimes uses this right of veto on foreign investments for diplomatic bargaining. For example, in 1909 the Danish Government intended to raise the import duties on French wines, and the French Foreign Office thereupon threatened the Danish Government that if the duties were imposed no new Danish loans would be allowed to be quoted in Paris. Similarly, Sweden and Norway were granted leave for quotation of their new loans in Paris only on consideration that they lowered their duties.[7] In 1909 the Krupps obtained a contract for artillery for the Argentine in competition with a French firm, and therefore the French Government refused to allow in France the raising of the Argentine five per cent loan of that year.

In 1911 the French Government refused permission for the quotation of an Hungarian loan in Paris. The reasons were (1) the money was to pay for expenses due to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for military needs

[6] Becque, *l'Internat. des Capitaur.* p. 112 sq.
[7] Becque, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

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of the Triple Alliance and (2) French capitalists had felt themselves interfered with in Austria. In 1912, the French Government refused permission for a loan for Cuba. It was urged that Frenchmen injured in the Cuban revolution of 1895 had not yet been compensated. M. Poincaré, the President du Consul and Foreign Minister, said in the Chamber (3rd February, 1902) that "the Government unanimously agree that the interests of France should take precedence of the financial interest—whatever that may mean!" A Turkish loan in 1910 was refused quotation both because the young Turks were hostile to France and because the security was regarded as doubtful. This latter reason is similar to that given by the British Foreign Office to explain why certain loans to China would not be supported by the British Government; but the reply made by financiers in the both cases was that they were the best judges of the security for the loan; a reply which has never been fairly used by those who advocate or those who operate the governmental control of foreign investment.

In England the situation is different. The Committee of the Stock Exchange in London makes and enforces the rules for new issues and these rules make no distinction between conditions for admission of home and foreign securities. Ordinary Company Law, chiefly now the Companies Consolidation Act of 1908, governs the situation; but the government had no power to forbid any issue of foreign securities. The Foreign Office, however, does influence new foreign issues, as has been shown above in the case of the Chinese loans. All other countries follow this method of influence rather than control, and France, therefore, is an exception in having a definite and legal relation established between the Stock Exchange and the Foreign Office in regard to foreign issues.

During the War, however, the British Government, like other governments, extended its control over financial operations, and one of the first Regulations under the Defence of the Realm Act was to prevent the export of capital except by license. The text was as follows:

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"A person resident in the U. K. shall not, without permission in writing from the Treasury, directly or indirectly, either on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person resident in the U. K.—

(1) Send any remittance out of the U. K. for the purpose of:

(a) making or subscribing to any loan or subscribing to any issue of capital outside the U. K.; or

(b) purchasing any stock, shares or other securities or any property other than merchandise, if the securities or property are not in the U. K.; or

(c) purchasing any foreign currency to be held with a view to appreciation in value or as an investment; or

(2) take part in, or agree or offer to take part in, any of the above mentioned transactions if such transaction involve the sending of any remittance out of the U. K." [8]

This regulation is now no longer in force; but it is interesting evidence of the tendency of war to separate the financial structure of the world into arbitrary units marked by political frontiers.

The same tendency is to be found in Germany. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury in the House of Commons, on 2nd March, 1921, said:

"The export of capital from Germany is prohibited by various laws of the German Government, the chief of which is the law of 26th June, 1918. I understand that the object of these laws is to prevent the evasion of taxes." [9]

All such action of government in regard to foreign investment is dominated by the idea of the national or *domestic* results of the investment. Control by a Treasury or a Foreign Office usually involves the attempt to separate and not to unite the peoples. Each government normally is considered by its people as the agent of their interest in contrast with the interests of foreigners, and the cry for control of foreign investments normally comes not from those who have large views of the interests of many different peoples but from those who desire to keep all available wealth for persons of their own nationality.

The tendency to separate the peoples, much increased

[8] D.O.R. Regulation 41 D.

[9] *Hansard*, H. C., 2nd March, 1921, col. 1795.

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by the war, is still more increased by the Treaties of Peace. In Section 297 of the German Treaty and Section 249 of the Austrian Treaty arrangements are made with regard to the property of German and Austrian subjects in the countries of the Entente. Part of such property consist of investments; and since these investments can be taken, under the Treaty, for the payment of monies owed by the German Government, there is naturally a discountenancing of foreign investment. After former wars the obstruction to intercourse was not so great; for now if the Peace Treaties are to be guides to the future the people of every nation will fear to invest any capital in any State with which their own may at any time quarrel; and presumably foreign policy will not support this giving of hostages to a possible enemy.

Problems are already arising. Owing to the rate of exchange with Europe, Canada is being severed more completely in finance from the United Kingdom and bound more closely to the United States. The foreign debt of Canada, governmental and private, amounts to about £800,000,000; about half of which is owing to British investors, but the United States citizens have increased the amount owed to them by Canadians since 1914 five times and they now hold about £250,000,000 of Canadian securities. This, undoubtedly, was one of the influences leading to the appointment of a Canadian governmental representative in Washington, in addition to the British Ambassador. What, then, are we to expect? Are we to refuse to Canada the use of American capital when she cannot obtain any from Great Britain, or are we to compel British citizens to invest in Canadian and not in French or Austrian enterprises? Are we to care at all from what source our investors draw their income? Or are we to refuse them permission to draw any income from abroad?

Clearly we must at least refer to the effect upon the country in which we live if we are to decide upon the action of government or the position to be given to financiers and investors.

A foreign policy, therefore, which supports foreign in-

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vestment will be partially the cause of all the goods which flow from such investments, and the balance cannot easily be struck. The agent of the state and the people as the "principals" in foreign policy will have to decide upon the course to follow, whether or not to support any particular foreign investment, after making some estimate of the good and the evil which is likely to be the result. That may indeed be difficult to do; but it is most important at the moment that it should be generally recognized that a judgment should be made. Investments go abroad. Results follow at home. Politicians and the foreign services are called upon to act in the matter; and unless there is some popular understanding of the importance of such problems, policy becomes a mere drift,—an opportunism without moral quality on economic or political value.

Further, whatever the action of government, either by control, or by support of foreign investment, it is important to notice that the activities of governments play comparatively a small part in this financial world. The movement of capital abroad is in the main directed by no conception of public service, however crude, but by an appetite for private gain. In so far, therefore, as investment abroad has any effects, good or evil, upon domestic affairs, the effects are chiefly due to the use of private property for private gain, and not to the action or inaction of governments. Thus we appear to face a dilemma. Unregulated foreign investment is dominated by the idea of private gain and may have very pernicious public effects; and on the other hand, regulation of foreign investment by governments seems to lead only to the separation of nations and the domination of the most selfish and nationalistic foreign policy.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

LONDON.

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THE HEDONISM OF DISILLUSIONMENT IN THE YOUNGER GENERATION.

RAYNA RAPHAELSON.

I HAVE been attending a philosophy seminar, where twelve of us have been considering various aspects of modern ethical theory. To an inquiry as to why more attention was not given to Hedonism, answer was made that hedonism as a philosophic theory has had few advocates in recent days. Idealist, Realist, and Pragmatist have with one accord agreed that hedonism is logically, psychologically, and ethically fallacious.

Yet, as I listened, the insistent query kept rising in my mind, "Then why is there so much hedonism in literature and in life?" For whatever may be true as to philosophic theory, no one who knows what the younger generation at least is thinking and reading and doing will so easily be assured that hedonism has entirely disappeared from earth. It may have no excuse for tarrying after it has been so thoroughly done to death by philosophers, but whether due to the fact that it has not yet learned of its demise or to some more plausible ground, the fact is that it is still here.

Hedonism at times is a surface symptom of an extremely insidious and serious social disease. It is the reaction of a particular sort of temperament to the disillusionment that comes from a realization of social disintegration. And it is because social disintegration is so fatal a disease that hedonism is deserving of more than the casual dismissal it usually receives at the hands of the modern philosopher. For to tell a dangerously ill community that its disease is irrational and to let it go at that is on a par with curing delirium by arguing with the delirious victim about the foolishness of fever. Furthermore, this philosophic indifference seems particularly criminal just at this time, when we are in the grip of a disillusionment that is, very probably, the most severe the world has ever seen.

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I am not going to write about hedonism as a philosophic system. I am interested in it only in its relationship to widespread moral anarchy and in its inevitability and its insidiousness. Neither shall I concern myself with the familiar hedonistic fallacies—with the logical, psychological and anthropological difficulties. I know that hedonism can be defeated on any of these grounds. My point is that, in spite of its fallacious logic, in spite of its faulty psychology and its doubtful anthropological assumptions, hedonism is worthy of consideration. For it is an undeniable fact that the attitude persists in the minds of many people to-day—and the presence of this attitude in any community raises social questions that are both fundamentally ethical and of the greatest practical importance.

> My candle burns at both ends
> It will not last the night.
> But ah my foes, and oh my friends,
> It gives a lovely light.

That's hedonism—in its only consistent and unequivocal form, and, therefore, the only hedonism that is worthy of the name. It is the attitude of the Rubaiyat and of Aristippus, and, with some tempering, of Epicurus—the attitude also of Boccaccio and Rabelais and Byron and Baudelaire and Remy de Gourmont and Stendhal and George Moore—to mention only a few names.

The word, hedonism, has not always been used with a consistent meaning and so it is necessary at the start to indicate how it will be used in this paper. Hedonism here will mean the mood that is expressed in Edna St. Vincent Millay's flippant little candle poem. The other familiar meaning of the word is that associated with the term, Utilitarianism. But this double use of the word leads to confusion. Aristippus himself, the traditional founder of hedonism, would have been surprised and puzzled to find himself coupled with Jeremy Bentham, and I do not think Epicurus would have permitted John Stuart Mill to remain long in his garden. For Aristippus and Epicurus —like all consistent hedonists—were concerned with their

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own states of happiness; Bentham and Mill were worried primarily about the happiness of mankind. The difference is sufficient to justify the use of two words.

But be that as it may, I shall concern myself only with consistent hedonism—and, more especially, with consistent hedonism in only one of its two phases—the hedonism that results from despair. The other type of consistent hedonism—the spontaneously bubbling spirit of youth as expressed either by an individual or by an age—is not so likely to lead to bitter excess. That was the mood of the Renaissance and of the early phases of the Romantic Movement—the mood that said, "Let's get everything possible out of life because life is a gorgeous opportunity and the world is teeming with promise of happiness and gaiety." Such hedonism can easily be sublimated into fine art and literature and science. Not so pliable is the despairing hedonism—the hedonism that comes not from youthful enthusiasm but as a reaction to a too gullible idealism. The man who, when he returns from the hospital to find that he has lost his job, that his wife has run off with another man and his dog has died, slams the door of the house and goes out to get wildly drunk, is giving expression to this despairing hedonistic mood. It is about him—and about allied types of hopeless people—that I shall be speaking in this paper.

The despairing man has five alternatives. He can become fighting mad and resolve to remake the world—either grimly and ruthlessly as a setting for himself as would Nietzsche in his *Will to Power*, or with a stubborn hopefulness as a decent place for all mankind to live in, as would many of our modern reformers; or he can shrink from the world, first into himself and then through himself into the realm of mysticism; or he can become a stoical martyr and find the sole meaning of life in showing others the weaknesses in their faiths and beliefs; or he can become a hedonist. This leaves out, of course, the optimist, who still maintains that all's well with the world or that it can be made so.

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Every time in history that things have gone to smash—from the disintegration of the Greek city states to the disaster of the last war—there has followed a period of disillusionment which has become more or less widespread and found expression in one or more of the forms just mentioned.

In Greece, disillusionment came in with the Sophists, was carried on by Aristippus and culminated in Epicurus and the Stoics. When Epicurus was born, the Peloponnesian War had been ended and Pericles dead for sixty years. Greek freedom had become an empty tradition. Local pride could no longer exist. Man was restless and cosmopolitan. Social institutions were unstable; there were corruption, decay and economic disturbances. And men were asking, "How shall a man conduct himself in a world that is going to pieces?"

All through the Roman era, disillusion reigned. Law and order created a great empire but they could not give men confidence in themselves or faith in their world. The Roman Empire was an unnatural phenomenon at best—poorly designed for happiness and contentment. In the first place it was inordinately ambitious; and in the second place its size was all out of proportion with its technology. What roads there were led to Rome—but there were too few of them and the journey took a long time. Also, if you wanted to go to Rome, you had only the roads—no newspapers, no mail service, no railroads, no telegraph.

Roman disillusion found little expression in philosophy, but, for that matter, there was little philosophy of any kind in Rome—only a warmed-over Greek philosophy that had lost its content and its spirit. However, in the everyday life of Rome there was disillusion and unrestraint enough, and in the literature of the time we have Horace and Lucretius, who offer in their mild, almost calculatedly moderate epicureanism a criticism of a society more unrestrained than these two writers thought wise. It was an age of war and uncertainty, and the disintegrating religious and social structure made people sceptical, sophisticated

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and hysterical. It was this state of affairs that finally gave rise to the great Christian church organization.

Christianity became a world power not so much because of its truth as because it answered a need. Life on this earth was wretched, but the church pointed to a happy life beyond the grave, and there was a gradual lessening of tension as hedonistic Rome ceased to struggle and succumbed gratefully to the mystical power and practical control of the Christian church. It is not necessary in this paper to treat of this period which Sir Gilbert Murray aptly calls the Age of the Loss of Nerve, except to point out that it, too, resulted from a mood of disillusionment and despair.

Europe did not wake up until the Renaissance, when the world was again split up into smaller units and it was possible for men to feel more at home. The familiar events of this energetic reawakening—the widening world, the new science, the awakening of the individual to the realization of long dormant powers within himself, the rise of princes, the discovery of new themes for art and literature, the inventions in printing that made possible the rapid spread of new ideas—are coupled in our minds with the healthy curiosity and egoistic individualism of such men as Bacon and Descartes and Galileo, of Macchiavelli, of Leonardo and Boccaccio, and of the adventurous explorers of the new continent to the west.

But this high hopefulness of the Renaissance could not last for long. The first flush of enthusiasm and ambition paled, and, in a calmer mood, Europe was forced to see that the new science and the new worlds could not fulfil their promise as quickly as had been expected. The world again succumbed to disillusion. In England there was the philosophy of Hobbes and his followers and on the continent there was the Enlightenment. The keynote of both is individualism—but it is a dogged and determined individualism entirely unlike the joyful enthusiasm of the Renaissance.

This period of cold critical analysis was broken by the industrial revolution and the rise of democracy. These

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brought a new period of hope into the world. Democracy and equality meant a new hopefulness for society, and romanticism, for a brief while, succeeded in giving back hopefulness to the individual who for one short hour revelled in a surprised joy in his own emotions—and enjoyed a freedom of expression which had been stifled by the cold analysis of the Enlightenment. But this romanticism could not live long. The materialism of the new world killed it—or else it succumbed to its own logic and ended in melancholy and satiety.

Long after the romantic poets had become silent, the faith of the more active politicians and economists lived on. It is this faith that has supplied us with our optimistic catchwords right up to the present day. Democracy and industry developed and spread. They reorganized most of the world, gave us cities and legislatures and factories and working classes, and remolded our minds to the understanding of an entirely new system of values. They created a world smug in its faith in democracy and economic growth, and secure in an unquestioning belief in its own power, which it had substituted for an implicit belief in the power and indulgent favoritism of an Almighty God.

But in 1914 the industrial revolution, the democratic movement, modern science and the transfer of individualism as an ideal from the individual himself to national and racial groups culminated in a world war which caught us on the crest of a wave of self-confidence and conceit. We began to sink. Some people think we reached the depths in 1917 and have since been slowly rising. Others fail to detect any rise. And these are the disillusioned people of the present day. There are thousands of them.

When these people become articulate they tell us that our world is being attacked by the same disease of disintegration that invaded Greece after the age of Pericles. Religion has been overthrown by modern science and economics; God's hand no longer points our way. Even economic activity—the great god before the war—has

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nothing divine about it any more. And the war itself and analytical, dispassionate sex novels have done strange things to men and women and to family and community life.

There are hedonists among these disillusioned people—and also stoics and sceptics, and a veritable flood of mystics of one sort and another. It is the hedonists who have recently been indulging themselves in a competitive orgy of extravagance. Just at the present moment, this riot of spending seems to have been partially abandoned—of necessity; but these hedonists still flood our cabarets and dance halls and create bizarre studios and eating places all along the little side streets of American cities. They follow their own sweet individual will in art and literature and life—and scores of them are persistent in their open and blatant defiance of prohibition.

This new age has received much condemnation, but also some vigorous support and justification. One of the most stirring defences of the so-called "younger generation" was made in an article entitled "*These wild young people,*" *by One of Them*, which was written by John F. Carter, Jr., for the *Atlantic Monthly*. Mr. Carter is not crushed by the situation. He is a militant stoic and somewhat of a hedonist. He is impatient of restraint and tackles the job of reconstruction with a confessed lack of hopefulness but with great vigor, and he pays respects to none of the traditional gods.

Mr. Carter talks about the things that have made these young people wild. "My generation is disillusioned," he says, "and, I think, to a certain extent brutalized. We have in our unregenerate youth learned the practicality and cynicism that is safe only in unregenerate old age. We have been forced to become realists overnight. We have seen man at his lowest, woman at her lightest, in the terrible moral chaos of Europe. We have been forced to question, and, in many cases, to discard the religion of our fathers. We have seen hideous peculation, greed, anger, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness, unmasked and rampant

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and unashamed. We have been forced to live in an atmosphere of 'to-morrow we die,' and so, naturally, we drank and were merry. We have seen entire social systems overthrown and our own called in question. In short, we have seen the inherent beastliness of the human race revealed in an infernal apocalypse."

However, although Mr. Carter is defiant of criticism and impatient of restraint, he is not a slacker when it comes to the work of reconstruction. "Oh! I know we are a pretty bad lot, but has not that been true of every preceding generation? At least we have the courage to act accordingly. We drink when we can and what we can, we gamble and are extravagant—but we work, and that's about all that we can be expected to do. . . . The Grundy's shake their heads. . . . They'll make us good. Prohibition is put through to stop our drinking and hasn't stopped it. Bryan has plans to curtail our philanderings but he won't do any good. A Draconian code is being hastily formulated at Washington and elsewhere to prevent us from, by any chance, making any alteration in this present divinely constituted arrangement of things. . . . They won't do any good. They can shackle us down, and still expect us to repair their blunders if they wish. But we shall not trouble ourselves very much about them any more. Why should we? What have they done? They have made us work as they never had to work in all their padded lives—but we'll have our cake and ale for a' that."

There you have the younger generation when it is courageously hedonistic and militant. Often it is neither, and then it is more insidious.

These young people are indeed disillusioned. With true sceptical vigor they scoff at governments and at all the democratic ideals that were used so facilely by politicians and statesmen during the war; they listen unmoved and with tongue in cheek to patriotic speeches and to the blare of bands, and they invariably make significant reservations to themselves about the idea of God. Add to these attitudes an easy if surface familiarity with a new kind of psychology

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that traces our actions to not the most pleasant of motives and you have the soil in which many of the minds of our modern youths are taking root.

The first, most obvious objection that will be made to this view of our young people will be that there are, after all, not so very many of these rebels, but that they talk so loud that the millions of steady conservatives can no longer be heard. And this may be true; yet college campuses seem to belie this contention. All the students may not be out of bounds, but the increasingly difficult problems of deans of men and deans of women seem to indicate that at least the number is growing.

It will be said, too, that these wild young people are the victims of an after-the-war psychology; and, as a matter of fact, this is probably true. Yet we cannot go on from that to say that, therefore, this lawlessness and unrestraint among our youth is a passing phenomenon. Once before in history disillusionment held the world in its grip for almost a dozen centuries; it may do so again. All we can know to-day is that here are these disillusioned people,—also incidentally that they are not entirely confined to the younger generation,—that their number seems to increase and their questions continue to confront us and to present an unanswered and seemingly unanswerable challenge.

We get many glimpses of the moods of these people from contemporary literature. There are sceptics—and, as might be expected, these are often older men—men who had vision enough to see what would happen long before it did happen and so, long ago, noted the flimsiness of many of our pretensions. Notably among our older sceptics are Anatole France and James Branch Cabell, both of whom are becoming increasingly popular among young people.

Anatole France mixes his scepticism with a sober hedonism. Cabell's scepticism is so fraught with romanticism and medievalism that at times he seems almost a mystic.

France in *The Garden of Epicurus* says, "All we know is this; there is no more repose in the spaces of the sky than on

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earth, and the same law of strife and struggle governs the infinitude of the cosmic universe." And this, "What better can we do than build sand castles at ten years old and form collections at sixty. Nothing will remain in any case of all our work, and the love of old books is not more foolish than any other love." And this, "In life we must make all due allowance for chance. Chance, in the last resort, is God." And this, "There is nothing else for us to do in this world but resign ourselves to circumstance. But the nobler natures know how to give resignation the fine name of content."

Cabell, also, finds the world a hopeless place, but he, also, refuses to be made tragic by its hopelessness. "A comedy of woman-worship," "A comedy of purse-strings," "A comedy of appearances," "A comedy of limitations," "A comedy of evasions," "A comedy of justice,"—these are the subtitles to some of his books. But this is not comedy of the Charley Chaplin variety. There is nothing really funny about his books. They leave one with the feeling of having experienced great beauty and great futility. Everything is illusory—except, indeed, romance, in which Cabell finds his only solace. And even of romance he at times expresses doubt. He is a strange combination of gently embittered disillusion and vaguely smiling trust in the efficacy of dreams. He wants to think of the world not as it is but as it ought to be; and yet all the time he refuses to be deluded; he always remembers that the romance he creates is only a dream—a dream, indeed, which is consciously designed "to free us from this unsatisfying life that is calendared by fiscal years, and to contrive a less disastrous elusion of our own personalities than many seek dispersedly in drink and drugs and lust and fanaticism and sometimes in death."

So we have Cabell—a combination of a scepticism of this life and the hedonism of despair.

Walter Pater and Remy de Gourmont died before the war—but they, also, saw how pathetically futile were the ideals of our modern civilization. Both of them turned to

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hedonistic æstheticism, the one with a fine and mellow toleration and the other with a flippant, almost supercilious scepticism. It is Remy de Gourmont who says, "The ill are always optimistic; perhaps optimism itself is an illness." And, "Believe in nothing; not even the trade you follow, not even the hand you caress, the eyes in which you are mirrored, not even yourself—above all, not in yourself."

As to the immediate present, our literature is still very chaotic and confused, but, nevertheless, the war has brought out several significant things. It has stimulated a new freedom of form in literature, painting, sculpture and music. There has been a flood of free verse, much of it difficult to understand, but all of it attempting, either naturally or affectedly, to express unfettered individuality. We have also had a flood of love lyrics, many of them reflecting disillusion in their new note either of desperate abandon or of weariness. These lyrics seem to be replacing the vigorous propaganda thought-poems of the pre-war and early war period. And then there is some frank hedonism and despair.

We have already cited the candle burning at both ends from Edna St. Vincent Millay, who early abandoned the wistful hopefulness of her first book, *Renascence*, for the slightly humorous but infinitely sad disillusionment of her later books, *A Few Figs from Thistles* and *Second April*. Sometimes her mood verges on despair. She shifts from flickering outbursts of adventurousness to a doubting of what will be found at the end of the road—from

> My heart is warm with the friends I make
> And better friends I'll not be knowing.
> Yet there isn't a train I wouldn't take
> No matter where it's going.

to

> There was a road ran past our house
> Too lovely to explore,
> I asked my mother once; she said
> That if you followed where it led
> It brought you to the milk-man's door.
> That's why I have not traveled more.

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Edna St. Vincent Millay is probably the most popular of our younger poets. If she has a rival it is Rupert Brooke, another hedonist, but one who did not live long enough for his healthy hedonism, which reminds one of the earlier Millay poems, to shift to pessimism. He died at the height of the war while idealism was still in the air. But there are enough hints in his poetry—in *When Love Has Turned to Kindliness* for instance, and in his insidious *Helen and Menelaus*, to indicate that the gay buoyant earthiness of *The Great Lover* would have shifted at the end of the war to something less hopeful and less strenuous. I have heard some people say they are glad he did not live.

Scores of other poets are sprinkling their inevitable love lyrics with various kinds of pessimism. Sassoon writes—

> Do they matter, those dreams from the pit?
> We can drink and forget and be glad.

Conrad Aiken faces a new day with calm resignation but with little hope.

> It is morning, Senlin says, and in the morning
> When the light drips through the shutters like the dew,
> I arise, I face the sunrise,
> And do the things my fathers learned to do.
> Stars in the purple dusk above the rooftops
> Pale in a saffron mist and seem to die,
> And I myself on a swiftly tilting planet
> Stand before my glass and tie my tie.

In the evening Senlin sings another song, of which this is the last refrain—

> And the star I laugh on tilts through heaven;
> And the heavens are dark and steep.
> I will forget these things once more
> In the silence of sleep.

There is disillusion in Alfred Kreymbourg's *Idealists:*

> Brother tree: Why do you reach and reach?
> Do you dream some day to touch the sky?
> Brother stream: Why do you run and run?
> Do you dream some day to fill the sea?
> Brother Bird: Why do you sing and sing?
> Do you dream—
> Young Man: Why do you talk and talk and talk?

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Arthur Davison Ficke writes—

I am weary of being bitter and weary of being wise,
And the armour and the mask of these fall from me after long.
I would go where the islands sleep, or where the sea dawns rise
And lose my bitter wisdom in the wisdom of a song.

and even Ezra Pound—

Sing we for love and idleness
Naught else is worth the having.

While a number of our lyric poets are turning away from this western world and are seeking solace in the beauty of ancient Chinese, Japanese and Indian poetry.

An interesting poet is Louis Untermeyer. Four or five years ago he was in high hope and wrote a book called *Challenge*. He was very brave then, even though the task of remolding the world seemed rather appalling—

And we shall cry out till the wind
Roars in their ears the thing to come.
Yea, though they make us deaf and blind,
Nothing will keep us dumb.

But his post-war book, *The New Adam*, shouts no challenge. It is a collection of love lyrics, dealing often with the disillusion of love and often frankly sensual. Here is one, written in a cemetery—

Life is all that matters
Love is all that saves.
Then I heard the dead men
Chuckling in their graves.

For once, the comment on the jacket of a book is significant. The publisher recognizes the forces that are making the poet of to-day. "Caught in the eternal struggle of the flesh, this new Adam is the child of a complex and analytical age, a being who realizes his inability to dwell in Paradise, and yet longs continally to regain an impossible Eden."

So much for the poets. Of course, these few quotations do not give any adequate idea of the whole of the poetry of any of these writers. There is a great deal of poetry being written by them and others that does not strike the key

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of pessimism. Nevertheless, the minor note and the note of scepticism recurs again and again.

Among the prose writers, there has been an even more significant development. First there were the extreme war horror stories, the result of a violent aversion to brutality—such books as Barbusse's *Under Fire* and Latzko's *Men in War*. This intense mood was, of course, too extreme to last for long.

But since the days of the war, books of a new type have literally poured in on us. With the self-revealing frankness of expression which psycho-analysis and the war developed, we are still having a flood of realistic psycho-analytical, slightly disguised autobiographical novels. Everybody started out to tell the truth about himself and the world, and much of it has not been very pleasant truth. In America there have been *Moon Calf*, *Briary Bush*, *Erik Dorn*, *This Side of Paradise*, *Poor White*, *Main Street*, *Miss Lulu Bett*—and many others which have not attracted such universal attention. From England, we get *Potterism*, *Dangerous Ages*, and *Debatable Ground*. And from Germany there has come Wasserman's *Great Illusion*—in two volumes.

These are to-day our "best sellers." They have very little in common with the best sellers of the early years of the century or with the social problem novel which always had a vigorous solution in the end, novels of the type of Ernest Poole's *Harbor*.

Yet in spite of their gloominess and pessimism and sordidness, these recent books leave the impression of being more significant than any books we have had in a long time. They are honest. They give expression to sincere emotion and voice the insistent questions which are making life an uncertain performance for many people of the twentieth century. We are reminded of the sordid naturalism of Artsibachev's *Sanine* which came as a reaction to the fiasco of the Russian Revolution of 1905—and of the weary rebellion and pessimism of Andreyev.

Side by side with these unabashed novelists is the group

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of the so-called young radical intellectuals who have been flooding our magazines and newspapers with destructive criticism. A group of them have gotten together recently and put out a book which they call, *Civilization in the United States*. The gist of this examination of civilization seems to be that there isn't any. These men have been unceasingly berated by the more conservative critics on the ground that they are purely destructive, that they howl inconsistently but with great vigor for the limitation of individualism in order to make room for socialism, and for the destruction of society in order to make way for the individual; and because they indulge in a general thumping of the table in behalf of the freeing from convention of everything that has traditional value—government, industry, war, sex, God. A recent critic has said of this group that the trouble with them is that, first, they are not gentlemen and, second, they do not use their brains.

Now this may be so. Yet little seems to be gained by calling these young men boors; and terming them half-baked will not serve to dismiss them. There are too many of them. They are giving expression to a mood that is becoming more widespread every day, and the ridicule of the critic will do no more than the logic of the philosopher to silence the mood of the genuinely disillusioned man when he has a disillusioned audience that will listen.

The proof that these poets and novelists and belligerent critics are not merely lone voices as were the radicals before the war is found in the fact that their books are selling in a way that similar books never sold before. Almost any writer of radical critical comment, any new poet, any new realistic novelist can find an audience; and one clue to the amazing sale of H. G. Wells's *Outline of History* is, I think, the fact that people are worrying to-day about the perplexing problem of the purpose of life—and are in search of understanding.

Even so, it will be said, there is no reason for viewing this situation with alarm. Even granting that the world these pessimists see is the true world, things have gone to smash

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before and the world has recovered; it will recover again. And to strengthen this, we can point to the great achievements of the last few centuries which give promise for the future—our workable science, our workable psychology; our beginnings of a more adequate understanding of the history in back of us and the society around us. But, the pessimist answers us, these are not unmixed goods. Our greater knowledge also brings us a clearer understanding of our own limitations and the limitations of our world. And he will go on to point out that there never before has been an age just like this one—just because we do know so much; we have discovered all the geographic world there is; we are beginning to have a suspicion that science has its limits, and we have taken much of the mystery out of the heavens.

And this pessimist—who, by the way, usually terms himself a realist—will then go on to say that in the days of Epicurus, if a God had looked down from the heavens, he would have seen hope. The civilized world had not yet been rounded out—just a few tribes huddled around the Mediterranean—and beyond, thousands of miles of untapped world. For, even though the men of Greece did not fulfil the hope of that outer world, there it was and its very existence constituted a promise for the future.

So, too, in Rome. Although Rome did not permanently conquer Europe, it could set out to explore the world beyond the grave—and dreams of paradise could prove a solace for many, many years. Then, when in the course of time, this spiritual adventure lost its zest, there was again that world to be explored. And people brought their eyes down from the heavens and were soon launched on voyages of hopeful discovery—geographic, scientific, artistic.

But to-day, the pessimist goes on, the world beyond the grave which was discovered by the scholastics and the world this side of the grave which was found by the treasure seekers of the Renaissance seem to many people to be on the verge of exhaustion. We may still find a comfort of a sort in religion, but there is not in our new religion which spells Society with a capital letter and god with a small one,

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the personal promise that proved a solace in the Middle Ages. And although we may still enjoy the art and use the science discovered by the men of the Renaissance, we no longer have their faith that wonders will be accomplished.

It is this feeling of having reached the end of the rope that has gripped the world to-day. We've seen all there is. There isn't any more. We look about us. Our science may still improve industry, but many people detect danger in that. Around the world in eighty days has no longer the power to thrill. We do it now in a month. The mystery of foreign places is being dispelled. Mankind, we have come to see, is much the same the world over and foreign peoples seem more prone to ape our economic efficiency with its correlated social and human problems than to embrace the outworn theology which we offer them. And, finally, there is the war disillusionment, the doubting of motives and a new attitude toward the individual, who no longer has a soul but a mind,—the limits of which are being fatally proved by relentless mental tests—and a heart which is rapidly becoming a matter of Freudian complexes.

What to do in such a world? This is the same problem which Epicurus faced in Greece over two thousand years ago—the same question for which Marcus Aurelius sought an answer—and St. Augustine and Voltaire and Hobbes.

It may be said that this is, after all, not precisely a philosopher's business. A philosopher's concern may be primarily with theory and it may not be part of his task so to phrase and interpret his theory that it can be used by unphilosophic men in solving their problems. And the fact does remain that the contemporary philosopher has little to say that can be of direct use to the contemporary pessimist.

To take the two extremes, the pragmatist and the idealist —the pragmatist, with his ideal of controlling this world and building solidly on the results of science, would be said by the disillusioned man to be expressing either the discredited

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spirit of the past war, or the spirit of frenzied economic activity, or the blind hopefulness of a stubborn optimism that refuses to recognize that there is nothing particularly fine or hopeful about people or society or God. And sometimes, this sceptical pessimist wonders if the pragmatist is any other than a stoic with a feverish program of reform which serves to keep him from thought.

The alternative answer is that of the idealist who still hopes to save from the pessimist's wreck some of the old significant structures—friendship, art, virtue, God. But the last two of these seem to the disillusioned man to have little ground to stand on, and as for the first two, he may recognize them as goods—but not in the way of the idealist—as a part of a hierarchy of goods which can be depended upon to save the world. He sees them rather as the only possible goods—and at that not ultimately satisfactory—left dimly shining amidst a rubbish heap of outworn hypocrisies.

But what *can* the philosopher do, then? Just this—he can face the fact that this disillusioned attitude may continue to spread until it becomes a factor in the determination of life values for all of us. Of course, this is not an immediate possibility—but neither is it inconceivable. And, it seems to me, the philosopher should try to have some answer ready. He should not continue to ignore the hedonist and the pessimist or to pursue the ridiculous attempt of defeating them by pointing out their faulty logic and psychology.

As I see it, it should not be considered the whole of the philosopher's task to interpret the life that has gone by: he should keep ahead of life and see the future if he can—or, at the very least, he should face the immediate problems that surround him. To-day he seems blind to the world he is living in—a world that is being shaped more and more by these pessimists who do not understand his language—who hate abstractions and are suspicious of familiar phrases, who have abandoned the old religion and seem to feel no insistent need for a new one, who see in ethical standards

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nothing binding, only a conventional expression of social customs which might easily be different and which, moreover, these pessimists propose to make different, who have the frank, analytical, unabashed and unworshipful attitude toward sex and family life which is portrayed in *Debatable Ground*, who, in fact, have no great respect for man, God or devil, and in whose ears the roars of cannons still reverberate and the phrase, love of humanity, sounds as hollow as does love of country or love of God.

It is, I think, up to the philosopher, who purports to be an authority on values, to face this world as it is—and to attempt to save traditional values if he can, or else, if he can't, to create some new ones; and it is up to him to come down out of his world of abstractions or technical pragmatic terms and answer the disillusioned citizen in words that he can understand. This certainly would be an ambitious undertaking It stumped Socrates and Plato when they were challenged by a similar need in Greece. But at least they tried to face it.

It would be ridiculous, of course, to expect that I, a student in a seminar, should have a solution to offer. I haven't. But, as one of the younger generation, I can insist that the philosophers ought to recognize the needs of this present age—that they should wake up to the fact that for the past seven or eight years or more, there has been more than a hint of moral anarchy in the air which, if it be allowed to develop, has within it the power to shatter many, if not all, of the values that have given meaning to life in the past—to insist, indeed, that in connection with our moral world, the philosopher should face squarely the fact which Delisle Burns recognizes in regard to our political world, that, just as in Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, we are again at the cross-roads and progress is not inevitable.

RAYNA RAPHAELSON.

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THE HONOR SYSTEM IN COLLEGES.

JOSEPH ROY GEIGER.

ONE of the priorities of the College of William and Mary, in which the writer of this paper happens to be a teacher of philosophy, is that of having been the first to formulate and adopt the "honor system" as a method of student government. Up to that time student government had been conceived and organized along lines closely analogous to a police system. In 1779, however, the faculty of the College of William and Mary, inspired by their ideal of democracy and by their faith in human nature, appointed a committee to draft a plan of college discipline which should be in keeping with the "liberal and magnanimous" attitude of the college toward its students. The plan reported by the Committee was adopted and has been in operation at William and Mary ever since. And from William and Mary it has spread to other institutions, in more or less modified forms, until to-day it is firmly entrenched in the student life of America.

The fundamental principle of this plan of college discipline which came to be known as the "honor system" was that of individual responsibility in matters involving the student's honor. The presupposition back of it was that "he who cannot be held to do his duty but by base and slavish motives can never do honor to his instructors" and that "such a system as keeps up a sense of responsibility to society at large is most conducive to high excellence." (Cf. Extracts from Addresses of Judge Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, Professor of Law in the College of William and Mary, in the *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 165–171.) In the words of a professor of law in the College during the earlier years of its history: "He (the student) comes to us a gentleman. As such we receive him and treat him and resolutely refuse to know him in any other character. He is not harassed with petty regulations; he is not insulted

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and annoyed by impertinent surveillance. Spies and informers have no countenance among us. We receive no accusation but from the conscience of the accused; and should he be even capable of prevarication or falsehood, we admit no proof of the fact." (Ib. p. 165.) But not only was the student put on his own responsibility in matters of honor, and more particularly in matters involving his pledged word regarding any of his actions, he was allowed, with a few exceptions, to judge for himself what were to be considered matters of honor. "While nothing is required of him (the student) but attention to his studies," says the same authority quoted above, "nothing is forbidden but dueling, which might be fatal to his life, and gambling and drunkenness and tavern haunting, which must be pernicious to his health and morals." (Ib. p. 169.) And finally, the enforcement of the "scanty, but important code" thus imposed by the faculty was "committed to the student's sense of duty and interest," while "academic censures were only resorted to in extreme and rare cases." (Cf. Ib. p. 169.)

Now, it is not the purpose of this paper to eulogize the honor system as a method of college discipline, or to attempt any critical evaluation of it. Perhaps no one would deny that it has been worth while. Certainly, the idealism back of it and the faith in human nature which it presupposes are influences which must profoundly affect the characters of those who come under its sway. About the only way to make people responsible in matters of morals is to induce them to practice responsibility in such matters. Nevertheless, the most enthusiastic advocates of the honor system must recognize that in practice it has not always worked as effectively as it authors expected that it would. It has been found necessary, wherever it has been in operation, to supplement it with a system of student organization and self-government which, with its councils, its investigations, its court-like trials, and its rules for binding the student to become an informer on his fellow student, belies its assumption that the "honor" of the individual can be depended on to control his conduct without any restraints or penalties

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externally applied. Furthermore, it has been found that the student's "sense of honor" frequently fails to include within its scope matters which involve in a vital way the welfare of the college and of the student himself. In such cases, one of two things has happened: the standards in question have been written into the students' recognized code of honor by the authorities of the college; or these standards have been the subjects of legislation and discipline from the maintenance and enforcement of which the students have been more or less excluded. Needless to say, both these procedures are foreign to the spirit and intent of the honor system as originally conceived.

But if the honor system has in practice failed to measure up to the expectations of its authors, to what has this failure been due? Why has it been necessary to modify and supplement it in such fundamental ways? Numerous reasons, more or less superficial, and varying from locality to locality, might be cited as explanations. Back of all these explanations, however, is the fact that the individual which the honor system presupposes and with which it pretends to deal, is artificial and unreal. The student who is inherently a "gentleman" or a "man of honor," or who is "morally responsible" in whatever situation he may be placed, is as unpsychological as the "sinner" presupposed by medieval theology or the pleasure-seeking individual presupposed by eighteenth century ethics and economics. These preconceptions of the student do not sufficiently take account of the social context in which the moral sense and ethical traits of the individual develop and express themselves. More particularly, a "sense of honor," or "moral responsibility," is a function of a social context involving numerous and complex factors; and any system of control whose application depends on the presence of these traits must include within its *modus operandi* a clear insight into what these factors are and adequate methods of making them effective.

This discussion is more concerned with the former of these two conditions than with the latter. Our problem is: What are some of the factors which must be operative if the

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honor system is successfully applied? It is obvious that some of these factors reach back into the former environment, and even back into the heredity of the student. How the student will behave when put on his honor in college, how he will respond when thrown on his own responsibility, will depend in part on the hereditary and environmental forces which have combined to make him what he is. And this fact sets a limit to what can be accomplished in the way of student discipline through the honor system. The honor system can never be one hundred per cent effective because it has to deal with the student who is handicapped by defective heredity and inadequate training as well as with the student whose heredity and training predispose him to respond to its demands. Aside from these factors which reach back into the heredity and early environment of the student, however, the conditions on which the applicability of the honor system depends are not impossible of realization, however remote they may at times seem to be. Let us see what these conditions are:

In the first place, the standards of honor within the scope of action in which the honor system is to be applied must be well defined and generally recognized by the rank and file of the students. And in this connection it is important to distinguish between the theoretical scope of the honor system and the actual scope within which it is practical to apply it. More particularly, the concept, "Honor," which is fundamental to the honor system originally meant "to esteem" or "to have high regard for." One of the earliest forms of social control was that of praise and blame. Men were praised, esteemed, honored who performed the actions essential to the group's welfare in the most excellent manner. On the other hand, men whose actions either contributed nothing to the group's welfare, or were inimical thereto, were blamed or ridiculed. Because man's desire for praise and aversion to blame or ridicule is one of the most deep-seated and universal dispositions constituting his nature, honor and dishonor, as reflecting the attitudes of the group toward its members, were from the first powerful instru-

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ments of social control. Later, "honor" came to stand for those traits of character which were most honorable, *i.e.*, most worthy of being honored or praised, as contributing the most to the common welfare; and dishonor came to denote those traits of a contrary nature.

Now, if the view set forth above is correct, it must be obvious that "honor" is a relative term. It always connotes those standards of actions which, from the point of view of the welfare of a given group, are most worth while, *i.e.*, are most conducive to the ends or purpose for which that group exists; the particular traits of character denoted by it in any particular group at any particular time, however, will depend on the character of the group in question and on the character of the vital interests and activities of the group. For example, one of the precursors of our modern state was the military or warrior group. The traits most essential to the purposes for which this group existed were courage, loyalty, and chivalry. These traits, therefore, constituted the "honor" of the members of this group. Another precursor of the state was the "town" or trading group. Among the members of this group, "honor" came to designate such things as industriousness, sobriety, honesty, and fairness, because these were just the traits on whose presence and operation the welfare of craftsmen and traders depended. Incidentally, it is the imperfect assimilation of these two groups one to the other in our national life of today that accounts for much of the conflict and confusion centering about current moral standards.

But what is the bearing of all this on the problem of the scope and operation of the honor system? Well, the most obvious implication would seem to be that the "honor" of those who live under this system has reference primarily, not to the abstract moral traits of certain individuals who just happen to be attending the same college and living on the same campus, but rather to those concrete standards of action which are most essential to the welfare of a college community of which such individuals are members. This being the case, it would seem arbitrary to single out some

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one trait of character as constituting "honor" under the honor system, however "honorable" the trait may be in non-academic groups, or even in academic groups, for that matter. To say that the honor system should operate only with reference to lying or cheating in relation to class-room activities is to presuppose a narrow and abstract conception of the vital interests and activities of a college group. These interests and activities are numerous and complex. They contemplate the welfare of the college community itself and the welfare of all those groups of which the college community is a fusion. Any standard of action, then, which implicates the welfare of the college community or the more remote forms of welfare represented thereby is, according to our analysis, theoretically, at least, a matter of honor. And the first problem which the leaders in student government must face is precisely this: What interests and activities are fundamental to our welfare as students and as members of a college community? For, having determined what it is that constitutes their welfare, they will then be in a position to consider a further problem, viz.: What standards of action are calculated to best promote our welfare thus defined? The proper solution of this problem should define the theoretical scope of the honor system. Whether all the standards of action included within this scope can be treated as matters of honor and dealt with accordingly is a practical problem to be worked out in the light of practical considerations.

These considerations have to do with the extent to which any action, however much it may implicate the welfare of the college community, is definitely recognized by the students as being a matter of honor. For the effectiveness of a standard or an ideal in controlling the behavior of the individual requires the public opinion of the whole body of students to reinforce it. It frequently happens that because of pressure brought to bear by college authorities, or because of the personal influence of student leaders, standards are injected into the code of honor prevailing in a college concerning which the opinion and sentiment of the student

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body as a whole have not become crystallized. In such cases, the enforcement of the standards in question is impossible. And the evil effects growing out of situations of this kind are far-reaching. It isn't merely that standards of action, vital to the welfare of the college community remain unenforced; this failure on the part of the student body to enforce any part of its code has a tendency to undermine the students' self-respect, to weaken their morale, and to cause them to become indifferent to those standards in their code about which they really have had convictions. To attempt to apply the honor system to actions which are not as yet considered as matters of honor by the rank and file of the students, then, is one of the surest ways to make it ineffective. On the other hand, as soon as any action is generally recognized as affecting in a vital way the welfare of the student body or the good name of the college, the extension of the honor system to apply to that action is likely to be regarded as a matter of course. For example, a body of students might not recognize drinking as being generally dishonorable, in which case, they would be unwilling to be placed on their honor with reference to it; and yet, they might be easily made to see that drinking during college dances or just previously thereto, is to be regarded as pernicious, and hence, dishonorable, and is to be dealt with accordingly. Or, a student body as a whole might have no adverse convictions with regard to smoking, keeping late hours, or indulging in other forms of dissipation; and yet these same students might think it entirely appropriate for a squad of athletes during training to pledge themselves to refrain from these practices and might be willing to extend their code of honor to enforce such a pledge.

And this suggests a second prerequisite to an effective application of the honor system in any college; namely, moral leadership within the student body of that college. For while it is true that the effectiveness of the honor system at any one time depends on restricting its application to those actions which are regarded by the student public as matters of honor, yet if it is to function adequately over a

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period of years, the students' code must adapt itself to changing conditions and must assimilate new standards and ideals as these articulate themselves in the give and take of college life. To this end there must be leaders gifted with insight, courage, and tact to mediate to the student public recognition and appreciation of such standards and ideals. But unfortunately, a sufficient premium is not always placed on moral leadership in the average American college. And this is due very largely to the disproportionate prestige and influence enjoyed by certain interests within the life of the college. The overtowering importance attached to intercollegiate athletics is a case in point. The competition for athletic supremacy among the colleges is such that the exceptional athlete commands a following and exerts an influence that is out of all proportion to his real qualifications for leadership. In student elections, for example, involving positions of trust and responsibility whose successful administration depends in no sense on physical prowess, the athlete, merely because he is such, too frequently is favored over his non-athletic competitor, however well qualified for the office in question the latter may be in all respects that matter. It is not implied, of course, that the athlete is necessarily lacking in real leadership; much less that his athletic interests and abilities are *per se* inimical to such leadership. The point is simply that the disproportionate importance attached to athletics in the student's scale of values has the effect of narrowing the circles within the student body from which leaders are selected and of limiting the quality of leadership thus secured.

And the prestige and influence enjoyed by the fraternity idea in college operates in somewhat the same way. The college fraternity is doubtless its own excuse for existing. But inasmuch as it is the college community that makes the fraternity as such possible, it would seem to be a matter of simple justice for the fraternity to repay the debt thus incurred in whatever way is most appropriate to it. And when the fraternity's standards are what they should be, and when these standards are lived up to in the selection and

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training of its members, it should be in a position to repay this debt many times over in the quality and quantity of leadership which it furnishes. As a matter of fact, however, the fraternity frequently prefers the short and easy method of politics in the bad sense as a means of furnishing its quota of leaders. Men are put forward and supported for offices for no better reason than that they are representatives of fraternities and as such are somehow felt to be worthier of trust and responsibility than their less fortunate opponents. And the fraternity is not wholly, or even primarily, to blame for the restriction that is thus placed upon the sources of student leadership. The fault lies with the scale of values embedded within the traditions of American college life. The more ultimate reasons for the anomalies exhibited in this scale of values reflect conditions which reach beyond the confines of the college as such and raise problems with which this paper cannot concern itself. Suffice it to say that American colleges are sadly in need of moral leadership among its students, in connection with student government, as well as in other connections, and that before this need can be adequately met, there must be a "transvaluation of values" at certain important points within our college tradition.

But there is at least one other thing that is needed if the honor system is to achieve its greatest usefulness in our colleges: there must be more sympathetic and more intelligent co-operation on the part of the college authorities, and more particularly on the part of instructors. Instructors must come to realize once for all that the student's "sense of honor" is a relative matter; that "moral responsibility" is nothing more nor less than the capacity on the part of the individual to respond morally to certain stimulating conditions. That the individual is possessed of such a capacity is to his credit; and to believe in and depend on this capacity in relation to the control of his conduct, is to the credit of those who share these attitudes. But this should not blind us to the fact that the student's moral capacities must be

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appropriately and adequately stimulated if they are to issue into moral conduct. And in this connection the instructor and other college authorities owe the student a very definite obligation; they owe it to him, as far as in them lies, to create and maintain conditions favorable to honorable, gentlemanly behavior. Character doesn't grow in a vacuum. Neither does it thrive under conditions which place too great a strain on its powers of resistance. If it is to bear its best fruit, it must be planted in a congenial soil and must be nurtured by influences which reinforce its potentialities for good. The observation of the writer has been that wherever the honor system prevails too much is taken for granted in the way of abstract honor and a ready-made moral sense on the part of the students, and especially on the part of those students who are immature.

The irregular conditions under which delinquent examinations or tests are sometimes given reflect these preconceptions all too clearly. It is assumed that because a group of students may be trusted not to cheat while taking a test without supervision, any single member of this group may be similarly trusted under similar circumstances. But isn't such an assumption a case of the logical fallacy of division? The sense of honor ascribed to members of the group belongs to them not so much as separate and distinct individuals; it belongs to them *as members of the group* whose common interests, ideals, and traditions are just the conditions which are calculated to evoke and encourage moral responsibility or honorable behavior. It frequently happens that certain individuals share these interests, ideals, and traditions to such an extent as not to need the presence and support of their group, or any part of it, in situations involving their honor. And whenever an instructor gives a test to a student alone in his class room, he must no doubt assume that this is the case. But to give a student a test to take in his own room and at his convenience; or to give him a series of problems in mathematics, let us say, to be solved during a period of several days without aid from any source

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whatever, and to permit him to know that the results of his work are to have a crucial bearing on his class standing, would almost seem to be a case of tempting providence. And the instructor who views the matter in this light and governs himself accordingly does not thereby show himself lacking in idealism, or faith in human nature. Neither does he intentionally or unintentionally impugn the actuality of student honor or do violence to the principles underlying the honor system. He merely recognizes that the honor of students, as well as of human beings in general, is not an abstract, ready-made trait which operates automatically in any situation regardless of circumstances; but that this trait is a function of numerous and complex factors, and is therefore always relative to such factors. His insistence that work involving the student's honor shall be done under controlled conditions is rather an expression of his interest in and regard for the particular student with whom he may be dealing and of his determination that this student shall have the benefit of just those circumstances which are most favorable to the right kind of response to the expectations of the student's instructors, his fellow students, and his own better self.

We are familiar with the dictum, accepted in some quarters, that a government owes it to its people to force them to be free. No doubt it is a contradiction in terms to speak of forcing a people to be moral. And it is possible that in some respects we are now reaping the fruits of not having sufficiently distinguished the spheres of legislation and morals. At any rate, this is the belief of many thoughtful and conscientious people. On all sides we hear it preached that interference and prohibitions will never make moral citizens. But this ethical brand of laissez faire can easily be carried too far. It is the opinion of the writer that it is carried too far in many cases in relation to our college discipline. And if this statement is warranted at all it would seem to apply not only to class-room matters in the manner described above, but also to matters of personal morals. College authorities cannot force their charges to be moral, but they certainly owe it to them to create and maintain conditions

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as favorable as possible to moral behavior. A fair chance of being his best self is the least that the student can demand of his college; and until this chance is afforded him, it is worse than mockery to depend on his "honor" or "moral sense" as means of controlling his behavior.

JOSEPH ROY GEIGER.
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY.

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JOURNALISM, ETHICS, AND COMMON SENSE.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

SEVERAL books and many articles have been published lately on the far from fresh subject of journalistic ethics—or, rather, the lack of ethical standards and principles in contemporary journalism. Some writers have not hesitated to indict the entire newspaper business—or profession—on such charges as deliberate suppression of certain kinds of news, distortion of news actually published, studied unfairness toward certain classes, political organizations and social movements, systematic catering to powerful groups of advertisers, brazen and vicious "faking," and reckless disregard of decency, proportion and taste for the sake of increased profits. Other writers have been more moderate and have recognized that there are three species of newspapers—good, intelligent, honest newspapers, morally pernicious and intellectually contemptible newspapers, and colorless, indifferent, innocuous newspapers.

The latter group of writers is clearly right, of course. Only puerile or hopelessly prejudiced "radicals" seriously assert that every "capitalistic" newspaper—and we hardly have any other type—is depraved, malicious, cynical, and commits daily sins innumerable because of its desire to shield injustice and wrong-doing and to prevent well-intentioned and reasonable men and women from learning the full truth regarding the iniquities of the present social order. No thoughtful newspaper man of experience, no sane outside observer even, will entertain so childish a view for a moment.[1] On the other hand, it is not to be denied

[1] NOTE: That our newspapers are "capitalistic," in the sense that they represent and reflect the opinions and sentiments of the present social and economic order, is of course true. Even the majority of the Trade Union organs are capitalistic, for they do not attack the foundations and essential features of the present order. All the farmers' papers outside of North Dakota are capitalistic in the same sense. These are natural and understandable facts. Very few Americans believe in Socialism or any other theoretical

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that something *is* "rotten" in Denmark, or in the republic of newspapers, for there are too many newspapers of the objectionable and noxious species. And it is this fact—the quantitative fact, the number of undesirable and demoralizing newspapers—that gives rise to the newspaper problem.

For it must be obvious to intelligent persons that if the newspaper profession had no more charlatans, quacks and unethical practitioners than Law, Medicine, Politics, to mention no others, there would be no special newspaper problem, but only another phase of the broad and permanent problem of human conduct—of securing conformity to certain recognized and even professed ethical standards.

The case of the modern newspaper publisher or editor who sincerely desires to adhere to decent standards is very different from that of the reputable physician, or reputable lawyer, or clean, high-minded statesman, who makes war on dishonesty and humbug in his profession. The law and public opinion are potent allies of the latter; they do little or nothing for the former. Not only are there too many yellow and irresponsible newspapers, but the superior species of newspapers deem discretion, or silence, the better part of valor and make no effort worthy of the name to cleanse and fumigate the Augean stables in their domain. Complaints against the ordinary offences of newspapers against morals, taste, conscience and reason are heard only in advanced reform circles or in private homes. Only an extraordinary "fake" provokes public comment or newspaper protest. Such facts as these point to a lower morale than we normally demand of the liberal professions.

Are, perchance, the ideals and standards held up by the

substitute for capitalism. There is no necessity for any deliberate conspiracy to shield capitalism or misrepresent and libel the radical "isms." No such conspiracy exists even in the storm-centers of reform agitation. The men who control and direct the Press are perfectly sincere in their policies, though many of them are doubtless ignorant. Most of them cannot imagine any social order different from the present one, and cannot take any radical "ism" seriously. What is reprehensible in their conduct is ascribable not to any conscious determination to defend and protect the present order, but to environment, habits of thought, routine, vague sympathies and antipathies, and fear of offending advertisers or large groups of readers.

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thoughtful and cultured to the newspaper profession too high, too difficult of realization? Do the critics of the Press expect too much of average human nature in that particular sphere?

The answers to these queries are scarcely open to doubt. No Utopian perfection is preached to the newspapers. The things, positive and negative, demanded of them are very far from being beyond their reach. All that is desiderated may be summed up in one formula, "Reasonable accuracy, reasonable impartiality, reasonable regard for the rules of fair dealing and reasonable efficiency in handling and presenting news and comments." What is there especially "difficult" about any of these desiderata?

No; "impossibility" or "difficulty" will not explain the grave shortcomings of many of our newspapers.

What is the explanation?

Perhaps one root of the trouble lies in the fact that the newspaper, as a rule, is supported not by its readers, but by its advertisers. "Circulation" is regarded as a means to an end—the procuring of profitable contracts with the big advertisers and the capture of a host of small advertisers. The subscriber or reader does not pay a "living" price for his morning or evening newspaper. He is the beneficiary of indirect subsidies, the advertisers being the subsidizers. The inevitable result is that the advertisers have too much influence with publishers and editors, and the readers too little. Sometimes this undue influence of the advertiser is exerted frankly and even brutally, but more often it is used indirectly and discreetly. The writer of these lines was once shown a letter from a great firm, whose advertising patronage was extremely valuable, to a publisher of a conservative-liberal daily newspaper, in which the latter's tolerably fair and decent editorial attitude toward organized labor was querulously criticised and the intimation pointedly conveyed that so long as that attitude was maintained no advertising contracts need be expected from that house. Such instances may be exceptional, but they are none the less significant. What one firm ventures to set down

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on paper, many feel and contrive to express in less crude ways.

It is hardly necessary to labor the proposition that a newspaper dependent for its "bread-and-butter" on its subscribers and readers, not on the advertisers, would study the leanings and sentiments of the former rather than of the latter. Readers, as a rule, demand the news, and even if a certain element of the public dislikes certain news and would gladly see it suppressed, it does not actively resent the publication of such unpalatable items. The general public has not been educated to demand, or expect, special consideration for its prejudices or ideas. Moreover, it knows that it is too heterogeneous and divided to agree upon any question that is at all complex or new, while those who seek to control newspaper policies "know exactly what they want," to use the expressive phrase of the late Senator Dolliver of Iowa, and have very definite orders or hints to give.

Independence of advertisers, however, though a basic necessity, would not of itself solve the newspaper problem. It would constitute only the first step toward that solution, though a very important step. For newspapers free to give the news fully and impartially, and free to express their real opinions regarding the developments of the day, would soon begin to attract a type and variety of men very different from the average publisher or editor-in-chief of our period. After all, personality largely determines standards. No profession or business can rise higher than the character of the men who dominate it and function in it. High-minded, upright, self-respecting, cultured, morally sensitive persons will be governed by one set of principles; men of low ambitions and ignoble motives, and men of little education and less culture will establish and maintain standards that will inevitably reflect such traits and characteristics.

Too many men in the newspaper business are of the latter kind and type. They are publishers and editors of newspapers because they expect to make money by building up huge circulations and corresponding advertising patronage;

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or because they have political axes to grind; or because they have inherited "good properties" and do not care to surrender control of them to outsiders; or because they like the excitement and the sense of power afforded by the ownership of "an organ of opinion." The intellectually and morally fit editor or publisher is notoriously a rare exception to-day. What sort of newspapers can one expect *á priori* under such a state of affairs?

It is often said that only millionaires are able to start or acquire newspapers nowadays. This is true only of the bigger newspapers in metropolitan cities. In the smaller cities and towns a newspaper is still very far from being "a millionaire's proposition." One wonders why young college men and women of ideas and ideals do not gravitate toward the newspaper business, which presents so many alluring opportunities of service and of leadership—civic, ethical, literary, industrial and artistic. We hear that the liberal professions are overcrowded, and that the educated young men and women are compelled to take inferior jobs in which their discipline and attainments count for little and in which there is no possibility of growth. Why should not educated young men and women aspire to capture the newspaper business—making their "drive" first against the smaller communities that are poorly or indifferently served by their respective newspapers?

It is true, of course, that many college graduates seek and obtain newspaper positions as reporters, special writers, correspondents, editorial writers and critics of books, plays, musical performances and the like. But, alas, what happens to the great majority of these? Do they elevate journalistic standards? Let the facts answer!

One of the gravest evils in American journalism is that which the more intelligent and serious newspaper writers themselves do not hesitate to characterize as "prostitution." One is often shocked at hearing correspondents, reporters, critics or commentators on the news candidly and brutally speak of themselves as intellectual prostitutes. What they mean, of course, is that they write contrary to their own

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opinions, sentiments and knowledge of facts. Reporters color and distort the news; correspondents "editorialize" in their dispatches and give the managing editors just what they think, or what the publisher thinks, the readers ought to have. The men whose duty it is to interpret events and developments and to apply guiding principles to public questions express not their own ideas, but those of the proprietors. It not infrequently happens that the opinion strongly and even aggressively expressed in a newspaper is condemned or ridiculed literally by every one else in the establishment, from the managing editor down to the bright office boy. It is the opinion entertained by the publisher, and he orders it expressed. He dictates the "policy" of his paper, and he never asks or cares what his employes who write and edit the paper think of his policies. They are all "hired men"; they are paid to take orders and carry them out.

Many newspaper men know, to give a few examples, that free traders write protection editorials; that Democrats write Republican editorials and Republicans Democratic editorials; that earnest radicals write conservative editorials; that advocates of public ownership write what they believe to be fallacious and dishonest stuff in opposition to that policy; that pacifists write militaristic editorials, and so on.

Now, can one imagine that a really sincere and enlightened publisher mindful of his opportunities and responsibilities to the public would encourage and invite such "prostitution?" Would he not take pains to surround himself with assistants and subordinates who share his opinions and are glad to expound them?

In Europe, where each political faction, group or school, has its organs, it is the rule that only adherents of a given school or group, anxious propagandists and partisans, shall be permitted to write and report for the organ of that school. Thus in France royalists do not write for republican papers, nor individualists for socialist organs, nor centrists for leftist newspapers. This may not argue superior honesty

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and integrity, but it does argue superior method, higher efficiency, better management. Why should not the American editor or publisher value intellectual integrity and honesty in his employes? Why should he create conditions that make for cynicism, flippancy, contemptuous treatment of journalism and journalists by the cleverest practitioners of the profession?

The answer is, doubtless, that publishers and editors reflect the moral tone of the general American environment. Public opinion, even educated opinion, is not at all disposed to frown on persons who violate their own opinions and sentiments by writing for newspapers of a party or group opposed to their own. Our Schools of Journalism—of which there are now a goodly number—have courses on ethics, yet they are not known to enjoin their students not to write contrary to their own beliefs. Society has so much respect for property and so little for intellect and the spirit that it assumes, as a matter of course, that men without capital will take orders from men with capital and forget that they have minds and consciences of their own. When a publisher says, "This is my paper and I expect all my employes to obey me and even to anticipate my wishes," no one finds this utterance in the least unnatural. In such an atmosphere, perhaps, the development of a high ethical standard in journalism is scarcely to be expected.

Are we, then, in a vicious circle? Is there no hope for reform in newspaperdom in the directions where improvement is so urgently needed?

The writer of these lines has elsewhere advocated co-operative and temporarily endowed journalism. No other practicable remedy is in sight. It is idle to propose municipal, county, state or national newspapers. Even Mr. William J. Bryan is only suggesting a national weekly bulletin, to be published under bi-partisan, or nonpartisan, direction, for the purpose of presenting all sides of national issues. Such a bulletin might serve a useful function, but it would not take the place of the complete and wide-awake newspaper which all sorts and conditions of men have

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learned to demand. The only feasible alternative to private and capitalistic ownership and control of newspapers is co-operative ownership and management, with subsidies, for a period at least, from persons of wealth, vision and sympathy. But pending the application of this remedy in any part of the country, the appeal must be to those elements of the great reading public that are acutely conscious of newspaper shortcomings and justly discontented with things as they are in contemporary journalism. These elements are not doing much—if anything— to make their discontent effective. They grumble, they rail, they swear, but they take no action designed to persuade editors and publishers that their ways require mending. Labor, advanced social groups, fair-minded persons who merely ask for impartiality, accuracy and care in the handling of the news, and for sincerity in commenting upon it, should be far more vocal than they are in their opposition to injustice, slovenliness, inefficiency and ignorance in journalism. They may have to "take" and read a paper they dislike simply because no choice is presented to them in their own community; but they can protest and object far more often than they do to instances of bad faith, "faking," falsification, vulgar sensationalism. They can make the publisher uncomfortable and uneasy. They can "put the fear of God" into him by protests and corrections.

After all, let me repeat, that which is demanded by integrity and common sense of the modern newspaper is far from being difficult of realization. There is no rational objection to the most aggressive partisanship on the editorial page, provided it be honest, for Tories have the same rights as Liberals and Radicals. There is decided objection to false pretences and to deliberate distortion of facts. There is decided objection to discrimination and favoritism in the news. There is decided objection to misstatements, to garbled and misleading statements.

Take two or three examples. A strike takes place. The editor may not approve of or sympathize with the strikers. He is within his rights in expressing such disapproval or

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lack of sympathy. But in *reporting* the affair he should, and can easily, give daily both sides; he can obtain labor statements and publish them alongside of the employers' statements. He can give as much space to labor as to capital.

A Radical meeting is announced. The editor can assign the task of reporting it to a competent and honest person with instructions to treat the meeting seriously and fairly.

An important bill is under consideration in congress or the state legislature. The editor can get intelligent and honest reports of the progress of the bill, seek interviews with its proponents and opponents, and keep the reader informed of the vicissitudes undergone by the measure without bias or malice. At the same time he is quite free to comment upon the bill as he sees fit.

Now, what is there that is extravagant in these illustrative propositions? What editor dowered with elementary decency and common sense would venture to challenge them?

Democracies, says James Bryce, are what their leaders make them. Masses can be educated upward or downward. Newspapers, in the aggregate, possess more power than the political leaders clothed with brief authority. To-day, as Carlyle said long ago, "the able editor is king." Newspapers make and mar public men. They impose policies. They can add cubits to the moral stature of whole communities, and they can degrade and vulgarize communities. We know unhappily what mischief and evil newspapers are able to inflict by pandering to prejudices, hatreds and jealousies. We know what allies, or instruments, of political knaves and demagogues newspapers often are. It is not too much to say, paraphrasing Bryce, that democracies are what the newspapers make them.

But in every community there are groups and unorganized forces that might powerfully counteract the sinister and vicious influences of noxious journalism, and in the long run modify many of the newspapers themselves in the right direction. If the vigilance of free men is the price of

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liberty, the vigilance of upright, earnest, broad-minded, clean men is the price of wholesome social life generally. Democratic communities must learn to insist on high standards in journalism, and to support newspapers that maintain such standards or strive to rise to them. The good newspapers should be supported and commended; the vicious and dangerous ones boycotted and sternly condemned on all suitable occasions. Dishonesty, unfairness, stupidity, cynical flippancy, inefficiency in journalism should always be rebuked and held up to the censure of the enlightened and decent elements. The particular victims of newspaper bias and newspaper incompetence, by the way, are too prone to start inadequate rival newspapers of their own that, alas, imitate the bad practices of their formidable competitors. This is not the road to reform. Journals of protest should be free from all the vices they are supposed to protest against. They should be accurate, fair, exact, sane. The qualities that are offensive in so-called capitalist papers are equally offensive, to the judicious and impartial, in reform or radical organs.

However, the labor or reform newspapers, at the best, will not take the place of the true newspapers. These are now a necessary of civilized existence. The community is entitled to good, adequate, dignified, honorable newspapers, and it will get them when it develops a sufficient minority and worthy leadership that will demand them and brook no denial. Millionaires will not come to the rescue and establish the type of newspapers needed and possible. Democracies must solve their own problems by co-operation, education and moral pressure.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

HULL HOUSE, CHICAGO.

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THE BOUNDARIES OF SOCIETY.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER.

I PROPOSE to speak about society in this paper without attempting to give a true definition of the term. As a philosopher my first care should be to give a true definition of society, but I am approaching the subject here rather from the point of view of the scientist than of the philosopher. I wish to point out certain facts about the nature of society, and certain implications that follow out of these facts, rather than to define society.

But the thought will occur, How can we talk about the nature of society and draw inferences from that nature before we have discovered the true definition of society? How can we talk about something when we cannot define what we are talking about? But that is the very paradox of science: it is always talking about things that it cannot define. Biology is the science of life. What is life? Chemistry is the science of matter. What is matter? Physics is the science of force and motion. What is force or motion? In fact, science could be distinguished from philosophy almost by this one particular. Philosophy is always trying to find out what it is talking about with the result that it says very little, while science says a great deal, but it does not know what it is about. In spite of being myself a philosopher, I have at present somewhat of the scientist's attitude and wish to say something even at the risk of not knowing what it is about.

I shall not, therefore, attempt to give a true definition of society, but only a working definition. The distinction between the two is enormous. A true definition should be unambiguous and exact. A working definition should within limits always be ambiguous. The aim of the one is to fit its object; the aim of the other is to fit the men studying the object, men often of widely differing opinions. The one is a careful survey; the other a mere gesture, as

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much as to say the object lies somewhere over there. The one is an ideal to be striven for; the other a mere tool to be used until its usefulness is over, then to be discarded for a better.

Such a working definition of the term, society, we need for our purposes, and I propose the following: *A society is a unit of co-operation.* I believe nearly all sociologists though widely disagreed among themselves could accept this as a working definition. What it states without ambiguity are points that are generally agreed upon by all to be characteristics of society; what it leaves ambiguous are the countless points at issue.

All are agreed that a society is some sort of unity constituted by some sort of activity by individuals of some sort. The word, unit, implies that unity; and the word, co-operation, implies an activity of individuals. It is furthermore generally agreed that society is a vital phenomenon, that the individuals constituting it must be living individuals. The word, co-operation, has with us, I believe, rather that connotation: only living beings can truly be said to co-operate. At any rate, let it so be interpreted, for I shall not attempt to consider a molecule as a society of atoms. Again, it is generally agreed that a society is for the mutual benefit of the individuals that constitute it. The word, co-operation, has also that connotation, I believe. Again, it is generally agreed that purely accidental occurrences of mutual benefit do not create a society, as when men throw rubbish about a camp and scavengers devour it. At least as long as the mutual benefit is accidental no social phenomenon occurs. I believe there is even some such connotation as this in the word, co-operation, a feeling that true co-operation must be purposeful in some sense. All in all, it seems to be generally agreed that a society is a unity constituted by the purposeful activity of living organisms for the mutual benefit of one another. Further than this there does not seem to be any general agreement, and all of this, it appears to me, is implied in saying that society is a unit of co-operation.

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What a unit of co-operation definitely implies I have enumerated. What it leaves ambiguous no man could enumerate. I will mention just a few of the ambiguous points to give some conception of the unutterable vagueness of this definition, of its miserable hopelessness from a purely philosophical point of view.

It gives no clue as to whether a society must have a definite duration. If I meet a strange lady in a narrow passage and I turn to one side and she turns to the other and we pass never to see each other again, did we for that brief fraction of a minute create a new society, and was it almost as soon as made dissolved forever? Our definition will not say. Does society extend into the past and future as well as across the present? Are our forefathers who did many things for us, and are our children and grandchildren yet unborn for whom we are doing many things, are these members of our society? If so, how far into the past and how far into the future does our present society extend? Are slaves a part of society? If so, are domestic animals? And if so, are vegetables? Are what I like to call "social relics"—*i.e.*, mills, railroads, ships, telegraph lines, wireless systems, buildings, works of art, books in which the knowledge of society is stored, and the enormous mass of such things so characteristic of modern civilization—are these in any sense, as Spencer said they were, parts of society? Does society imply a conscious unity? If so, what shall we say of the so-called insect societies of ants and wasps and bees? If not, what shall we say of those strange harmonies of nature, dozens of which have been discovered, such as the relation between the flower and the bee, and which have recently been summed up in the name, symbiosis? Do these constitute a social relation or not? Above all, does society involve an overindividual unity that is something more than the unity of the sum of individuals that compose it? And if so, what is the nature and extent of that unity?

These are some of the questions that our working definition leaves unanswered. I mention them that there may be

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no doubt of the type of definition I am employing. I am not attempting to present a true definition that shall be exact and unambiguous. I am merely assuming a working definition for the sake of bringing out certain facts with their implications. My attitude is that of the scientist rather than that of the philosopher.

According to our working definition, then, co-operation is the differentia of society, the extent of co-operation indicates the extent of a society, and where co-operation ends there is the boundary of a society. Now I wish to examine certain important concepts involved in social structure, and to call attention to a law that seems to govern social changes. These will be the facts I wish to bring out. Then I will draw the implications.

Societies are constructed on two plans. Suppose we call them the concentric and intersectional plans. The concentric plan involves a system of societies in which each successive society has an ever widening membership and an ever widening authority. The readiest example of this is a government; for example, our system of town, county, state, and federal government. But a better example is an army with its squad, company, regiment, brigade, and division. The fundamental characteristic of this type of society is that the purposes about which each lower society in the system is formed are a means to the purposes of each higher society. Thus the purposes which a squad co-operates in carrying out are a means to the purposes of a company, and these in turn are a means to the purposes of a regiment, and so on up. The means and end relation which binds this type of society together implies as its converse a more obvious characteristic, viz., that each higher society in the system has authority over each lower one. Thus the division has authority over the brigade, the brigade over the regiment, the regiment over the company, and so on. I need not amplify these two characteristics of the concentric society. Everyone is familiar with what I am referring to.

But it is evident that there are great differences between

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one concentric society and another. There is a striking difference, for example, between the organization of our army and that of our government, and yet both are concentric societies. What is that difference? It is the difference in the degree of centralization in the two societies. Now the two extremes of centralization are, on the one hand, such a thoroughgoing organization as an army, and, on the other, such a social arrangement as Kropotkin and Tolstoi have desired. As social organization approaches the type of the army we call it centralized; as it approaches the type of anarchy, we call it decentralized.

Upon analysis it turns out that this difference depends ultimately upon the distribution of authority in the system. In the ideal centralized society, all the authority of the whole system is concentrated in the highest society of the system. In an army all the authority is concentrated in the hands of the commander in chief who represents in his person the army as a whole. What he commands must be obeyed without question by every lesser society in the system whether it is the division, regiment, or squad. None of the lesser societies in the system have any rights whatever. There are no regimental rights nor divisional rights. The army as a whole is the only society in the system that has any rights and these are all concentrated in the hands of the commander in chief who represents the whole army.

It is obviously quite different with our government. The federal government has certain rights, but there are also state rights, county rights, and town rights, and the federal government has no authority whatever over these. In short, the authority is not concentrated in the highest society of the system, but is distributed through the system. Or to put it another way, the state co-operates in certain purposes which are not necessarily a means to the purposes of the federal government, and the county co-operates in certain purposes that are not necessarily a means to the purposes of the state, and similarly with other lesser socie-

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ties in the system. The system still remains concentric, because there is a sufficient group of purposes in each lesser society which are a means to the purposes of the higher societies to hold the whole system together. But just as soon as the authority begins to be distributed through the different levels of a concentric system, just so soon decentralization begins, the extreme of which is the absence of all authority, or what is known as anarchy.

Another name that is frequently given to this authority when political matters are under discussion, is sovereignty. And it is patent that the nature of sovereignty is very different in a decentralized society from what it is in a centralized one.

And while I am speaking of decentralization, I want to make sure it is not being confused with democracy. Democracy is the rule of the people; decentralization is the distribution of authority or sovereignty through the different levels of a concentric system. The two concepts are entirely different. We may have centralized democracy as in the idea of state socialism. And we may have decentralization without democracy, as was the case under the feudal régime in France. The king of France represented a higher concentric level of society than his barons but he had very little authority over them, yet at the same time the people of France had no voice in their government. Nevertheless, while democracy and decentralization mean quite different things, there is a strong tendency for democracy to follow upon decentralization, and for absolutism to follow upon centralization.

Opposed to concentric societies and cutting across them are intersectional societies. The characteristic of these is that they exist within a concentric system, yet the purposes about which they are formed are not means to the purposes of the system. For example, clubs, churches, political parties, business corporations, labor unions, and the like within our government are intersectional societies. The government has power of restraint over them, but no

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authority. It can tell them what they shall not do, but not what they shall do; and whether they exist or not is a matter of indifference.

The existence of intersectional societies implies a certain field of endeavor not brought under the authority of the government. Consequently, in a perfect centralized society such as we find in the idea of state socialism there would be no intersectional societies whatever, because there would be no air left for them to breathe. On the other hand, in a decentralized system there is bound to be a buzzing swarm of active intersectional societies.

Where there are many intersectional societies, we have the maximum of competition. Where we have highly organized centralization, we have the maximum of efficiency. Intersectional and concentric societies, therefore, are somewhat opposed. But obviously an intersectional society may in its internal structure be concentric and highly centralized, as is the case in all big modern business corporations.

Now I think we can get a broad view of social structure. It always seems to me like an enormous spider's web with wide embracing concentric threads spreading out in every direction, and across these thousands of radiating threads and other threads criss-crossing in every direction in desperate confusion and in most unspiderlike fashion. These threads are the boundaries of societies.

That being the structure of society, I will now state what appears to be the law of social change. It is this: *The greater the power of a society and the less the pressure of environment, the larger the society and the more decentralized.*

This law includes four terms, each one of which needs definition—power of society, pressure of environment, largeness of society, and decentralization. Let us begin with the last of these terms and work backwards. I have already explained what I mean by decentralization.

By largeness of society I mean the number of individual organisms that make it up. I do not mean the amount of territory it covers, nor the number of subordinate societies

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it includes, but simply the number of individual organisms it includes, the number a census would give. The largeness of Great Britain is the sum of the populations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and of all the colonies.

By environment I mean the whole mass of external forces social or physical which have an influence upon society. Its social environment would be all the societies that are not included within the society in question and yet come in contact with it. The social environment of any modern nation is all other modern nations. The social environment of any modern industrial corporation within a nation is the government that has power of restraint over it, other industrial corporations and in fact other intersectional societies of any kind within the nation that come in contact with it, and possibly other nations and intersectional societies within those other nations. In short, the social environment of a society is all societies beyond its boundaries that have an influence upon it. The physical environment is all physical forces that have an influence upon it—climate, geography, natural resources, food supply, etc., etc.

Now, by pressure of environment I mean the tendency of these forces to be destructive to the society. Two societies concerned with similar purposes so situated that they have to seek the satisfaction of these purposes from a common field when the supply in that field is limited, two such societies are bound to exert strong pressure on one another. When two such societies exist under a government that has restraint over them, we call the conflict that results competition; when they are under no restraint, we call the conflict the struggle for existence.

In the absence of a social environment, however, a society still feels forces pressing upon its life, and these are purely physical—extreme cold, poor soil, constant danger of floods or volcanic eruptions, insufficient food supply and the daily possibility of famine. All of these forces tend to destroy a society, and these and a thousand like them constitute the physical environment.

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By power of society I mean something rather complex. It includes a physical element and a psychological element. Its physical element is what the economists call capital. Its psychological element is the knowledge and enterprise of its people. If it is asked what specifically are capital, knowledge, and enterprise, I answer those are questions for the philosopher to answer. He may define them at the same time that he defines society.

In the power of a society, however, I do not include the natural resources of the territory on which the society lives. That goes into the physical environment. Nor do I include the size of the society nor its social organization.

The power of society is the internal outward pushing force, the pressure of environment is the external inward pushing force, and these two forces interacting determine the constitution of a society, its size and its organization. That is the essence of the law of social change I gave. The greater the power of a society and the less the pressure of environment, the larger the society and the more decentralized.

Let me take a fictitious example to give some conception of how the law works. Suppose a large number of people were placed on a South Sea Island, and that there was plenty of fruit and fish to be had and no other people within reach. Under those circumstances our people on the island would live with practically no social organization whatever, because there would be no environmental pressure. Even the family organization would be very weak under such conditions. But at the same time and for the very same reason the size of our society would rapidly increase. The result is that soon it would have to face the problem of food supply, and immediately environment would begin to exert a pressure. To meet this pressure the individuals of our society would have to begin to cultivate the soil and to fish in ways somewhat different from their old haphazard methods. But obviously everybody would want to cultivate the best soil and fish in the best fishing grounds. Squabbles would arise, the inevitable result of

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which would be some sense of private property with some recognition of an authority that could enforce the observance of property rights. At the same time the problem of the care of children would begin to grow acute and would be solved either by rapid depopulation and a return to the old social status (which is unlikely, for if the maternal instinct were weak enough to allow of that, the chances are the society would soon annihilate itself altogether), or, if depopulation did not take place, there would have to develop some strong form of family organization. Now with private property, the sense of authority, and family, our society would have acquired a considerable degree of organization.

But the population would still continue to increase. The pressure of environment would consequently become stronger and stronger. There would be only one way for our society to meet this increasing pressure and that is by still better organization, by greater centralization. And this process of greater and greater centralization would continue up to the limit of the power of our society—*i.e.* up to the limit of its intelligence and enterprise. But finally that limit would be reached. Then there would be just two alternatives. One would be to have imbedded in their organization some means of disposing of their superfluous population such as infanticide for certain classes of cases, and celibacy for certain classes of cases, the killing of their infirm, and the like. Within limits these and similar things can be done and have been done in many primitive tribes. But it involves a highly centralized society under a tremendous environmental pressure to permit these things to be done successfully, because such practices violate the fundamental instincts of social growth—the maternal instinct and the sexual instinct—without which in great strength the society could not exist at all. Yet without the sanction of these practices, there would be only one alternative for our society to look forward to and that would be its own destruction. That destruction would not mean the annihilation of all its members, but it

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would mean an explosion sooner or later in which our society would be shattered into fragments, and each fragment would start out as an independent society. For a society is like a worm: you cut it in pieces, and each piece marches off a little stunned but quite lively.

And now we have a new situation. For now each society has to meet the pressure not only of a physical environment but of a social environment composed of the numerous other small societies about it. And then begins the regular struggle for existence with its concomitant, war. And this condition may continue for many years. A number of warring tribes in moderately close proximity often reach a state of pretty fair equilibrium. If the population in any two tribes gets a little large so that they begin to infringe upon one another's territory, they go to war and kill off each other's surplus population, after which they can live in peace for a number of years more. And if any one tribe begins to get a little too powerful, that very fact drives other tribes into an alliance to crush it, and again the equilibrium is established. Once in a while, however, one tribe more powerful than the others and usually helped by a propitious physical environment overcomes all obstacles and establishes a supremacy over all the surrounding tribes, either absorbing them as slaves, or even eventually as citizens, or overawing them into the condition of mere provinces. Then we get the origin of a nation.

Now let us suppose that one of the tribes of our South Sea Island, a fragment of our old unified society, after a long history of tribal warfare finally acquired supremacy over all the other tribes on the island. So much of the other tribes as it did not care to absorb—which would not improbably be all their males—it would massacre, and would find itself at last in undisputed possession of a large fruitful island with plenty of elbow room. What would happen now? The tribe would come into possession of this island as a rather small and highly centralized society. Would it remain small and centralized? No, the moment

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it came fully to realize that the environmental pressure was completely removed, there would take place a gradual disorganization and decentralization. The chief's authority would be clipped more and more, the warrior would no longer be useful except as a decoration, and would slowly pass into tradition, class distinctions would disappear, the slaves would be freed and in a primitive, uncouth form there would be a saying that every man has an "inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," there would be agitation to do away completely with the institution of private property, and more and more every man would be allowed to go about and do as he pleases, as men did in the Golden Age when they were first deposited upon the island. But meantime the population would be increasing and the limit of food supply would little by little be creeping nearer, and sooner or later the disorganization would have to give way to a new organization, and our little South Sea Island would witness the beginning of another social cycle.

I do not give this little account as a history nor even as a prophecy. The ways of real societies in our real world are infinitely more complex and can be traced only with great difficulty. The actual physical environment is never an absolutely calculable thing, never an impenetrable wall, but man always finds some unexpected hole in it that opens into another wide expanse. Man is never satisfied to stay within allotted bounds. He will even make a hole in the wall, if he finds a place where the wall is thin. Some of our South Sea Islanders would undoubtedly have found another land to migrate to, though it were leagues away. We may think we have found a society's physical environment, but behold a curtain lifts and we have to begin our calculations anew.

Nor is it even possible to tell exactly what is the limit of a society's power. Even in a primitive society there is always the possibility of a new invention. That invention is partially due to the state of the society, to be sure, but not wholly. There are sociological reasons for every human

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discovery, but there are individual reasons also; and it is these individual reasons that blur the action of any sociological law. And if we cannot estimate the power of a primitive society, how much less can we estimate that of a civilized one! In our society to-day, is there any proposal so absurd that we can afford not to consider it seriously? We can fly like birds and we can swim like fishes under the sea. Has anyone the audacity to say there is anything we cannot do?

But the most disturbing element in any sociological law is the social environment. What is the social environment of any given real society? It is utterly impossible to say with any degree of accuracy. We watch the growth and development of some society through the lens of history. We see it take shape and gradually approach the type and our enthusiasm rises and we think here is the perfect specimen of a society we have been searching for and we are about to set it down as the proof of all our theories, when there is a rumble from an undreampt of region and a horde of barbarians swoops down upon our society and wrecks it in flame and blood. It is the Huns out of the black north, or the Mongols out of the wastes of Asia, or the Spaniards from far over the sea, or the English from heaven knows where. Who would have thought of putting these in the social environment of the society we were so carefully watching? And even to-day with the whole world in telegraphic communication we cannot be quite sure that we know the whole social environment.

Such an isolated life as our South Sea islanders led is impossible in the actual world. Such a society never existed and never can exist. The account I gave is simply a fiction showing what would happen if the law I stated were put in operation under ideal conditions. In the same way I could explain the operation of the law of gravity by showing how two bodies would behave in an infinite empty space. The fact that there is no such thing as an infinite empty space, and that therefore the law of gravity never exhibits itself in its pure simplicity is no disparagement

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upon that law. In the same way, the fact that a society never is isolated is no disparagement of the law I stated. Just as the law of gravity interferes with itself and covers itself up with the multitude of its applications, the same with this law. Yet occasionally the law creeps out of its complexities and we catch brief glimpses of it in the empires of the world.

But if left to its single self the law would operate with a process of alternate expansion and contraction like the life of a gigantic amœba. And the expansions and contractions are of the boundaries of society. First a society expands at the same time consolidating until it reaches the limits of its environment, then from the very excess of its internal pressure it breaks into pieces and its boundaries contract. And again the process of expansion begins.

I have sought to show in rough detail how this happens and why. But here I am not so much interested in the details as in the fact—the fact that society is not a static thing, but a thing that expands and contracts, a changing thing with change essential to its nature and implied in the fundamental instincts which make society and even human life possible at all, the instincts of self-preservation, the sexual instinct, and the maternal instinct. This fact of change inherent in the nature of society, this alternate expansion and contraction of the boundaries of society combined with alternate centralization and decentralization in the structure of society, is the fact or group of facts that I was particularly desirous of bringing out. And now I wish to point out the moral implications of these facts. There are two important implications.

I believe it is unnecessary to point out at the present day that morality is primarily a social phenomenon. For an isolated individual permanently out of communication with his fellow men, there will be problems of prudence but nothing more. The characteristic moral problems of right, wrong, and obligation, personal liberty, punishment, and compulsion will not have any meaning for him whatever. It is only in society that morality exists.

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It follows that right and wrong are determined by the nature of society. And again, if the foregoing analysis of the nature of society is correct, it follows that for any given individual, right and wrong are determined by the structure of the society in which he lives. This is the first important implication that comes out of our analysis of the nature of society.

It means that there are as many standards of right and wrong as there are types of social structure. What is right for the Hottentot may be wrong for the Arab, and what is right for the Arab may be wrong for you and me. Moreover, to bring the point sharply home to us, what was right for the German before the war might have been wrong for us; and since it was right for the German and a German was the agent, then it *was* right and that was all there was to it, and any judgment we might have on the matter was totally irrelevant. We might not like the act, and indeed we did not. We disliked it to such a degree that we expended quantities of money, thousands of lives, and much suffering to wipe out the social structure that made the German act morally right. We wiped out a moral standard. But even that fact is irrelevant to the German act performed before the armistice. If the act was then right according to the standards of the German social structure, then that act is right to-day and for all eternity. For an act must be judged by the standards under which it is performed and all other standards are irrelevant.

Did we do wrong, then, to wipe out the German social structure? Not at all. On the contrary, it was the only right thing that we could do. For if we did not impose our moral standards upon Germany, she would have imposed hers upon us. But that does not make her any less in the right nor us any more in the right. The only trouble with Germany was that she had developed a social structure that was out of accord with the prevalent social structure of the rest of the world. Cooped up in the middle of Europe with no chance to spread in any direction, she had

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just gone through a period of most extraordinary expansion. She had no means of disposing of her surplus population; so all she could do was to consolidate and centralize, which she did in a way that attracted the admiration of the whole world. But there is a limit even to centralization, and we happen to be living in the decade that saw that limit reached. Germany did not prove strong enough to force an outlet for herself, and consequently collapsed. There was no ethical question any where in the whole episode.

Everybody did right to the best of his ability as he saw the right. It was simply a great social eruption causing untold suffering but for which nobody is to blame. If there is any lesson to be learned from it—certainly not that centralized governments are an everlasting sin, for the time may come not so many decades ahead when centralized governments will be the only kind that can stand the storms of life and live—but if any lesson is to be learned from the late war, it is that some means should be found to equalize the social pressure throughout the world. So long as there are parts of the world that are allowed to become overpopulated and with no means of outlet provided, especially if the people in those parts are intelligent and enterprising, just so long there will be smoldering craters liable to erupt at any moment and destroy the peace of the world. There is no moral lesson to be learned from the late war whatever.

The first implication, then, that follows from our analysis is that there are as many moral standards as there are types of social structure, and that each of these is absolute within its own sphere and utterly irrelevant within any other sphere.

The second implication is that there is no moral standard beyond the boundaries of sovereignty in any society or system of societies. Social boundaries are also moral boundaries. This second implication is inseparable from the first, but yet is different. The first says that there are many moral standards, one for each society, the second that the boundaries of sovereignty in a society are the boundaries of morality in a society. For sovereignty is the

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outward limit of a society and beyond that is no social organization. This is particularly evident in a highly centralized society. Each concentric society here is under the authority of the next higher concentric society above it and so on up until at last the concentric society of widest authority is reached beyond which there is no society of wider authority to which appeal may be made. The authority of this highest society, therefore, is final and there is no obligation beyond it. In such a system this highest society would absorb all the sovereignty of the system, and consequently the boundaries of the sovereign society would exactly coincide with the boundaries of morality in that social system.

In decentralized systems, however, we saw that sovereignty or authority is distributed in different amounts among different societies in the system, and even intersectional societies possess in a sense a certain degree of sovereignty. In decentralized systems, therefore, the limits of sovereignty do not coincide with the boundaries of any single society in the system, but sovereignty covers the whole system like a cloak resting lightly on the boundaries of nearly every society in the system. But in both cases and wherever sovereignty lies, there is no appeal beyond it, and therefore, no obligation. The limits of sovereignty, consequently, are the limits of morality, and whatever is done beyond those limits is simply non-moral. The behavior of a member of one tribe to a member of another may be generous and hospitable, and we may admire it; or it may be cruel and malicious, and we may abhor it; and we may have our own opinion of the man who does it: but since the act is performed beyond the pale of sovereignty, it is simply non-moral. It does not come under the head of the moral but under the head of the creditable.

There is a vast difference between the creditable and the moral. We admire the daring and cunning of a robber, and we admire the sympathy and courage of the person that gives him shelter in a pinch. The behavior of both is

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often highly creditable, but always totally immoral. In point of fact, the creditable is an æsthetic category and is of an entirely different character from the moral. That is the reason why robbers and cutthroats have such a prominent position as heroes in our poetry, drama, and romance. Consider how much of our literature is woven about stories of Robin Hood and of knights errant. The immorality of these ideal heroes is concealed, or ignored, or excused by arguments a hardened criminal would blush to make; and, in fact, we do not ask about the righteousness of our heroes, but are interested only in their deeds. The moral of a large part of our literature is extremely dubious, but it is nevertheless excellent literature. We must not confuse personal admiration with moral approval. The former has wings and knows no bounds, the latter is closely confined within the limits of sovereignty.

But granted all this, it may be asked, is there not such a thing as a super-national standard? Are we not under a certain obligation to humanity over and above the social structures of nations? Quite possibly Germany could not be held for committing a crime under the constitution of the United States seeing that she had never come under the jurisdiction of that constitution, but did she not commit a crime against humanity from under whose jurisdiction neither German nor American can escape?

If by humanity is meant simply the class of all human beings, I must answer, No, we are under no obligation to humanity. I cannot conceive of any argument to prove that simply because I am a member of a logical class, I am therefore under moral obligation to that class. As a man I happen to be a member of the class of all men known as humanity. For the same reason I happen to be a member of a certain class of animals known as vertebrates. Surely it cannot be argued that because I am logically a vertebrate, I am therefore under moral obligation to Vertebrata. No more can it be argued that I am under moral obligation to Humanity (even when written with a capital H).

There are two reasons, however, which account for the

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plausibility of the belief that we have duties to humanity. One of these is that while we cannot easily conceive of rabbits and armadillos as fellow citizens with equal suffrage in a society of which we form a part, it is not difficult to conceive of a society of all human beings. Other men have their societies as we have ours. Why could not all these societies be welded into one great whole, the society of humanity? As an ideal that society has existed for thousands of years, and it lives at present in the minds of many people, who measure progress by measuring their times with that ideal. Any event that moves away from that ideal is viewed by all these people with disapproval, and it is easy to mistake that disapproval for moral disapprobation.

But the two are by no means the same. It was this difference perhaps that Kant felt when he made the distinction between the hypothetical and categorical imperative, though he accounted for it in another way. If people have a certain ideal in mind, then certain acts are necessary for the realization of that ideal, and these acts will be approved with an intensity proportional to the value set on the ideal. We say that *if* an ideal is to be realized, then such and such acts *ought* to be performed, and we are liable to call such acts *right* when they are performed, and contrary acts *wrong*. The whole vacabulary of morality is employed, and yet it is not a question of morality at all. Two men in a single society might have opposite ideals—let us say an anarchist and a state socialist—yet in that society only one of these could possibly be morally right (and the chances are neither would be). Indeed, a single man with an eccentric ideal could lay judgment on the whole world, for if morality were merely a matter of ideals, why should one man's ideal be subordinated to another's? If morality is merely a matter of ideals, there is no real obligation anywhere, but only hypothetical obligation. But morality is not a matter of "if's," it is a matter of fact. A morally wrong act does something more than cause a pang of disapproval by conflicting with somebody's ideal,

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it brings a whole social structure to bear upon it. Morality is not hypothetical, it is categorical.

In making this distinction between hypothetical and categorical obligation, I hope it is not thought that I am trying to prove ideals to be irrelevant to morality. On the contrary, human society is built round ideals. When I have spoken of societies co-operating about certain purposes these purposes were nothing other than ideals, and in these cases ideals that actually function in morality. But for an ideal to function in morality it must be more than a mere ideal. There must be co-operation of individuals about it, and that co-operation must be in some degree crystallized into a social structure. It is the action of this social structure that makes obligation categorical. Until an ideal takes root in a social structure it can claim nothing but hypothetical obligation, no matter how many people may have that ideal in mind.

Now, a society of humanity is an ideal in the minds of a great many people, and obviously Germany performed acts that ran counter to this ideal and outraged individually all the people that had it in their minds. But in so far as it was simply an ideal and could claim no social structure crystallized about it, obligation to it could not be more than hypothetical though tens of thousands of people were outraged. Even though it can be shown that there were Germans that had this ideal, the situation remains unchanged, for the whole thing floats above the sphere of social structures, and therefore cannot solidify into morality.

And, by the way, it must be pointed out that there is a difference between a society's being organized *about* a purpose and *for* a purpose. There were many societies before the war organized *for* the purpose of bringing about a world federation. But no one of these societies, of course, constituted a world federation. And until the world should become organized *about* the purpose of a world federation, it could not be maintained that that purpose had any moral validity.

But, it may be said, and this is the second reason for the

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plausibility of a moral judgment on the basis of humanity, did there not exist before the war actual social structures of an international character such as international law, international labor organizations, and international business organizations, and in violating these was not Germany immoral? So far as this argument is merely to show that there are social organizations cutting across national boundaries, it has no bearing on our point. If a German marries an English woman, there occurs an international social organization, but that does not commit Germany and England to an international alliance. Germany and England still remain separate national organizations, and if their laws conflict, either the German man must become an Englishman, or the English woman a German woman, or else the two must separate. International organizations of this sort are made at the risk of the contracting parties, and the governments as a whole are not responsible. International labor and business organizations are essentially of this sort.

But international law is different. And here is the crux of the moral indictment of Germany. Did there or did there not exist prior to the war a super-national (which is after all somewhat different from an international) social structure with authority over nations? It would seem obvious that there was not, for it would hardly be reasonable to assert that authority could exist without power to enforce obedience. In fact, the United States implicitly recognizes to-day that no such super-national organization existed when it hesitates to join the League of Nations for fear the League would infringe upon its sovereignty. In other words, we feel that nothing does restrict our sovereignty; we feel that there is no social organization superior to the nation. If that is admitted, then we are under no obligation to humanity in any sense whatever. It is possible that we may be sometime, but we are not now, and we shall not be until an actual society of humanity is instituted.

The boundaries of sovereignty, therefore, are the bound-

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aries of morality. The social organization of each society constitutes the moral standard of that society, and there are as many absolute moral standards as there are independent social structures. Also, any change in a social structure entails a change in a moral system and these changes occur according to definite laws. In short, society is a phenomenon behaving according to certain definite laws, and morality being essentially social is also determined by these laws and finds its outermost limits at the boundaries of society.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Harold J. Laski. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1921. Pp. lx, 137.

Disappointment is in store for one who opens this book with the thought that it is Mr. Laski's promised work on political theory, for he will find in it only a collection of essays, most of which antedate his most systematic work, and only one of which has not been published before. Even the title of this new essay which gives name to the book is somewhat misleading, for it turns out to be an historical study of the development of political sovereignty rather than a discussion of its philosophical basis.

But disappointment is tempered by satisfaction at having in permanent form some of the author's earlier and best work. For the essays are predominantly legal and give characteristic expression to Mr. Laski's essentially legal type of mind. Their erudition is imposing, almost repelling, for the most obvious and innocent statements are usually supported by unnecessary and obstructive citations. The habit is good, of course, and we are introduced to a wide and interesting range of reading; nevertheless, an impression remains that the argument would be clearer and more cogent if the author's memory were not so complete or his note-books so detailed. Considered merely from the legal and historical point of view, however, the volume is a very welcome addition to sound scholarship.

The general theory embodied in the essays is that of political pluralism. In the first paper the unity of the state is shown as the outcome of crises, in which its sovereignty is advocated as the only escape from external dominion or internal dissent. But while this unique absoluteness was perhaps historically justified and may be still a useful assumption for the lawyer, in *The Theory of Popular Sovereignty* it is pointed out that any realistic political philosophy must recognize that the will of the state is always actually a particular group will, and not the expression of a true social purpose. Moreover, in *The Personality of Associations*, real group wills are recognized to have an existence and a character apart from the state will of which they are legally supposed to

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be the product and expression. The presence within it of such independent entities is evidence that the state is not the sole or absolute embodiment of society, but is only one of a plurality of coordinate institutions competing for the loyalty of their included members. The growing recognition of *The Responsibility of the State in England* is a further proof of this dethronement of the absolute state. The practical aspects of the political question are brought out in the *Problem of Administrative Areas*, where the unwieldiness of our modern legislatures is pointed out, and the growing indifference of the citizen to the state is noted. Unless the political structure can be decentralized or federalized, the interests of men will be entirely absorbed in their local and functional groups, and the life of the whole will be devitalized. In the essay on the *Pluralistic State* these various notes are repeated and there is added the final point that, after all, the ultimate sovereignty is in right conduct and not in any externalized authority, be it church or state. Papers on *The Early History of Corporations in England*, *The Basis of Vicarious Liability* and *The Political Theory of James I*, complete the volume.

It is impossible in the space of a brief review to discuss in detail these interesting and scholarly papers. One point in regard to the significance of the personality of associations might be suggested. Like most adherents to the group theory of society, Mr. Laski seems to feel that the admission of a real group personality is a deadly blow at the unity of the state. The Maitland-Gierke discovery is regarded as revealing that unity to be a superficial sham, behind which are these lusty personalities contending for the mastery, upon the securing of which, the forceful victor assumes the mask of unity behind which he conceals the plurality of his temporarily subdued rivals.

But even if we grant the reality of these group wills, their existence creates in theory no new objection to the monistic concept. If that concept could include the individual individual, it can certainly find room for this collective compound, for the latter is no more independent of the state than is the former. It is true that we may find it desirable to give representation to these functional groups as well as to individuals, but this has no relevance to the theoretical question of the sovereignty of the state however composed. A unity of groups may be as real as a unity of individuals. Indeed, the unity of the lesser group, if it argues

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anything, points rather to the possibility of a similar unity in the larger state. In this respect, Duguit's denial of group personality is a far more logical support of the pluralistic theory than is this position of the English school.

Looking at the more general aspects of Mr. Laski's work, especially as exhibited in this volume, one is tempted to find the motives of his pluralism in his pre-occupation with the legal point of view. His ideas seem to be those of the lawyer who has discovered the limitations of the legal theory of sovereignty, and has been moved by his interest in sociology, social psychology and practical politics, to take a more realistic view of the actual structure and functioning of the state. He knows that the legal finality of the state is not the last word, but that legal omnipotence may be political incompetence. The actual power of the state is a matter of social psychology and not of abstract legality. Hence his prophets are McDougall, Graham Wallas, the Webbs, the Hammonds, and the socialized jurists such as Dean Pound, Felix Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Holmes, his delight in whom finds expression in his touching, but somewhat irritating, mannerism of never referring to them without an adverbial encomium. They always "significantly remark," or "brilliantly analyse," or "finely put," or "happily term."

Having made this necessary distinction between the legal and the political, however, Mr. Laski fails to recognize, or, at least do justice to, a third point of view, the philosophic or teleological. The last word surely has not been said when we have substituted the actual plurality of powers in society for the absolute authority of the legal sovereign. The philosophic problem begins where Mr. Laski leaves off, with the question of the function of the state in the moral life of the community. To adduce against the monistic theory the obvious facts of conflict within the state is beside the mark. It is only when philosophers lapse into the same confusion exhibited by Mr. Laski that their weapons appear to meet. That they do thus lapse is perhaps a justification of his work, but it would certainly conduce to clearness if Mr. Laski would disabuse his mind of the idea that his valuable plea for administrative decentralization is a philosophic theory of a pluralistic state.

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EDUCATION AND WORLD CITIZENSHIP: an Essay towards a Science of Education. By James Clerk Maxwell Garnett, C.B.E., M.A., etc. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1921. Pp. x, 515.

This is certainly one of the most interesting and instructive books that have ever been written on education. It sets out, in the main, from the standpoint of physiological psychology, and it owes a good deal to the work of William James and that of his distinguished successor, Dr. McDougall. His treatment of this aspect of the subject is highly technical and very thorough, involving a considerable use of advanced mathematical methods. The practical applications are somewhat less elaborately dealt with, and are comparatively simple. Mr. Garnett dwells much on the importance of cultivating a wide central interest. The exact nature of this interest would vary greatly with different individuals, and it is not to be understood as excluding "hobbies" and other incidental relaxations. What the Germans call a *Weltanschawung*, however, is very important for every one. He quotes with strong approval the passage from Mr. Chesterton's *Heretics* in which it is urged "that the most important and practical thing about a man is still his view of the universe." He then goes on to urge that what he describes as "the Christian hypothesis" furnishes the best practical basis for a general philosophy of life. He adds, however, that "the Christian hypothesis is not necessarily the only possible one from which to start. But if any other that equally well fits the facts we have been considering has ever been formulated, it certainly is not so readily available, or so widely accepted already, as that which Christianity offers. We conclude that every member of a maximally progressive society should begin with the Christian hypothesis. . . . We must, however, be careful to realise that the acceptance of the fundamental teachings of Christianity does not mean the acceptance of all the frills that have been gradually added to them. . . . If, therefore, that is true for any man which fits his personal experience and so much of the experience of others as he can disentangle from their interpretation of it, there is much reason to expect that, whoever will begin to act on the hypothesis that Christianity is true, will find the hypothesis fits his experience, and so will verify it. But his experience, as it develops, will doubtless lead to modifications of any unessential assumptions which he may include in his first approximation. His Christian-

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ity will thus be sure to differ, in some respects, from that of any other Christian. Indeed, it must, if it be a living faith, grow from day to day and from hour to hour."

With the explanations and qualifications that are here made, there is not much to object to in this. It may be said that it depends on the Pragmatist heresy about the nature of truth; but the main points could be stated without this implication. We could substitute "working hypothesis" for "truth," as in fact Mr. Garnett usually does. It might be urged also that it is not so easy as he seems to imply to separate what is essential in Christianity from its "frills." Perhaps a more serious objection is that for purposes of "world citizenship" we have to take account of those to whom the Christian point of view is not familiar. Might not, for instance the philosophy underlying the *Bhagavad-Gita* furnish a working hypothesis (also involving some frills) that could equally well be used as a starting point? I should be disposed to admit, however, that the Christian statement is the best.

At any rate, whatever may be thought about this, there can be no doubt that the book is an extremely valuable one, both theoretically and practically.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE. By Professor Edward Westermarck, LL.D., etc. In three volumes. Fifth edition, rewritten. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. xxiii, 571; xi, 595; viii, 587.

Professor Westermarck's book on the History of Human Marriage has long been known as the most comprehensive and reliable work on that subject. In this new edition, however, its value has been immensely increased. It has been enlarged to nearly three times its former size; and it has been greatly enriched, both by the results of his own explorations and by the consultation of a number of works of reference, the mere names of which occupy more than 100 large and closely printed pages (as against about 30 in the previous edition). He has not, however, altered his main views on the subject. He still retains the firm conviction that marriage was not evolved out of a condition of promiscuity; and he brings forward a good deal of fresh evidence against that theory. He supplies much interesting material about different

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forms of polygamy and other deviations from the normal conditions of married life; but, on the whole, the general result to which he points is in harmony with the great Hegelian *dictum*, that the Real is the Rational. It is shown that, broadly speaking, any deviations from the normal that have at any time been prevalent have been due to exceptional circumstances, such as devastating wars, by which the usual balance of the sexes has been temporarily disturbed. When the general conditions of life are normal, the monogamic family, involving a permanent relationship, shows itself pretty clearly as being at once the only form that is satisfactory and the only form that tends to persist.

It has already been pointed out in this JOURNAL (January number, p. 223) that Dr. Westermarck has recently been giving a good deal of attention to the question of the origin of sexual modesty, and that he has brought out an interesting monograph on that subject. Further discussions relating to it will be found in this new edition. In connection with this, he rejects the view that modesty is the origin of clothing (the view suggested at the beginning of Genesis), and on that theory his arguments appear to be conclusive; but perhaps he has hardly given enough attention to the converse theory, that clothing is the origin of certain forms of modesty, or at least of the sense of indecency. Mr. Austin Freeman (author of the very remarkable work on *Race Decay and Regeneration*) has brought forward some strong evidence in support of this view in his book on *Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman*—one of the very few works bearing on the subject of Marriage with which Dr. Westermarck does not appear to be acquainted. "Indecency," Mr. Freeman states (p. 379) "can hardly exist apart from clothing, but results from the partial or complete exposure of a body that is habitually covered." This, of course, does not refer to modesty in the wider meaning of the term, but more definitely to the sense of shame. In other respects Mr. Freeman is entirely in agreement with Dr. Westermarck. When a new edition of Dr. Westermarck's most valuable and interesting work is called for, he may perhaps deal a little further with this topic. In the meantime, we have every reason to be grateful to him for the rich feast that he has provided. It must have cost him an almost incredible amount of labour.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

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A STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By W. K. Wright, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 441.

Professor Wright comes to his subject through psychology and general philosophy. The book is substantially the reproduction of his class room lectures to undergraduates in Cornell University. It has the quality of answers to the live questions of keen, energetic youth, who want these matters dealt with in the light of facts. Extensive notes and bibliographical references accompany each chapter and impress the reader that the text is fortified by an abundant literature and by much scholarship.

The key to the whole treatment is found in the definition of religion. "Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency." The first half of the definition indicates in terms of "the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values" the standpoint from which the psychological and historical portions of the book proceed, while the reference to "some agency" suggests the problems considered in the third part which is more metaphysical. These problems are mechanism and teleology, God, evil, freedom, and immortality. In connection with each topic, after a critical presentation of the views of other writers, the author frankly and briefly states his own position. The discussions of this third part are concerned with the question, "Is religion true?"

The first and second parts give answers to the question, "What is religion?", the first in terms of history and the second in terms of psychology. Following the definition, various stages and types of religion are surveyed with reference to the "values" which they conserve. The fruitfulness and sense of reality which one gets when studying religions in terms of values rather than in terms of "beliefs" could not be more aptly illustrated. The customs of the Australians, the Todas, the Melanesians and the Bagandas are compared. The more elaborate systems of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Greece and Rome, Judaism, and Christianity in its different epochs and forms are set forth with special reference also to the social values which they cherish. An interesting and very sympathetic statement is given of the historical facts and the working ideals of Christianity in terms of moderate liberalism. "The great ethical service which Christianity has

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rendered has been in the deepening of moral convictions, in making the moral life a concern of the heart as well as of the head, and so imparting dynamic force to moral principles." Ethical inwardness is the supreme Christian value. Different sects recognize and cultivate different values or at least give different expression and emphasis to the same values. As to whether any religion is *true* the author remarks that religions symbolize truth, some more than others. "With the experience of future ages Christianity will become further advanced. There may be greater changes in future doctrines, ritual, and ecclesiastical organization than even the past has known."

In personal experience, religion appears not as an instinct but as a sentiment. It has its origin in childhood but its chief growth comes during adolescence. The conversion phenomena are well described with the psychologist's usual preference for the less emotional types. Prayer is presented as an expression of the natural conversational form of thought. Dialogue prayers may be either individual or community prayers, and these may be æsthetic or for benefits of some kind. As to the efficacy of prayer it is held that there are definite subjective effects and effects upon health, upon the temper of individuals and communities and even upon the physical environment through its influence upon human conduct. The author inclines to leave the way open for a definite influence from an outer Agency, but he everywhere maintains a balanced judgment and a cautious scientific reserve.

The book deserves wide reading by all classes of thoughtful people. It is an impressive indication of the tendency of the best current science and reflection concerning these questions in which the age is becoming deeply interested.

E. S. Ames.

SHORTER NOTICES.

What Religion Is. By Bernard Bosanquet, Fellow of the British Academy. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920. Pp. xii, 81.

This book, though small, contains material that might easily be spread out into many volumes. It is a sort of philosopher's confession of Faith. Indeed, it might even be compared with the famous book of Thomas à Kempis. At least I know of no work that could so well as this be said to do for religion without the supernatural what that remarkable book did for Christianity. But, indeed, Dr. Bosanquet's work is also based on the religion of Jesus; and it is so finely done that it seems almost a desecration to offer any criticism upon it. I will confine myself to a single comment. Chapter VII, on Prayer and Worship, is headed with this quotation:

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"After this manner therefore pray ye. . . . Thy will be done"; and it is mainly occupied with injunctions to accept all apparent evils as being fundamentally good. I hope it is not irrelevant to point out that this is not exactly the lesson that is naturally taken from the context of the quotation: "*Thy kingdom come.* Thy will be done *in earth, as it is in heaven.*" This seems to imply at least that the will is done more perfectly in some parts of the Cosmos than in others. It is as if one were to say "Help me to make my own little garden as fine in its way as the gardens at Kew." It would not be worth while to call attention to this if it were not that the omission of the context seems to form part of the running polemic against the ethical attitude which is to be found in almost all Dr. Bosanquet's recent writings. It is noteworthy, in the same connection, that, in referring to the great trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, he omits the last and substitutes for it Love. I should have thought that Love might rather be regarded as the spirit underlying all three. Love is a very comprehensive spirit. As Shakespeare expresses it in "As You Like It"—

> "It is to be all made of faith and service;
> It is to be all made of fantasy,
> All made of passion, and all made of wishes,
> All adoration, duty and obedience,
> All humbleness, all patience, and impatience,
> All purity, all trial, all observance."

There is room in it for active goodness, as well as for the joyful acceptance of truth and beauty. It may be admitted that the attitude of moral endeavour, the effort after improvement, is only one aspect of religion, but surely it need not be represented as opposed to other aspects. Nor, I suppose, does Dr. Bosanquet really mean this. He wishes only to guard against the one-sided emphasis on this aspect. And perhaps this is a danger that the English-speaking peoples have to be on their guard against. We are apt to have more appreciation for moral effort than for Truth and Beauty.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

THE GLANDS REGULATING PERSONALITY. By Louis Berman. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 300. Price, 18s. net.

For some time past we have heard of the revolutionary theories based on the study of the ductless glands, and Doctor Berman, in a lively volume, has done his best to make the gland theory rival the deductions of Professor Freud as a subject of drawing-room conversation. To be quite truthful, Dr. Berman presents as proved a good deal of what is still unproven. For instance, on page 70, he states categorically that tumours in the cortex of the adrenal gland evolve a condition of pseudo-hermaphroditism. Frankly we doubt if enough children have been cut open to justify such a definite statement.

Dr. Berman also becomes on occasions dangerously loose in his language. An adrenal-centred type has "a tendency to diphtheria and hernia." What is the exact meaning of "tendency to" in this sentence? On page 249 Dr. Berman, who keeps up with modern literature, quotes Mr. Strachey's inimitable description of the dying Florence Nightingale: "absolutely typical pituitary history," we are told and referred to Napoleon, who also grew fat in later life. We may remark that Miss Nightingale, unlike

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Napoleon, died in extreme old age. Is it to be taken that "pituitary inferiority" and senile decay are one and the same thing?

On page 88 Dr. Berman talks of the pineal gland with an intimacy in which few will feel themselves privileged to share. Vague references are made to experiments about which we would like to have more details, and while on this subject we may deplore the absence of a bibliography or a single footnote, surely essential features of a volume such as this.

We hope enough has been said to show we think this book should be taken with a considerable dose of scepticism. Modern physiology has important bearings on ethics and even on politics, and while it would be obviously lamentable if the man in the street were still pre-evolutionary in his outlook, there is no reason why he should not be a few years behind the times, while he may be led into very dangerous errors by Dr. Berman's offers to make us all happier and better. Finally he seems to feel this himself, draws in, and remarks that it is all highly speculative and at any rate very much in the future. Here scientists will agree with him and we hope the man in the street will take the overdue warning to heart. For there is no doubt he will greatly enjoy Dr. Berman's book.

FRANCIS BIRRELL.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RENEWAL OF LIFE: three Lay Sermons. By Professor W. R. Sorley. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1919. Pp. 52.

THE GROUNDWORK OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION. By William Glover. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1922. Pp. 106.

These two little books have much in common. Both emphasise the importance of thinking of a human society as a living organism and both urge that social reconstruction must be based upon a moral religion without theological dogma. Professor Sorley's book is noteworthy from the fact that the sermons that it contains were actually delivered in Cambridge chapels. They are eloquent and eminently religious in their tone. Mr. Glover's book is more definitely ethical and contains admirable popular expositions of some of the leading aspects of the problem of reconstruction. He urges that "religion should look inward a great deal less, and outward a great deal more."

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

HELLENISM AND CHRISTIANITY. By Edwyn Bevan. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 275. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

This collection of essays is not strictly speaking a contribution to the large questions of what we owe to Greece and to the fact of Christianity. It has the defect of including some slighter studies which are not much concerned either with Hellenism or Christianity. But these excepted, there is real evidence of the mental unity claimed by the author, a single body of interests and observations and ideas, which is one individual's reaction of the spectacle of the universe. During these last few thousand years two predominant factors are the rise of rationalist culture first in the ancient Greek world and then again in modern European civilisation and the entrance of the Christian life into the world process. It is in treating of the critical early points of contact between these two factors and in bringing vividly before us one, like Augustine, standing "between two worlds" that Mr. Bevan's work is most interesting and adequate.

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There is a full and brilliant treatment of Gnosticism and the things akin to it in the ancient world in the fifth chapter. The study of those half-hidden strata of ancient religion that lay below the daylight world of classical scholarship—of Magic and Orphism, of Mystery cults and Gnosticism—raises questions with which the theologian has to grapple to-day. The ancient Hellenist seems to have thought mainly of the transitoriness of material things in envisaging the evil of this world; secondly, evil was to him specially connected with sensuality. Thirdly, the iron necessity of the influence of the stars made the world appear a prison house from which the soul cried for deliverance. To Mr. Bevan the idea of a Christian redeemer is not an element taken over from Hellenistic theology, but peculiar to Christianity (p. 108). In the later chapters, such as the "Paradox of Christianity," and "Christianity in the Modern World," what is significant is that Mr. Bevan can quote a cynical comparison of modern liberal theologians to men sitting in a slowly heated room, who divested themselves of garment after garment, discussing the while what minimum decency compelled them to keep on. He can also, in the article on the "Paradox of Christianity," tell us that if cheerful life is the main desideratum, it would be better frankly to put Epicurus in the place of Christ. "Epicurus would be a teacher far safer, saner, and truer than Jesus"; Christianity makes man stake their all upon an "if," and supposing the promised sequel fails, it has made life a discord, and it leaves it at that, and as a discord it must be pronounced simply a failure. The temper is as we may see that of a delicate reasonableness, that will state the case against itself with the utmost fulness and unreserve, although in a book which is an apologia for Christianity from the point of view of a convinced and devout believer. M. J.

LONDON.

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